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MUTINY RECORDS.

PART I.—REPORTS.

MUTINY RECORDS

REPORTS

IN TWO PARTS

PART I.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THE present volume is one of a series of selections from the Punjab Government records which have been published by the Punjab Government. The volumes constituting the series are—

The Delhi Residency and Agency Records ... 1807-1857, Volume I.

The Ludhiana Agency Records, 1808-1815, Volume II.

The Political Diaries of the Resident at Lahore and his Assistants ... 1846-1849, Volumes III—VI.

The Mutiny Records—Correspondence and Reports ... 1857-1858, Volumes VII and VIII each in two Parts.

It had been intended to issue further volumes also, dealing with (*a*) the records of the Karnal, Ambala and Ludhiana Agencies (including the despatches of Sir D. Ochterlony, Superintendent of Political Affairs and Agent to the Governor-General at Ludhiana, and the diaries of his Assistant, Captain G. Birch), 1816—1840; (*b*) the records of the North-West Frontier Agency, 1840—1845, and (*c*) those of the Lahore Residency, 1846—1849; but it has been found necessary on financial grounds to postpone the publication of these further papers.

The material for the volumes issued has been prepared and put through the Press by Mr. A. Raynor, late Registrar of the Punjab Civil Secretariat.

LAHORE:

December 1915.

PREFACE.

THIS volume contains the Reports on events in 1857 submitted in 1858 by Commissioners of Divisions and District Officers to Mr. R. Montgomery, Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab, and also a reprint of the "Punjab Mutiny Report," which has been included for convenience of reference. Mr. Montgomery's Report, compiled from the reports of Commissioners and District Officers, reached the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, Sir J. Lawrence, in March 1858, and was submitted to the Government of India with a Narrative and Comments by Sir J. Lawrence in a letter dated the 25th of May 1858, from Mr. R. Temple (later Sir Richard), who was then Secretary to the Chief Commissioner. It may be noted that the names of persons and places have been spelt as in the original manuscript.

Mr. Montgomery's Report and Sir J. Lawrence's Narrative and Comments formed the "Punjab Mutiny Report," which first appeared in a Blue Book issued in 1859, and was later reprinted more than once by the Punjab Government.

With the exception of the following, which were published in the Blue Book already referred to, the Divisional and District Reports have not appeared in print before :—

(*a*) Report by Mr. G. C. Barnes on events in the Cis-Sutlej States, with the reports on the Ambála

and Ludhiána Districts submitted by Messrs. T. D. Forsyth and G. H. M. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioners of those districts respectively.

(*b*) The Amritsar District Report by Mr. F. H. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner.

(*c*) The report on events in the Pesháwar Division by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes, with the Hazára District Report by Major J. R. Becher, Deputy Commissioner.

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MR. G. C. BARNES, B. C. S., C. B.

COMMISSIONER, CIS-SUTLEJ STATES, IN 1857.

Photogravure - Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, March 1910.

MUTINY REPORTS.

CHAPTER I.

REPORTS ON EVENTS IN THE CIS-SUTLEJ DIVISION.

1. *From* GEORGE CARNAC BARNES, *Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States, to* ROBERT MONTGOMERY, *Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 54, dated Umballa, 5th February 1858.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Circular No. 5, dated the 16th instant, calling for a report on the administration of this territory during the late crisis.

2. I returned from England and resumed charge of my office towards the close of March last; at that time the station of Umballa contained the following troops :— Ambála garrison at the time of the outbreak.

Her Majesty's 9th Lancers.

4th Regiment, Bengal Cavalry.

5th Bengal Native Infantry.

60th Bengal Native Infantry.

2 Troops, Horse Artillery (Europeans).

The Musketry Depôt for teaching the new drill was also located at Umballa, and included detachments from various sepoy regiments, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Greathead, of Her Majesty's 8th Foot. General Sir H.

Barnard also arrived about this time from England and assumed charge of the Sirhind Division.

Retrospect of the state of the Bengal Army.

3. At the outset of this report I trust I shall be excused for taking a very brief retrospect of the state of Upper India at the commencement of the year 1857. The discipline and loyalty of the Bengal Army, from a variety of causes, had been gradually undermined. The campaigns of Affghanistan, Scinde, Gwalior and the Punjab had partially diverted the thoughts of the sepoys from their own position, but subsequent inaction in quarters had afforded them ample opportunity for reflecting on and estimating their own strength; it became impossible to conceal from them that they were opposed only by an inadequate force of Europeans. The arsenals, the forts, the public treasure, were all in their hands, and the Government itself existed only by their forbearance; sedition was spread from corps to corps by letters and by fanatical mendicants, and organized by secret deliberations, until at last a general spirit of disaffection pervaded all ranks of the Native Army and wanted only a pretext to explode into open rebellion.

Immediate cause of the revolt.

4. The spark which lit the train was undoubtedly the greased cartridges. A change in the shape of a turban had led, in 1806, to the mutiny and massacre of Europeans at Vellore; and there can be no doubt that the danger to their caste, supposed to be hidden in the obnoxious cartridge, was sufficient cause, in the existing temper of the sepoys, to incite a revolt. Incendiary fires began to blaze in every large cantonment, and soon the special grievance of the new cartridge was lost in the unmistakable signs of a general mutiny. In February the 19th Native Infantry refused even the old cartridges which, in common with the whole Bengal Army, they had used for years. A fanatic of the 34th Native Infantry attacked his Adjutant, Lieutenant Baugh, sword in hand, and the sepoys on main guard looked on, passive and exulting spectators. The troopers of the 3rd Cavalry at Meerut also insolently rejected the old familiar cartridges, and shortly the sepoy rebellion, with all its horrors and heroic incidents, burst upon us.

Early symptoms of discontent at Ambála.

5. At Umballa the incendiary fires began early in March, and continued, at intervals, until the outbreak. The sepoys were all along suspected, and even among themselves the 5th Native Infantry accused the 60th Regiment, and the 60th Regiment the 5th, while both accused the soldiers of the Musketry Depôt. An offer of 1,000 rupees reward, made with your sanction, failed to discover the perpetrators. The houses and property of the officers and men attached to the depôt, or assigned to them for shelter, were especially marked out for destruction; and the Government also was a heavy loser. Affairs remained in this unsettled state until Sunday, the 10th of May, the ever-memorable day on which the Native troops at Meerut broke out into mutiny, and, after burning the station and massacring all the Europeans they could find, marched unopposed to seize the fortress and arsenal of Delhi. On that day the two sepoy regiments at Umballa, probably by concert with their comrades at Meerut, rushed out of their lines, broke open the bells of arms, and began to form and load under the direction of their Native Officers. General Barnard acted with promptitude, and ordered out the 9th Lancers and the Horse Artillery, and, while they were getting ready, he rode down, attended by his staff, and succeeded in pacifying the sepoys. The men returned to their lines, and restored their arms to the places where they were usually kept. Next day General Barnard issued an address to the native regiments, assuring them of his satisfaction at their return to duty and promising them, if they behaved well, that their misconduct on the 10th should be overlooked.

The news of the Delhi massacre.

6. On the afternoon of the 11th May, while the horrors at Delhi were yet enacting, a brief telegraphic message came up the line from the signaller at Delhi to the signaller at Umballa. It conveyed the news of the seizure of Delhi by the mutineers, the murder of their officers by the 54th and 38th, and the preparation for flight made by all the Europeans who had escaped the general massacre; the same message was flashed along the line to the extreme frontier and transmitted by post to every station off the Grand Trunk

Road. Thus a monopoly of intelligence was secured for the Europeans, and by means of the telegraph we were enabled to prepare ourselves for the coming storm. The sepoy guards at Phillour and Ferozepoor were speedily set aside by European troops, and the inestimable advantage of two well-stocked arsenals was secured for our side. Their preservation under God's Providence is attributable to the telegraph, and in the future administration of India the telegraph must play an important part. No native should be taught the signals, and science must be pressed to devise means for the effectual protection of the wires.

March of troops, and summons to the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs.

7. At this time I was at Kussowlee; the news was known there on the 12th, and arrangements were immediately made for getting carriage for the 75th and other European regiments in the hills. The 75th marched the same afternoon, and I reached Umballa on the night of the 13th. Mr. Forsyth had written to summon the Maharajah of Putteeala and the Rajahs of Nabha and Jheend. His orders were confirmed by me on the 14th, and as my first thoughts were for the protection of my own division, I made the following arrangements.

Measures to keep open the Grand Trunk Road.

8. The first object was to provide for the safety of the Grand Trunk Road, and the two stations of Thanesur and Loodiana, which were without reliable troops. I accordingly directed the Rajah of Jheend to proceed to Kurnaul with all his available force; Captain McAndrew, an energetic officer, Assistant Commissioner at Umballa, was deputed to accompany him, and started at once with some Putteeala sowars. The Maharajah of Putteeala, at my request, sent a detachment of all arms, and three guns, under his brother, to Thanesur, on the Grand Trunk Road, between Umballa and Kurnaul. The Rajah of Nabha and the Nawab of Maleir Kotla were requested to march with their men to Loodiana, and the Rajah of Fureedkote was desired to place himself under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepoor. Thus all points of the main line of road were secured; and the Rajah of Jheend was also instructed to collect supplies and carriage for the field

force, to protect the station of Kurnaul and to get trustworthy intelligence of the mutineers at Delhi. At the same time a telegraph station was established at Kurnaul.

Measures for the protection of the public treasure.

9. My next thought was for the treasure: at Umballa there were 3½ lakhs under a guard of the 5th Native Infantry; at Thanesur about a lakh under a detachment of the same regiment. At Loodiana the treasure (about 1½ lakhs) was guarded by a company of the 3rd Native Infantry from Phillour. At Ferozepoor there was a considerable sum in the hands of a detachment of the 57th Native Infantry, and the Simla treasure was guarded by a party of Goorkhas of the Nusseeree Battalion. The Umballa treasure was escorted by the sepoys themselves, and lodged safely in the quarter-guard of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, who had just come down from the hills. Captain McNeile, at Thanesur, adopted the same means for sending in his treasure to Umballa; Mr. Ricketts sent his money to Phillour, and the Deputy Commissioner at Ferozepoor removed his treasure to the fort, and placed it under charge of a guard from Her Majesty's 61st Regiment. Thus all the public money in the treasuries in the plains was at once placed in security. At Simla alone was any risk incurred. For a time the treasure there was in the hands of a mutinous guard, but eventually it escaped plunder. The branch treasury at Kussowlee was not so fortunate. The money belonging to Government, about 30,000 rupees, was saved by the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Taylor, although the guard were in open mutiny. But the deposits [1] lodged for safety by the Commissariat officer and Executive Engineer were carried off by the Goorkhas; and though 12,963 rupees were eventually recovered by Lord W. Hay, yet the balance, or 20,080 rupees, was lost to Government.

Arrival of the Commander-in-Chief and staff.

10. On the 16th May General Anson and the head-quarters staff arrived at Umballa. His first act was to confirm General Barnard's promises and to pardon the two Native

	Rs.	A.	P.
[1] Treasury money	2,043	14	1
Commissariat Department . .	16,000	0	0
Executive Engineer's Department .	14,000	0	0

regiments for their behaviour on the 10th. Those orders were given unwillingly, and afterwards embarrassed the Commander-in-Chief. One of the regiments, the 60th, actually marched with the Field Force, and eventually went over to the mutineers with their arms and ammunition.

Difficulties in providing carriage and final start of the Field Force.

11. Within five days of the first intelligence of the Delhi massacre there were collected at Umballa three regiments of European Infantry (the 75th Foot, the 1st and 2nd Bengal Fusiliers), one regiment of Dragoons (the 9th Lancers), and two troops of European Horse Artillery, with 6-pounder guns. There was a great scarcity of ammunition (both for light field ordnance and small arms) in store at Umballa. The Nusseeree Battalion, which had been ordered to march to Loodiana and escort the Siege Train, mutinied at the eleventh hour. The Commissary-General and the Superintending Surgeon sent in rather extravagant indents for supplies, carriage, doolies and doolie-bearers. It was an especial feature of this crisis that all classes of natives seemed to think us embarked on a desperate cause. The Commissariat department was quite paralysed, and the camp followers, so necessary to the efficiency of an army in India, deserted the station like rats from a sinking ship. The natives seemed aghast at the enormity of the odds against us, and held aloof; the entire burthen of furnishing carriage and supplies fell upon the Civil department, and Mr. Forsyth made the most strenuous exertions to meet the emergency. With the aid of the loyal Sikh Chiefs, carts, camels, mules, doolies and bearers were at last secured, and the first detachment of the advancing army marched on the 17th and was followed by the last on the 23rd May.

The defence of the Cis-Sutlej territory and the noble assistance rendered by the Chiefs.

12. The station of Umballa was left with four weak companies (about 250 men) of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, the 5th Regiment, Native Infantry, and some 6-pounder guns, to man which we had only Native Artillerymen. A redoubt was erected, with the church in the centre, and the remaining residents were concentrated in the houses around. A militia was formed of uncovenanted officers; and the magazine, the treasure, and the commissariat stores were all lodged in the

redoubt, which was garrisoned by a company of the Fusiliers. Owing to the defection of the Nusseeree Battalion, there was no available escort for the Siege Train or for the ammunition so urgently needed by the army. I offered, however, to furnish political escorts, and accordingly the Siege Train came down from Phillour under a guard of horse and foot furnished by the Nabha Rajah, and accompanied by a detachment of the 9th Irregulars, under Lieutenant Campbell. The ammunition was conveyed by a party of the district police, and so, throughout the campaign, the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the charge of contingents furnished by the Chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej States; their troops protected our stations, and patrolled the Grand Trunk Road from Ferozepoor and Phillour down to the very walls of Delhi. The safety of this province may be attributed to their loyalty and good example. The Rajah of Jheend, with Captain McAndrew and a small but well-disciplined force, acted as the vanguard of the army, and by my directions kept always in advance. When the first detachment of Europeans reached Kurnaul this little band proceeded 22 miles further to Paneeput, quieting the country, securing the road, and collecting supplies; and in this manner they advanced boldly to within 20 miles of Delhi. A detachment of the Jheend troops seized the bridge at Bhagput, and thus enabled the Meerut force to join head-quarters. A party of the Jheend sowars, with Captain Hodson at their head, rode into Meerut, and opened our communication with that station. The troops of the Maharajah of Putteeala guarded Thanesur and Umballa; and the safety of Loodiana was entrusted to the Rajah of Nabha and the Kotla Nawab. These eminent services afforded by the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs are thus casually noticed as part of the history of the late campaign. I feel under the deepest obligations to them, and the Governor-General in the Gazette announcing the fall of Delhi has declared that they shall not be without their reward.

The calling out of the Jagirdar levies.

13. Previous to the departure of the Field Force I had not neglected measures for the general safety of this large division. Instead of enlisting new levies of police, I called out

the contingents of the jagheerdars who were disfranchised in 1849. These petty nobles are very numerous in the Cis-Sutlej territory; they all pay in times of peace a commutation tax of one-eighth of their income in lieu of service. As these Chiefs had their homes and estates in this province, I conceived we had excellent guarantees for their loyalty, and I preferred such contingents as they could bring to levies of police raised by ourselves. I therefore issued a general summons demanding their assistance and relieving them temporarily from the payment of the commutation. This irregular force was placed at the disposal of the district officers, and distributed to the different thannahs and tehseels; they were employed to carry on the communications, to escort treasure, to guard the ferries, and patrol the minor lines of road. This measure has had excellent effect; all our outposts were strengthened, and a sense of security generally diffused; the jagheerdars themselves were greatly pleased at this mark of confidence, and discharged their duties with alacrity. Some that had been left out accidentally complained of the omission, and other influential people not required by their tenure to provide a contingent came forward with levies equipped at their own cost.

Survey of the position of the Cis-Sutlej territory.

14. At this stage of my narrative I trust I shall be excused for reminding you of the extent and position of the Cis-Sutlej territory. It comprises all the country north of Kurnaul between the Jumna and the Sutlej; the portions belonging to the British Government (excluding the hills) cover an area of 8,090 square miles, and the foreign territory intermixed with it contains an additional surface of 7,369 square miles. The Grand Trunk Road traverses the entire length from Kurnaul to Ferozepoor, a distance of 200 miles. In this tract there are upwards of four millions of inhabitants. The people are of mixed races, but more allied to Hindostanees than to the natives of the Punjab. Throughout the rebellion the greater part of them have shown sympathy with the mutineers. The southern frontier rests on the Delhi territory. On the east lies the Meerut Division. The neighbouring districts of Sirsa, Hansi, Hissar, Paneeput and Mozuffernugger were completely disorganized. The Civil authorities

had either been murdered or obliged to fly. The Magistrate of Paneeput had no control outside Kurnaul. The Magistrate at Saharunpore held out most gallantly at the station, but his district could scarcely be called his own. The predatory population was abroad. Armed bands overran the country and set authority at defiance ; everywhere was anarchy and confusion.

Measures for preserving the public peace.

15. This division acted as a kind of breakwater : beyond was the raging sea ; inside, as yet, was comparative calm. It became the duty of myself and the district officers to take every precaution to preserve the territory from the surrounding contagion. The first measure was to close the ferries on the Jumna. This step had been partially taken on our own instincts, but it was generally and effectually adopted by the orders of the Chief Commissioner on every river of the Punjab. A circular to the following purport was issued by myself on the 30th May. The police, strengthened by the jagheerdar contingents, were put on the alert, the roads were well patrolled, and explicit instructions given "to attack and destroy any plundering band seen in the actual commission of crime." I promised them that not only would they be exonerated if fatal consequences ensued, but handsomely rewarded for such acts of prompt and retributive justice. Any assemblage of armed and suspicious persons was to be instantly attacked and dispersed; sedition was not to be allowed to get head." In a circular of the 2nd of June the police were again exhorted "to use their arms freely; no responsibility would be incurred by the man who took the life of a robber in the act of crime, but, on the contrary, such bold deeds would be rewarded by promotion." A few examples of this sort would check the spread of crime and be true mercy in the end. These orders were constantly repeated in demi-official letters, and full authority was placed in the hands of every Magistrate to act fearlessly as emergency might dictate. Every available officer was sent into the interior to preserve the peace and furnished with an escort of horse and foot to repress disorder wherever it might show itself. Captain McNeile took the field in person at Thanesur. Mr. Levien, the Assistant Commissioner,

was sent to the banks of the Jumna; and Lieutenant Parsons, the other Assistant Commissioner, was despatched to Kythul, at the western extremity of the district, towards Hansi. Mr. Plowden, of the Civil Service at Umballa, was deputed with two companies of the 5th Native Infantry and a squadron of the 4th Lancers (natives) to Jugadree, an important town on the Jumna, on the high road to Saharunpoor; here also we had a bridge of boats. The second Assistant Commissioner, Captain McAndrew, was with the advanced guard of the army, and there was no Civil officer to send towards Roopur; but two companies of the 5th, under Captain Gardner (a refugee from Delhi) proceeded there, and I gave him full powers to act, if necessary, as a Magistrate. The districts of Loodiana and Ferozepoor were less disturbed, and there was full work for the Civil authorities in supplying carriage for the guns and ammunition issuing daily out of the arsenals, in providing escorts, and in facilitating the passage of the heavy Siege Train across the sands and branches of the Sutlej.

Partial disturbances.

16. It was too much, however, to expect that with such examples on all sides we would keep ourselves absolutely free from contagion. The River Jumna was fordable, and the population on both banks were a lawless and predatory lot. The "Rangurhs" of Paneeput and Hissar were in successful rebellion, and taunted their brethren in the Cis-Sutlej territory with their want of courage in still submitting to the Feringhee. Men's minds were further unsettled by the passing of mutineers of the 45th and 57th Native Infantry from the cantonment of Ferozepoor, and by alarming stories circulated in every quarter of the desperate position of the British in India. Towards the end of May and beginning of June daring outrages were of daily occurrence. The Grand Trunk Road for some days was not safe. Close to the Umballa cantonment a villager posted himself on the road with a gun in his hand, and plundered at his leisure. He was seized and immediately executed. Villages in Thanesur, headed by their lumberdars, turned out in broad day fully armed and equipped, with drums beating and flags flying, to prey on the weaker villages. Frequent fights occurred, and

the police were afraid even to report the state of affairs. The country was getting rapidly disorganized. This was not the time for hesitation: every highway robber that was seized was immediately hanged, and at my request the districts of Thanesur and Umballa, from the 5th June, were placed under a summary law, declaring highway robbery and all daring outrages of that stamp punishable with death. The two companies sent to Roopur, so far from maintaining order, were the first to excite sedition. The sepoys turned the butchers out of the town, and maltreated the town-crier, who was publishing some general order of the district officer. They were, of course, recalled, but on their way back the worst of them absconded. However, five were singled out, and the crime of sedition proved against them; one Sirdar Mohur Singh, of Roopur, who had made himself conspicuous, was also seized. These men were tried by myself and Mr. Forsyth on the 5th June, and hanged the same day.

Disarming of the wing of the 5th Native Infantry.

17. I should here mention that three days after the Commander-in-Chief had left Amballa the five companies of the 5th Native Infantry remaining at the station were promptly disarmed (29th May) by Major Maitland; the two mutinous companies that returned from Roopur were disbanded without pay, and the Native Officers were tried by court-martial and sentenced to death. Major Maitland referred the case to head-quarters, but eventually the men were hanged. He has been much blamed for this delay, and I regret, for his sake, that he did not hang them at once; but they enjoyed only a few days' respite. In other respects Major Maitland behaved with great promptitude, especially in the disarming, and kept the station in excellent order.

Capture and punishment of fugitive mutineers of the 45th and 57th Native Infantry.

18. I have said that the people of these States sympathized with the mutineers, who were regarded as martyrs for their caste; they would plunder any stragglers, but they would not seize and hand them up to justice. So out of the 45th and 57th Regiments who passed through this territory we succeeded only in capturing 20. I do not count, however, the men seized near Ferozepoor; I never heard how many

were captured,[1] though I know that some were executed. These 20 were seized either in the Thanesur or Loodiana districts; they were all conveyed to Umballa. No military court could be convened to try them, so at last I tried them myself. There was only their own statements, which proved that they were deserters, at the very least, and on the 17th and 25th June I sentenced them to death; they were blown away from guns at a general parade of all the troops at the station; their executioners were the Native Artillerymen. There is one fact regarding the mutineers of the 45th Native Infantry which cannot be passed over in this narrative. The Maharajah of Putteeala captured a body of 100 fugitives and shut them up in one of his forts; his Dewan, Nihal Chund, a native of Delhi, by an unfortunate mistake, let them all go after taking away their arms. Reflecting over this incident at this lapse of time, I feel very doubtful whether they were not released purposely. There was a general unwillingness (from which I believe the Maharajah himself was not exempt) to surrender mutineers to the fate that awaited them.

Mr. Plowden's services at Sahâranpur and elsewhere.

19. To return to the course of events. Mr. Plowden found the eastern portion of the Umballa district comparatively quiet; but Saharunpoor was in great disorder. He immediately crossed, and employed the detachments under Captains Wyld and Garstin in punishing robbers and in restoring confidence. I left him at liberty to do as he liked, and to advance to Saharunpoor if the Magistrate sent any requisition for his services. Accordingly, he proceeded to that station on the 21st May, and remained there until the Nusseeree Battalion, under Major Bagot, relieved him on the 3rd June. During this stay the detachment, always accompanied by Mr. Plowden, did excellent service, and were the means of saving Saharunpoor. Several Goojur villages were destroyed, and bands of armed plunderers were dispersed. The temper of the sepoys, however, was uncertain, and there was no real dependence to be placed on them: at one time they refused to march; on another occasion some mutinied and went off to Delhi. At last, on the 12th July, when the

[1] 151 were captured—*see* Captain Mercer's Report and para. 28 of this letter.

order was issued recalling them to Umballa, the sepoys, 80 in number, mutinied in a body, fired at their officers, and killed a Havildar of their own regiment, who was standing between Mr. Plowden and Captain Garstin. The Cavalry detachment under Captain Wyld had previously returned to cantonments, and were here deprived of their arms and horses. Mr. Plowden was out in camp on active duty during the whole season, from the 19th May until the fall of Delhi: he showed great energy and courage throughout, and deserves the thanks of Government for his arduous services.

The passage of the Jullundur brigade of mutineers.

20. Our attention at this time was earnestly directed towards Meerut and Delhi, and the district officers were busily engaged in repressing the early symptoms of rebellion on the border, when a new danger assailed us from the west. On the morning of the 8th June I went to the telegraph office, and, to my dismay, was informed by the assistant that a message had been received during the night, not from any official personage, but from the signaller at Jullundur to the signaller at Umballa, announcing that the Jullundur Brigade had mutinied, and were in full march to the Sutlej; the news was instantly sent back by the wires to Loodiana, and to Phillour, and proved the first intimation they had had of the outbreak. The bridge-of-boats was broken up, and the ghauts closed to the right and left of Phillour. But at the Lussara Ferry, four miles above Phillour, the advanced guard of the mutineers managed to seize a boat that was on the Jullundur side, and, crossing over in numbers, took possession of the other also; they were joined by the 3rd Regiment, Native Infantry, at Phillour, and now consisted of a strong column, nearly three regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry, but without guns. Mr. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana, with two guns of the Nahha Rajah, and a detachment of the 4th Sikh Infantry under Lieutenant Williams, then encamped at Loodiana, opposed the crossing with the utmost gallantry, but they were unsupported. The noise and flashes of the cannonade were heard distinctly at Phillour during the early night, but Brigadier Johnstone, with his European troops and Horse Artillery, would not move. Next day, 12 o'clock, the

mutineers marched into Loodiana, broke open the gaol, and, guided by the rabble of the town, plundered the Mission premises and the property of supposed British partizans. The eyes of the beleaguered Europeans were strained anxiously in the direction of Phillour; still there was no sign of the pursuing column. The mutineers marched leisurely away, and got clear off to Delhi, and Brigadier Johnstone did not arrive till they were beyond pursuit. In this daring attempt to obstruct the passage, Lieutenant Williams was seriously wounded; Mr. Ricketts worked one of the guns himself; 50 of the enemy were killed or drowned, and the loss on our side was about 15 casualties. A small body of the mutineers, separating from the main column, took a northerly road skirting the hills; they crossed the Sutlej in the Hooshiarpoor district, and, traversing the length of the Umballa district, eventually got away to the other side of the Jumna; they were befriended by the people, who gave them supplies and guided them by secluded paths across the country. Mr. Forsyth started to intercept them with a party of the Police Battalion, but was not successful.

Effects on the division generally.

21. This incident did not improve our position in the Cis-Sutlej States. However, the increase of lawlessness was met with increased severity and zeal on the part of the district officers. The people of Thanesur withheld their revenue, but Captain McNeile declared such recusancy was an act of rebellion, and that wilful defaulters would be punished as traitors; the threat was enough to bring them to reason. Wherever an outrage occurred, there the Deputy Commissioner moved with instant despatch and dealt summary justice on all heinous offenders; it required a stern and unflinching hand to keep this unruly district in order. The number of robbers executed was 62, of whom —— were hanged on the nearest trees without reference to me, and the sentence on the others was passed by myself. Serious outrages began to occur at Mookutsur in the Ferozepoor district, but the march of General Van Cortlandt's force quieted the country, and the opportunity was taken at the same time to execute one or two of the worst offenders.

Vigorous measures at Ludhiána.

22. After the Jullundur mutineers had left Loodiana, all those who had made themselves conspicuous in abetting the sepoys and plundering the city were at once seized by the Magistrate, Mr. Ricketts. In their houses were found articles of stolen property, and a hundred tongues bore witness to their guilt. Twenty-two prisoners of all classes,—Cashmeerees, Boureas, and other noted blackguards of the town,—were condemned to death; the sentence was confirmed by telegraph nearly as soon as it was passed, and the same evening the whole of them paid the penalty of their crimes. Some seditious correspondence at this time was intercepted, and all concerned (one was a vakeel of Roostum Allee Khan of Maleir Kotla) were summarily hanged. It was by such measures as these, and by these alone, that the peace was preserved; any vacillation or tender-heartedness would have been fatal, for rebellion would have spread into this province, and many valuable lives would have been lost in recovering our authority. So long as order was maintained here, our communications with the Punjab on the one hand and the Delhi force on the other were kept unimpaired; as it was, with daily convoys of treasure, ammunition, stores, and men passing down the road, I am happy to say not a single accident occurred.

Suppression of other petty insurrections.

23. About this time also a petty insurrection arose at Jeytokee in the Nabha territory. It was speedily put down by Major Marsden, Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepoor; and the leader, a fanatic Gooroo, by name Sham Dass, was killed. The Thanesur gaol became crowded with prisoners, many of them Ranghurs of the Delhi territory. The gaol was seriously threatened by bodies of their kinsmen. I immediately despatched a detachment of the Police Battalion to reinforce the guard, and removed secretly in one day all the more desperate convicts to the gaol at Umballa. The police at Assund, on the border, were attacked and driven in by some insurgents. Assund is well known for the bold and lawless character of its population. Captain McNeile marched there in force, and the people deserted; but the gateways of the village were found barricaded, and entrenchments had been

commenced round the village site. To strike an example the houses were destroyed and such property as remained was given up to plunder.

The army transport train for conveyance of stores to Delhi.

24. The requirements of the army became incessant, and the road was thronged with carts laden with every variety of stores. A bullock train was suggested by Mr. Forsyth, to be carried on by the district officers. This arrangement proved defective in practice, for the want of a general superintendent in charge of the whole line. I obtained leave from the Chief Commissioner to organize a "military transport train" under the agency of Captain Briggs, an able and zealous officer of great experience. His exertions and complete success deserve the special thanks of Government. We had been drained of our carriage, and no assistance could be drawn from either the Ganges Doab or the Delhi territory. The army commissariat could give no help. Carts that reached Delhi never came back, and there was imminent danger of a deadlock. All these difficulties were overcome by Captain Briggs. His jurisdiction extended from Ferozepoor to Delhi, 265 miles. A train of 30 waggons a day from each of the principal stations of Umballa, Loodiana and Kurnaul, and 14 waggons per diem from Ferozepoor, was soon organized. The same number were also daily employed on the return journey. Stores of every description, especially the enormous demands for ordnance ammunition, were safely and regularly supplied to the army. The sick and wounded were comfortably conveyed from camp to Umballa. The train was in full operation from the 22nd July to the middle of October. The scheme was eminently successful, owing to the skill, tact, and indefatigable energy of Captain Briggs. He has fully acknowledged his obligations to the Civil authorities of the Cis-Sutlej States, who gave him their utmost support. The cost of the train was 97,317 rupees, and it has fully realised the objects for which it was organized. From Ferozepoor to Loodiana and Kurnaul the district police guarded the line ; beyond Kurnaul the road was protected by our excellent allies the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs, whose troops garrisoned the several posts of Kurnaul, Paneeput, Kussowlee and Rhae. Without their *invaluable*

assistance our communications could never have been so efficiently maintained.

The disarming of the population.

25. At the suggestion of the Chief Commissioner we commenced on the 17th June to disarm the people. The bazaars in cantonments had been previously disarmed, and even the police, who were mostly Hindoostanees, were allowed no other weapons than sticks. Mr. Ricketts took the opportunity of the presence of Major Coke's regiment to disarm the town of Loodiana. The search was effectually made, and upwards of 10 cart-loads of arms of all sorts were seized and confiscated. The several officers out in camp were busily engaged in the same duty. A proclamation was issued declaring the carrying of arms to be a misdemeanor. The towns of Umballa, Thanesur, Jugadree and Ferozepoor were all searched under the personal superintendence of European officers; there was some delay at Simla, but eventually the bazaar there also, much to the relief of the residents, was disarmed. Since then a second and more complete search has been made in every village of this division, and the provisions of the Board's famous circular, No. 212 of 1849,[1] have been fully carried out. I believe that very few arms remain in our own districts. But Foreign States occupy the heart of the Cis-Sutlej territory, and many of our subjects have secreted their weapons *in Putteeala. I have used my influence* with the Chiefs to adopt our measures, and with some success; but they are slow to move, and perhaps a little suspicious of our intentions. The disarming should be general, or much of its efficacy will be lost. From a letter intercepted towards the end of June it appeared that there was an inquiry amongst natives for sulphur, lead and saltpetre; it seemed advisable to place some restrictions on the sale and export of such articles, and accordingly on the 4th July the police were directed to ascertain and register the amount in store, and to prohibit the removal of any portion, or the importation of fresh supplies, without a pass; this circular was afterwards extended to the whole Punjab. It will be here observed that

[1] Punjab arms law.

in the measures adopted for the trial and punishment of mutineers and heinous criminals, or for disarming the population, or checking the importation of military stores, we only anticipated the Acts almost simultaneously passed at Calcutta by the wisdom of the Legislative Council.

The revenue and measures to meet the scarcity of money.

26. At a very early period of the rebellion the probable scarcity of funds was not overlooked. The communications were interrupted; treasuries in the Agra province had been plundered. The yearly revenue could not be collected, and considerable expenditure was to be anticipated. On the 23rd May therefore I issued a circular to my district officers, and desired them to commence their collections for the spring harvest without delay; and I may here state that, notwithstanding the disturbed state of parts of this division and the evil example of the surrounding districts, where no money could be got in, the entire demand for land revenue in this division was realised without arrears. In some places there was a disposition to be restive, and in the lower portion of the Thanesur District, and generally along the River Jumna, the public money was collected as it were at the point of the bayonet. Still it was all saved by the promptness and energy of the district officers. At the same time I saw that the ordinary income would never suffice, and in this emergency I turned to the Sikh chieftains of Putteeala and Nabha, whose soldiers were already engaged in our cause. Both were known to have money, and I obtained from each of them, on the 23rd May, a promise of assistance to the extent of seven and three lakhs respectively. I was determined, if possible, to raise an equal sum from the capitalists of the territory who had amassed their wealth under British rule. The subject was communicated to the district officers on the 23rd May and again towards the middle of June. A proclamation was issued in the vernacular, pointing out the causes which had led to the temporary want of money, and calling upon all who had the means, to come forward and show their loyalty to the British Government, not by empty professions, but by contributions to the loan, which was declared to be open for one year only, at 6 per cent. per annum. The Financial

Commissioner extended this circular to other parts of the Punjab. The wealthy bankers were given distinctly to understand that their demeanor in this matter would be taken as the test of their attachment to the British rule, and those who held back would lose the confidence and good-will of the local authorities. The measure proved successful. The collections realised were as follows:—

Where realised.	Amount.	REMARKS.
	Rs.	
From Putteeala	5,00,000	*N. B.*—More would have been furnished, but it was not required.
„ Nabha	2,50,000	
„ other Chiefs	85,000	Kulsea and Furreedkhote.
By Deputy Commissioner, Umballa .	2,53,591	
„ „ Thanesur .	2,35,000	
„ „ Loodiana .	2,32,400	
„ „ Ferozepoor	1,70,300	
„ „ Simla .	91,300	Partly from Hill Chiefs.
TOTAL . .	18,17,591	

Remittances were made to the army, to Simla and Kussowlee, where numerous families were assembled; to Mussoorie, to Saharunpoor, and even to Nynee Tal. We have still upwards of 18 lakhs, including present collections and remittances received from the Punjab; and I have proposed to the Financial Commissioner to pay off some of the smaller contributions to the 6 per cent. loan.

Subsequent events until the fall of Delhi.

27. There is not much more to be said. The crisis with us was from the 11th May till the end of July. After that the people gradually returned to their allegiance, and the peace was not again disturbed. Reinforcements passed down,

and helped to tranquillize the country. Apprehensions were raised when the Sealkote Brigade mutinied, and when the 26th Light Infantry broke away from Meean Meer, but not a man of these regiments was fated to reach the Sutlej. General Nicholson was an officer of another stamp, and after a march of 41 miles under a July sun the Sealkote mutineers were met and annihilated. The 26th met an ignominious death at the hands of the police or by the public executioner. The "Eed" and "Mohurrum" passed over quietly. The processions issued as usual without let or hindrance, but the Magistrates were on their guard in the event of an *émeute.* In the beginning of September desertions became frequent among the disarmed sepoys of the 5th and the depôt of the 60th Native Infantry left at Umballa. They were ordered into the Umballa gaol; on being paraded for the purpose, a voice from the ranks called out, "fly," and they instantly broke and fled. The Europeans fired and pursued them. In ten minutes 135 were killed, 33 were made prisoners, and the rest, about 40 men, made good their escape.

Numerical return of mutineers executed and killed.

28. I have not received all the reports from my district officers, and write this statement at considerable disadvantage. The number of mutineers killed and executed in this division are, as well as I can make out, as follows :—

——	Killed.	Executed.	——
Umballa . .	135	*29	*25 by Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner, 4 by Court-martial.
Thanesur . .	...	...	
Loodiana . .	50	16	
Ferozepoor. .	15	†13	†By Court-martial; 102 others were sentenced to imprisonment. They should all have been hanged.
Simla . .	...	...	

29. The number of robbers and heinous criminals executed during these eventful months is as follows. The return is a tolerably good index of the disturbed condition of each district:— Numerical return of robbers executed.

—	By Deputy Commissioner.	By Commissioner.	Total.	—
Umballa . .	15	...	15	Mostly confirmed by Commissioner.
Thanesur . .	12	50	62	
Loodiana . .	32	...	32	
Ferozepoor. .	1	12	13	
Simla . .	1	...	1	
TOTAL .	61	62	123	

30. My thanks are especially due to Mr. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana, and Captain McNeile, the Deputy Commissioner of Thanesur. Neither of these officers had the support of regular troops, while in the one case there was a large and disaffected city, and in the other a turbulent and lawless population to control. On Mr. Ricketts devolved the very arduous duty of providing carriage for the ordnance stores from Phillour, and for facilitating the passage of the Sutlej during the height of the rains. Both these officers bore themselves with conspicuous gallantry and zeal; and Mr. Ricketts especially was always cheerful, prudent, and active. In stirring times like the past he was the beau ideal of a district officer. I also desire to express my sincere acknowledgments to Mr. Forsyth, Lord William Hay, and Major Marsden. The two first officers had each a most difficult charge; Mr. Forsyth was indefatigable in collecting carriage and in controlling the important district of Umballa. Lord William Hay had charge of Simla, which was crowded to excess with helpless women and children. His measures were characterized by judgment and tact, and attended with complete success. Acknowledgments to district officers.

Acknowledgments to Assistants.

31. Of the Assistants, Mr. W. C. Plowden especially distinguished himself for courage and zeal. He was constantly exposed wherever danger threatened. Mr. Levien and Lieutenant Parsons had also perilous duties to discharge in the turbulent district of Thanesur. Lieutenant Nicols proved of great assistance to his superior Mr. Ricketts; and Mr. Elliott of the Civil Service, Mr. Thornton and Captain Mercer are entitled to special notice.

The lessons taught by the Mutiny. Military reforms.

32. It may not be amiss before closing this report to note down the lessons which these mutinies have impressed upon my mind; most if not all of them have been generally recognised. Although experience and knowledge of the country are now frequently depreciated, because they are too often enlisted on the side of the traditions and policy of the past, yet clear and practical views seen by the light of a long residence in this country should help our rulers in the arduous task of reconstructing the government. On military matters I am less qualified to speak. But all must see that our future dominion in the country and our personal safety can only be maintained by British troops. I think the proportion of Europeans in the standing army of India should at least be equal to the number of natives. The Native regular army should consist of various races; and the Sikhs, Goorkhas, Hindoostanees and others should be kept in separate battalions, so as to preserve their nationality. I think there is danger, if they are mingled together, of a general combination. I would disband and re-enlist under new conditions of general service such portions of the late Bengal Army as are really worthy of this mark of confidence. Under another and more healthy system the Bengal sepoy would make a good soldier, and cannot with justice be entirely excluded from the military service of the Empire. The battalions of the regular army should be massed in large and well-selected cantonments. The forts, arsenals and the bulk of the public treasure should be under the exclusive charge of Europeans, and the seats of Government, supreme and local, should be well protected. The humiliating spectacle of the Agra Government, beleagured

and helpless, should never occur again. No natives should be admitted into the Artillery nor initiated into the higher secrets of the ordnance department. Working on these principles, I think the numerical aggregate of our standing army might be greatly reduced.

33. In the Civil department I would introduce everywhere local police battalions for each division or Commissionership. I would employ these men for all standing guards not only over the gaol, the local treasuries (containing only money for current expenditure), the civil offices and for personal guards, but also for our police posts and subordinate revenue stations. The present number of our police might be advantageously reduced if their places were supplied by a small complement of well-trained men for a standing guard and a band of five or six detectives at each thannah for the pursuit and prevention of crime. At the head-quarters there would always be a reserve force to act on emergency. Secondly, I would at once set aside the cumbrous and elaborate system, both of law and procedure, now current in the Agra and Bengal provinces. The machinery is not adapted either to the people or to the agents through whom we are obliged to work. Let advantage be taken of the present revolution to introduce short and *simple Codes both of civil* and criminal law, to limit the right of appeal, to *abolish judges and boards and courts*, and to act upon the principle of individual responsibility; in short, to adopt the Punjab system, uniting all departments in each district under a single head. Let us expedite the construction of railways and telegraphs, and encourage by all the means in our power the influx of our own countrymen into India, being assured that their character and energy, moral and physical, must tend to civilize the country, dispel barbarism, and consolidate our strength. Let us in our legislative enactments give them their just precedence as a superior race, and secure to them the privileges to which by birth and by the constitution of England they are entitled. Above all, let us each and all conduct ourselves boldly as Christians and Englishmen, tolerating other creeds, but neglecting no opportunity to inculcate

Civil reforms.

our own. With such principles for our guidance, we shall speedily, and yet insensibly without a violent onslaught, undermine the superstitions of Paganism and caste.

P. S.—Such of the district reports[1] as have been received are submitted in original. I also beg to submit copy of a letter dated 28th of September from General Wilson, Commanding at Delhi, regarding the services rendered by the officers in the Cis-Sutlej division.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 1.

2. *To Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, K.C.B., Chief Commissioner in the Punjab,—dated Delhi, 28th September 1857.*

SIR,—In the despatches which I have recently submitted to the superior Military authorities I have taken occasion to express the obligations I feel towards the officers of the Civil Service attached to the force under my command, for the valuable aid and assistance they have afforded me in the operations before Delhi.

Acknowledgment by Major-General A. Wilson, Commanding Delhi Field Force, of services of Mr. G. C. Barnes and Mr. G. Ricketts.

2. In justice, however, to two officers who, though not actually present in the field, have contributed so greatly by their well-directed energies to the successful issue of the siege, I feel bound to place on record the very high sense I entertain of the admirable manner in which they have, during a very critical period, conducted their responsible offices.

3. I beg, therefore, to bring specially to your notice the very important services rendered by the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States, Mr. G. C. Barnes, to whose good government, under yourself, may be justly attributed the preservation of peace in his districts, and to whose influence with the independent Chiefs I am mainly indebted for the valuable aid of the Putteeala and Jheend contingents, by means of which my communication with our rear has been kept open, and the safe escort of numerous convoys of stores and ammunition to the camp has been effected ; and his most energetic assistant

[1] From Thanesur, No. 33, dated 24th January 1858.
" Umballa, No. 31, dated 23rd January 1858.
" Ferozepoor, No. 20, dated 30th January 1858.

Mr. G. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Loodhiana, of whose unflagging exertions in procuring carriage, aiding the movements of troops and forwarding supplies, and of his hearty co-operation with the magazine officer in the despatch of ammunition, I am deeply sensible and cannot speak too highly.

I have, &c.,

A. WILSON, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding Delhi Field Force.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 1.

3. *Narrative of events in the Thanesur District from May to December 1857, by Captain W. McNEILE,—No. 33, dated 24th January 1858.*

Receipt of news of Delhi massacre at Tháuesar.

THE first intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut on the 10th May was received at Thanesur early on the 12th in a note from the Deputy Commissioner of Umballa, who had obtained the news by electric telegraph. This, following close upon the accounts which I had heard the previous day of disaffection exhibited by the Native troops at Umballa, caused me some uneasiness about my Treasury Guard, which was composed of men belonging to the 5th Native Infantry, one of the corps then known to be in a mutinous condition. I immediately walked over to the guard room, where I had reason to be anything but pleased with the bearing of the sipahis, and I was considering what step to take when a sowar galloped up and handed me an envelope marked "Immediate." This was from Kurnaul and contained information of the massacre at Delhi and seizure of that city by the mutineers on the previous day, adding that such of the European residents as had escaped were in full flight towards Umballa, and that the rebels were believed to be following.

Departure of ladies.

2. I immediately determined to send away the ladies at the station and to obtain if possible a small party of Europeans to take charge of the treasure, with which latter object an express started forthwith carrying a letter to Brigadier Hallifax, Commanding at Umballa. The departure of the

ladies was hastened by the receipt of further news, which stated positively that the Delhi mutineers were marching up the Grand Trunk Road to effect a junction with their comrades at Umballa, and at nightfall the few European residents assembled at my house not because we expected the rebels up so soon, but that we might act in concert in event of the Treasury guard becoming unruly. Meanwhile the Tehseeldar at Peepli, where at that time travellers were obliged to change from wheeled vehicles to palanquins on their upward trip, had been furnished with money to meet the pressing requirements of any who might have been forced to fly without an opportunity of obtaining funds for their expenses, and this precaution proved very useful to many of the fugitives. The first of these reached Peepli soon after sunset, having been upwards of 24 hours *en route*, and this party was forwarded on at once. A second batch consisting principally of ladies and children arrived about 10 P. M., and finding a scarcity of bearers at Peepli came into Thanesur, where the coachmen who had driven them from Delhi gave the natives the first information of what had occurred and again confirmed what I had previously been told of the mutineers' advance to the northward.

Arrival of fugitives from Delhi.

Arrival of squadron of 4th Light Cavalry from Ambála.

3. At daybreak on the 13th, instead of the party of Europeans I had hoped for, a squadron of the 4th Light Cavalry under Captain Dumbleton marched into Thanesur, bringing me a note from Brigadier Hallifax, in which he stated that no Europeans could be spared, and that I had better bring away my treasure and fall back upon Umballa. Mr. Forsyth, Deputy Commissioner of that district, gave the same advice, and added that the 4th Cavalry were as mutinously inclined as their brethren of the Infantry. To vacate Thanesur was, however, not to be thought of until at least the mutineers attacked us, and so, as it was impossible to get any other guard for the treasure, I made it over to the men already in charge and ordered them to take it to Umballa. Each bag was regularly weighed and sealed as on ordinary occasions, but the arrival of the Cavalry had

Despatch of treasure to Ambála.

not been without its effect upon the sipahis, who were very disrespectful and crowded round myself and Lieutenant Parsons as we sat in the Treasury, causing us considerable apprehension as to the result. They marched, however, according to orders, and a detachment of Sikhs from the Jail guard was immediately put in possession of the Treasury, which they have ever since retained. Throughout this and the following day every report that reached us about the proceedings of the rebels agreed in representing them as *en route* for Umballa, and, however improbable such a move on their part appeared, we could not wholly disbelieve a statement so constantly repeated. I therefore destroyed all the most valuable stamp paper and arranged for sending the most important of the revenue records to a place of concealment in the town. On the 14th at 2 P. M. the squadron of Light Cavalry picketed in the Kutcherry compound seized their arms, saddled and mounted. The Amla fled in confusion to the town, where a panic was caused; the shops were all shut, and a disturbance seemed imminent. But the troopers remained stationary, and after a time most of them dismounted, though they refused to unsaddle or to lay aside their arms. It seems they had some expectation of their corps rising at Umballa and had told off one of their number to bring them word if such an event should happen, when they were to follow suit at Thanesur. They saw a sowar of the regiment come galloping at speed along the road, mistook him for their appointed messenger, and were apparently very loth to be undeceived. To retain such men at Thanesur, where there was nothing to keep them in check, was to encourage the budmashes and to court an outbreak, so I requested Captain Dumbleton to take them back at once to Umballa, and in a couple of hours they were off.

Suspicious behaviour of 4th Light Cavalry.

Reinforcements from Patiála and Jínd.

4. The Maharaja of Putteeala entered the station the same evening with 1,500 men and 4 guns, and when next morning (the 15th) we at last got reliable information that the rebels were not on the move from Delhi, our worst crisis was over and our immediate apprehensions were a good deal quieted. On the 16th the Maharaja returned to his own

capital, leaving me the 4 guns and 1,100 men, of whom I sent on 150 the same day to Kurnaul with Captain McAndrew. On the evening of the 17th the Raja of Jheend arrived with some 400 men and pushed on to Kurnaul next day, closely followed by the first portion of the Delhi Field Force, consisting of a wing of the 1st Fusiliers, a squadron of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers and 2 Horse Artillery guns.

Increase to Police Force.

5. As yet there was no increase of crime in the district, but as a measure of precaution the Police strength was increased in certain places, 80 extra burkundazes being temporarily entertained and detachments of the Putteeala Force being sent out to the places where they were most likely to be required.

Storing of supplies.

6. I also ordered in eight thousand maunds of grain, which I stored at Thanesur, in anticipation of a possible demand from the Commissariat. This, however, was never made, and I eventually resold the grain, making a profit for Government upon the transaction.

Jagirdari Levies.

7. The extra burkundazes were soon dispensed with in conformity with instructions from the Commissioner, who directed that the Jagheerdars should be called upon to furnish men in lieu of their commutation tax, and by this means a force of 350 men was obtained, though the greater proportion of them were not furnished till the middle of June. The Nawab of Koonjpoora, however, was ready with his contingent of 50 on the 20th May, and was posted at Pehoa, where his people were of great use in securing the safety of the roads.

Organization of system of patrols for the Grand Trunk Road.

Parties of Putteeala Horse were also distributed along the Grand Trunk Road, and a system of strong patrols was organized for the protection of travellers and of the telegraph; while a mounted picket went out from Thanesur every eight hours to receive their reports and collect information. On the 21st Mr. Levien, Assistant Commissioner, was sent to Shahabad to arrange for carriage that would be required there for troops moving down by forced marches, and on the 23rd Lieutenant Parsons was deputed on a similar duty to Bootana.

8. The mutineers of the 45th and 57th Native Infantry from Ferozepore were escaping through the district about this time, but the people could not be induced either by rewards or threats to bring them in. Many were waylaid and robbed of everything they had about them, and this was encouraged so far, but the next step, that of delivering the sipahis up to Government, the people would not take, and only nine of the rebels were captured, all of whom were afterwards blown away from guns at Umballa. On one occasion, while as usual riding about the streets of Thanesur in the evening, I heard of three sipahis being in the town with their muskets, but the residents shewed no disposition to assist me in capturing them, and it was dark before I found out that they had taken to the Koolchetur Teeruths. Here the Brahmins befriended them, and only one was seized whom a lucky shot frightened back into a thakoordwara from which he was sneaking through the crowd of Brahmins.

Punishment of mutineers passing through the Thánesar District.

9. On the 24th May I was surprised by the arrival of a company of the 5th Native Infantry from Umballa, and, as the next day was the Eed, I was apprehensive that the Mahomedans, knowing they might calculate on assistance from the sipahis, would make a disturbance, more especially as I had received a telegraphic message from the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner saying that an outbreak on this occasion was contemplated at Thanesur. I had indeed bound over the influential Mahomedans of each tribe in heavy recognizances to keep the peace, and I had taken measures to prevent any gathering at a certain mosque which, having in olden times been built within the precincts of the Koolchetur for the express purpose of annoying the Hindoos, was likely, if resorted to this year (as was customary), to become the scene of a serious *émeute.* But recognizances were little to be depended on at such a juncture, and a mob of fanatic Mussulmans were likely enough to be tempted by the presence of a sipahi company to break through all restraint and force their way into the mosque. I therefore broke up the company into parties of eight and distributed them in various directions, got the Putteeala Force under arms and placed a couple

Precautions against disturbance on the 'Id festival.

of guns so as to command the roads leading to the mosque. The day passed off quietly, and next morning the sipahis were ordered off to patrol the bank of the Jumna, another portion of the same regiment being employed on a similar duty in the Saharunpoor District. Mr. Levien, Assistant Commissioner, who had returned from Shahabad, accompanied them.

Assistance to troops passing through Thánesar.

10. Nothing particular occurred from this time till the end of the month. Troops were constantly passing down towards Delhi, and I paid daily visits to their camps at Peepli, rendering whatever aid was required for the supply of carriage. The budmashes of the district were, however, gradually following the example set them in Saharunpoor, Moozuffurnuggur and Hissar, and several highway robberies were committed near the Jumna; while to the south-west the Rungurs got up a plan for attacking the jail. After much talk about this they fixed on the 31st May for the attempt, and in the evening of that day I received an express from the Thanadar of Rajound saying I might expect them during the night. I and Lieutenant Parsons therefore moved down to the jail and took up our quarters there, while the guard was strengthened and other precautions that appeared necessary were taken. The Rungurs prudently kept off, and soon afterwards, under instructions from the Commissioner, all the prisoners of that tribe were sent in to Umballa.

Threatened attack on jail by Rangars.

11. On the 4th June the company of the 5th Native Infantry were recalled by the Commissioner's orders from their patrol duty and distributed about the Sudder Station, as had been previously done during the Eed, and the Jail guard was restored to its proper strength by the arrival of 50 more Sikhs to replace those that had been transferred to the treasury on the 13th May. On the 5th June two companies of the 5th Native Infantry were disbanded at Umballa and 67 men were turned out of that cantonment, and next day incendiary fires commenced at Thanesur, the Government road bungalow being burnt down first. I have no doubt these disbanded men were the incendiaries, but I was unable to catch any of them.

Incendiary fires at Thánesar.

12. Meanwhile the Paniput District had become very disorderly, and the notorious village of Joolmana was giving trouble. The Commissioner desired that it should be attacked and punished, and Lieutenant Parsons started for the purpose, but not being in sufficient strength he wrote in for reinforcements, and a troop of Punjab Mounted Police just arrived from Umballa were starting to his assistance, when on the 8th June news of the Jullunder and Phillour mutiny reached me with an intimation that the rebels being a numerous body might be expected to march upon Umballa or Putteeala, in either of which cases Thanesur was pretty sure of a visit from them. Mr. Parsons was therefore recalled, but before he could get in the Maharaja had also taken the alarm, and on the night of the 9th June there was not a Putteeala soldier, horse or foot, left in the Thanesur District. We had a company of Sikhs over the jail and treasury, a troop of the same for pickets, patrols and orderlies, and a company of Poorbeeas looked upon rather as foes than friends. We therefore vacated our bungalows and took possession of a walled haveli, to which I also transferred the treasure and its guard as a garrison, and getting the corner towers loopholed we felt pretty confident of holding out for some time against mere musketry. On the 10th, however, the Putteeala Force began to return; in two days they had all come back; we left the haveli; and the Commissioner having written to me that the Jullunder mutineers had broken up and that the Rudour ferries on the Jumna should be secured against a party of them supposed to be taking that route, I started for this purpose on the 13th and Lieutenant Parsons returned to his beat in the direction of Kythul on the 15th. These expeditions and the departure to Kurnaul of the Sikh sowars again left the Line Sipahis a superiority of strength at Thanesur, so on finding that the Jullunder rebels had escaped across the Jumna without coming down into my district, I lost no time in sending back the greater portion of my force to the Sudder Station, while with the remainder I continued my tour along the river, got in the revenue of the Ladwa Tehseel, and punished some refractory villages. It was at this time that the increasing insubordination of some parts of the district

Trouble in Pánipat.

Precautions against Jullundur mutineers.

Execution of turbulent inhabitants of Thánesar.

and the frequency of violent crimes shewed the necessity for measures of unusual severity, and in the 12 days from the 19th to the 13th inclusive 52 robbers and dacoits were hanged, some on the trees of their own villages immediately on their capture and conviction, others after being sent into the jail, and their cases referred to the Commissioner.

Threatened attack by Gujars of Saháranpur.

13. At this time too the Goojurs of Suharunpore, who were plundering several towns and villages in that district, continually threatened to cross over to my side, and it was not till the 29th June that the river rose so as to be no longer fordable and relieved me from anxiety on this account. From that date boats afforded the only means of passing, and all the ferries being stopped except two, of which both were strongly guarded, not a single outrage was committed by parties from the other side of the Jumna. Towards the westward, however, we had no river to cut off communications, and the Rungurs from Kurnaul to Rohtuk, Hansi and Sirsa were all getting ready for an outbreak and refusing to pay any revenue. Our Police chowkie at Assundh was driven in upon the thana, losing a prisoner and two muskets, and to the disgrace of the party be it said not firing a shot. On hearing this I reinforced Lieutenant Parsons, who was at Kythul, and he restored the chowkie, but did not feel himself strong enough to attack the Rungurs, who mustered in great numbers and were very near attacking him.

Outbreak of Rangurs.

Disarming of Thánesar District.

14. On the 1st July, having received orders to disarm the district, I carried them out myself at Thanesur. Mr. Levien did the same at Shahabad, Lieutenant Parsons at Kythul, and the Tahsildars and Thanadars at other places. The search for weapons has been continually prosecuted since then, but their possession not being prohibited in the neighbouring territories many were passed over the border, and up to the end of the year only seven thousand of all sorts were seized. On the 14th July the company of Native Infantry was at last disarmed by a detachment of Her Majesty's 8th Foot sent down from Umballa for the purpose. The sipahis were taken by surprise at noon, each guard was disarmed in succession, and the same night they nearly all deserted to Delhi.

15. I was now at liberty to withdraw a portion of the Putteeala Force from Thanesur, and wishing to punish the village of Assundh, as well as to make the Nirdhuk pay up their revenue, I marched on the 16th *viâ* Kurnaul, selecting that route at the request of the authorities there who wished the force to pass through the Kurnaul Pergunna. Captain Hughes' dashing affair at Bulleh saved me any trouble at Assundh, which was vacated at my approach and which I burnt. I then moved upon Dhatrut, the largest village in arrears of revenue, and which had also plundered and destroyed the Mazra of Khuruk Gadean in its neighbourhood. Chatur had a similar account to settle, and on both I imposed considerable fines, which, as well as their revenue, I obliged them to pay down at once. All the defaulting villages then gave in, and the Government demand was realized in full throughout the tahseel.

Punishment of villages refusing to pay revenue.

16. There is nothing further to report. On the 20th August I took up my residence at Kurnaul as directed by the Commissioner, and remained there till after the fall of Delhi in command of the Putteeala and Nabha Contigents.

Transfer of Captain Mc Neile to Karnál.

17. The following is a memo. of the cost of the extra Police and Jagheer Levies maintained in the district during the disturbances:—

Cost of extra Police and Levies.

	Rs.	A.	P.
80 Burkundazes for five weeks	504	14	3
130 Jagheer Horse and 220 Foot, commutation tax remitted	15,711	3	0
	16,216	1	3

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 1.

4. *Narrative of events in the Umballa District, by Mr. T. D. Forsyth.*

THE station of Umballa was, at an early stage, an object of painful interest to all who watched the small cloud like a man's hand which portended the approaching storm. Here the Commander-in-Chief had ordered to assemble detachments from every regiment in the North-Western Provinces to learn to practice with the Enfield rifle.

Assemblage of detachments at Ambála to learn the use of the Enfield rifle.

Complaints regarding cartridges.

2. It was in February first that the undefined rumours of a feeling of dissatisfaction began to be circulated. Officers attached to the depôt received complaints from their men that they feared exclusion from caste on return to their regiments owing to the alleged adulteration of the grease used for the cartridges. There were not wanting among us foreboders who predicted terrible outbreaks, but such were everywhere silenced as insufferable croakers. On the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, however, in March, affairs assumed a more serious aspect; a sepoy of the 36th Native Infantry attached to the depôt went to visit his brethren, who were part of His Excellency's escort, and found himself taunted with the opprobrious epithet of Christian. What measures were taken by the Commander-in-Chief it is not for me to detail; I mention the circumstance merely as occurring at Umballa, and inducing us to place somewhat of credence in the predictions which hitherto we had so entirely ignored.

Incendiary fires at Ambála.

3. The first symptom of disaffection displayed itself on the 19th of April, in the breaking out of fires in cantonments. One or two European barracks were burnt down; a police station was fired, and from time to time the flames broke out in a mysterious but determined manner, in spite of all the vigilance of Captain Howard and his police. The "grammies" or thatchers were suspected, and there was an evident disinclination to believe the fires to be the work of sepoys; sowars were reported on several occasions to have been seen galloping away from a building which was afterwards discovered to be in flames, and the conviction was gradually forced upon us at last that some emissaries were at work to spread the flames of disaffection.

Cause of fires and extent of rumoured disaffection.

4. General Sir H. Barnard arrived at Umballa in the last week in April, and immediately after requested me to make use of the district police to institute searching inquiries amongst the native soldiers as to the cause of fires and the extent of the rumoured disaffection. It was his particular desire that the inquiry should form the subject of no public report, and the information received from time to time was forwarded by him

privately to the Commander-in-Chief. Sham Singh, a Sikh sepoy in the 5th Regiment, was induced through the exertions of Jowala Nath, Kotwal of Umballa, to give what information he could collect. It was to the effect that the Mussulmans and Hindoos were united in the determination to resist what they looked upon as tampering with their religion, and that there was a clique who held consultations which were not communicated to the sepoys generally. Subsequently the information took a more tangible form, and it was positively stated on the 7th or 8th May that in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Umballa, and that a general rising of the sepoys would take place; it was even foretold that there was a conspiracy amongst the syces of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers to hamstring the horses in the event of an outbreak. All this information was conveyed to the General Commanding this division, and through him forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief; but, as the Officers Commanding regiments expressed entire confidence in their men, the assertions of the informers were discredited, and there was a lull, a fatal calm, for a few days preceding the outbreak of this fearful storm.

Misbehaviour of 5th and 60th Regiments, Native Infantry.

5. Early on the morning of the 10th of May the Kotwal brought information of the 5th and 60th Regiments, Native Infantry, having turned out and taken their arms, and simultaneously a man came from the treasury with the news of the guard (*a detachment of the 60th Native Infantry*) having suddenly got under arms. The Subadar was sent for and asked to explain his conduct, which he could not do, but though ordered to dismiss his men to their lines, he kept them to their arms during the whole day, and then in the evening denied having done so. It was too plain that he had acted on a concerted plan, which, if carried out, would have caused the loss of our treasury.

Excitement at Ambála.

6. It is not necessary for me to detail the events of that day in the cantonment of Umballa. The 5th and 60th Native Infantry flew to their arms, but were quieted and induced to return to their lines. The storm was thus for a while lulled, but there was too good ground for future apprehension, too soon to be realised.

Receipt of news of mutiny at Delhi.

7. On the ever-memorable 11th of May Brigadier Hallifax sent me a hurried note calling me to his house as he had received the first telegraphic message of the arrival at Delhi of some mutinous sowars from Meerut. This was shortly followed by the appalling announcement of a general massacre of all the Christian inhabitants of Delhi. The telegraphic announcement was brief and significant, and broke off with the announcement of the death of the Inspector, and the words "Good bye, I am off." After that the wire vibrated in vain to the signals from Umballa ; and the next communication from the city of Delhi was made after a lapse of four months by the same signaller, who had to announce the victorious entry of our troops into the city from which he had telegraphed the news of our expulsion. News of the Delhi disaster was at once forwarded to yourself and the Commander-in-Chief, and General Barnard took upon himself to call down Her Majesty's 75th Regiment from Kussowlie.

Measures for securing safety of Treasury.

8. The worst apprehensions were entertained regarding the native troops at Umballa, and every precaution was used to secure the civil treasury from plunder in case of an outbreak. I was anxious to remove the Government money at once into safe keeping, but General Barnard considered it unwise to distrust the sepoys. To counteract any attempt on their part we had 200 sepoys belonging to the 4th or Sooruj Mookhee Police Battalion, under the command of Colonel Futteh Singh. These men were ordered to remain in their lines, and one-half were kept under arms all night. The roads in the civil station were patrolled vigorously by the detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, and the city police were organised and made to patrol the city in compact bodies.

News of Meerut outbreak. Application to Patiála for aid.

9. On the morning of Tuesday, the 12th May, a hurried letter from Mr. Spankie, Magistrate of Saharunpoor, gave us the first news of the outbreak at Meerut. Matters appeared to become more complicated, and the want of some force to counterbalance the preponderance of sepoys in Umballa being strongly felt, I took upon myself, in anticipation of sanction, to call in the aid of the Maharajah of Putteeala, reporting to

yourself and the Chief Commissioner my having done so. Tuesday and Wednesday were days of intense anxiety, as the regiment summoned from Kussowlie had not yet arrived and the sepoy regiments in Umballa were evidently in a state of excitement.

10. On the afternoon of Wednesday the Maharajah of Putteeala arrived at Jesomli, a village a few miles from Umballa, with a force of 1,000 men. I had by that time received the orders of the Chief Commissioner to call upon him to garrison Thanesur and Loodiana; but he declared himself too weak to divide his force, and as the choice lay between these two places, I chose Thanesur. The Rajah in a moment broke up his camp, and started for that place, thus displaying, from the very outset, that alacrity and devotion to our cause which have characterised all his proceedings throughout. Arrival of Maharaja and despatch of Patiála troops to Thánesar.

11. On the same day I deputed Mr. Plowden to give a correct account of what had occurred to yourself and to the Commander-in-Chief, as the first report appeared to have been misunderstood.

12. On the evening of the 13th a council of war was held at the house of Brigadier Hallifax, consisting of General Barnard, Brigadier Hallifax, Captain McAndrew and myself, when it was determined to send on the troops under the command of the Rajahs of Putteeala and Jheend to Kurnaul to open communication with Meerut, and a letter announcing the 18th as the date of their arrival at Kurnaul, with a pledge that a European force should speedily follow from Umballa. Captain McAndrew was deputed to accompany the force to Kurnaul. Council of war at Ambála.

13. On the following day you arrived in Umballa, and I would leave it to your able pen to describe all the military operations from that time, and propose confining myself to the part which I and other district officers took in the general operations. Arrival of Mr. Barnes at Ambála.

14. Our first pressing difficulty was to provide carriage for the speedy transit of the European regiments from the hills to Umballa, which was accomplished by the evening of Sunday Provision of carriage for troops.

the 18th, on which day too we removed our treasure, consisting of Rs. 3,71,535-5-0, from the Kutcherry to the quarter-guard of the 1st Europeans.

15. As soon as it was determined by the Commander-in-Chief that an onward move should be made a sudden difficulty arose in want of carriage. The Deputy Commissary-General having officially declared his inability to meet the wants of the army, the Civil authorities were called upon to supply the demand. At Umballa there has ever been a difficulty to furnish carriage of any kind, the carts being of a very inferior description. However, such as they were, they had to be pressed into the service, and in the course of a week, after the utmost exertions, 500 carts, 2,000 camels and 2,000 coolies were made over to the Commissariat Department ; 30,000 maunds of grain were likewise collected and stored for the army in the town of Umballa.

Despatch of force to Jagádhri to check Gujars.

16. As soon as these urgent calls had been complied with it was necessary to look to the state of the district, which caught, in a measure, the excitement of cantonments. In Saharunpoor the Goojurs raised their heads in defiance of authority, and it was apprehended that their brethren on this side of the Jumna would catch the infection. To overawe the disaffected, and to watch the movements of the insurgents across the Jumna, a squadron, 4th *Light Cavalry*, under Captain Wyld, and two companies, 5th Native Infantry, under Captain Garstin, were placed at the disposal of Mr. W. C. Plowden, Assistant Commissioner, who at once proceeded to take up his quarters at Jugadree.

Disturbance in Nálagarh. Measures for protection of Rúpar.

17. At the same time it was necessary to provide for the safety of the western pergunnahs, for the petty Hill State of Nalagurh had taken advantage of the complication of affairs at Simla to raise a disturbance which threatened to extend to the Roopur tehseel. Two companies of the 5th Native Infantry were at once despatched under command of Captain Gardner to garrison Roopur and repel any attempt at rebellion. This detachment, however, was mutinous and spread around the disorder it was sent to repress.

18. The seditious language and disgraceful conduct of the sepoys in the bazaar of Roopur induced a misguided few to believe that the British rule was at an end, and one Mohur Singh, a Sikh Karinda of the late ex-chief Bhoop Singh, was foolish enough to endeavour to put a stop to the slaughter of kine. A slight disturbance occurred at the tehseel, and it was deemed advisable at once to recall the detachment before it broke out into actual mutiny. Three of the ringleaders, with the Sikh, Mohur Sing, were tried, condemned and executed in the space of two hours. The rest of the sepoys were disarmed and disbanded, and some of them punished by court-martial.

Misbehaviour of detachment of Native troops at Rúpar.

19. In order to preserve peace throughout the district you at an early stage called out the service levies which the various jagheerdars were bound to furnish on demand. A detail of these levies with their posts is given below,[1] and the general arrangement was as follows.

Calling out of Jagirdari levies.

20. At Roopur the Singhpooria Sirdars took up their abode in the tehseel, and watched with their levies all the fords and ferries on the Sutlej. No boats were allowed to ply save at Roopur, where a strong guard was stationed to examine all passengers.

Services of Singhpuria Sirdars at Rúpar.

21. The roads between Morinda, Khurrur and towards the hills were carefully patrolled, and sowars were stationed on the road to convey with the utmost rapidity intelligence from one part of the district to another.

[1] *List of the Levies kept up at each Tehseel and amount of Commutation remitted as remuneration for their services.*

Tehseel.	Foot.	Sowars.	Amount of commutation.		
			Rs.	A.	P.
Umballa	...	24	2,000	0	0
Jugadree	144	99	4,551	15	5
Roopur	76	49	2,822	0	0
Khurrur	128	61	7,064	11	7
Naraingliur	111	26	2,728	1	9
TOTAL	459	259	19,166	12	9

Services of Jagirdars and other volunteers.

22. The same arrangements were made in every tehseel, the petty chiefs or jageerdars ranging themselves under the immediate orders of the tehseeldar, and conveying at once to their followers whatever instructions he received from myself. In addition to these jageerdars, who were bound to supply levies, several public-spirited individuals volunteered their own services and brought several followers; amongst these the most prominent were Rao Raheem Bux, of Punjlasa, who, with 50 followers, guarded the road between Umballa and Jugadree, and the Sirkurdahs of Sadhoura, who furnished 60 men to protect the public and private buildings in the civil station, thus relieving our police of very heavy duty.

Measures for protection of Ambála Cantonment.

23. It was necessary to make some provision for the protection of cantonments when denuded of troops, for there was every fear lest the surrounding villagers, who are a notorious set of incorrigible thieves, should break in and plunder in wholesale manner. The Commander-in-Chief had sanctioned the entertainment of two chokeedars to every bungalow, and I arranged with the zumeendars that they were to take the whole cantonment under their charge, appointing their own chokeedars, and each village was made responsible for the safety of the bungalows nearest to it. This system worked well for two or three months, when it was discontinued.

Suppression of lawlessness.

24. There was at the outset an attempt to set the law at defiance, and for several days in succession daring highway robberies were committed; but out of seven robberies not one criminal escaped detection; and the rapid apprehension, conviction, and in several cases the execution of the culprits, produced the most wholesome effect. Bands of robbers collected together, but their courage failed when they saw so plainly the fate which awaited them. One case only of dacoity occurred on the confines of the Nahun district, but I followed up the pursuit in person with Mr. Plowden, and hanged one of the robbers to a tree near his own village, and of 16 others

who were caught soon after, 4 shared the same fate and the rest were imprisoned.

25. It was a remarkable fact that misdemeanors at once seemed to cease, not only in this district, but throughout the country; men's minds seemed to be intent on watching the extraordinary progress of events, and none but daring crimes tempted the more reckless characters.

Precautions against Jullundur mutineers.

26. On the 8th June we received intelligence of the revolt of the Jullunder Brigade and the rapid approach of the mutineers towards Loodiana. In order to oppose their progress, and to preserve our gaol, I strengthened the prison guard and threw up hasty fortifications, disposing the whole of my force, about 150 men, round the walls. Here the Reverend Messrs. Carleton and Orbison joined me, and we awaited for some 36 hours with no small anxiety the approach of a whole brigade of mutineers. They, however, avoided the station of Umballa altogether, and we emerged from our defences to endeavour to intercept a body of some 400 sepoys and 15 sowars, who were making for the Jumna across the foot of the hills. The Commandant, Futteh Singh, refused to attack so superior a force without being supported by Europeans, for whom I urgently sought, and who arrived within five miles of the rebels at Ramgurh, but owing to some unexplained reason they did not come on till six hours too late. The pursuit was, however, continued vigorously for two nights and a day, and Mr. Plowden with his force endeavoured to intercept them though without success. One fact was evident to all engaged in the pursuit, that the population had decidedly not enlisted themselves warmly on the part of the Government. Not a man turned out who was not compelled to do so through fear of the loss of his jagheer, and in many instances information calculated to deceive was all that we could obtain. On this occasion the Mir of Kotaha showed great lukewarmness: and I fined him 1,000 rupees for his conduct. The Pathans of Khizrabad and the villagers of Ferozepore, Narainghur, Thuska, and Gobindpoore, were likewise heavily mulcted.

Watch over tone of conversation and correspondence in city of Ambála.

27. It became very necessary to watch narrowly the tone of conversation and correspondence carried on in the city of Umballa, and though no instance of proved treason occurred, there was much ground for suspicion, and letters speaking of the English in no laudatory terms were now and then brought forward. Periphrasis and enigmatical sentences were used to convey doubtful sentiments, and under the pretence of sending merely commercial news, remarks on the absence of white sugar, and the abundance of *goor*, or of the diminution of red pepper and the increase of black pepper, were intended to convey to comrades at a distance accurate information regarding the weak state of our garrison or of our forces.

Details of carriage supplied to the army.

28. Throughout the month of June the labours of the police were incessantly devoted to the collection of carriage and supplying generally the wants of the army. It is impossible to state accurately the number furnished, but the accounts of the Umballa tehseel show that upwards of 900 carts and 1,800 camels, and 500 coolies, were collected for the army during this month.

Transport train between Ludhiána and Karnál.

29. The Post Office department was not in a state to meet the emergent demand for transport, and in compliance with the orders of the Judicial Commissioner a district bullock train was organised to run between Loodiana and Kurnaul. By dint of labour and management we were enabled to despatch 20 carts daily, and often the number rose to 50, irrespective of the convoys of carts load of shot and shell, which poured in one continuous stream along the Grand Trunk Road. Great though the difficulties were, it is no small satisfaction to be able to record that not one single instance occurred of a cart load of stores of any kind being detained or delayed on the road between Loodiana and Kurnaul ; still the difficulty of getting sufficient carriage, and the apparent impossibility of ever recovering from Kurnaul a cart which had once got there, rendered it necessary that a more complete transport agency should be organised, and this very heavy duty was on the 17th July made over to Captain Briggs.

30. Towards the end of June the orders of the Chief Commissioner were received to disarm the district, and no time was lost in carrying out this measure. As far as it was possible at that season of the year, the operations were superintended by my assistants and myself, and we collected altogether 16,000 arms. At a later period of the year we had again endeavoured to disarm the population more thoroughly, but the number of arms only amounted to 1,240; and with the neighbouring independent states of Khulseea and Putteeala bordering on, and often intermingling with our own villages, it is difficult at once to complete the operation. It must be a work of time, and will require constant attention.

Disarming of Ambála District.

31. No small portion of the labour of the past year consisted in the management of the treasury and the receipt and despatch of money to the army. Our revenue was paid in with an alacrity almost unknown, and constant remittances from Jullundhur, Hooshiarpore, and other stations, were received and forwarded to Delhi.

Work of treasury.

32. In addition to this, contributions were invited to the Government 6 per cent. loan, and though at first the people looked upon the investment with disfavour, we were *eventually able to realize 2½ lakhs* from different parts of the district.

6 per cent. loan.

33. Over-zeal on the part of some tehseeldars caused at one time some little confusion by the collection of small sums below 100 rupees, but this was speedily set aright, and on your subsequent request that I should repay a portion of the loan, I liquidated all loans of sums under 500 rupees. On this occasion the wealthy bankers of Jugadree displayed a spirit of disloyalty and close-fistedness unworthy of a class who owe all their prosperity to the fostering care and protection of the British Government.

Disloyalty of bankers of Jagádhri.

34. On the first outbreak of the Mutiny our civil courts necessarily were temporarily suspended. One Assistant,

Judicial work.

Captain McAndrew, was deputed with the Putteeala troops; another, Mr. Plowden, was out at Jugadree; Mr. Vaughan's time was engrossed with the duties of the treasury, whilst the tehseeldars and myself were wholly engaged in the duties of supplying the army. But in June I received the valuable aid of Mr. C. P. Elliott's services, and we commenced at once to clear off the civil file. The result at the end of December shows that out of 4,231 cases filed in a year, when owing to the introduction of the new Statute of Limitation there was a rush of suitors to our courts, only 153 cases remained undecided. The result in the criminal department is equally satisfactory. Petty crime has, as stated, not been so rife, but the proportion of apprehensions and convictions to the crimes committed is, as the returns show, far in excess of any former years.

Disbanding of Native troops.

35. On the 1st of September the orders of the Chief Commissioner to disband the remnant of the 5th and 60th Native Infantry were received and carried out. The sepoys were to have been lodged for a time in our gaol, but an attempt to escape being made by a few, they were summarily dealt with by the Europeans.

Operations of Mr. W. C. Plowden at Jagádhri.

36. Of the conduct of the detachment of the 5th Native Infantry at Jugadree I think it better to leave to Mr. Plowden to speak, as it is only fair that this energetic officer, who so zealously remained out in camp throughout the whole hot season and rains, should have the opportunity of reporting his own operations; purposely, then, I leave all details to him to record, and merely beg to acknowledge my sense of the services rendered by him.

Misconduct of Mir of Kotáha.

37. In September the Meer of Kotaha, whom I have already mentioned, again fell under suspicion, in consequence of a letter supposed to have been written by his son-in-law, Abul Hussun, from Moozuffernugger. This led to the search of his fort, where a large quantity of gunpowder, sulphur, &c., was found, and shortly after I received the orders of

the Chief Commissioner to dismantle his fort, which has been completely done.

38. No other inhabitants of this district have been so severely dealt with, though many have fallen under grave suspicion ; and when the orders of the Judicial Commissioner for the dismissal of Hindoostanees from employ was received I took occasion to remove many inhabitants of Umballa, such as Burkut Allee, &c., who are worse if possible than regular Hindoostanees.

Conduct of subordinate officials.

39. The conduct of the native executives has throughout been very satisfactory on the whole. The thannadar of Beelaspore, Jumna Doss, was summarily removed for incapacity, and others were got rid of as being obnoxious characters ; but other officials have behaved well, Gungapershaud, tehseeldar of Narainghur, and Sadi-ood-deen Khan of Umballa, particularly so.

40. I strongly doubt the tehseeldar of Jugadree, Moojibooddeen ; and the demeanour of the Extra Assistant, Budrool Islam, during the months of August and September, was anything but satisfactory.

Communication made by Muhammadans of Delhi to Dost Muhammad Khan in 1856.

41. Of the causes which led to this rebellion it is not for me to speak, but I cannot refrain from recording one fact which was not without significance. In August 1856 a letter from the Akhoond of Swât, addressed to Futteh Khan of Pindee Gheb, was brought to me when Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Rawul Pindee. Amongst much other news, the writer stated that the Mahomedans of Lucknow had written to Dost Mahomed informing him that Oude had been taken by the British, and that, as they supposed, Hydrabad would follow, there would soon be no stronghold of Islam left in Hindoostan, and unless some effort were made the cause of true believers would be lost. In the event of the Mahomedans of Oude entering on any plan, they wished to know what aid they might expect from the Dost. The sagacious reply to this application was stated by the writer to be "What will be, remains to be seen."

ENCLOSURE (4) TO 1.

5. *List of Collections made in the Umballa District on account of 6 per cent. Loan.*

Name of Tehseel.	Amount.	REMARKS.
	Rs.	
Sudder	78,100	
Umballa	40,100	
Jagadree	54,300	
Roopur	35,200	
Khurrur	34,800	
Narainghur	18,600	
Total . Co.'s Rs.	2,61,200	

DY. COMMR.'S OFFICE :
Umballa, 22nd Jany. 1858.

T. D. FORSYTH,
Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (5) TO 1.

6. *From Captain J. M. CRIPPS, Offg. Deputy Commissioner, Ferozepore, to G. C. BARNES, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States,—No. 20, dated Ferozepore, 30th January 1858.*

Narrative of events in the Ferozepore District.

As directed, I have the honor to forward a narrative of occurrences in the Ferozepore station and district during the disturbed period since May 1857.

Having been myself in charge of the Gujranwala District during the above-mentioned crisis, I have, agreeably to request, submitted a full account of all the measures adopted there for preservation of peace ; and for justice to all parties here have obtained the annexed narrative from Captain Mercer, Assistant Commissioner, who has ably set forth the bare facts.

ENCLOSURE TO 6.

7. *Narrative of events at Ferozepore during the rebellion of 1857, by Captain T. W. MERCER, Assistant Commissioner,—dated 28th January 1858.*

1. During the month of March some signs of disaffection were evinced in the 57th Regiment Native Infantry. Placards threatening the life of the Commanding Officer in return for some supposed grievance had been stuck up at the Brigadier's house.

Signs of disaffection in 57th Native Infantry.

2. A sepoy of that regiment had been excommunicated by his comrades for handling one of the new Enfield rifles and was forced to seek refuge in the Regimental Hospital.

3. At a Court of Enquiry a Native Officer had openly declared that it was the intention of the sepoys of the 57th to refuse the Enfield cartridges.

4. It was rumoured that meetings were held in the lines, and measures had just been proposed between the Military and Civil authorities to ascertain the object of these and to prevent the incendiarisms which had occurred in other stations, when the intelligence of the events at Meerut and Delhi were received by express from Lahore on the 13th May.

5. It was supposed that the 57th Native Infantry was the only regiment here bitten by the cartridge mania, as the 45th had expressed their contempt of such conduct, and had said they were willing to take any cartridges that were served out to them.

Attitude of 45th Native Infantry and 10th Light Cavalry.

6. There was the greater reason to believe in the sincerity of the 45th as the two regiments were not on good terms.

7. It was not known that the 10th Light Cavalry had taken any part in the discussion.

Measures taken by Brigadier Innes, Commanding at Ferozepore.

8. On receipt of the disastrous news from Dehlee, Brigadier P. Innes, who had only assumed command of the station the day before, after consulting the Commanding Officers of Regiments, determined on separating the 45th and

57th Regiments and move them out of cantonments, the 45th to take up a position on the Loodiana Road near the ice-pits, and the 57th on the extreme left of cantonments near the European burial ground. A company of Europeans was ordered into the intrenchment containing the vast stores of the Ferozepore Magazine.

9. All the ladies and Christian residents of the station were ordered up immediately to the European barracks.

10. The Artillery (Captain Woodcock's Light Field Battery) was also ordered to attach itself to the European Regiment (Her Majesty's 61st Regiment), but by some mistake proceeded to the intrenchment instead, where, owing to the confusion that prevailed in admitting a large train of Government cattle, &c., it was for some time inextricably fixed and its services rendered unavailable for immediate operations against the mutineers.

11. The two Native Regiments moved off quietly from their parades. The 45th Native Infantry marched through the Sudder Bazaar. Even here all was quiet, and no demonstrations of any kind made.

12. When nearing the intrenchment, Lieutenant-Colonel Liptrap, Commanding the Regiment, found the column inclining towards the glacis and that the men were getting beyond control.

Attack by the 45th Native Infantry on the intrenchment round the magazine repulsed by British troops.

13. It had hardly become evident that mischief was contemplated when the three leading companies of the column made a deliberate attack upon the northern face of the intrenchment, ascending the parapet (then in a very dilapidated state) and effecting an entry into the Eastern Gate, known as the Shot Yard Gate.

14. The design of the mutineers intuitively forced itself on the minds of the British soldiers, and in an instant the attack was repulsed by the bayonet. The Europeans had not time to load before a second attempt was made by the mutineers

to force the gateway, which was as quickly repulsed. In this attack Major Redmond, of Her Majesty's 61st, was wounded severely. Thus was the magazine saved from falling into the hands of traitors. Had they succeeded in gaining a footing within the magazine, they would doubtless have been joined at once by all the other Native Troops in the garrison and speedily reinforced by all the disaffected regiments at Lahore and the neighbouring stations.

Major Redmond, Her Majesty's 61st Regiment, wounded.

Saving of magazine.

15. Disappointed in this audacious scheme, the sepoys returned with an air of aggrievance into the ranks of the regiment. The main body moved off under the Commanding Officer to the ground selected for their encampment.

Further proceedings of 45th Native Infantry.

16. It is not for me to record all that passed while the men remained with their officers, but I believe that more than once were their lives threatened during the night.

17. The day closed, and with it began the work of destruction in the cantonments.

The sepoys, intoxicated with bhang, exasperated with rage and disappointment, proceeded in bodies into the cantonments with long torches, and in the course of half an hour the whole cantonment was in flames. The 2 Churches, 17 officers' houses and other public buildings were burnt to the ground.

Burning of cantonments by sepoys.

18. The officers of the 45th remained with their colors during the entire night, making every effort to restore confidence and quiet the minds of the men. About 150 men refusing to join their comrades in mutiny affected loyalty and devotion to their officers and colors.

Attempt of officers of 45th Native Infantry to restore confidence.

19. The 57th Native Infantry remained inactive during the night, and it is not known that any of them took any active part in the burning of cantonments.

Inactivity of 57th Native Infantry.

Some were deluded enough to attribute their inertness to the loyalty of the regiment.

The most reasonable construction of it is that, finding their plot defeated by the precautions taken and the alertness of the Europeans, they determined to bide the further issue of events.

Destruction of magazines of 45th and 57th Native Infantry.

20. Early the next morning the magazines of both regiments were blown up by order of the Brigadier, to prevent the mutineers from getting possession of the ammunition. The Brigadier seemed to anticipate some difficulty in removing this ammunition, and therefore adopted what he considered the safest course. The same consideration determined him to sacrifice the private property in cantonments rather than risk the loss of the barracks and endanger the security of the magazine by detaching Europeans at night to oppose the mutineers engaged in firing the cantonments.

Removal of treasure to the fort.

21. At daylight of the 14th, Major Marsden and Captain Mercer proceeded to the Kutcherry to remove the treasure to the fort. This was done under an escort consisting of part of the Treasury Guard from the 45th Native Infantry, a few sowars of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, and about 20 men of the Sooruj Mookhee Police Battalion. This portion of the 45th Native Infantry Guard immediately after joined the mutineers. It is a strange feature in the proceedings of that night that all the buildings and private houses protected by guards from the mutinous regiments were preserved.

Saving of Church registers by the Reverend Mr. Maltby.

One act of bravery and devotion performed that night is deserving of record. While the Church was yet in flames and the cantonment swarming with mutineers, who had evinced their fanaticism by first igniting the sacred edifices, the Reverend Mr. Maltby contrived alone to enter the Church and rescue the registers from the vestry.

Misconduct of magazine servants and Sadr Kotwal.

22. It was immediately discovered that some men in the magazine had been playing into the hands of the mutineers, and that aid had been obtained also from the Sudder Kotwal, who is believed to have supplied them with scaling ladders. He was afterwards tried by General Court-martial and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment in banishment.

23. On the 14th the whole of the 45th Native Infantry, with the exception of 133 men, went off with their arms and colors. A considerable portion of the 57th Native Infantry did the same.

Mutiny of 45th and 57th Native Infantry.

The remnants of the regiments were marched into the European barrack square and disarmed. These were disbanded a few days after by orders of the Punjab Government.

The 10th Light Cavalry had hitherto behaved well and appeared willing to oppose the mutineers, but, although engaged with the Artillery in the pursuit of the mutineers, they were never brought into actual contact. They, however, were much lauded for the ready manner in which they undertook some very fatiguing duties and received the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief.

Loyalty of 10th Light Cavalry.

24. Immediate measures were taken to strengthen the defences of the intrenchment, to discard suspicious men, and to protect the vast stores and property of Government.

Measures for protection of magazine.

The utmost energy was displayed by Captain Lewis, who was appointed to command within the intrenched camp, and in a few days, under the able direction of Mr. H. LeMesurier, Resident Engineer, whose services were volunteered, the slopes of the parapet were repaired, the ditch deepened, a large quantity of powder (about 7,000 barrels) was buried in pits, the inner walls of the magazine were loopholed, and places of shelter for the Europeans were erected and other works of defence rapidly completed. Guns were mounted and placed in battery, and the place rendered capable of resisting any sudden attack.

Services of Captain Lewis and Mr. LeMesurier, Resident Engineer.

25. Whilst by these arrangements the lives of the Christian residents were preserved and Government property secured and no immediate surprise gave any hope of success to the mutineers, the information from Lahore and elsewhere warned us that the plot was thickening, and that the neighbouring districts of Bhutteeana and Hurreeana were in revolt, and that danger was not confined to the military stations.

Safety of Christian residents.

Measures taken for securing safety of district.

26. To prevent the troops at Lahore or the stations in the Doab from crossing the River Sutlej into this district, the ferries were stopped and the boats brought over to this side. The boats from the small ferries were removed to the Hurreekee Ghat and bridge-of-boats. The bridge was broken and communication was thus cut off.

This measure was fully sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner.

In order to strengthen the hands of the Military authorities and to preserve order in the district, General Van Cortlandt was requested to raise a levy of Sikhs, and before the 1st June 500 men were under a course of drill.

Putteeala, 140 sowars.
Fureed Kote, 50 sowars.
Jageerdars, 10 sowars.
Furreed Kote, 40 footmen.

About 200 horsemen and 40 footmen were obtained from the neighbouring States and the Jageerdars of the district, who one and all were prompt in their assistance and cordial in their expressions of loyalty.

An increase of 157 burkundazes was made to the Police establishment, and chowkees established to watch the ghats and fords and to take up suspicious-looking people passing up the main roads. The Police were weeded and some Hindoostanees removed.

Good conduct of Police.

The Police conducted themselves well throughout, and effected the capture of 150 fugitive sepoys, permitted no gatherings of the village people, and gave prompt and accurate information.

Services of General Van Cortlandt's Irregular Force in maintaining order.

27. The tide of rebellion rolling up the Delhee Division to the very frontier of this district created some alarm and threatened danger, a few cases of highway robbery occurred and cattle theft slightly increased; but this was happily suppressed by the presence of General Van Cortlandt's Irregular Force which took the field on the 8th June and by the execution of every highway robber that was captured. The people generally were quiet and well disposed; no resistance was offered to the police; and, notwithstanding the wild

reports circulated by evil-disposed persons within the cantonment bazaars, the faith of the people in the British Government did not seem to be shaken.

28. Major Marsden, although uncommunicative, seemed to inspire confidence by his determination of character and never wavering sense of justice. His Assistants, Mr. Melvill, C. S., and Mr. W. C. Wood, zealously aided him by unremitting attention to their duties and in disabusing the minds of the people of the lying reports afloat. **Confidence inspired by Major Marsden and his Assistants.**

The courts were open as usual without intermission and the interests of the people were not allowed to suffer.

29. On the 13th June Major Marsden proceeded towards Jeytoo with the right wing of the 10th Light Cavalry and two guns to punish a faqueer by name Sham Dass, who had set up the standard of rebellion in the Rajah of Nabha's territory and had collected a large number of followers variously estimated at from 3,000 to 5,000 men. The expedition was attended with the most complete success. The insurgents were followed to the village of Dubree Khana, where after some resistance the place was taken and burnt, their leader captured and hung. The conduct of the 10th Light Cavalry in this affair was noticed as "conspicuous and gallant." **Defeat of Fakir Sham Das and rebels by Major Marsden.**

30. *On the 17th and 18th June the* Sudder Bazaar and city residents were deprived of all arms in pursuance of Act VIII of 1857. **Disarming of residents in city and Sadr Bazar.**

31. The presence of General Van Cortlandt's Irregular Force in the Bhutteeana territory, which with the auxiliaries of the Native Chiefs numbered about 5,000 men of all arms, completely restored order in the bordering districts, and it was resolved to reinforce the Delhee Field Force with a wing of Her Majesty's 61st from this garrison. The men marched from here on the 13th June in the highest spirits and after a notice of only five hours. **Restoration of order by General Van Cortlandt's Irregular Force.**

About this time also all the available Artillerymen from the Reserve Company were despatched to Dehlee by bullock train. **Despatch of reinforcements to Delhi.**

Despatch of stores to Delhi.

32. A transport train had been established under the superintendence of Captain Briggs, and stores and ammunition were daily despatched to Dehlee.

Not a single instance was known of the Government stores having been robbed on this side of Umballa, although they had no other escort than could be provided from the Police on the Grand Trunk Road.

Tranquillity of district and collection of revenue.

33. Nothing disturbed the quiet of the district, although it was afterwards known that emissaries from Dehlee had been at work and endeavouring to seduce the people from their allegiance.

The sum of Company's rupees 1,50,600 was collected in the district as contributions towards the Government 6 per cent. loan. The revenue was collected as usual without any difficulty.

Dismounting and disarming of 10th Light Cavalry.

34. After the outbreak of the 9th Light Cavalry and 46th Native Infantry at Sealkote, it was considered no longer safe to leave arms in the hands of any Hindoostanee Regiment in the Punjab, and orders were received from Lahore by express to dismount and disarm the 10th Light Cavalry.

This was done the next morning, the 11th July. The regiment having to this time conducted itself *sans reproche*, this measure was deeply felt by both officers and men. Some display of temper was evinced as the men delivered up their arms, but the presence of the Europeans in the vicinity effectually checked any further demonstration.

The horses of the Cavalry were from this time picketed near the guns of the Artillery, half the men being left with the horses and half in the Cavalry Lines at the further end of the station.

From this time till the 18th August, when orders were received to send the horses of the 10th Light Cavalry to Lahore, the regiment remained quiet and no further restraint was considered necessary or advisable. But correspondence of a seditious nature addressed to men of influence in the regiment was intercepted, and information was obtained that the regiment was preparing to break away; but all such reports

were considered vexatious, and there were few that questioned the loyalty of the men.

35. My information, however, proved perfectly correct, for on the morning of the 19th August the regiment broke into mutiny in the following manner :— **Mutiny of 10th Light Cavalry.**

On a preconcerted arrangement some men from the Cavalry Lines armed with *tulwars* which had been concealed when the lines were searched, and some few with firearms joined their comrades in camp with the horses, and taking advantage of the hour when the Europeans were at dinner made a sudden rush upon the guns, cutting down the European sentries. They found the syces ready enough to harness the horses, and the mutineers seemed to have entertained a vain hope of getting away the guns. **Attempt to seize guns.**

The delusion vanished on the appearance of the Europeans, who rushed immediately from the barracks and recovered the guns, bayoneting some of the sowars. In the meantime some 60 or 70 horses had been cut away from the Cavalry picket and some few from the Artillery. A gun from the nearest bastion in the entrenchment was immediately opened upon the Cavalry camp, killing but few of the sowars and unfortunately destroying a large number of the Government horses. The sowars made good their escape through the cantonments to their own lines, where they were joined by others of the regiment, and, having seized all the officers' chargers they could lay hands on and any horse or pony they found, they rode quietly off in the direction of Bhattinda and Hansie. The new Sikh Regiment under Captain Salmon were soon under arms, but what had occurred was done so quickly that the Sikhs had not time to intercept the mutineers when passing through cantonments, and they were soon obliged to abandon the pursuit as hopeless. **Escape of sowars.** **Unsuccessful pursuit of mutineers.**

Major Marsden with 45 of the Putteeala horsemen followed the mutineers for some miles, but could not get them to close upon them. He was at one time placed in great jeopardy by their abandoning him at a critical moment, and for a time

sustained a conflict with two men single-handed. Left alone on the field, he was forced to return.

The road taken by the mutineers was inaccessible for Artillery, and the pursuit was abandoned. The Dogur Chief, Jeymul, was offered a large reward to take some followers in pursuit and cut up the mutineers and bring back their horses, but they were never overtaken. About 200 of them thus escaped. It was said that a good many of these men were afterwards killed at the affair at Mungalee in the Hansie District.

Safety of ladies in cantonments.

36. Almost all the ladies in the station were in their bungalows, when the mutiny broke out, in the greatest alarm, but no attempt was made by the sowars to enter the compounds.

Murder of Mr. Nelson, Veterinary Surgeon.

Mr. Nelson, Veterinary Surgeon of the 10th Light Cavalry, was met by some sowars when endeavouring to escape from his own house to the fort, and was cut down and afterwards cruelly murdered by some grass-cutters. Three Europeans were killed and three (one female) severely wounded.

Number of mutineers accounted for.

About 15 mutineers were killed and 2 afterwards blown away from guns ; 10 were afterwards captured and hanged at Loodiana; 25 of the Artillery syces were transported for life by sentence of General Court-martial.

37. Of the mutineers captured since the 13th May—

44 were imprisoned for life ;
2 were imprisoned for 14 years ;
2 were imprisoned for 10 years ;
46 were imprisoned for 7 years ;
8 were imprisoned for smaller periods ;
2 were hanged ;
11 were blown from guns.

Execution of the Nawab of Ránia.

In the Civil jail 18 persons were executed, including the Nawab of Raneeah, who plundered the town of Sirsa and proclaimed the restoration of the Mogul Empire.

Thus ended all the disturbances in this station.

38. The event of all others which excited perhaps the greatest interest to the British public in these parts, pregnant at it was with such important results, was the despatch of the Siege Train to Dehlee on the 26th August.

Despatch of Siege Train and ordnance stores to Delhi.

With a new and inexperienced establishment, and many difficulties to overcome, Captain Lewis was never heard to speak of them, but with his subordinates laboured night and day to comply with all the demands for the Army before Dehlee and the large irregular force and levies that sprung into existence in the Punjab during those few eventful months.

More than 2,000 cart-loads of ammunition and military stores were despatched from this magazine to the seat of war between the 13th May and 14th September, and finally the Artillery and Engineer Park were rendered efficient enough with workmen, artificers, ordnance and stores, to bring to a successful and glorious termination the ever-memorable siege of Dehlee.

ENCLOSURE (6) TO 1.

8. *From Lord* WM. HAY, *Deputy Commissioner, Simla, to* G. C. BARNES, *Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States, Umballa,—No. 84, dated Camp, 6th February 1858.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 17, dated 18th January, calling for a narrative of events which occurred during the past year in the Simla Hills connected with the disturbances occasioned by the mutiny of the Bengal Army.

Report on events in Simla.

2. The news of the Meerutt and Dehli massacres reached Simla on the night of the 13th of May, and at a very early hour the following morning I received a letter from Colonel Becher, Quartermaster-General of the Army, intimating that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Staff would in the course of the day proceed to Umballa, and requesting me to forward orders to the officers in

Receipt of news of Mutiny.

command of the regiments stationed in the Hills to move down with the least possible delay. The Goorkha Regiment at Jutogh was also directed to march as soon as practicable, and I lost no time in arranging for the relief of their guards in the three cantonments as well as in Simla.

Departure of Commander-in-Chief for plains.

The guard at Barnes Court was marched off while I was there, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and Staff started for the plains at about 11 A.M.

Doubtful loyalty of Gurkhas.

3. Before, however, leaving Barnes Court, my Kotwal, who happened to be in attendance, brought to my notice that he had overheard the men of the guard make use of very questionable language, and on that account begged me to be on the alert.

I was soon after informed that the same party had loudly hissed Mr. Peake as they passed him on their way to Jutogh. When questioned by me on the subject, Mr. Peake entirely confirmed the report and declared that more than half of the guard greeted him with a loud and unmistakable "hiss," and further that they all appeared much excited, and were eagerly listening to a man who, keeping somewhat ahead of the rest, talked and gesticulated in a most unusual and energetic fashion.

From other trustworthy quarters I ascertained that men of the regiment had used language of a very insubordinate and mutinous character, and that several had declared their determination not to move a step from Jutogh.

Alarm of residents and precautionary measures.

4. The fearful intelligence from the plains, the very questionable fidelity of the Goorkhas, and the unprotected state of the station naturally produced the greatest alarm amongst the European residents, and some of them early on the morning of the 14th May applied to Colonel Chester, Adjutant-General of the Army, and obtained an order on the Jutogh Magazine for a supply of muskets and ammunition, for the conveyance of which I was requested to make the necessary arrangements.

A meeting of the residents was also called for the purpose of taking measures for the protection of life and property.

5. The greater part of the day I was fully occupied in making arrangements for the supply of carriage to the Head-Quarters Staff and with a thousand other matters connected with the emergency.

My great object was to get the Nusseeree Regiment out of the hills, and this I hoped to do, though requiring upwards of 700 coolies for the transport of its baggage, the following day.

6. In the afternoon I rode over to Jutogh to look after the muskets which, though sent for in the morning, had not yet made their appearance. I saw them on their way to Simla, and on my return joined the meeting of residents at Mr. Peterson's house. It was attended by almost every European in the place, about 120. A Committee of Safety had been appointed; a sort of Militia organized; such arms and ammunition as could be procured distributed; picquets and patrols told off; a place of rendezvous selected—in short, everything was done calculated to protect the station against all contingencies.

7. The next morning, the 15th, I again visited Jutogh. The coolies were arriving and the regiment was to march the same afternoon. I returned to Simla, but soon after (about 2 P. M.) again rode towards the cantonment.

Mutiny of Nassiri Battalion at Jutogh.

Just as I got about three-quarters of a mile from the station, a most unexpected sound of shouting and violent altercation fell on my ears. I observed natives flying in every direction: some, chiefly coolies, to the tops of the neighbouring heights; others, mostly bunyas and tradespeople, towards Simla.

8. I saw and heard quite enough to convince me that the regiment had mutinied.

9. Those whom I interrogated told me much the same tale, *viz.*, that just as the baggage of the regiment was about to be moved, one of the sepoys cried out "They are taking away our magazine. What shall we do without our magazine?"

This was the signal for a general outcry, in which every sepoy in the place joined. The coolies were ordered to leave their loads, and were driven with blows out of the station.

Feelings of regiment against General Anson, Commander-in-Chief.

The men declared that nothing would induce them to march; the name of the Commander-in-Chief was frequently mentioned in terms of the greatest disapprobation. The sepoys demanded with the most angry demonstrations that he should be given up to them and made to answer with his blood for the attempts which had been made to interfere with their religion and destroy their caste.

10. I subsequently learnt that the men of the regiment were fully convinced that General Anson was secreted in Jutogh, and it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to persuade them that he was not concealed in Major Bagot's house.

Some days after a Goorkha declared to me his perfect conviction that the Commander-in-Chief was still lurking about Simla; that he had shaved his beard and had assumed a disguise; but that under any circumstances he would never reach Umballa alive, so strong was the feeling against him among the sepoys.

Attitude of Gurkhas and speculations of Lord Wm. Hay as to the best course to adopt.

11. I remained where I had pulled up for some time longer in hopes that the commotion would subside and that the regiment would still be got to make a start; but, as the shouting and excitement seemed to be rather on the increase than the contrary, I rapidly returned to Simla, informed the residents of the exact state of affairs; warned them to be prepared for anything that might happen; proceeded to my own house, remained there only a few minutes, and then hastened back to Jutogh.

12. On reaching the spot where I first stopped I again pulled up. The sound of voices was loud as ever. I was informed that the European officers had vainly endeavoured to pacify their men; that they had met with nothing but insubordination and ill-treatment; that the depôt men had been ignominiously turned out of the station; and that the sepoys

had loudly threatened, and had been more than once on the point of putting their threat into execution, to plunder and burn the houses at Simla.

Speculations of Lord Wm. Hay as to the best course to adopt.

Such being the condition of affairs, I considered what line of conduct I should adopt.

I judged that it would be utter folly to place myself in the power of the mutineers, which I should of course do by riding into the cantonments; that without a force sufficiently strong it would be worse than useless to attempt coercion; and that therefore the only other course which was open to me was to endeavour to allay the excitement by measures of a conciliatory nature.

I considered that by this means I should at least gain time and enable the European residents either to make good their retreat to the other stations in the hills or to take effective measures for protecting themselves at Simla.

I had to decide whether the few Europeans in the station were warranted in maintaining the hostile attitude which they had assumed towards the Goorkhas at all risks and at any hazard, or whether it would not be more expedient to allay their excitement and if possible bring them to a sense of their duty. *I had only a few moments in which to* make up my mind. The juncture was an *unprecedented one. I was responsible* for the safety of many hundreds of women and children scattered over miles of hillside. I had only about 80 Europeans on whom I could really rely, and they were only partially armed and badly off for ammunition. I knew that danger was to be apprehended not only from the mutineers of the Nusseeree Regiment, but from the inhabitants of the Simla Bazaar, from the rascals who infest every native bazaar.

The occurrences at Dehli and Meerutt were quite fresh, and I apprehended that similar advantage might be taken of the unprotected state of property to perpetrate like iniquities.

What, from first to last, I most dreaded was what I could *not possibly* guard against. I feared that some scoundrel would

seek to precipitate matters and bring on a general riot by firing one of the many isolated and unguarded bungalows. I feared lest this should happen, for I knew what the consequences would be. A scene of plunder—confusion—would follow which no exertions of mine could check before the commission of incalculable mischief.

The very thing occurred at Loodhiana which I thought might happen at Simla, and which would have happened if order had not been speedily restored. The passage of a party of mutinous troops through the station was the signal for a set of budmashes to commence looting the empty bungalows of the European residents.

Decision to adopt a policy of conciliation and measures taken to this end.

13. Such were the thoughts which passed through my mind while sitting on my horse listening to the loud and continuous roar of mutinous voices. I soon made up my mind that it was my duty to abandon all idea of coercion and to endeavour to do what I could by conciliation.

14. Accordingly I despatched into the cantonment a Native Chief, Miya Ruttun Singh, uncle to the Rajah of Mundee, who happened to be with me, with a message from myself to the mutineers to the effect that I was close at hand and both ready and willing to hear what they had to say and as far as lay in my power to redress their grievances. His mission did no sort of good, but the Miya deserves credit for the alacrity with which he obeyed me and undertook a service not unattended with risk.

Interview between Major Bagot and Lord Wm. Hay and representatives of the Gurkha Battalion.

15. But soon after he had gone I forwarded by a Goorkha-looking individual (the only man I could induce to take a letter into the cantonment) a few hastily-written lines to Major Bagot requesting him to come and speak to me. I saw the messenger enter the cantonment, and in a few seconds the sound of voices, which had continued for several hours without interruption, suddenly ceased. Shortly after, pale and exhausted, Major Bagot, accompanied by two Goorkhas, deputed by the rest of the men, issued from the cantonment and came to where I was.

16. The two men at once commenced a detail of their alleged grievances. Their language and demeanour were respectful, but they were evidently in a state of the greatest excitement. They complained that by relieving their guard over the Treasury, by taking their arms and ammunition, by establishing patrols, the European residents at Simla had shewn a want of confidence in them which was not deserved; they went on to say that the introduction of the greased cartridge, the distribution of *attah* adulterated with bone dust, the establishment of tolls, and the promulgation of certain orders relative to their pay were indications of a change of policy which boded nothing but evil to them and religion.

In reply I pointed out that when the former Nusseeree Regiment, now the 66th, was ordered to the plains on the occasion of the First Sikh War, their guard over the Treasury was relieved; that the tales about greased cartridges and adulterated *attah* were pure fabrications; and that Government had never discovered (*sic*) the slightest disposition to meddle with their religions. I further reminded them that Government had always placed marked confidence in its Goorkha Regiments; that their being ordered down with the European Regiment was an additional and special mark of the trust reposed in them; and that their guards were relieved with no other object than that of swelling to the utmost our force of soldiers on which we could place complete reliance.

To this they answered that no good could result from their going down to the plains; that the magazine at Phillour had probably fallen into the hands of the sepoys; and that in any case they were determined not to fight against their 'bhais.' I replied that they would find the Fort of Phillour still in our hands; that whatever the Poorbeeas might do, I was perfectly confident their real 'bhais'—the men of the 66th, the Sirmoor and Kumaon Regiments—would remain faithful to their salt; and I ended by saying that to shew that confidence was reposed in them I was ready to restore their guards, their muskets and ammunition, and give them the advance of pay they required.

Concessions offered by Lord Wm. Hay, and their acceptance.

17. To this they said they would consult their comrades, and then returned to the cantonment. Not long after I was informed by Major Bagot that his men had expressed themselves satisfied and had gone quietly to their lines.

Alarm of residents of Simla.

18. Just about this time Sir E. Campbell with a party of gentlemen rode up and informed me that they were deputed by the residents to consult with me as to what line of policy should under the circumstances be adopted. I explained to Sir Edward my views and what I had done. He said he entirely agreed with me, but that I should have the greatest difficulty in inducing the rest to take the same view, for they had made up their minds to resist to the last and grant no concessions.

19. On my arrival at the Bank, the place of rendezvous, I briefly narrated all that had passed, and satisfied nearly all who were present, that, taking everything into consideration, I had acted for the best. And if any doubts on the point still lingered in my mind, they were completely removed when I observed the crowds of helpless women and children, the defenceless and isolated position of the Bank House, the want of water and provisions, the difficulty of obtaining them, the unsteadiness of some of those on whom I had to depend, the scarcity of water, and not the least when I considered how near we were to a bazaar crowded with low Mahomedan and bad characters of every caste and description.

20. The assurances which I gave of the absence of any immediate grounds for fear induced many ladies to return to their houses. Some 80 or 90 persons, including myself, remained to a much later hour. I did not myself get home before dawn of day, and at about six o'clock was again on my way to Jutogh to meet the men coming in to resume charge of their guards.

21. I met the party commanded in person by Major Bagot a few yards from the cantonment, and was surprised to find it larger than was at all necessary.

Major Bagot informed me that he was going to make the Bank over to a guard and asked me to say a few words to his men. After doing so I turned and rode back to Simla.

Placing of a Gurkha Guard over the Bank building at Simla.

22. Placing a guard over the Bank was an arrangement which I had not contemplated, and the fact of Major Bagot's deeming it necessary or expedient to agree to it affords a convincing proof that he was still doubtful of his men, or at least that they were not completely under his control.

I regarded it as a clear indication that the regiment was not to be trusted. But long before I had an opportunity of giving expression to my convictions the residents of Simla had fully made up their minds on the point before I got back to the station and had commenced leaving it with the utmost precipitancy.

23. When asked my opinion as to whether it was advisable to remain in the station, I said decidedly that implicit faith was not to be placed in the regiment, and that, though I did not think there was ground to anticipate any immediate danger, I was of opinion that it would be wise to withdraw the ladies.

Flight of European residents of Simla.

Whether I was right or wrong in giving this advice I *leave to others to decide. Of one thing I* am quite certain, namely, that nothing I could say or do would have prevailed to stop or in any way check the flight of the Europeans from Simla.

24. Some took refuge at Junga, the residence of the Rana of Keonthul, others with the Thakurs of Kotee or Bulsun; while the remainder sought safety in the Hill Cantonments of Dugshai, Subathoo and Kussowlie. In the hurry of the moment few provided themselves with suitable means of conveyance or with even a small stock of provisions. Consequently all were exposed to annoyances and privations; many underwent great hardships, while a few met with severe injuries. Happily they experienced much kindness at the hands of the Hill Chiefs; and, as the Goorkhas shortly

after marched for the plains, confidence was gradually restored and the inconveniences to which all had been more or less subjected were soon forgotten.

Conduct of Gurkha Guard at Kasauli.

25. I will now briefly detail what occurred about the same time at Kussowlie.

When the news of what was taking place at Simla reached that station, the authorities deemed it expedient to endeavour to obtain possession of the treasure under the Goorkha Guard. This was, I think, an error in judgment.

Two courses were open for adoption: the one was at once to overpower the guard and take forcible possession of their arms and the treasure in their keeping; the other was to let them alone, but at the same time to keep a strict watch over their actions. The Officer in Command of the Station had upwards of 50 European soldiers at his disposal. The Goorkha Guard scarcely numbered so many. Coercion was quite practicable. Was it expedient? This question was answered in the negative. It was thought that coercive measures would be very likely to exasperate the men at Jutogh and incite them to retaliate on the unprotected Europeans at Simla. Under this view of the case it is clear that the proper course was not to meddle at all with the Goorkhas, but to leave them in undisturbed charge of the treasure; at the same time to take effectual measures to prevent any disturbance or the removal of a single rupee.

Attempts of authorities to remove treasure.

With the force at Captain Blackall's disposal nothing could be easier, but instead of this the suspicions of the Goorkhas were excited by the removal of a portion of the treasure under the pretext of placing it in a more secure place. And after 40,000 rupees had been carried off, they refused to allow any more treasure to be taken away.

Plundering of Kasauli Treasury and subsequent arrest of men concerned.

26. This insubordinate and mutinous conduct seems to have paralysed every one in authority. Nothing whatever was done to overawe the guard, and they were permitted without the slightest molestation to load themselves and their women with as many rupees as they could carry and then leave the place. Encumbered by the weight of the rupees

they had thus possessed themselves of, they proceeded slowly towards Jutogh by the high road to Simla.

At Hurreepore they burnt some of the Commander-in-Chief's tents and looted some baggage. At Syree they stopped and searched one or two English officers and ladies on their way to the plains and intercepted and destroyed a post bag containing the outgoing letters.

27. But by this time the main body of the regiment had resolved to be loyal, and accordingly a party sent out for the purpose came up with the men of the Kussowlie Guard close to Syree and conveyed them to Jutogh, where they were secured, not however without much difficulty and not before a shot was fired.

Investigation into causes of the mutiny by Captain Briggs and march of Gurkhas for the plains.

28. An investigation into the causes of the mutiny was then commenced by Captain Briggs, who was deputed for this purpose by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I shall not say more regarding it than that it was conducted with the tact, judgment and skill which might be expected from so distinguished an officer, and that the result of it was that the regiment, to the great relief of all at Simla, marched without a murmur.

29. I have gone into considerable detail in the foregoing account of the mutiny of the Nusseeree Regiment and the "Panic," as it is styled, of the European residents at Simla.

Justification by Lord Wm. Hay of action taken by him.

30. I have done so as much out of a desire to see justice done to the latter as to myself; for my conduct, as well as theirs, on that occasion has been severely, but I think unjustly, censured. I have been blamed for making humiliatory terms with a mutinous regiment, they with giving way to groundless alarms.

31. That there were some who left Simla with indecent haste, who should have remained there to the last, I won't deny; but it is simply absurd to charge helpless ladies with having been foolishly panic-stricken because, justly doubting the fidelity of a regiment which had given such unquestionable

Justification by Lord Wm. Hay of action taken by him.

signs of being infected with a mutinous spirit, and with the horrors of Dehlie and Meerutt before their eyes, they fled from a place where they could not remain a moment with any degree of security.

32. With regard to the part acted by myself, I have only to remark that I trust it will be considered that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, with a mutinous regiment at Jutogh, a bazaar or rather several bazaars full of Mahomedans and doubtful characters of all kinds, responsible for the safety of many hundreds of ladies and children, without any armed force on which I could depend, I was justified in the line of policy which on the spur of the moment I adopted.

33. It never came to a question of whether we could or could not, should or should not, resist to the last in spite of every difficulty and against great odds. If it had, I have no doubt as much gallantry would have been displayed at Simla as has been shown in other places.

But, though affairs never came to this pass, they were fast approaching it, and I am convinced that if we had continued to maintain an hostile attitude towards the Goorkhas, they, seeing no chance of pardon, no loophole for escape, aware of the magnitude of the offence of which they had been guilty, would have resolved to make the best of a bad case. Bungalows would have been fired; the budmashes of the bazaars instigated to rob, burn and destroy; straggling Europeans would have been murdered; and we should have seen our women and children perishing from hunger and thirst, or they would have been compelled to risk a retreat through a hilly and difficult country, exposed to the practised aim of men as active as monkeys.

"It is easy," to quote the words of a writer on the occasion, "to say that no fear and no flight ought to have taken place, but I think that no candid person will deny that there was great cause for both."

"The Goorkhas were in a state of mutiny, and at one time seemingly intended to make an attack upon the

inhabitants. Moreover, they were in a most excited state, and the casual firing of a shot, a single affray of a Goorkha with an European, or a single rumour on the part of any designing native that the Europeans were going up to attack them, might have plunged them headlong into the wildest and most murderous outrages."

34. Again, although the condition requiring the restoration of the arms and ammunition sounds very humiliating, it was not in reality more so than any other dictated by force, nor was it practically attended by bad results. On the contrary, whereas the other conditions agreed to at the time were then and there fulfilled, up to this moment I have not succeeded in getting back all the muskets.

35. The Nusseeree Regiment contained men as thoroughly mutinous as any in the worst regiments which mutinied on the plains. It was delicate handling and judicious treatment which saved it in the first instance from the commission of the worst excesses; but its subsequent good behaviour is owing to no one thing but the fact of the other Goorkha Regiments remaining faithful.

The behaviour of the guard at Kussowlie affords ample evidence of what a less judicious treatment of the main body *would have led to.*

Theft of treasure at Kasauli by Burkandazes.

36. On the departure of the Goorkha Guard from Kussowlie the Treasury was left in charge of the burkundazes of the Cantonment Police. Unfortunately Mr. Taylor neglected to examine or even to secure the treasure chests. The temptation thus placed in the way of the Police proved too great, and in the course of the night all the treasure left by the Goorkhas was abstracted; while the burkundazes, to account for the empty chests, trumped up a stupid story of the Goorkhas having returned in the middle of the night, bound them to posts and trees, and carried off the treasure.

37. The story was obviously false, but it was some time before I obtained satisfactory proof of how the robbery had been committed. At last, however, one of the burkundazes

engaged in it made a clean breast, pointed out where the Daroga had secreted his share, amounting to 2,000 rupees, and where the shares of several others were concealed,—in short he gave a clue which led to the apprehension of most of the offenders and to the recovery of a large portion of the missing treasure.

Disturbance in Hindour.

38. I must now turn to Hindore, where, while the events above related were occurring, a slight disturbance took place.

39. When the Jutogh Regiment first shewed signs of disaffection I despatched a messenger to Nalagurh for some arms and ammunition I knew to be there. Simultaneously with their despatch from Nalagurh, news of the mutiny at Jutogh and what had occurred at Kussowlie spread through Hindore.

Fearing lest the arms, &c., should fall into the hands of the Goorkhas and other disaffected persons, the zumindars of Malown seized them and refused to allow the party in charge to proceed.

I at once deputed Miya Jye Sing, brother of the Rana of Bagul, to the disturbed locality, through whose instrumentality order was speedily restored.

Arrival of party of Jullundur mutineers at Buddee.

40. The next occurrence was the arrival at Buddee of a party of the Jullundur mutineers, about 600 strong. They remained there a very short time, for, hearing of the approach of a party of Europeans, they struck their camp, followed the Seeswan line of road through the Sewalik Range, and then made the best of their way to the Jumna, across which they escaped, having succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Deputy Commissioner of Umballa, who with a party of Sikhs, &c., endeavoured to intercept them.

Execution of Ram Pershad, Bairagi, of Subáthu, for sedition.

41. About this time one Rampershad, a Byragee of Subathoo, was suddenly arrested on a charge of being the writer of certain seditious letters, conveyed to Umballa, and there executed.

42. The letters were unquestionably seditious. They could scarcely be more so, but it appeared to me at the time—and I see no reason to change that opinion—that Rampershad was quite innocent of writing or causing them to be written. In the first place he was a hillman; in the second, he was unable to write; thirdly, the letters shew evident marks of being fabrications. They were three in number, and, though full of the most seditious expressions, the supposed writer's name and address appeared at full length on the envelope of each of them.

Doubts as to Ram Pershad's guilt.

The letters were forwarded through the post at a time when it was notorious that native letters were subjected to the strictest examination. Two of the letters were addressed to a Subadar of the Nusseeree Regiment, then doing good service at Saharanpore, and the third was directed to the care of the Rajah of Putteeala's Vakeel in attendance on the Commissioner. The contents of this letter were especially calculated to excite suspicion that it was not written by the person whose name appeared outside. It called upon the Rajah's Gooroo, mentioning him by name, to exert himself in the cause of the mutineers, but the Gooroo referred to had been dead six months,—a fact which might not be generally known, but of which a man of Rampershad's calling *could not possibly* have been *ignorant*.

Again, after the most seditious expressions, the letter goes on to say that the writer is afraid to put more on paper for fear of detection, but will send a trusty messenger who will state his views with more precision : no such messenger was ever caught. It seems to me clear that Rampershad was the unfortunate victim of a conspiracy. He was possessed of considerable wealth and had recently made himself obnoxious to one creditor at least by the enforcement of somewhat stringent measures for the recovery of his claims.

I have not taken into account the universal belief in his innocency which prevails in the hills, though it is of greater importance than it might appear at first sight. No disposition has been manifested by the hill-people to encourage,

screen, or in any degree sympathise with the seditiously disposed, and I am confident that even had this not been the case some sort of evidence would be forthcoming.

A man who should be so daring, so reckless, so utterly indifferent to consequences as to commit to paper such unqualified sedition with his name attached at full length, and transmit the same through the Government Post Office, when every letter was searched, such an individual would not be likely to exercise much control over his tongue.

Raising of a Volunteer Corps at Simla and other measures.

43. To return to Simla. Although confidence was in a great measure restored by the march of the Goorkhas, and the general good feeling displayed by the hill-people, yet it was considered expedient to establish a Volunteer Corps, to call in contingents from the Hill Chiefs, to increase the strength of the ordinary Police, and to disarm the Hindoostani section of the Native community.

44. Happily the active services of the Volunteers were on no occasion required, for the utmost decorum and good order prevailed throughout the hills, and but for the occasional panics into which the residents allowed themselves to be betrayed, no one would have guessed that scenes of such stirring interest were being enacted in the plains.

Attitude of natives at Simla towards Europeans.

45. The following remarks referring to the behaviour of natives, especially servants, towards Europeans, taken from Lieutenant Maxwell's report, coincide so entirely with my views that I feel I cannot do better than include them in this report:—

"Whatever may have been their real sentiments, all classes of the natives, who were under my observation, at all times evinced the best possible feeling towards ourselves individually and towards our cause. I always did and do now utterly disbelieve in the supposed readiness of the native servants and others to rise and massacre the residents. I never did share these apprehensions, and I invariably found that they were entertained chiefly by those most ignorant of the people. So far from harbouring such suspicions of the natives here, I always thought and always shall think that in adhering to our cause

and refraining from injuring us in our helpless hour they afforded the best practical proof of their utter want of sympathy in this military rebellion. * * * I might have won a cheap and vulgar popularity by indiscriminate severities towards the servants during the past season in deference to the blind exasperation of many of the residents; but, although ever ready to punish the really guilty, I cannot understand that sort of discrimination which sees no difference between the guilty and the innocent, and which, because certain natives have behaved ill at Cawnpore, would punish certain others who behaved well at Kussowlie."

46. The conduct of the native servants appears to me to have been highly creditable to them, and I cannot at this moment recall a single well-authenticated case of insolence or improper behaviour towards an European in any way traceable to the Mutiny or affording any proof of the offender being actuated by motives inimical to the British.

47. But it was almost useless at one time to endeavour to persuade Europeans that every Native did not desire or was not encompassing his immediate destruction. Dread of treachery and an ardent desire for revenge filled their breasts, to the exclusion of every other feeling.

To judge by the language generally held, our countrymen had lost all notion of justice. Expression was given to this feeling by *a loud cry for the extension of martial law* to Simla, not because guilty men had been allowed to escape, but simply because martial law was supposed to afford greater facilities for taking revenge on men whose only crime was their dark skin; and because the authorities did nothing to gratify this blood-thirsty disposition; because they could perceive no good to be attained by compelling natives to treat Europeans of every grade with a degree of respect or rather obsequiousness (compatible, of course, with the deepest detestation) which had never before been exacted or accorded; because they failed to see in every petty neglect of duty, in every trifling impertinence, unmistakable signs of base treachery and murderous intention: in short, because they continued to do justice between man and man—they have

been loaded with opprobrium and even accused of a fellow-feeling with the monsters of Dehlie and Cawnpore.

48. The truth is, one has now to guard against, not a tendency to be lenient to natives, but the very contrary feeling, and I am sure most officers will admit that in every case in which a native is on one side and a European on the other, it is most difficult to avoid a bias in favour of the latter.

Services of subordinates.

49. In conclusion, I do myself the honor to bring to your notice the names of those subordinates who appear to me to deserve honorable mention.

Mr. Berkeley, Cantonment Magistrate, Kasauli.

And first I would mention Mr. Berkeley, for from him during the short time he acted as Cantonment Magistrate of Kussowlie I received the most willing and valuable assistance. I found him active, energetic and judicious, and it affords me much pleasure to be able publicly to record my sense of his services. His place has been filled by Lieutenant Maxwell, whose reputation is already sufficiently established.

Lieutenant Maxwell, Cantonment Magistrate, Kasauli.

Wazir Khan, Kotwal of Simla.

Of the native officials I would prominently mention only one—Vuzeer Khan, Cotwal of Simla. He is a native of Delhi and is a Mahomedan; but at a very early age he was taken into the service of Captain Cunningham of the Engineers, and accompanied him during his travels in Thibet, &c. By the Hon'ble Lieutenant Erskine he was made Cotwal of Simla, in which capacity he has never failed to give great satisfaction. His conduct during the disturbances left me nothing to desire, and though his merits have been acknowledged in the most substantial way—first, by his appointment to the post of Cotwal of Dehlie at a time when such an appointment was doubly honorable, and subsequently to a Tuhsildarship in the Mozuffurnuggur District on Rs. 200 a month—yet I think his loyalty and admirable conduct deserve at the hands of Government a more direct recognition, and I would recommend the bestowal of a valuable khillutt.

In the appendix will be found extracts from a report furnished by Lieutenant Maxwell, a memorandum of subscriptions to the loan, and also of the cost of extra establishments.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 8.

9. *Extract from a letter No. 7, dated 8th January 1858, from Lieutenant P. MAXWELL, Assistant Commissioner, Kussowlie, to Lord WM. HAY, Deputy Commissioner, Simla.*

1. You will perceive that, as might have been expected, the ordinary business of this Court was, in a great measure, suspended by the more momentous affairs transpiring throughout the Empire. There has been but little simple crime, and little civil litigation of any consequence. It would seem as if the attention of all classes was in a manner riveted by the astounding events occurring throughout the districts of the plains. **Report on events in Kasauli.**

2. I assumed charge of my present office on or about the 26th of July 1857. From that day to this the state of the three Hill Cantonments and Kalka has been, under Providence, one of the most profound and undisturbed security and repose.

3. Perhaps it is too much to use the word "security" with reference to our condition during the above period, since unquestionably our safety must have been threatened by a thousand contingencies, and at many times, perhaps unknown to ourselves, we may have been on the brink of disaster; but I would imply that there has happily been no interruption of that actual safety and tranquillity which have rendered the hill stations generally asylums of protection to those of our people who resorted to them.

4. I am not invited to take any notice of events antecedent to my own assumption of office here. The authorities already know that a violent commotion occurred here about the middle of May, when the soldiers of the Nusseeree Battalion, who formed the guard over the Civil Treasury, broke **Plunder of Kasauli Treasury by Gurkha and Police Guards.**

into open and menacing mutiny, plundered the treasury which they were appointed to protect, and marched in a mutinous triumph to Jutogh.

5. At the same time the chief Native Police Officer and many of his subordinates threw off their allegiance and aided in the plunder of the Government coffers.

These unhappy disorders unquestionably owed their origin, or at least the formidable development they assumed, to extravagant rumours at that time current regarding the conduct of the Nusseeree Battalion at Jutogh and the supposed condition of Simla. Fugitives from the latter place, not females alone, but men,—nay Military officers,—entered Kussowlie in a state of wild disorder and alarm, and hesitated not to utter the most extravagant assertions regarding what they termed the "fate" of Simla and its residents.

6. Considering the inflammable state of the native mind at that period, but above all of the native soldiery, there is little room for wonder at the outbreak of the Goorkha soldiers here, who believed that, in bursting into mutiny, they were merely following the suit of their comrades at Jutogh and acting the part assigned to them by destiny in the eventful drama of 1857.

But it does appear difficult to comprehend how 40 native soldiers were permitted to commit such outrages within 100 yards of the barracks of 200 European soldiers, and were suffered to march out of the station, laden with their booty, and exulting in their facile mutiny, under the very eyes of this powerful European force.

7. This seemingly unaccountable circumstance has, I believe, been referred to the operation of a species of conciliatory policy, in accordance with which it was deemed inexpedient to offer any opposition to the mutinous soldiery here, lest their comrades at Jutogh should inflict tragical reprisals on the defenceless community of Simla.

Whatever the merits of this policy, it is nevertheless deeply to be regretted that a handful of mutinous scoundrels

should thus in the first blush of the rebellion have been permitted, in absolute impunity, to beard the British Government in one of its own strongholds, and to carry off British treasure before the very faces of four times their number of British soldiers.

8. On the arrival of this mutinous detachment at the head-quarters of the Nusseeree Battalion at Jutogh, I understand that they were immediately deprived of their booty and placed in confinement by their own comrades, the booty being restored to the authorities.

Suicide of Budh Singh, Police Darogha.

9. About the same time Boodh Sing, the Police Darogah, above referred to, was found lying dead on one of the station roads with a pistol ball through his chest and an exploded pistol in his grasp. It was the opinion of a Court of Inquest and Inquiry that he had died by his own hand.

At this period I arrived at Kussowlie, having been despatched from Simla on "special duty." The result of my inquiries tended to corroborate the verdict of the Court of Inquest regarding Boodh Sing's death. I apprehended and forwarded to Simla nearly the whole body of the Native Police, and I understand that the greater part of them were there found guilty of having participated in the plunder of the treasury, and that considerable portions of the plundered money were afterwards discovered in the village homes both of these men and of the deceased Darogah.

10. With the above exception, no actual disturbance of any kind has visited Kussowlie, or its neighbourhood, throughout the progress of the present rebellion.

Panic among European community at Kasauli.

But, although not convulsed by actual danger or disturbance, the community here has been subject to chronic panics and alarms, the natural enough result of the alarming tidings from other parts of the country, acting on a community chiefly composed of females, many of them refugees from scenes of massacre, whose nerves still vibrated with the horrors they had witnessed or the hardships they had undergone.

The greater part of these panics were not only without foundation, but almost without excuse, in so commanding a positon, guarded by a very considerable force of European soldiers.*

* The garrison here at one time amounting to about 300 men never I believe fell short of 120.

Some apprehended a rising of the bunneas in the bazaar!—some an insurrection of mussalchees!—one day we were all to be poisoned by our cooks. Again it was the Bheesties who were to rise and massacre us!

Reasoning and argument had little effect in allaying these alarms; and there were not wanting some sufficiently unmanly, or unsensible, to do their best to foment them. In this wise much misery and suffering was caused.

Disarming of natives in Hill Cantonments.

11. In the month of June the order for the disarming of all classes of the natives was carried out here and at the neighbouring cantonments and Kalka. The measure was not considered completed by one search and confiscation. On my arrival in July I renewed the search, and maintained it periodically, not without advantage.

Disarming of detachment of 60th Native Infantry at Kálka.

In June, too, was disarmed at Kalka a small detachment of sepoys of the 60th Native Infantry, who had been acting as a guard over public stores at that station. I believe they are there to the present day, and they have never misbehaved themselves in any way.

1 Havildar.
1 Naick.
8 Sepoys.

Throughout the greater part of the season a small party of European soldiers, under a steady non-commissioned officer, was posted at Kalka. They are now withdrawn.

Groundless apprehensions of an attack by Jullundur mutineers.

12. Shortly after the outbreak of the Native troops at Jullundur, the impression gained ground here that the mutineers of that Brigade were bent on attacking Kussowlie and the other hill stations—an irrational fancy, the entertainment of which well shows the fearful temper of the European mind at that time.

Much anxiety was felt on this account; and it was declared by many (among them some of those who had before seen Simla in ashes, and other prodigies) that large bodies of the mutineers were distinctly visible at Buddee, &c.

With the view of allaying this anxiety, Captain Blackall, Commanding the Troops, made a strong reconnaisance in the suspected quarter, when no symptoms of any mutineers were perceptible.

13. Subsequently to this, on my arrival here, I was incessantly receiving letters from the *quidnuncs* who infested the place, pointing out the presence in, and around, the station of supposed sepoy mutineers.

I need hardly tell you that, in every case, these suppositions proved entirely groundless; and I do not believe that any body of mutineers ever came even into the neighbourhood of Buddee, much less contemplated an attack on the hill stations.

I was entreated by some persons to take stringent measures for the seizure of all arsenic and other poisonous substances in the bazaar. But I considered the existing restrictions on the sale of poisons perfectly sufficient, and deemed it extremely inexpedient to make any unusual fuss about the matter.

14. I have said that, in all probability, we were at many times threatened by secret dangers of no mere fanciful nature.

Treason of Ram Pershad, Bairagi, and his execution.

Of this character was one brought to light by Mr. Barnes, the Commissioner, who discovered a correspondence of a most seditious tone, and murderous intention, having for its object the raising of all the Hill Chiefs and the destruction of all the English in the hills.

The author of this corrrespondence, a Byragee, or Hindoo churchman, named Rampershad, a resident of Subathoo, and a person of some wealth and great influence there, was apprehended by me, under Mr. Barnes' directions, and sent to Umballa, where he was tried and shortly executed.

The discovery of this correspondence was a most providential thing; and it can hardly be doubted that this circumstance, together with the swift destruction of the incendiary, had the most salutary effect on our safety.

Precautions taken during the Muharram.

15. Much anxiety being felt as to what might occur during the Mohurrum festival, I bound over all the substantial Mahomedans in heavy recognizances for the maintenance of peace and order, not only here, but at the two neighbouring Hill Cantonments and at Kalka. At the same time the Military were held on the alert. The consequence was that the festival passed off, not only without disturbance, but almost without the customary ceremonial observances.

Attitude of natives.

16. I cannot think of anything to add to these remarks: at no time, and in no class of the native community (with the above exceptions) did I ever perceive any symptoms whatsoever of disaffection. Whatever may have been their real sentiments, all classes of the natives, who came under my observation, at all times evinced the best possible feeling towards ourselves individually and towards our cause. I always did, and do now, utterly disbelieve in the supposed readiness of the native servants and others to rise and massacre the residents.

I never did share these apprehensions; and I invariably found that they were entertained chiefly by those most ignorant of the people. So far from harbouring such suspicions of the natives here (servants and others), I always thought, and always shall think, that in adhering to our service and our cause, and refraining from injuring us in any way in our helpless hour, they afforded the best practical proof of their utter want of sympathy in this military rebellion; and that instead of reviling them, and, as too many do, treating them with harshness and severity, we owe a deep debt of gratitude, not only to the natives of the hills, but even to our faithful native domestics.

I might have won a cheap and vulgar popularity by indiscriminate severities towards the natives during the

past season in deference to the blind exasperation of many of the residents. But, although ever ready to punish the really guilty, I cannot understand that sort of discrimination which sees no difference between the guilty and the innocent, and which, because certain natives have behaved ill at Cawnpore, would punish certain other natives who have behaved well at Kussowlie.

17. The hill stations generally, and Kussowlie in particular, have indeed proved blest asylums of safety to hundreds of our people during the past memorable year. During the whole season, not only were the houses in the station filled to overflowing, but the magnificent European barracks, nearly abandoned by their natural tenants, were crowded with those who sought the safety and other benefits of the station. Even the dâk bungalow became a lodging-house in permanence, and as for myself, failing to get accommodation elsewhere, I lodged in the Cutcherry itself. **Refuge of Europeans in hill stations, and particularly Kasauli.**

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 8.

10. *List of parties who deposited money in the 6 per cent. loan at the Simlah Treasury.*

No. in book.	Date and month.		Names of subscribers.	Amount of each.
				Rs.
21	3rd	July 1857	The Ranah of Bulsun	2,000
22	9th	Ditto	Gungaram	1,500
23	9th	Ditto	Lolljeemull	500
24	9th	Ditto	Pyladdoss	700
25	9th	Ditto	Manuckchund	500
26	9th	Ditto	Hurdeodoss and Gunaseeloll	1,000
27	9th	Ditto	Bhugwandoss	2,000
28	9th	Ditto	Issurreemull and Rooldoomull	2,000
			Carried over	10,200

List of parties who deposited money in the 6 per cent. loan at the Simlah Treasury—continued.

No. in book.	Date and month.		Names of subscribers.	Amount of each.
				Rs.
			Brought forward .	10,200
29	9th	July 1857 .	Emam Bux & Co. . . .	500
30	9th	Ditto .	Punahloll, Gomasta of Daveechund.	250
31	9th	Ditto .	Bindrabund and Moolraj .	1,500
32	9th	Ditto .	Seeosahoymull and Nundamull	700
33	9th	Ditto .	Chotaloll, Bazaz . . .	300
34	10th	Ditto .	Dwarkadoss	467
35	13th	Ditto .	The Raja of Nahun . . .	20,000
36	13th	Ditto .	Kanahmull and Koonjeemull .	1,000
37	14th	Ditto .	The Rajah of Bhagal . .	4,000
38	15th	Ditto .	Nugurmull, Bazaz at Kussowlie	1,000
39	15th	Ditto .	Mujjoololl, Bazaz at Kussowlie	1,000
40	16th	Ditto .	Needhu, Baniah, Simla Bazar .	500
41	16th	Ditto .	Mr. David Mahony . . .	1,000
42	10th	Ditto .	Sowaee Sing and Futteh Sing	250
45	20th	Ditto .	Soorjun Sing and Beer Sing of Sirmour.	3,000
46	20th	Ditto .	Shaikh Hossainee . . .	4,000
48	21st	Ditto .	Chujmull and Jankeedoss .	250
49	21st	Ditto .	The Ranah of Turoch . .	100
50	24th	Ditto .	Ram Sing, Rana of Durcotee	100
51	24th	Ditto .	The Ranah of Mylog . .	2,000
52	28th	Ditto .	Ditto Mangul . .	100
53	28th	Ditto .	Rooldoo at Subathoo . .	50
			Carried over .	52,267

List of parties who deposited money in the 6 per cent. loan at the Simlah Treasury—continued.

No. in book.	Date and month.		Names of subscribers.	Amount of each.
				Rs.
			Brought forward .	52,267
54	28th	July 1857 .	Sunkurdoss, Bazaz at Subathoo	200
55	28th	Ditto .	Kuniah, Punsaree at Subathoo	200
56	28th	Ditto .	Choonee, Khattre at Subathoo	100
57	28th	Ditto .	Lallee, Buniah at Subathoo .	70
58	28th	Ditto .	Oodmee, Khattre at Subathoo	100
59	23rd	Ditto .	Miss Anne Green . . .	100
61	23rd	Ditto .	Bahadoor, Buniah at Subathoo	800
62	29th	Ditto .	The Ranah of Kothar . .	2,000
65	3rd	August 1857 .	Ditto Kotee . .	1,000
71	10th	Ditto .	The Rajah of Belaspore . .	15,000
73	10th	Ditto .	The Ranah of Koomarsain .	2,000
75	11th	Ditto .	Lallee, Buniah . . .	30
76	11th	Ditto .	Myheeah and Choonee . .	100
77	11th	Ditto .	Kanah	100
78	11th	Ditto .	Boodoo, Buniah . . .	50
79	11th	Ditto .	Boodoo, Khattre . . .	50
81	14th	Ditto .	Pay-Master D. Chambers .	1,000
82	14th	Ditto .	Quarter-Master J. Dunlop .	3,000
83	14th	Ditto .	Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Herbert.	3,000
84	4th	Ditto .	The Ranah of Koonyhar . .	250
85	17th	Ditto	Ditto Turoch . .	200
87	24th	Ditto .	Pyladdoss, Bazaz . . .	300
88	25th	Ditto .	The Ranah of Keonthul . .	1,600
			Carried over .	83,517

List of parties who deposited money in the 6 per cent. loan at the Simlah Treasury—concluded.

No. in book.	Date and month.		Names of subscribers.	Amount of each.
				Rs.
			Brought forward .	83,517
89	26th	August 1857 .	Munuckchund, Bazaz . .	500
37½	15th	July 1857 .	Thakoor of Ghoond . .	100
90	27th	August 1857 .	Myah Ghuzur Sing of Sangry	100
94	1st	September 1857	Chotaloll, Bazaz . . .	200
95	1st	Ditto	Thakoor of Beejah . . .	250
96	4th	Ditto	Bahudoor, Johoree, of Subathoo	200
97	4th	Ditto	Chujoololl, Bazaz, ditto	250
100	7th	Ditto	The Ranah of Damee . .	400
101	7th	Ditto	Ditto Bhujjee . .	1,000
102½	14th	Ditto	Thakoor of Theog . . .	300
104	14th	Ditto	Mrs. Hope Grant . . .	4,800
107	24th	Ditto	Shaikh Hooseinee . . .	2,000
119	15th	October 1857 .	Quarter-Master J. Dunlop .	700
122	26th	Ditto .	Ditto ditto .	1,000
123	26th	Ditto .	Pay-Master F D. Chambers .	600
124	28th	Ditto . .	Quarter-Master J. Dunlop .	300
131A	12th	November 1857	Lieutenant-Colonel C Herbert	3,000
151	20th	December 1857	Mrs. R. C. Byrne . . .	600
164	14th	January 1858 .	Mrs. C Hall	200
165	14th	Ditto .	Ditto	200
165	13th	July 1857 .	From the residents of Nalaghur	8,000
			Total Company's Rs. .	1,08,217

SIMLAH TREASURY: }
The 27th January 1858. }

WM. HAY,
Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (7) TO No. 1.

11. *From G. H. M. RICKETTS, Esquire, late Deputy Commissioner, Loodiana, to G. C. BARNES, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States,—dated 22nd February 1858.*

Events in Ludhiána District.

I HAVE the honour to reply to your circular, No. 17, dated 18th January, conveying orders from the Judicial Commissioner for a report on what occurred in the Loodiana District during the early months of the rebellion.

2. Having left the district I can only reply by referring to a few notes made at the time and from recollection of the different events.

3. I find my notes commence from 15th May, when there was no further room for the most sceptical to doubt that an anxious time had commenced, and from which period my preparations also date.

Early preparations.

4. On that day, on the strength of a letter from yourself, I wrote off to the Jheend Rajah for a troop of Cavalry and two companies of Infantry, but the Jheend troops, being far from Loodiana and being required down in the Delhi direction, never arrived. In their stead the Nabha Rajah sent his available troops and the Maleir Kotla Chiefs their levies, mention of whom will be made hereafter.

Assistance of Jagirdars requested.

5. On that day also letters were written to the principal Sirdars, jageerdars and men of influence belonging to the district, that the time was come when true men should be forward with their assistance to the State, and requesting them to furnish 80 horsemen at once. They all responded with alacrity to the summons; the men were raised, equipped and mounted at once, and each leader made further preparations to supply horse and foot according to the numbers required of them under their former rulers, and in lieu of whose services they had rendered a money commutation to our Government.

Mith Singh of Malaudh.

6. Conspicuous amongst all was old Mith Singh, the most influential of the Mullowdh Chiefs, and guardian of the present head of the family, who is a minor. Mith Singh came

in person to have an interview with me, supplied 50 good horsemen, volunteered as many matchlock footmen as his jagheer could furnish, and subsequently sent me many fine recruits for the new regiment raised at Loodiana, and volunteered a considerable sum of money as a loan to Government. I feel sure his good example was of great benefit towards keeping up a good feeling towards us among the men of influence in the district, and I hope he may be favourably considered by Government.

Basant Singh of Kheri.

7. The next most conspicuous was Sirdar Bussunt Singh, who owns a fine estate at Kheeree, near Khunna, on the Grand Trunk Road, on the boundary of the Umballa district. He furnished 18 well-mounted men, two being mounted on his own carriage horses, which I returned to him.

Bhadaur Chiefs.

8. The Budhour Chiefs were represented by 20 horsemen, but the majority of their force was sent to Ferozepoor, under whose jurisdiction their estate is situated, and where I believe they did good service.

Ladhran Sardars.

9. The Ludran Sirdars, and they alone, failed in giving me satisfaction; their men were ill-mounted, the Sirdars themselves are a degenerate lukewarm set, perpetually quarrelling with each other, and difficult to manage; once they withdrew their men from the post where I stationed them. On a future occasion I should prefer their money contribution to their aid in men, and their own absence.

Imam Bakhsh of Raikote.

10. Rai Emam Buksh of the old Raikote family, also, though exempt from liability to contribution in either men or money, being a mere pensioner, furnished 10 men, and Bhae Sumpoorun Singh, of Bagrean, an equal number of horse and foot under himself in person.

Chaudhris of Lulton.

11. Conspicuous amongst the less influential were the Lulton Chowdries. The five or six brothers are old soldiers, and as such, being conversant with the numerous wants and requisitions of troops, were exceedingly useful in furnishing escorts, in arranging for supplies, carriage of all sorts, in arranging and loading convoys of magazine stores, in superintending the bridge-of-boats and ferry at Phillour when

troops were passing, in expediting the moving and transit of heavy ordnance, and in raising recruits, both Infantry and Cavalry. Their staunchness to Government has been often tested; they were with the old Loodiana Residents, G. Clerk and Broadfoot; were with the latter when killed at Ferozeshah, and with Mackeson and Major Lake. I have given two of them small situations under Government (jemadars in Thannah Tehseel at Loodiana) and one since my removal to this district I retain as an immediate attendant I can rely on; and several of the younger members are in Hodson's Horse, but I should be glad if their services, both during my time and previously, could obtain for them some substantial recognition.

12. The disposal of the horse and foot contributed by these district Chiefs I shall treat on subsequently.

Removal of treasure.

13. Further, to return to my early preparations. On the 15th May I find the treasure was removed by Mr. Thornton, the Assistant Commissioner, and myself from the treasury, where it was under the usual guard of the 3rd Bengal Native Infantry, and sent under a police escort to Phillour Fort, where it was lodged under the keeping of Her Majesty's 8th Foot, who formed the garrison there. I may as well here mention that the treasure remained there; it was not one of the least arduous duties devolving on the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Thornton, to have repeatedly to go to and fro to Phillour in compliance with constant and unexpected demands for money, the distance being seven miles, besides the passage of the Sutlej, which also, in the absence of the bridge-of-boats, occupies from two to four hours either way.

Increase of police force.

14. On the 15th May, also, four burkundauzes from each tehseel and thannah, two from each first class and one from each smaller chokie, were called in to assist at the station, their places being supplied by recruits. This gave me an accession of about 80 trained men to my city police; they formed all the smaller escorts and guards supplied for treasure, ammunition, magazine stores, baggage, and all the thousand supplies for the troops at Delhi.

Police escorts.

My plan was to associate some jageerdari footmen with a few experienced men from my police, and I am glad to say in no one instance was there any loss or delay, though the charges were most important, including remittances of treasure; and on one occasion 12 Artillery wagons of Artillery and small arm ammunition for the European troops at Umballa were escorted by 30 burkundauzes to that station at a most critical time, when the Native troops were all in open mutiny and ammunition was short. The men commanding this escort refused to give over their charge to a detachment of the 4th Light Cavalry sent to relieve them, bluntly telling them they had no confidence in them; and they received great praise both from the Officer Commanding the station and the Artillery for their spirited conduct. I may as well state, by the way, that these Sikhs make the best possible escort for all stores of an inflammable nature, as they alone of the native population do not smoke, and they take a pleasure in preventing others from doing so.

Miscellaneous duties.

15. A further reference to my notes, a copy of which I append, just as I kept them for the first 15 days, by which time the necessary arrangements were either carried out or in train (and one had become so habituated to the new state of things, and orders were issued so fast, that notes would have been superfluous and too numerous) shows that on that and the few subsequent days supervision began to be exercised over the post office. Every post without exception till October was opened and sorted by my assistants and myself, and great and endless were the irregularities; extra ammunition was distributed throughout the district police; supplies were accumulated at the different encamping-grounds and halting places, the prisoners looked to and re-ironed; materials were collected for the bridge-of-boats, and the repair of its approaches; a staff of artisans and labourers, and an increased guard of picked Sikhs was posted there; parties of Jageerdari or contingent horse were posted at all the tehseels and thannahs and along all the roads; proclamations of rewards for the apprehension of deserters were promulgated; arms for the irregulars were

escorted to Ferozepoor through the deserting sepoys; ladies and children were sent out of the station and across the Sutlej to Phillour, where they had the advantage of a place of refuge in the fort garrisoned by Europeans; and from time to time, carriage for the transport of all kinds of army stores was collected; the bullock train arrangements were taken in hand, and the commissariat for European detachments passing through, the executive in both these departments devolving under existing circumstances on the district officer, until at a subsequent date the transport service was separately organised; also supervision was instituted over all dealers in sulphur and lead, and vendors of caps; a system of passports for all travellers was introduced; Hindoostanees supposed to be tainted were weeded out of all departments; the fort, after it was kindly vacated by the mutineers, was emptied of all its munitions of war, which were sent to Delhi—it was provisioned in case its defence became essential, which was fortunately unnecessary, as its well supplies no drinkable water, and it was placed in some sort of repair; a regiment of Sikhs was raised, in which all furlough men belonging to the district and on leave from their regiments were incorporated; horses were collected for service at Delhi; 200 men were raised for Hodson's Horse; 50 old Sikh golundauzes, survivors from Sobraon, were enlisted for service before Delhi; 500 or 600 Sikhs and Muzbees were enrolled as pioneers; 250 (I think) doolie-bearers were engaged and sent to Delhi for the transport service; 200 men were raised for the North-Western Provinces police battalion; the men on furlough from the Ferozepoor and Loodiana Sikh regiments were formed to the number of 140 (or thereabouts) into one body, were armed and sent down to the Mozuffernugger district, where they are still watching the Rohilkund rebels; estimates were formed of the amount of cattle available for provisions for the vast increase of European troops; and lastly, the manufacturing classes in the town were set to work at sand bags for Delhi, at tent cloth (of which 300,000 yards were made for tents for European troops), and on saddles for the Horse Artillery; artisans were furnished for the magazines at Ferozepoor and Phillour, and

masons and carpenters for the new European barracks in course of construction in the hill stations; and so on, in various ways which have escaped my notes and my memory, the internal resources of the district were brought into play to meet the demands of the times, whilst the spirit of the people was taken advantage of to commit them to the quarrel against the common enemy, and the various subordinate official departments were roused by rewards freely given, and by punishments sharp and severe, to lend their co-operation. I see no need to enlarge on the various heads of matters of detail enumerated above, and will only observe that the commissariat arrangements, and working of the transport train in a great measure, the supplying carriage for the Phillour magazine, for marching troops, the recruiting for all branches of the service, and the passport system, and the care of the post office, were operations continuous from the outbreak till the fall of Delhi.

16. There now remains to notice those topics of a more general nature, affecting the district in particular, and the public interests in general, and these I propose dividing into:—

17. *1st.*—As regards the feelings of the people of all classes of the city, and of the agricultural population.

2nd.—On the bearing of our allies, the Nabha Rajah and the Maleir Kotla Chiefs, their advisers and their forces.

3rd.—The various posts of importance in the district, the different roads, ferries and fords which have to be commanded to ensure the safe occupation of the district.

4th.—The capabilities, resources and wants of the district, and its important but neglected position.

City population.

18. First, as regards the feeling of the city population. At the commencement of May the garrison of the fort, the guards at the Treasury, the general hospital, and over the commissariat stores, were all composed of detachments of the 3rd Native Infantry from Phillour. When matters began

to look unpleasant the Colonel of that regiment sent me over an extra company of that corps; these men were encamped close to the Treasury and Kutcherry, had no duties, and were a source of much anxiety to me; but I was obliged to receive them, as the military authorities at Loodiana were under the Officer Commanding at Phillour. At a later date, through my remonstrances[1] that if they were all right I did not want them, if disaffected (which they were, as they had refused the cartridges, old as well as new), I could not hold them, as I had no one to oppose them, they were recalled to their head-quarters at Phillour. The men off duty from these guards had free access at all times of the day to the city, and I know were in the habit of talking seditiously and mutinously before the police, to the zumeendars at the tehseel kutcherry, and in the streets of the town itself. It is to this that I am inclined, in some measure, to attribute the disaffection, which was general through all classes of the city community.

Kabulis in the city.

19. The city contains a most curiously mixed population. The pensioned descendants of Shah Zaman and Shah Shoojah have increased to the dimensions of a small colony; amongst their retainers are men from every tribe in Cabul, some who have followed all the misfortunes of the Sudozye family, and others who have more recently joined their service. The whole of these masters and retainers may be said, with justice, to subsist on the bounty of our Government. The immense sum of 75,000 rupees a year is disbursed in pensions amongst them. It is strange that while so many soldiers from the Peshawur frontier were fighting in our ranks, no efficient aid could be organised amongst these men. Some few seek, by maintaining a haughty reserve, to support what they are pleased to call their dignity; the generality of them are sunk in the lowest debauchery. From none could I obtain any trustworthy information, even of current events; one of them, Shahpoor, I believe, was willing to be of use, as far as his capabilities extended, but he is a man of no natural parts and of no local weight or influence amongst his brethren.

[1] As also an extra guard from the bridge-of-boats.

Kabulis in the city.

Another Shahzada, Secunder, an employé of low retainers, and in private life sensual and debauched, at times, attempted to inform me of the under-current of feeling, but his information was so mixed up with matters of private spite and old quarrels, that I was forced to reject it in the mass as untrustworthy. To him, strange to say, we are indebted for the preservation of the lives of all the Christian children supported and educated by the American Mission: at the outbreak in Loodiana they were deserted by the lay preacher in charge of the establishment, though he might have brought them to the Treasury, where he himself came for protection, but were fortunately protected by this Shahzada Secunder within his own dwelling.

20. Sufdur Jung, another Sudozye pensioner, who proved a traitor to us and his own race in Kandahar, and is now a pensioner, it is hard to say why, was in league with a Moulvie fanatic residing in the city, and was indefatigable in exciting the Mussulman population, causing seditious meetings and giving so much trouble that I was obliged to request your permission to expel him for a time from the city; but I now regret I did so, as he would most certainly have committed himself when the outbreak occurred, and would have been no longer a recipient of the bounty so little deserved, or a further source of doubt and anxiety to the district officer. On a former occasion I recommended that he should be punished by the reduction of 100 rupees a month from his pension (leaving him 150 rupees), and I still adhere to my opinion that if he remains unpunished he will consider we hold such offences lightly, and on the first opportunity he will give trouble again, and perhaps with more success. Another Shahzada, for nearly 40 years a pensioner (ever since his birth), joined the mutineers, proceeding with his whole family to Delhi, but fortunately the unaccustomed fatigue and exposure killed him; he was accompanied by others of lesser note.

21. The Cabulie followers of these princely recipients of Government bounty were conspicuous in the outrages and

plunder committed in the city, their masters being unable to control them; and these facts induce me to state that in disturbed times the Cabul colony in Loodiana will always be a source of trouble and anxiety. They should not be allowed to increase their number of Cabul servants or be permitted to harbour those not in their service; they should be compelled to furnish lists of all in their employ, for whom they should be strictly answerable, at the peril of their pensions; and lastly, as Sufdur Jung's seditious proceedings, and plan of joining the mutineers (he took his family and all his property) must have been known to all, and no report was made, they should be held mutually responsible for each other's conduct. On such conditions only should these aliens be allowed to enjoy a refuge in our territories. Surely there can be no hardship in insisting that in time of need they must render some support to the State to whose bounty they owe all they possess, or at all events that they cannot be a source of embarrassment or anxiety with impunity.

Good conduct of some of the Kabulis.

22. In contrast to the above, I must not omit to mention that Hussun Khan, a Cabuli, who did us good service in Cabul, was all along a favourable exception to the rest of his race. He was strenuous in his exertions to procure, and successful in procuring, good trustworthy information; he equipped some Pathan horsemen he could rely on amongst his followers from his own country, and was in person willing to undertake any duty or stand any exposure or risk that might be required of him. With his men he was first to occupy the fort when its complete evacuation was far from certain, and from his shrewdness and intimate knowledge of his own countrymen in the city, and his undoubted friendship to Government, he is a valuable man in time of need to any one in charge of Loodiana.

23. Abdool Rehman, formerly of Jelallabad, should also be excepted, though his age and limited means prevent his being of any great utility. He has sons Native Officers in our service, who have all distinguished themselves in the late mutinies; and lastly, Saleh Mahomed, the well-known double

traitor of Affghan war celebrity. He raised and equipped a party of horse, with whom he long did duty at Delhi: perhaps his propensity for horse dealing, for which he had considerable scope in his appointment, tended as much as any other consideration to induce him to take active service.

Kashmiris and others.

24. The other residents of the city can be more briefly alluded to. They consist of a numerous colony of Cashmeeree shawl workers, imported by Sir C. Wade. They have plied their trade unmolested for years, under advantages they never could have enjoyed in their own country, being free and untaxed. They were most conspicuous in the outbreak in plundering the Government stores; in pillaging the premises of the American Mission, where many of them had received their education; in burning the churches and buildings; in destroying the printing presses and stores of books; and in pointing out the residences of Government officials or known well-wishers of Government as objects of vengeance for the mutinous troops. For these offences some were executed on the following day; all had to bear their share in an impost levied on the city to reimburse the sufferers, but what had more effect than anything else was a threat that they should all be expelled from our dominions, whose protection they had so abused, and be banished to their own country.

Gujars.

25. The remaining Mahomedan population consisted of a fraternity of Goojurs and Syuds, the old landed proprietors of Loodiana, and the low Mahomedan rabble,—butchers, petty traders, and discharged servants and camp followers,—who infest the bazars in all our old cantonments. They had been worked up to a high pitch of excitement and fanaticism by the preaching of a fanatic Moulvie. He had twice roused the whole of the Mahomedan population to the very verge of an outbreak; his influence extended to all classes. He was respected by many of the Affghan Shahzadahs, with one of whom (Sufder Jung) he was in league, and with the inferior classes he was all-powerful. His influence also extended far through the district, as he is by origin a Goojur, a numerous race, all along the lowlands bordering on the Sutlej. He was a

compulsory resident of Loodiana, as in 1849 he was detected in treasonable correspondence with the Akhoond of Swat, whom he was secretly furnishing with arms. So to be under closer surveillance he was compelled to remain in the city (a measure of doubtful expedience perhaps, as he had far greater opportunities of disseminating treason in the heart of a large city than in his small and remote village), and the surveillance of course was nominal, as who cares narrowly to watch a person convicted of treason if Government treat the crime lightly and let it go unpunished. On the arrival of the mutineers he collected all his disciples, hoisted the green ensign of his faith, and led them to Delhi. I was thus relieved of one great source of anxiety; he has not since been accounted for, and is probably somewhere in the protected Sikh States.

26. But to return to the Goojurs, Syuds and Mahomedan rabble: the first-named assisted the sepoys in the fort in mounting two heavy guns in the fort bastions (the guns being heavy, a 10-inch howitzer and a 24-pounder, and being run up a steep earthen ramp by main force, unassisted by any of the usual mechanical aids, must have required some 200 men at least, besides the sepoy garrison, to manage them). They possessed themselves of an immense quantity of accoutrements plundered from the fort stores and raw materials for manufactures from the gaol.

Misconduct of Hindu Chaudhris and others.

27. As regards the Hindoo portion of the population, the principal chowdries, traders, and the banking community, who might have done much towards maintaining order, had they exerted their well-known influence over the lower classes, quietly shut themselves up with their money bags in places of safety and concealment, and allowed matters to take their course. They are almost to a man the same who welcomed the Sikh force under Runjode Sing when he attacked Loodiana in 1845, and, like all their class, turn with the prevailing wind, indifferent which side is uppermost, as long as there is no immediate interference with their interests. Though none benefit more by order and good government, and suffer

more from the reverse, still perhaps to none are loyalty and patriotism in their truest sense and for their own sakes more thoroughly unknown. Want of knowledge and foresight prevent their observing beyond the state of affairs immediately presented to them, which obviously is profitable; but their cowardly habits, engendered by their previous life, engrossed in the one pursuit of gain, prevents them declaring themselves prominently, while there is no gratitude on their parts for benefits which they freely admit, for safety for years when Loodiana was the great frontier post, for unexampled freedom in trade, for exemption from all duties and taxation. There should be no further forbearance on the part of Government, and respect and assistance should be enforced through their fears and through their interests; and if it is decided that Loodiana is not to be left so entirely forgotten and unprotected in future, I should be glad to see this class compelled, by some appropriate system of taxation, to contribute to the maintenance of their own safety and the welfare of the State. These persons have contributed some two lakhs to the Government loan, but have done so reluctantly, and none could be obtained previous to the fall of Delhi.

Loyalty of Ram Singh, Chaudhri.

28. But there was one exception deserving of notice among them: Ram Singh, Chowdry, has throughout been zealous and useful as Bazar Chowdry, in laying in supplies and provisioning the fort, and such like duties in his line. He advanced from 2,500 to 3,000 rupees from his own funds at a time when there was no leisure to keep the accounts from day to day; there can be no greater proof of his wish to serve Government as far as lay in his power, and I hope he may be suitably rewarded.

Misconduct of rabble.

29. The lower orders and castes, amongst them Hindoos and Mahomedans, acted as rabbles do, whatever their creed: followed any casual leader that turned up, and joined in promoting general disorder and in promiscuous pillage; almost every class had its representative on the gallows the following day.

30. The means taken to preserve order, and after the outbreak the precautions taken to prevent any further disturbances, may as well find mention here. From the middle of May I used to patrol the city and its environs every night, at any time between 10 and 2; Lieutenant Campbell, of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, who was then quartered in the station, Captain Cox of the Engineer department, Lieutenant Yorke, Commanding Detachment of 3rd Native Infantry, assisting in this duty, which was continued until the Mutiny occurred. Further, as it was brought to my notice that the sword-sharpeners in the city were busily plying their trade, 56 swords being at one time in a shop close to my house, I determined on the first favourable opportunity to disarm the whole city. Then the outbreak occurred, in which as no sword in the city was drawn on our side, there was no room for doubt for what purpose they were got ready. **Patrols.**

31. The first favourable opportunity was on the arrival of Major Coke's regiment, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Younghusband, with a squadron of Punjab Cavalry. They arrived before dawn; by daybreak officers acquainted with the city had taken portions of these troops round the city, posting parties as they went at every outlet. Major Coke then proceeded with the main body through the streets, posting his men at the cross-roads and on all commanding houses. The surprise was most complete. When the population began to stir they were summoned to return and remain in their houses by some threatening rifleman; those foiled in one exit attempted another, but with a like result. The consternation was great, the impression being that, in revenge for the violence of the outbreak, the city was to be given up to plunder to these most unwelcome and most unexpected visitors. The search for arms was conducted by gangs of the police, each under an European officer, each party having a separate division of the city. The result was 11 two-bullock hackery loads of swords and matchlocks; these swords were distributed to the numerous new levies, who hastened down to the scene of the main conflict at Delhi. **Disarming of the city.**

Misconduct of townspeople.

32. Further, on the occupation of the fort by the mutineers, the townspeople in its immediate neigbourhood (amongst them the Goojurs aforesaid) assisted in mounting the cannon. They gave them in one night provisions to last them 10 days, these provisions being all carried to them in the fort ; and in return the sepoys gave the townspeople free access to the stores in the fort. The next morning I saw some 400 townspeople at the gate, and on the crest of the glacis, conversing with the mutineers and still supplying their wants. On endeavouring to apprehend some of them they all received shelter and concealment in the neighbouring houses, and I was frustrated ; and, in the meantime, I was with a dead wall behind me within 80 yards of the muskets aimed at me from the fort, and had to be off with more speed than dignity. As these houses were obnoxious in a military point of view, and the spirit of their inmates was hostile also, I obtained General Nicholson's permission to level all within 300 yards, and I did so, banishing the unhoused Goojurs to seek a residence in their own lands, separated from the city by a deep nullah.

Levelling of houses near fort.

Expulsion of aliens.

33. Again, separated from the city only by a road are the bazaars of the old cantonment. These consisted of some 1,300 houses, inhabited with the swarms of low caste camp followers, breeders of pigs and poultry, butchers, sweepers, and dealers in hides, tolerated for their usefulness where cantonments exist, but intolerable in such numbers when troops are withdrawn. On a previous occasion I represented how obnoxious they were, and requested permission to disperse them, but without success ; however, during the last few months, when expediency and the preservation of order were the great requisites, as I found I could not manage these people, I took advantage of their being Hindostanees, or aliens, and dispersed them to their own houses, and levelled their houses, and Loodiana is a cleaner and quieter place in consequence.

34. My endeavours in these retaliative measures was to devise a punishment in kind such as would be obvious to all

in its working, and which might suggest itself as a natural effect from any given cause. Such punishments are better understood and dreaded from their certainty by all classes (and I confess I understand them better myself), than the orthodox admixture and alternation of fine, labour, or imprisonment, or stripes, each commutable for the other at the fancy of the judicial authority, or, more peculiar still, at the option of the offender himself. For instance, the city armed itself not in its own defence or to preserve order, and its arms were taken away. Again, the houses near the fort gave shelter to the friends and associates of the mutineers; these houses were levelled. The Goojurs proved themselves unworthy members even of such a city community, and were selected for removal from the city precincts to the lowlands in the neighbourhood; the cantonment bazaars gave trouble, and were done away with; aliens resident in the city, made themselves obnoxious, were ejected and sent to their own distant homes; individuals guilty of violent crime, robbery, or murder, were summarily disposed of with drum-head court celerity; and lastly, when all classes joined in the outbreak, all were subject to a fine to reimburse the sufferers. Each punishment suggested itself from the crime which made punishment necessary, and followed sharply in its footsteps.

Fine on city.

35. *It was to this last measure, this fine on the city,* that I attribute more than anything else the subsequent tranquillity in town and country; many influential natives have congratulated me on its aptness to the wants of the times. It was simply an application on a large scale of the village responsibility system, the one local principle in the ancient Punjab code, so appropriate in its nature, and simple and intelligible in its working, which we have engrafted in our criminal system. It enlists all classes on the side of order; the higher classes, whose wants and inclinations do not incite them to join personally in scenes of violence, know that their active co-operation in behalf of Government is essential to prevent their being deemed accomplices in any outrage that occurs; the lower orders know the certain penalty for

their license. Thus, when all are enlisted in the cause of order, through self-interest, and fear of its infraction, order is maintained without trouble or risk. This feeling, actually experimented on in Loodiana City, quickly spread to the other country towns (six in number) in the districts, and from these was communicated to all their neighbouring agricultural population, and with the most satisfactory results. This fine has been considered of doubtful policy, and elsewhere I have had to report at length on all connected with it, but I consider it so imporant that I feel this report would be incomplete if it was not again prominently noticed.

Events leading up to outbreak in Ludhiána.

36. In the course of this narrative allusion has so often been made to the Mutiny and outbreak that some detail of this event appears necessary. The Native troops in Loodiana consisted at the commencement of a small detachment of about 50 men of the 9th Irregulars, but they were sent down to Delhi with the 1st Siege Train; of a guard of 40 sepoys of the 3rd Bengal Native Infantry in the Treasury; about 65 men of the same regiment in the fort; and smaller guards at the general hospital, commissariat godowns, and post office—in all about 130 men of all ranks. Their conduct contains the same inexplicable mixture of contradictions apparent in most corps throughout this Mutiny: they refused their cartridges, old and new, on parade, but afterwards took the old ones and used them. When those humiliating explanations on the cartridge question which emanated from Army Head-Quarters were explained to them, I myself heard one man, a notorious turbulent character, and a man of influence amongst them, say that it was quite satisfactory, leaving nothing further to be desired on that point; they permitted the treasure to be taken away from them,[1] and actually assisted in loading it. The magazine conductor used to be day after day, to the last, single-handed among them, issuing stores and superintending the works in his magazine without any molestation, an instance of coolness and indifference to danger on the part of the conductor (Mr. Harris) which could not be exceeded.

[1] But this was in some measure a surprise, as they were quite unaware it was to be removed.

They escorted the Siege Train across the Sutlej from Phillour, many men working with all their might in assisting, drilling (*sic*) through the heavy sand, though when the train of guns was on the bridge-of-boats it was entirely at their mercy, and though they had previously formed a plan to possess themselves of Phillour Fort and magazine, in which they were fortunately anticipated by the sudden advent of an European detachment only 18 hours before their plan was to have been put in execution ; they escorted ammunition right down to Delhi camp; they were extremely civil and obedient to their own officers, and even after they were in open mutiny, and had threatened to fire on Captain Rothney and the 4th Sikhs, they allowed their officer (Lieutenant Yorke, killed at Delhi) to be with them, and showed him no insult. Of the two men of the regiment who met their death in Loodiana, one was a Jhelum Mussulman, caught as a spy; another, who attempted Lieutenant Yorke's life, and was shot by him, was a young Manja Sikh.

37. These inconsistencies can bear but one explanation: they had one fixed plan; and no minor considerations, no single outrage, or opportunity to plunder any detached treasury or defenceless city, was to be allowed as an inducement to deviate from that plan.

38. These intentions were by chance divulged by a wounded Havildar of the 3rd Native Infantry to an officer who found him concealed at Humayoon's tomb, after the capture of Delhi. This information was given without any attempt at palliation or reserve, and without any extra communicativeness. It was from the lips of a man who knew his end was near, and conveyed the impression of truth to his hearer; it is moreover borne out by known facts and circumstances. It was shortly that all the troops in the Jullundur Doab had agreed to rise simultaneously; a detachment from Jullundur was to go over to Hooshiarpore, to fetch away the 33rd Native Infantry, failing which the 33rd were to remain (and they did so, and are probably considered immaculate) ; then their arrival at Phillour was to be the signal for the 3rd to join, when all were to proceed to Delhi, fording the river as best they could.

39. The Jullundur mutineers sent a trooper in advance, galloping into the 3rd Native Infantry lines, to intimate their approach; this regiment joined them. They sent intimation, probably by a spy, to Loodiana. This spy I imagine was a relative of a sepoy in the 3rd, whom the sepoy had represented to me as a smart useful man and had asked me to entertain as a private servant, which I had consented to do when the mutinies were over if his regiment remained unsuspected. This man I recognised on the banks of the river on the day of the mutiny, and have never seen since. His relative in the regiment was their most conspicuous leader. No doubt he was the means of communication between Phillour and Loodiana.

Receipt of first intelligence of outbreak at Jullundur.

40. The first intelligence of the outbreak at Jullundur was conveyed to me by telegraph from Umballa from yourself. The signaller at Phillour was hopelessly drunk, so he never heeded the signals from Jullundur; fortunately, as a last resource, the Jullundur man communicated direct on to Umballa, and then the wire near Jullundur was cut. It was at 10 A. M. before I received your orders. On the receipt of the news I could scarcely credit it, not understanding why I had received no information direct from Phillour; but doubts were soon settled by the hasty arrival of the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Thornton, who had fortunately been that morning to Phillour for treasure to pay these very troops: he had seen the Jullundur mutineers, had cut the bridge-of-boats, and hastened to me with the news. I ordered Lieutenant Yorke on the hopeless and hazardous duty to try and do what he could with his men; a few moments showed him they knew what had occurred and that it was all up with them. I detained the onward march of the 4th Sikhs, who had most providentially marched into Loodiana that very morning, obtained three companies from that regiment under Lieutenant Williams, Second-in-Command, turned out some 30 of the Maleir Kotla Chief's sowars, requested assistance from the Nabha Rajah's force, to the amount of two guns, 50 of his drilled Cavalry, and 150 of his drilled Infantry, and spare ammunition for the guns. I was most particular in explaining these orders to the Rajah's representative (the Rajah was absent); but I had

Measures adopted by Mr. Ricketts.

no time to wait till the men were ready, and never suspected he would play me false as he did: he never sent the spare ammunition, though he had abundance; he sent undisciplined matchlock-men, horse and foot, instead of his drilled troops, and he next day objected to lend a gun to defend the Kutcherry, where the mutineers were expected. I had to remove this gun myself, his own people looking on and giving no assistance. He also denied having any ammunition, though when the danger was passed he pressed it on us in cooly-loads. These troops were all placed under the command of Lieutenant Williams, with orders to come, as soon as they were ready, to the head of the Phillour bridge, in case the mutineers should seize the boats and attempt to force a passage, and I proceeded alone towards the bridge to get what information I could. On my arrival there I hurried off men on horseback, both up and down the river, to secure all the ferries; they were unfortunately too late at the ferry immediately above Phillour, whither the sepoys had hastened on finding the bridge-of-boats impracticable (it must be remembered they reached Phillour at daybreak, the ferry they seized is only three miles above Phillour, I had no intelligence till 10 A. M.), and I proceeded across to Phillour to obtain intelligence. They had none to give beyond the fact that the mutineers had gone in a body higher up the river, so I sent off a sowar of 2nd Punjab Cavalry who had just arrived, to take this information to the pursuers from Jullundur, who were one march behind, and I returned towards Loodiana. On my way across the river I received letters from Captain Rothney, 4th Sikhs, that the mutineers had defied him and his men, and had taken possession of the fort and treasury. On this as I found Lieutenant Williams with the force under him all ready waiting at the side of the river, I told him what had happened. It appeared to be a regular organised plan to seize Loodiana, and we decided the best thing was to endeavour to seize the ghaut at any risk, to prevent a junction with the Loodiana mutineers; and I moreover feared the effects their successful advance would have on the city, knowing the elements of discord it contained, and there were European women and children in

Measures adopted by Mr. Ricketts

the 4th Sikh camp, their only refuge. A guide was easily obtained until it got dark, when they misled us, and deserted one after the other. However, after a march of five or six miles, we came right on the head of the ghaut, with the mutineer camp directly between us and the river, which was about 120 or 150 yards off; the surprise was complete: fire was opened before they knew who we were, or what we were, and they dispersed and ran in all directions, comparatively a few only holding their ground; but these few caused several casualties amongst the 4th Sikhs (the Nabha and Maleir Kotla men, horse and foot, and one gun, had bolted to a man before they were under fire), and Lieutenant Williams was severely wounded. The gun ammunition was expended, small arm ammunition began to run short, and we had to retire; and the mutineers, after an hour or two, again concentrated at the ghaut. The next morning they threw their dead into the river, so the number of their casualties could not be ascertained; villagers in the neighboourhood and prisoners estimated the killed variously from 45 to 65 men: 10 dead bodies were found stranded on the bank on the next day.

Action with mutineers.

41. Thus, though the immediate object of the attack failed, I believe it tended to prevent the mutineers carrying out their plans against Loodiana itself, as they had collected a quantity of provisions in the fort. I imagine their plan was temporarily to hold that fort and city, whence they could command the Grand Trunk Road from the Punjab to Delhi, whence they could have spread disorganisation throughout Cis-Sutlej, and have shaken the Sikh States, and, by cutting off supplies and placing troops in requisition to attack them, have made a most untoward diversion for our small force before Delhi; but their ammunition was expended: in their hurry in leaving Jullundur they had carried off blank for balled ammunition, and so they had to hurry on by forced marches, avoiding any possibility of collision with our troops. It may be said the above is conjecture. I admit there is no certain information to base my remarks on; but their combination, their collecting provisions, and the fact that (had

ammunition not failed) they had the game in their hands—at least for a time—and that it was their obvious policy, bear me out in the assertion, and my impressions are based on very probable contingencies.

Arrival of Jullundur mutineers in Ludhiána and their proceedings.

42. The following morning, about 11 o'clock, the mutineers arrived at the city. They were joined by their comrades in the fort, which they vacated, the party in the fort having been joined the night before by those in the Treasury, who had abandoned that, to us, invaluable post, by stealth and in the night, and also by all the smaller guards. (One Havildar only, a Hindostanee, manfully resisted the threats and temptations of his comrades and remained true to his salt, and two young Sikh sepoys in his guard also). The populace rose and joined them, and then commenced that scene of disorder and promiscuous plunder above related. The houses of Government officials were attacked; Madho Pershaud, the Extra Assistant, saved his life by concealment. The Kotwal no sooner showed his portly person than he was fired on and fled; the Police (excepting four men) left the kotwali and concealed themselves. The mutineers confined their depredations to an occasional imperious demand for money, to carrying off flour and grain from the bunniahs' shops, and all horses and mules they could lay their hands upon to assist them in their flight; they *released the prisoners, though the guard were quite strong* enough, had they not been cowardly or corrupt, to have prevented the release, and then they made the best of their way after a short rest, in a compact body, on their way towards the south. In the meantime no troops arrived in pursuit. I sent twice begging the Horse Artillery might advance, and they might have caused them immense loss, but they could not be trusted to the 4th Sikhs or the small detachment of Punjab Cavalry, and had to wait for the European Infantry; and so this second great opportunity to destroy these mutineers was lost, and as they had four miles' start of the European Infantry, of course pursuit was hopeless that evening.

43. On their evacuating the town I sent detachments of 4th Sikhs and 2nd Punjab Cavalry through the different

streets to sweep the inhabitants back to their houses and to search out any stragglers from the mutineer force; eight of them were picked up outside the town by Lieutenant Nicholson's detachment of Cavalry without a casualty on his side, and these were all that were then accounted for.

Abortive pursuit of mutineers.

44. The following morning a pursuit was ordered, but it was too late; the mutineers had made a forced march in the night and were far beyond reach, but 13 stragglers were apprehended and executed. The pursuit could not have been made earlier, as the troops, though they had not undergone any wonderful fatigue in rapid marching, had been much harassed by being constantly under arms and without provisions. The troops marched 12 miles out from Loodiana and returned, and the next day proceeded on towards Delhi.

45. There is no doubt that by the advent of the mutineers the civil power in the district was most rudely shaken: the Goojurs along the river banks made cattle-lifting expeditions inland and raids across the river; violent crime immediately sprung up, especially along the neighbourhood of the line of the mutineers' route, excited in a great measure by the released prisoners; murders, highway robberies, dacoities, and village burnings, in revival of old smouldering feuds, occurred simultaneously, but fortunately successful apprehensions were made in almost every instance, some of the offenders informing me with all simplicity that they thought our rule was over; and the storm which had swept through like a whirlwind was succeeded by the pristine state of tranquillity.

46. But to return to the main point under discussion, from which I have found digression inevitable, in a relation of reference to numerous collateral events, and which had to be alluded to each in its place to the interruption of the regular narrative.

Attitude of people.

47. The feeling of the Hindoo and agricultural population in general was undoubtedly devoid of sympathy with the mutineers, but there was not that active hatred of the Poorbeah soldier which seems to have existed in the Upper Punjab; the old soldiers of the Sikh Government, who had

fought against us in the two campaigns, and who are still numerous in all the large villages, have not abated in their antipathy, came forward anxiously for service, and infused no doubt a portion of their spirit into the Jat population, from which class our Sikh troops are recruited. This was most remarkable in the Sikh villages in the neighbourhood of Jugraon, and towards the southern angle of the Loodiana and Ferozepoor districts, where the population is strictly agricultural, where the men are finer, evince much force of character, and are a simple, straightforward race, who take naturally to soldiering. Had the Raikote Thannadar made the most of these people, no doubt much might have been done with them towards apprehending deserters from Ferozepoor, but he was negligent of his duty, and was removed (he was a Mussulman of the Thanesur Nawab's family). Since his removal the most successful apprehensions of mutineers and rebels have been made by them; they posted men to watch all their roads and wells, and were constantly on the alert. A similar feeling existed towards Badhour, and partly in Deylon.

48. On the direct line of the Grand Trunk Road, and to the north of it, this feeling does not exist; but one mutineer was apprehended in that direction. In the neighbourhood of Loodiana alone was any hostile feeling to the Sikh troops evinced. The guards of the 4th Sikhs were abused by the villagers for taking service in our army; sepoys of that regiment were similarly abused in the Loodiana Bazaar. In only one case was a wounded mutineer sheltered and concealed, but this was more a solitary than a characteristic instance of sympathy, as the village he was found in (Gill, four miles from Loodiana) is a regular sepoy village; perhaps it contains hardly a family without a representative in our ranks.

Attitude of Gujars.

49. The Mahommedan Goojur population, who exclusively possess the belt of lowlands along the banks of the Sutlej, and who have villages in almost every part of the district, are thoroughly bad and disaffected. The Moulvie before alluded to as having given so much trouble was of that race and possessed great influence amongst them. From

their position along the river banks they commanded all the ferries, and this induced me to deprive them of all their boats and make inflated skins contraband among them. They played me false when guides were required from amongst them to discover the mutineer camp; they were in constant communication from village to village with the Delhie rebels. I disarmed them all early in the season, but there is nothing to fear from them as regards open opposition, as they are a lazy, cowardly, thieving race, given to marauding and plunder when no great danger to themselves is probable. They are peculiarly vulnerable also through their large herds of cattle, which constitute their chief wealth, and which thrive and multiply on the river banks, giving little trouble to their owners.

Thieving tribes.

50. It could not be expected that in times like these the hereditary thieving races, Harnis, Boureahs and Sansees, would refrain from availing themselves of the increased opportunities for exercising their congenial predatory habits. Throughout the period under report these tribes were astir and restless; they were in constant communication with Delhi; they counted the number of the second siege train guns on their halt at Jugraon, and speedily conveyed the intelligence to the Delhi rebels; but while the police were certain of the general direction of their movements, their hardy habits and the facility with which they assume all disguises prevented the apprehension of any one whilst actually absent from his village. The peculiar legislation for their restraint, to which they are subjected, has proved quite inadequate in its provisions, and the difficulty is increased when men of influence and familiar with our legislation, like Moonshee Rujjub Allee, presume to entertain them as private messengers. I consider the restraint of the Boureahs especially as perfectly hopeless without resort to some severe means, as wholesale transportation, to which I see no reason why they should not be subjected, as they have no feeling for home ties or attachment to place, beyond the facilities it offers for their depredations. They are purely a roving

predatory race, who live on society from their births till they die—you might as well try to domesticate a wolf; but if they were largely transported to some place like the Andamans, where they and the natives might improve each other to their mutual benefit, the remains of the tribe might through fear be induced to attempt some settled and creditable means of livelihood.

51. On the bearing of the Native Chiefs, our allies the Nabha Rajah and the Maleir Kotla Chiefs, not much need be said. The Nabha Rajah evinced his good feeling towards our Government by the alacrity with which he attended in person with all his available troops, which rendered the valuable military service of escorting the first siege train to Delhi, by the readiness with which he advanced money, and the expense he willingly incurred in increasing his forces. Individually, for so young a native, he is one of the most intelligent I have ever met; there is the making of a good man in him, and it would be a great advantage if he and his younger brother could be induced to visit England, leaving his territory to be administered by Putteeala or by us. Like all Native Chiefs, his good qualities are neutralised and his good intentions weakened by his corrupt ministers, prompters, and conscience-keepers; one of whom I have before mentioned as playing me false in need *I consider as so objectionable a minister that if* he could be dismissed through our representations it should be exerted. As for his troops, "the Nabhas don't fight" was I fear a common saying regarding those associated with the Jheend troops at Delhi; and in the one opportunity I afforded them they conspicuously bolted. Should future necessity arise for their aid, their passive forbearance only should be reckoned on and not their active assistance.

Attitude of Native Chiefs.

Nábha.

52. As regards the Maleir Kotla Chiefs, old Soubah Khan was doubtless our staunch ally; he alone remembered the great friendship, for old times and in return for former assistance, borne by his house for our Government, when in the midst of hostile Sikhs we were his only stand-by. But Soubah Khan has died since; his son is a miserable instance

Máler Kotla Chiefs.

of imbecility and debauchery, ignorant and obese; if he succeeds to the chieftainship of his clan and the management of his territory, he will inevitably ruin all connected with him. Of the other Chiefs of that family, Gholam Mahomed, who was with me at Loodiana, was detected in treasonable correspondence with Roostum Ali, his brother, who remained in Maleir Kotla: the intercepted letter contained the rankest treason, calling on him and all true Mussulmans to rise in behalf of their faith and exterminate all unbelievers. A tehseeldar, a thannadar, and four or five in the district, being near relations of one of the principals in this correspondence, were dismissed the service. The only trustworthy member of the family is Dilawur Ali Khan, who exceeds all his brethren in intelligence, has some influence, and is reported wealthy. He offered a considerable sum as a loan to the Government, which I consider a good test; but their horsemen, one and all, are a cowardly rabble, who deserted to a man on the advent of the mutineers, saying they had not come for such duty as this. On the whole, I fear the Maleir Kotla Chiefs may be transferred without any injustice from amongst the rolls of the staunch to the most indifferent and lukewarm of friends to our Government.

Details of location of horsemen.

53. The various posts where bodies of horse were posted are enumerated and the strength of each post detailed in an appendix. Suffice it here to state that detachments of district Jagheerdari horse were maintained at each thannah and tehseel, and on one of the minor lines of road (the old road from Loodiana to Roopur through Macheewara), the Maleir Kotla Cavalry were posted along the Grand Trunk Road from between Sirhind and Kurnaul to beyond Jugraon. The 32 Putteeala horse were posted on the old Ferozepoor road towards Sidwan, ten being half way between Loodiana and Sidwan, at Boondree, and an advanced picket of five at Teharah, beyond Sidwan. To these, as soldiers of our best ally, the Putteeala Maharajah, was entrusted the road towards Ferozepoor and the ghauts along the river towards Jullundur, in case the Jullundur mutineers or others should

take that route, or it should have been selected by the Ferozepoor deserters. A strong post of sowars was stationed at Jugraon should the Ferozpoor mutineers, or from beyond Ferozpoor, have selected that road. The third road to the district through Raikote was stopped by a party there; the fourth, to the southward, whose nearest point was Maleir Kotla, was left to the Chiefs of that State; half way between that city and Loodiana, on the road, was another party at Deylon. The new road to the eastward, through Sumrala, was held by sowars of Sumrala Tehseel. Horse and foot were on the road towards Phillour, and thus all the eight roads centring in Loodiana were guarded. The men at all these posts had to be constantly visited, and the reports made on the laxity of their discipline is beyond conception; these duties had to be left to the thannadars, tehseeldars, and the vakeels of the different Chiefs. I submit a rough map, in which each post occupied and the strength at each is entered. The Nabha force was not as a rule employed in broken parties, but was maintained as far as possible in its integrity at Loodiana, whence detachments were sent to escort treasure from the tehseels or to any post where danger threatened.

54. The ferries it was found impossible to guard; they were so numerous, so difficult of access, should anything happen, *owing to the numerous nullahs intersecting* the belt of lowlands, some six miles in width, and the neighbouring Goojur population were so hostile. So to save further anxiety on that score, I removed all the boats to the main ferry at Phillour; but even then several were sunk in remote creeks and concealed in the long grass on the river banks; these were from time to time discovered and brought to the ferry also. **Ferries.**

55. Early in the season, and again after a cessation of the rains, the river was fordable in many places. When the river is low, a ford exists at every two or three miles; these must afford constant anxiety in times of need, as they constantly vary, and the villagers carefully conceal their existence. Again, the whole riverfaring population are proficient at crossing on inflated skins; to prevent this, the supervision of **Fords.**

an army would be insufficient. Whilst on the subject, I may as well draw attention to the extreme difficulty of crossing this river in the rains with the means at present supplied by Government. The Movable Column under General Nicholson was detained three days at the river. The whole of the Cavalry, guns, commissariat, &c., were crossed in half a day; then the river came down in force, and the remainder of the time was occupied in crossing Her Majesty's 52nd alone, and even then their carriage had to be left behind and replaced with what was available on the south side of the river. This delay and the unavoidable exposure of the men caused much sickness from which some officers and many men were unfortunately prevented from taking any further share in the campaign. The addition of a few light iron boats or pontoons, to be used as ferry boats instead of the native boats or lubberly barges of European construction, which are fit for nothing but a standing bridge, would obviate all this difficulty; and the matter is worthy of consideration, now that the country will be held in future by thorough military occupation.

Capabilities of the district.

56. The capabilities of the district in furnishing army requisites were most severely tested during the year; and as some information on this point may be of use hereafter, I make a passing allusion to it. Camels can be procured in numbers, especially if warning be given, from among the Jat population to the south, from Pukohwal, Jugraon and Budhan Tehseels. These people also possess the best and greatest number of good bullocks and capacious carts adapted for military stores; upwards of 2,000 camels and about 2,000 carts with four bullocks each were obtained mostly from them.

Assistance rendered by Malwa Sikhs and their good qualities.

They are a thrifty, laborious and hardy set, good agriculturists and exporters of their own produce to less favoured districts, extending even to Delhi; they willingly engage in transport duties, and physically are a stalwart race, tall in stature, brawny and muscular, and anxious for military service; and from the nature of their country are hardy to a degree under exposure to heat and long marches.

57. Under the stigma of Malwa Sikhs they are objected to in the ranks of our army, and latterly were interdicted

altogether; but as long as they come from our own territory, I can see no reason against them sufficient to counteract the advantages above mentioned, which they undoubtedly possess. The instance of the mutiny of the Loodiana regiment at Benares should not be held conclusive evidence against them, for in that regiment any man affixing "Singh" to his name was considered eligible, his military qualifications being taken for granted. Its Native Officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, were almost all Poorbeas (one exception being a Sikh Soobadar, a barber), and at the time of the Mutiny I believe only from 240 to 250 Sikhs altogether were present with the regiment. On the other hand, conspicuous for its good services has been the Ferozepoor regiment, exclusively Sikhs, but carefully enlisted, and mostly men of the Malwa districts, and also the 4th Sikhs, raised at Loodiana.

Supply of horses.

58. Further, throughout the district, but especially towards the south, a good breed of horses exists. From 500 to 600 horses were obtained in Loodiana in 1856 from its neighbourhood and the adjacent Sikh States for mounting the Irregular Cavalry regiments in Oudh. The Sikh Sirdars, jagheerdars and retainers, especially in old horsemen families, all keep and breed horses; and, with encouragement, more might be done in those parts than in the much-famed Dhunnie districts towards supplying the exigencies of the mounted branches of the service.

Capabilities of district as regards recruits.

59. As regards recruits, I believe 4,000 good men might be obtained in two or three months; whilst the new regiment was being raised, men from all parts thronged for enlistment, principally Hindoo Jats. The Mussulman population do not take so regularly to the Infantry as to the Irregular Cavalry.

Importance of position of Ludhiána.

60. There is one more subject connected with Loodiana to which I call attention reluctantly and with diffidence, as it trespasses on forbidden grounds, beyond a subordinate's and Civilian's immediate province. This subject is the importance of its position, its weakness from foreign and internal sources, and, it must be said, the neglect it experienced throughout those anxious months. I relate only well-known facts; if

they are dispassionately considered, and the just inference deduced, my object will be gained. The only available means of communication from the north-west towards Delhi was through Loodiana; along that road alone, during the rainy season, could troops have marched without great exposure and difficulty. The transport of the heavy siege stores from Phillour and Ferozepoor could have gone by no other route, and from these places alone were our troops before Delhi supplied. Its position commands the passage of the Sutlej; it contains a fort, comprising a powder magazine, a depôt for tents, various military requisites, and three pieces of heavy ordnance; it was one of the chief depôts for collecting carriage for the forces, and the main terminus of the transport train. Previous experience has it that in turbulent times the city has always been a restless, troublesome place; it was the residence of about 30 Europeans, including their families, who, with fort and treasury in the hands of mutineers, were thankful for the poor security of the open camp of a casual passing regiment. Safety on all these essential points might have been ensured by a garrison in the fort of 50 English soldiers, who could or should have been spared from Ferozepoor, Jullundur, or Umballa. As it was, I fear the safety of what tended in some measure to the successful result of the northern campaign must be attributed solely to the fortuitous advent of the 4th Sikhs, who, passing on towards Delhi at a rate, march for march, equal to the famous march of the Guides, arrived that morning and were to have left that evening. I suspect that to that regiment also, more than to any foresight or solicitude on the part of their superiors, are the European inhabitants grateful for their escape from certain massacre or ignominious flight.

Services of district officers.

61. Mention still requires to be made of those officers who took a share in the various duties which have been alluded to in the course of this Report. Captain Nicolls, Assistant Commissioner, continued his usual civil official duties till the day of the mutiny, after which the civil courts were suspended, as civil process to be successful must be uninterrupted and continuous; his time and attention were chiefly required to

raise and discipline the new regiment. Mr. Thornton, C.S., arrived only early in May; having been at that time only eight or nine months in India, he had but slight knowledge of the language and none of official duties. He is one of the new Competition class seduced to this country with the idea that his superior education and studious, sedentary habits, the natural result of his education, were the essentials to ensure advancement in the service, and with the impression that no other qualifications were requisite; but he was speedily undeceived, and I must say he adapted himself to the new uncongenial state of things in a manner that did him infinite credit. I believe he thinks common sense and active habits are far better qualifications for the service than any brought to light by the arduous examinations he himself had passed through. He had the troublesome duty of the charge of the treasure, which involved constant journeys across the river to Phillour, and took a share in any other miscellaneous duties of the times.

62. The Extra Assistant, Moonshi Madho Pershaud, did not abate from his usual well-known honest and efficient discharge of his duties. He never flinched from such employment as searching houses, apprehending criminals, superintending executions,—conspicuous and trying occupations in such times. His life was attempted at the outbreak. I never had cause in the slightest degree to suspect his loyalty; and, where so many of his class proved faithless under temptation, I consider his conduct deserving of the favourable consideration of Government.

Probable consequences of delay in the fall of Delhi.

63. In conclusion, when I remember the various smouldering elements of discord in the city, and recall the doubtful chances of real assistance from the Nabha troops, and the still more doubtful state of the Maleir Kotla horsemen, the fact that 150 men of the mutinied 12th Irregulars belonged to the district, and also those of 9th Irregulars, who, though cut off almost to a man, were of course disloyal throughout their home relations; when I think, also, that though the Sikh population was with us, still that there must have been a

limit even to their forbearance; moreover, that many of this race from the Loodhiana regiment, from the Jhansi, Neemuch and Bareilly corps, whose nationality had been ruined by their association with Hindoostanees, were returning by degrees to their homes in the district, and were infecting their neighbourhood with stories of the complete disorganisation in the Lower Provinces,—the conclusion was forced upon me at the time (and I think so still) that had Delhi held out three weeks longer, risings would have occurred and attempts been made to subvert the constituted Civil authority in the district, by which it would have been most rudely shaken.

List of Appendices to Report.

64. Four appendices are furnished with this Report:—

(1) Notes for the first 15 days.

(2) Statement of Jagheerdari Horse raised and how distributed.

(3) A skeleton Map, corresponding with the above.

(4) Statement of executions.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 11.

12. *Memorandum of Orders and Letters.*

15th May 1857.—Wrote to Jheend Rajah for one troop, two companies. Wrote to Mith Singh, Ootum Singh, Bussunt Singh, Ludran Sirdars, Ahmad Khan of Raikote, and Wuzeer Khan, for 80 sowars amongst them.

Sent 20 rounds per man to Jugraon police; sent escort for sowars' arms to Ferozepoor; sent 45,000 rupees treasure to Phillour; wrote to Barnes, reporting, &c. Ditto to Montgomery.

Warned Baboo at post-office to open all daks in my presence.

Called in four men from each thannah and tehseel; two from each 1st class, one from each 2nd class chowkie.

Detained 16 return treasure carts for transporting ammunition.

Laid supplies for Goorkahs.

Sent out for 300 hackeries and 200 camels.

16th May.—Sent firewood to ghaut for the sepoys.

Had all prisoners well looked to.

Sent materials of all sorts to keep up the Phillour Bridge, at all risks and expense.

Sent men to prepare the roadways across the sands.

Ninety Maleir Kotla men arrived; distributed them.

Seized all bullock-train carts for ammunition.

17th May.—Wrote Morasilas to Putteeala, Nabha, Maleir Kotla, Bagrean, Budhour, Maloudh, that the sepoys were escaping from Ferozepoor, and looting the country; and directing them to make all arrangements for their disposal.

Issued orders to the tehseeldars to the same effect.

Issued orders to Postmaster to lay two additional horses for expresses at each stage from Phillour to Umballa. (This was not done, and the daks broke down.)

Gave orders to Saleh Mahomed, Shahpoor and Secunder to proceed by mail cart (Saleh Mahomed), or as soon as possible, for intelligence department.

Distributed Delawar Ali's men on Jagraon Road.

Recalled and collected the 32 Putteeala men; sent them, 20 to Teharah, 12 Boondree, to protect the old Ferozepoor Road.

Sent all the women over to Phillour.

Sent 10 of Maleir Kotla men on the Phillour Road.

18th May.—Sent 40 Maleir Kotla men back to Maleir Kotla to watch that road and to send 10 of them up the road towards Raikote.

Told Ahmud Khan, of Raikote, to get what men he has ready on the look-out between Raikote and Busseean.

Issued orders about telegraph posts being kept in repair.

Sent 20 rounds per man to the police, through the guard carrying their pay, and distributed 20 rounds to all the men called in.

Sent sowars to Dehlon (10), Pukowal (10), Jugraon (15).

Sent all available bullocks over to Phillour, both train and hired cattle.

19th May.—Sent Mahomed Ali's sowars down the Umballa Road.

Secured carriage for 9th Irregulars.

Telegraphed to C.-in-C.,—what the 9th escort was to go with, with Siege Train or 9-pounder battery?

Sent carriage to fort for tents for Umballa.

Sent off 200 camels to Umballa.

Warned 9th Irregulars to be ready for escort.

Warned Nabha Rajah's troops to be ready for escort.

Ordered thannadars to accompany night patrol.

Sent out to Rujjub Ali at Jugraon to hasten to Umballa.

Sent letter by Worthington to Adjutant-General, to say the river was rising, and it was all-important to get the Siege Train over.

20th May.—Sent 40 Nabha sowars to Jugraon on the strength of news from the Brigadier at Jullundur (which I don't believe).

Stopped the despatch of the two squadrons of Regulars.

Warned Nabha force,—200 sowars, 100 foot,—to be ready at 11 P. M. to march to Phillour for escort.

Ditto ditto one troop, 9th Irregulars.

Sent to Nabha Rajah to know if he wanted ammunition. (Says no, has lots.)

Sent Nabha elephants to tread down bridge road.

Got long English rope from Phillour magazine for bridge.

Sent 15 Nabha sowars to Boondree, directing the Putteeala men there to move on to Teharah, making 32 at that place, on strength of news from Montgomery.

21st May.—Sent 100 Nabha foot and 150 Nabha sowars, and one troop 9th Irregulars, to escort siege train over ; all the guns were in Loodiana, and packed by 3 P. M., and the carts all in by 6 ; six only were brought up afterwards.

Got extra bullocks for Griffiths, Commissary of Ordnance, 200 coolies to help dragging the train waggons, and 150 to keep the bridge, with mistries, &c.

Got three more letters out of the dâk for sepoys ; this makes eight.

Got some treasure over from Ferozepoor.

Mem.—To-day I received my first official intelligence from *Ferozepoor ; rather too late to be of any use.*

22nd May.—Sent 50 hackeries to Phillour for more shot and shell from magazine.

Sent 50 hackeries and 200 camels off with train to Umballa to Quartermaster-General.

Promoted Ram Singh and Doona Singh to Jemadars.

Sent guards to Campbell's house.

23rd May.—Sent 50 hackeries to Phillour for more ammunition.

Sent 50 more camels off for Quartermaster-General.

24th May.—Got bullock train carriage for Native Artillery proceeding to join train; advanced them 50 rupees.

Made arrangements for Eed: 80 men to Kotewalli, 50 to vacant Cavalry lines, and 25 sowars also; 25 sowars to my place, and elephants to be ready.

Sent to Moulvies, &c., to warn them against permitting any disturbance, &c.

Authorised Nuthana Thannadar to entertain a Jemadar and seven good men, to be stationed at Budhour.

Takeeded all the vakeels, &c., to keep their men up to the mark.

Issued orders to all thannadars to plunder and worry all fugitive sepoys.

Objected to Colonel Butler's proposition to remove the officer in command here, replacing him by a little boy.

25th May.—Secured bullock train carriage for European Artillerymen.

Sent 100 coolies to river to help getting mortars over.

Issued proclamations for recruits for Van Cortlandt's two regiments at Ferozepoor.

Issued purwannahs, &c., for all sepoys on leave from Punjab regiments to rejoin.

Issued orders to commence collecting the Rubbee *kist* at once.

26th May.—Sent 30 Nabha sowars to Nuthana and 20 to Budhour, and an alert to all the other posts, on the strength of Marsden's news that they were going to rout out the remainder of the two regiments from Ferozepoor.

Posted Bussunt Singh's sowars on the Kalkah road.

Sent out for 50 more hackeries for more Artillery ammunition.

Sent out to inquire how many camels could be got in the whole district, and from Nuthana; gave Commissioner's orders to Shazada Shahpoor that he was to raise 100 horse.

27th May.—Sent 60,000 rupees, under a Duffadar and six, off to Umballa by bullock train.

Laid supplies for the Guides at Budhour.

Ordered a third bridge over the third channel of the river.

Counter-ordered Shahpoor's raising horse.

28th May.—Laid supplies for European Artillerymen.

Sent 1,20,000 rupees to Umballa.

29th May.—Sent a vakeel to look out for 45th, on the strength of Marsden's letter announcing their disbanding.

30th May.—On strength of Barnes' news of the outbreak of two companies at Roopur, sent 25 Nabha horse and 30 foot and the Machewara Mohurrir to Bylolpoor to close that road, the same number to Sumrala to close that road, 10 sowars of Mith Sing's to Koom; 8 of Ootum Sing's to Kohara, and takeeds to thannadars of Machewara and Khunna, and Tehseeldar of Sumrala, to stir up the villages to look out for these men, to sink, burn and destroy; told the chowkies to look alive, and closed all the ghauts, sending the boats to the far side, and told the Kotwal to put a look-out at the old serai on Kalkah Road.

Laid supplies for Guides.

Recalled the 60 foot and 40 horse from Bylolpoor and Sumrala on hearing the two companies at Roopur had left all right, leaving 10 sowars at Sumrala.

G. H. M. RICKETTS,

Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE

13. *List of Jageerdars of the Loodiana District who Loodiana during the months*

No.	Names of Jageerdars.	Annual Jumma of Jagheer.	Amount of Annual Commutation paid to Government in lieu of Sowars and Footmen.	Number of Sowars.	Number of Footmen.
		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.		
1	Sirdars of Muloudh .	70,999 0 0	8,875 0 0	52	...
2	Sirdars of Budhour .	43,545 0 0	5,443 2 0	20	...
3	Sirdars of Ludran .	22,282 8 0	2,785 0 0	15	...
4	Sirdar Bussunt Singh .	15,773 0 0	1,972 0 0	18	...
5	Chowdries of Lulton .	3,232 0 0	768 0 0	...	30
6	Sirdar Chimun Singh of Mangut.	3,038 0 0	960 0 0	3	2
7	Jagheerdars of Kotla Budla.	6,700 0 0	818 0 0	4	...
8	Jagheerdars of Jubboo Mazra.	9,623 0 0	1,143 0 0	6	...

(2) TO 11.

provided Sowars and Footmen in rendering services at of May to October 1857.

Date from which the Jagheerdar placed his men under the orders of Deputy Commissioner, Loodiana.	Date on which their services were dispensed with.	Amount of commutation for six months which has been remitted by order of the Commissioner, Cis-Sutlej States.	Locality where stationed.	REMARKS.
		Rs. A. P.		
50 Sowars on 17th May 1857; 2 Sowars on 29th June 1857.	15th October 1857.	4,437 0 0	10 Sowars at Puckowal. 10 ditto Dehlon. 10 ditto Chokie Koom 8 ditto Kohara. 4 ditto Dadheri. 10 ditto Thana Sanehwal.	
20th May 1857.	15th October 1857.	2,712 0 0	10 Sowars at Thana Raekote. 10 ditto Chokie Raepur.	
17th May 1857.	15th October 1857.	1,392 0 0	All at Thana Jugraon and Sirdars in person.	
26th May 1857.	15th October 1857.	986 0 0	4 Sowars at Chokie Belapore. 4 ditto Kohara. 4 ditto Herian. 4 ditto Sumrala. 2 ditto Loodiana.	
18th June 1857.	15th October 1857.	384 0 0	At Tehseel Loodiana.	
22nd June 1857.	15th October 1857.	480 0 0	At Tehseel Loodiana.	
6th and 8th July 1857.	15th October 1857.	409 0 0	At Tehseel Sumrala.	
10th July 1857.	15th October 1857.	571 4 0	At Tehseel Sumrala.	

List of Jageerdars of the Loodiana District who
Loodiana during the months

No.	Names of Jageerdars.	Annual Jumma of Jagheer.	Amount of Annual Commutation paid to Government in lieu of Sowars and Footmen.	Number of Sowars.	Number of Footmen.
		Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.		
9	Bhaie Sunporun Sing of Bagreean.	4,870 0 0	432 0 0	10	10
10	Sikh Kothies of Goh-Herian.	5,729 0 0	680 0 0	4	...
11	Dul Sing and Humeer Sing of Rajowal and Beejah.	1,472 8 0	274 0 0	1	...
12	Jagheerdars of Kotla Ajnair.	3,725 0 0	1,384 0 0	2	...
13	Rae Emam Buksh of Raekote (a pensioner).	2,400 0 0	...	10	...
14	Bhaie Kan Sing of Tog-hul (Maafeedar).	903 0 0	...	4	...
	TOTAL . .	1,94,292 0 0	25,534 2 0	149	42

LOODIANA, DEPUTY COMMR'S OFFICE :
The 29th October 1857.

provided Sowars and Footmen in rendering services at of May to October 1857—concluded.

Date from which the Jagheerdar placed his men under the orders of Deputy Commissioner, Loodiana.	Date on which their services were dispensed with.	Amount of Commutation for six months which has been remitted by order of the Commissioner, Cis-Sutlej States.	Locality where stationed.	REMARKS.
		Rs. A. P.		
25th July 1857.	15th October 1857.	216 0 0	10 Sowars at Thana Machewara. 10 Foot at Tehseel Loodiana, with Jagheerdar in person.	
4th August 1857.	15th October 1857.	340 0 0	At Thanna Khunna.	
11th August 1857.	15th October 1857.	137 0 0	At Tehseel Sumrala.	
11th and 16th Aug. 1857.	15th October 1857.	692 0 0	1 at Tehseel Sumrala. 1 at Thanna Khunna.	
17th May 1857.	15th October 1857.	...	At Thanna Raekote.	
4th July 1857.	15th October 1857.	...	At Tehseel Puckowal.	
TOTAL . .		12,756 4 0		

G. H. M. RICKETTS,

Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 11.

15. *Return of Criminals (Civil and Military) punished in the District of Loodiana for acts connected, directly or indirectly, with the Mutinies during the year 1857.*

—	Shot.	Hanged.	IMPRISONED. For 14 years.	For 7 years.	For 5 years.	For 2 years.	For 1 year.	FLOGGED. 50 Lashes.	30 Lashes.	Under 30 Lashes.	Total number of Criminals punished.	REMARKS.
Civil . .	...	27	...	1	1	1	2	13	8	11	6.	
Military .	*2	14	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	18	*Shot by order of Brigadier - General Nicholson.
TOTAL .	2	41	2	1	1	1	2	13	8	11	82	

ENCLOSURE (8) TO 1.

16. *From Captain D. BRIGGS, Superintendent, Hill Roads, to the Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States,—No. 30 A, dated Simla, 3rd February 1858.*


Narrative of Captain D. Briggs, Army Transport Department.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 22 of the 18th ultimo forwarding a copy of the Judicial Commissioner's circular of the 16th idem, calling for a detailed account of such events connected with the late crisis which came under my observation.

In reply I beg to submit the following narrative.

Arrangements for transport of regiments in the hills.

2. On the night of the 12th of May, in reply to a query as to how I could best make myself useful in assisting in the active measures which the first news of the mutiny at Delhi demanded, I was instructed by the Quartermaster-General of the Army to arrange for the immediate move of the 1st Fusiliers from Dugshaie to Umballa, and these instructions


Jugraon
Tetharah
Sidwon
Bhudour
New Pucka Road to Ferozepoor
Old Road to Ferozepoor
From Ferozepoor
Raisun
Raikote
Man
Dakka
Bhoondree
Pukwal
Budowal
RIVER SUTLEJ
Loodianah
Phillowr
Muleir Kotla
Deylon
Didanee
Belapoor
Old Road to Roopur
Sanehwal
Grand Trunk Road
Kohara
Lushkuri Khan
Koom
Herian
New Road to Kalka
Sumrala
Khunnah
Macheewara
Bhyloolpoor

were followed on the morning of the 14th with orders for the move of the 2nd Fusiliers. On the same morning I received the Commander-in-Chief's permission to proceed to Kalka, having at the same time instructions to warn the Officers Commanding at Dugshai and Kussowlee to order any detachments of the Nusseree Battalion which might be at their stations to march to Kalka, where I would arrange for their onward move to join the head-quarters of the regiment at Buddee *en route* to Phillour.

3. These orders I carried out, and by means of the Hill Roads Wagon Train and assistance afforded by Sobhah Singh, Kulseeah, and the Tehseeldar of the Pinjore District of Putteeala, the 75th Regiment and the 1st Bengal Fusiliers were despatched without any delay, the regiments being supplied with carriage for half the men. The 2nd Fusiliers followed on the 15th. All three regiments reached Umballa within 36 hours after leaving Kalka, carriage as per margin accompanying them. The detachments of the Nusseree Battalion did not reach Kalka on the evening of the 14th as I had expected.

Carts of Hill Road Wagon Train .	124
Camels . .	85
Mules . .	12
Tattoos . .	40
Elephants .	9

4. The same evening the Commander-in-Chief, attended by only three of his staff and no escort, arrived at Kalka and proceeded onwards to Umballa. At the same time a lady and children, the first fugitives from Delhi, reached Kalka and gave the first particulars of the massacre. On the 15th I was able to make arrangements for the despatch of all the heavier baggage left behind by the force which had moved. The detachments of the Nusseree Battalion did not make their appearance on this day either, and I could learn no tidings of them.

Passage of Commander-in-Chief through Kálka *en route* to Ambála.

Despatch of heavy baggage of troops to Ambála.

5. On the morning of the 16th I obtained private information that the Nusseree Battalion had refused to march, and that amongst a certain portion of the Simlah residents panic had ensued.

Refusal of Nasiri Battalion to march.

Departure of Captain Briggs to Ambála for orders.

6. This information, coupled with the non-appearance of the detachments of that regiment, decided me to proceed express to Umballa to obtain orders from the Commander-in-Chief. I arrived at Umballa about 9 A. M. and found that a convocation of Commanding Officers and Heads of Departments was being held at Sir H. Barnard's house. His Excellency took me into his bed-room, read the letter I had received from Simlah, shewed me reports he had received from the Punjab and other places, and expressed his conviction that he must expect to hear of the whole Native Army having risen. His words were "There is now no Native Army in which I can trust." He expressed his doubts of the policy of moving upon Delhi with the small force at his disposal, as it was probable the mutineers would not stand, but that when he should reach Delhi he would find that they had formed another focus, perhaps in the Punjab, in his rear.

Orders received by Captain Briggs.

7. I subsequently received orders to return at once to the hills and to act as follows: "If the Nusseree Battalion *breaks out openly to violence anywhere,* let the European Troops from Subathoo and Dugshaie collect at Kussowlee, where they can be relieved from this. Let us hear quickly and regularly of the state of things in the Nusseree Battalion. "Officers on leave at Simlah to stand fast and do their best for Simlah." I reached Kalka about 5 P. M., but before doing so was met by my Second Assistant, Mr. Knowles, who informed me that the Kussowlee Treasury had been robbed by the guard of the Nusseree Battalion, and that he was proceeding at all speed by orders of the Officer Commanding at Kussowlee to recall the 2nd Fusiliers, who were then 20 miles in advance.

Panic at Kálka.

8. I directed him to return with me to Kalka, where I found every one in a great state of alarm—both Europeans and Natives—as the most exaggerated reports of the proceedings of the Goorkhas had been spread and they were believed to be marching upon Kalka. Despatching my Assistant to the Fort of Nalagurh, where I knew a quantity of powder and lead were stored, with instructions to convey it to Kussowlee

Arrangements for procuring ammunition from Nálagarh.

(which was badly off for ammunition) or to destroy it if this was not practicable, I sent an express to the Officer Commanding at Dugshaie requesting him to be ready at an hour's notice to move upon Kussowlee according to the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief. I then rode on to Kussowlee, where I arrived at 11 P. M. I found all the European inhabitants in the barracks, which had been barricaded, and in immediate expectation of an attack. From the Commanding Officer I learnt that, in consequence of rumours of the Nusseree Battalion having mutinied at Jutog, it was determined early on the forenoon of the 16th, after a consultation with the Heads of Departments, to remove the treasury into the barracks for greater safety, and that the guard of the Nusseree Battalion over the treasure, after having permitted a certain portion of the treasure to be removed, had refused to allow the remainder (which was in deposit by the Assistant Commissary-General) to be touched; that on an attempt being made to withdraw this money the guard had turned out armed and shewed a determination to prevent its withdrawal. It had before been explained to them that the treasure was being withdrawn from the detached building in which it lay to a place of greater security, and that they also would be permitted to escort it into barracks. They would listen to no orders, and drew up in line in sight of the barracks.

State of affairs at Kasauli.

A musket having been accidentally fired from the barracks, the entire guard made off with, it was then stated, treasure to the amount of 16,000 rupees.

9. Captain Blackall, the Officer Commanding, stated to me that it was at one time his wish—and it was certainly in his power—to have annihilated the greater portion of the Nusseree Guard, but his anxiety for the unprotected state of Simlah, which he believed was menaced by the Battalion, predominated, and he prevented his men firing. In this opinion he was supported by all his coadjutors. I then wrote a report of what I had heard to the Quartermaster-General of the Army, and at 2 A. M. rode on towards Subathoo for the purpose of arranging, if need be, for the concentration of that small depôt

Departure of Capt. Briggs for Subáthu.

upon Kussowlee and with a view to obtain correct information about Simlah; also despatched one of my Overseers to bring in some barrels of powder which lay in one of the store-houses on the new road. The universal opinion at Kussowlee seemed to be that the whole of the Nusseree Battalion had mutinied, and great anxiety was felt for Simlah.

10. The station of Kussowlee appeared perfectly quiet, but on arriving at Gurkul Huttee, 1½ miles further on, I observed in the moonlight an assemblage of natives, and from the remarks I overheard thought it prudent to avoid falling into their hands. I returned a mile and resumed my journey at 4 A. M. after an hour's rest.

The road proved quite clear, but the hillmen whom I met, and by whom I was known, were evidently much excited, and one of them, an old servant, regretted with tears the certain downfall (as he imagined) of our power. This man told me that an emissary from Delhi in the garb of a bunyah had been for some time at Dugshaie offering 15 rupees a month for any young men who would take military service at Delhi. This information, with the name of the bunyah, I afterwards communicated to the Officer Commanding at Dugshaie, but never heard what steps were taken to ascertain its truth. This man also told me that the Kussowlee Guard had passed the greater part of the night in the ravine between Kussowlee and Subathoo and that they were still there.

11. This I found, on arriving at the ravine, was not the case, but, meeting two officers of Her Majesty's 61st two miles further on, I learnt that they had passed a small detachment of the Battalion beyond Subathoo who took no notice of them. I reached Subathoo about 8 A. M., and, failing to obtain any information about the state of the Nusseree Battalion at Jutog, directed the Officer Commanding to send all the women and children (of which there were a large number) and all his spare ammunition to Kussowlee and hold the station with the few effective men he had. This I thought prudent as if he

Arrival at Subáthu and arrangements for despatch of women and children to Kasauli.

had left the station the budmashes of the bazaar would have probably seized the opportunity of burning the barracks and Government property.

12. Whilst writing a report of my proceedings to head-quarters in the house of the Commanding Officer, my attention was directed by a person present to the sound of firing in the direction of Simlah. I went out into the verandah with others, and we all repeatedly heard what we believed to be guns fired in Simlah. A haze which lay upon part of Simlah induced the belief that part of it was burning. Knowing that if the Battalion had risen with the intention of enacting the same scenes as at Delhi or Meerutt, the only chance of escape for the numerous women and children in Simlah would be in the Dugshaie direction, I at once rode off to that station and endeavoured to induce the Commanding Officer to permit me (in consequence of what I thought there was reason to dread) to take a party of his men towards Simlah, but he was opposed to this, having already made his arrangements for defending Dugshaie, and which arrangements, coupled with the opinion of his advisers that Dugshaie was more easily defended than Kussowlee, decided him on not carrying out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I then returned to Kussowlee, where I remained until next day, having travelled without rest 116 miles.

Anxiety for safety of Simla.

Affairs at Dagshai.

13. *En route* I received the following message express from the Quartermaster-General of the Army :—

Instructions received by Capt. Briggs.

"Captain Moffatt to be sent with the detachment of Her Majesty's 75th (100 men) to Kussowlee and to communicate with the Goorkhas (Nusseree Battalion) and to endeavour to conciliate and assure them that any expressed grievance or apprehension shall be removed; to appeal to their character as soldiers; and to do anything to suppress their excitement. Full confidence is given to Captain Briggs to say what the exigency requires and to secure their tranquil state.

By order of the Commander-in-Chief,
(Signed) A. BECHER, Colonel,
Quartermaster-General of the Army.

Captain Brooke, Commanding the Company, to be told to act under Briggs' *orders* and Moffatt the same."

Departure of Capt. Briggs for Simla and Jutogh.

14. On the morning of the 18th Captain Brooke and the detachment arrived at Kussowlee, and after consultation with Colonel Congreve, C. B., Officiating Adjutant-General of Her Majesty's Forces, I started for Simlah and Jutog (the head-quarters of the Nusseree Battalion).

I rode as hard as I could in order if possible to overtake the detachment of that Battalion which had broken into open mutiny at Kussowlee, that I might ascertain their temper and the effect they were likely to produce upon the regiment. From my knowledge of the hillmen and the fact of my being well-known amongst them I was not without hopes of being able to pacify them and prevent further violence.

Feeling as a soldier I would gladly have adopted other means in dealing with these mutinous scoundrels, but there were no coercive means at my command, and, filled as the surrounding valleys were with the families of these very men, I felt the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the duty entrusted to me.

News of misbehaviour of Nasiri Battalion.

On the road I learnt from fugitives from Simlah that that station was safe when they left, but that the whole Nusseree Battalion had been in open mutiny and were, as far as they knew, still in the same condition. Part of the Kussowlee detachment had been met on the road, and I was told that one of the sepoys had torn a lady's veil from her face, and another had drawn his "kookree" (large knife) upon an officer.

At Hurreepore some hillmen told me that the same detachment had destroyed a mail bag, burned one of the Commander-in-Chief's tents which was being carried to the plains, and had attempted to set fire to the staging bungalow. They had everywhere told the inhabitants that the British rule was over, and that if they heard of any one assisting us or performing any duty for us, they would have him shot.

15. At about midway between Hurreepore and Syree (or about 10 miles from Jutog) I came up with the detachment. They were at the time ascending a very steep hill, and as I rode up several of them faced about. I rode in amongst them and asked them where they were going.

Threatening attitude of a detachment of Gurkhas towards Captain Briggs.

The reply was "go along and don't speak to mutinous sepoys." I asked if there was a non-commissioned officer amongst them. "Yes," said the man who had already addressed me, "I am an officer." I asked him what was the reason of sepoys who had hitherto held such high characters, who had been praised by numerous European officers of distinction, and who had always been so well treated, behaving in this mutinous manner and replying to an officer as he had just done. He replied "Hitherto we have been all you say, but now the Government have lost confidence in us, and intended to have taken us to the plains to blow us from guns. Didn't the Europeans fire upon us yesterday, and would have shot us all if they dared; but *we* can fight too, and see! we go about with loaded muskets! You are carrying the news, are you? (bringing his musket to bear on me). We have killed all your 'hurkaras' (mail carriers) in the plains, and now you Feringhees have to carry your own news. We know it to be the case; don't *tell a lie*." All this was said in the most excited tone (several men joining in the clamour) and with threatening gesture.

16. I explained to them that they were entirely mistaken; that the Government meant them no harm; and that I had been sent up by the chief authority to listen to their complaints and to promise that Government would remove any cause of dissatisfaction they could prove to exist. They (for sometimes one man spoke, sometimes another) called out that it was now too late; that the sepoys had been imposed upon; that all confidence was destroyed; that the Commander-in-Chief had undertaken before leaving England to destroy all caste (literally to make Hindoo and Mahomedans one), but that they would have *his* blood and that of other authorities (mentioning their names). Then, breaking into childish

complaints, they stated that, whereas the sepoy was formerly well treated, now he was taken long distances from his home, and that his very letters were charged one anna for; that when he took leave with his family he had to pay tolls at every march; that the parsimony of the Government extended to all things; that all it cared about was to make money; and closed a long tirade of abuse, interspersed with frequent demonstrations of violence against myself, with these remarkable words: "It is (the Government) a *banchute bunyah bakkál Sirkár*."[1]

17. Their manner was so violent that, being wholly unarmed, I thought it the best plan to disarm their threatened violence by shewing I did not dread it, and I therefore dismounted and marched along with them. With many this had a good effect, and they spoke more rationally, but a few were most abusive.

All appeared very tired and heavily laden with (as I rightly guessed) the Kussowlee treasure. Two men even procured me some water, and when doing this, whilst I was separated from the rest of the men, they took the opportunity of telling me that if I really intended to pacify the regiment when I went to Jutog the first thing promised must be the removal of the Commander-in-Chief !!

With considerable difficulty I managed to get away from this party, not before one of them had told me that if I went to Jutog I should have a ball through me, and another was restrained from shooting me by a comrade saying, "it was not worth while as it was only one life." Another called out that I should find few Europeans in Simlah, and that next day they would kill all that remained and burn the place down.

Arrest of Kasauli detachment by party of Nasiri Battalion sent from Jutogh.

18. Before I had proceeded two miles further I met a party of the Battalion proceeding to make prisoners of this Kussowlee party, which I afterwards learnt they effected. I reached Simlah about midnight, proceeding at once to Lord W. Hay's house, the Superintendent of Hill States.

[1] Literally translated "A d——d Government of shopkeepers."

Simlah had the appearance of a city of the dead, but I was glad to hear from Lord W. Hay that he considered the crisis over unless the Kussowlee party should prove the strongest in the regiment, in which case it was impossible to say what would be the result.

Arrival of Capt. Briggs at Simla and state of affairs at that place.

Concessions had been made to the regiment, and the Treasury and Government offices had been recommitted to their charge. The regiment, however, shewed no signs of a disposition to march as ordered.

The next morning we learnt that the Kussowlee Guard, with a portion of the treasure they had plundered, was in the Quarter-guard of the Regiment, all the endeavours of these most mutinous rascals having failed to incite the regiment to *further* violence or mutiny. I say *further* because the regiment had already proceeded to decided acts of violence and mutiny in the treatment of its officers.

19. On the 20th I went to Jutog, and directing a parade of the regiment at noon called upon each company individually to send four spokesmen to the front who could represent the causes of dissatisfaction in the regiment. To these men I explained the object of my visit and the authority upon which I acted. At my suggestion they appointed one spokesman, and the following was his acount (sometimes corrected by the other bye-standers) of what had been going on in the regiment:—

Reasons for the misconduct of the Nasiri Battalion.

"The regiments of the line had refused to '*bite*' the new cartridges, and my regiment also determined not to do so. But the School of Musketry men at Umballa did (we believe) '*bite*' these objectionable cartridges. We hoped that the officers of the regiment would have asked us if we objected to use these cartridges, but we were not asked. The detachments of other hill regiments (the Sirmoor Battalion and the 66th Goorkhas) employed at the School of Musketry had applied to their regiments for leave to use the cartridges, and obtained permission, but the men of our regiment used

Reasons for the misconduct of the Nasiri Battalion.

them without the concurrence of the regiment. Our detachment states that they wrote letters asking our opinion, which letters we believe were suppressed. We then determined to exclude from caste the School of Musketry men. About all this there was a great deal of violent talk in the regiment, so much that our officers must have known of it. Yet no notice was taken of it. Subsequently, however, two sepoys (Munheer Sahai and Seeladhur) were tried by court-martial for having spoken against the School of Musketry men and were dismissed the service.

"It was then commonly said in the regimental lines that whoever expressed an opinion on this subject stood the risk of transportation or imprisonment. Under these circumstances several sepoys, declaring that there was no choice left them between loss of caste and a most severe punishment, took their discharge upon various pretences.

"Affairs were in this state when on the 15th of May the order to march suddenly arrived. At the same time all the Simlah Guards furnished by the regiment, including the Treasury Guard, were relieved.

"This had never been done on former occasions, even when the Battalion proceeded on service. A quantity of spare ammunition, muskets and military stores were also withdrawn from the regimental magazine. Following this the regiment heard that the European gentlemen of Simlah had armed themselves, loaded the two post guns, and would not permit any 'sepoys' to enter Simlah. The guns had also been discharged twice. The regiment did not know of the approach of any enemy, and therefore their suspicions were aroused by these preparations, and many sepoys believed that they themselves were menaced, and that if they left Jutog they would be cut up in the plains, and their wives and families sacrificed."

I find that I have in the above omitted to state the first portion of the men's representation, *viz.*, "that for a period of seven months prior to the mutiny reports had reached the

regiment from the plains that the Government had determined to destroy all caste distinctions and that the chief instrument in effecting this reform was the Commander-in-Chief."

Reasons for the misconduct of the Nasiri Battalion.

20. Beyond this they had no cause of dissatisfaction to urge. Their minds would appear to have become greatly inflamed with the above ideas, and many of the most violent in the regiment had proposed proceeding to extremities. The better behaved resisted this, and so occurred the tumultuous, disgraceful, but happily bloodless, row of the 16th, when their officers were pushed about and menaced by the mutinous throng. Twice bodies of men started to pillage Simlah, and twice were they restrained by the influence of the steadier and more loyal men of the regiment. Simlah was then known to be deserted. "Six Goorkhas" (said the well-behaved men pleading for the corps) "could have walked through it, and yet nothing had been touched!" Again, they urged that when intelligence was received by the regiment that the Kussowlee Guard had broken into open mutiny and robbed the treasury, they had gone to their Commanding Officer and demanded leave to proceed towards Kussowlee to make prisoners of the mutineers. "Their faces had been blackened," they said, "by their own men."

Leave having been granted, they effected the apprehension of the guard, and lodged it, numbering 46 men, with 7,000 rupees, in the Regimental Quarter-guard, and not without considerable risk to themselves, as the Kussowlee mutineers had expected a very different reception and attempted resistance.

21. Under these circumstances, and the orders which I had received from the Commander-in-Chief, "to do anything to suppress the excitement" in the Battalion, I proclaimed a free pardon on the part of Government to all with the exception of the Kussowlee Guard.

Action taken by Captain Briggs to suppress the excitement in the Nasiri Battalion and restore confidence.

There was a necessity for acting *at once*, as the Battalion was in a highly excited state, expecting the appearance of European troops, and the most trifling exciting cause might

have lit the spark which would have entailed consequences I need not stop to consider. Simlah too was deserted, its residents and visitors wandering over the neighbouring hills, affording an example of panic altogether new to the hillmen, and most destructive of our prestige.

The servants and lower classes in the bazaar had lost in but three days' panic all respect for their masters, and were becoming more dangerous than the Goorkhas. Nothing could allay this but return of confidence between ourselves and the Goorkhas, and this was effected by granting to the regiment a pardon for the excesses committed at Jutog in consideration of their subsequent good behaviour in making prisoners of the Kussowlee mutineers, an assurance that Government never intended to make them use cartridges which could affront their caste prejudices, and that the two men who had been dismissed the service for "taunting" the School of Musketry men should be re-admitted, *as a mere act of justice,* their conduct not having been one whit worse than that of the whole regiment. The Battalion was then ordered by me to march to Umballah, with its prisoners of the Kussowlee Guard in charge, which it cheerfully did, and has ever since been employed in the plains.

March of Nasiri Battalion to Ambála.

Justification by Captain Briggs of the action taken by him.

22. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in noting my report of the above proceedings appeared to disapprove of the "concessions" I was said to have made to the Battalion and also of its having been ordered to march.

As regards the first objection, it appears to me that there was no other course left me, and as to the second, it surely cannot be doubted that it was absolutely necessary to move the regiment somewhere, if only in order to test its obedience, for it had never been relieved from the marching order issued to it on the 15th May, the non-performance of which order was the first act of disobedience shewn by the Battalion. The marching of the regiment on the date ordered did more to restore confidence in the hills than anything else could have

done, and in corroboration of this I would refer to Lord W. Hay, the Superintendent of Hill States.

23. In consequence of orders from the Local Government to reduce expenses as much as possible, I had stopped all works to the north of Simlah, and ordered the Road Establishments which were then in Bussahir into Simlah. On their way in they were at several places treated with gross impertinence and warned that they would find no "Feringhees" to the north of Umballa. I merely state this as shewing that even these distant and naturally most peaceful valleys had either been tampered with, or had with others imbibed that restless desire for change which in many instances was the sole inducement to rebellion.

Unfriendly attitude of hillmen in the direction of Bashahr.

24. On the 10th of June news reached Simlah that the Jullundhur troops had mutinied, and on the 11th that a portion of them were crossing the Sutlej at Mukowal towards the Pinjore Dhoon. As Lord W. Hay could not leave Simlah, I at once started for Nalagurh near the entrance of the Dhoon, collecting as I went along levies from several of the Hill States with the intention of preventing the mutineers entering the hills and if opportunity offered of cutting them up in the Dhoon. Within 24 hours the Rana of Bagul furnished 150 matchlockmen, the Rajah of Kilure 250, and the State of Hindoor, which had but a few months previously lapsed to the British Government, 100. These were all very badly armed and deficient in ammunition. This did not however much matter, as before we reached the Pinjore Dhoon on the 12th of June the mutineers (about 600 in number) had passed through Buddee, and left the Dhoon by the Seeswan Pass. In passing through Nalagurh they had taken 200 rupees from the Tehseeldaree, and would probably have pillaged the place if it had not been for the adroitness of some of the relatives of the late Rajah who deceived them.

Measures for preventing the Jullundur mutineers from entering the hills.

Co-operation of Hill Chiefs.

After holding Nalagurh for a few days, and placing a small garrison in the Fort of Plassee, in case of any other detachments of mutineers attempting to cross the Sutlej, I returned to Simlah about the 20th of June.

In this expedition I found the hill people very willing to co-operate, but with the indifferent arms they possessed they naturally dreaded encountering the well-armed sepoys *in the plains.*

Return of Capt. Briggs to Ambála and his future employment.

25. On the 2nd of July, under instructions from the Chief Engineer, I proceeded to Umballa with the greater portion of my establishment to take charge of the unbridged rivers east and west of Umballa, and to facilitate the progress of munitions of war to Delhi.

On the 22nd of the same month I was appointed Chief of the Army Transport Train between Ferozepoor and Delhi, with the powers of a Deputy Commissioner, in addition to my other duties. Both of these duties have already been made the subjects of former reports. I will merely mention one fact connected with the Army Transport Train, which will shew what little sympathy the great mass of the cultivating population had with the mutineers. Three days after the complete investure of Delhi I rode over to Meerutt at General Wilson's desire for the purpose of establishing a train for the removal of the sick and wounded; and, although the country had only just been relieved from the presence of the rebel army, I succeeded *at once* in procuring from the villagers 40 pairs of cattle at each stage without the assistance of a single armed man.

CHAPTER II.

REPORTS ON EVENTS IN THE TRANS-SUTLEJ DIVISION.

17. *From Major* Edward John Lake, *Commissioner and Superintendent, Trans-Sutlej States, to* Robert Montgomery, *Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 6, dated Jalundhur, 5th January 1858.*

Reports prepared by Captain Farrington for Jalundhur, by Colonel Abbott for Hoshiarpoor, by Major Taylor for Kangra, in pursuance of instructions contained in your circular No. 50, dated 29th May 1857, are herewith submitted for your perusal. They contain an account of the most important events connected with the late Mutiny, and record in detail the measures taken in each district for preserving order. Submission of district reports.

2. Among the dense population resident in this division, some of whom were in open insurrection in 1848-49, that peace should have been preserved during a most critical period demands heartfelt gratitude and an open acknowledgment of thankfulness to Almighty God, under Whose divine care and providence we have enjoyed unbroken security. Tranquillity of Jullundur Doab.

3. Under God's blessing this result may be partly attributed to the untiring vigilance and indefatigable exertions of district officers to preserve order in their respective jurisdictions. Their position throughout was a trying one, demanding the exercise of more than ordinary self-reliance, Untiring efforts of district officers.

resolution, tact and moral courage. Their efforts have been attended with success, and deserve prominent notice and warm acknowledgment.

Consequences of a disturbance in the Jullundur Doab.

4. Situated as the Jalundhur Doab is on the main line of road by which the army at Dehlee drew its reinforcements and supplies from the Punjab, it is not too much to say that a disturbance here would have seriously compromised our operations at Dehlee. Even the interruption of the regular telegraphic and postal communications would have been a serious calamity. It is therefore a matter of deep thankfulness that no disturbance took place when it became necessary to denude the Jalundhur Doab of troops.

Military force in Jullundur Doab.

5. In this Doab, on our first occupation, a force of twelve thousand men was stationed, and, although this number was necessarily reduced after the annexation of the Punjab, the necessity of maintaining a larger force in it was pointed out by Sir Charles Napier in his Memorandum on the Military Defence of the Punjab. There have therefore been never less than seven or eight thousand men in the Jalundhur Doab, and this number cannot be considered excessive for a tract of country some twelve thousand square miles in extent, containing a population of nearly three millions, some of whom were in open rebellion in 1848-49.

Anxiety on withdrawal of troops from Jullundur Doab.

6. During the progress of this Mutiny, however, it became necessary to withdraw every available man and gun, until the only reliable troops left in the Doab were one hundred Europeans at Phillour, the same number at Jalundhur with a couple of post guns worked by volunteers, and a weak police battalion in the fort of Kangra. As this handful of men had moreover to watch and control suspected regiments of sepoys, the causes for anxiety while the struggle was going on, and for thankfulness now it is over, will be fully understood. But to realise the exact state of affairs it is necessary to review our position at the commencement of the outbreak.

Importance of Phillaur.

7. Phillour has been spoken of as the key of the Punjab. This appellation it scarcely deserves: in one sense it has proved

the key of Dehlee, as from it and the sister magazine at Ferozepoor were obtained those heavy guns and munitions of war which enabled our brave troops to achieve success at Dehlee. Its position on the Sutlej midway between Lahore and Dehlee on the main postal and telegraphic line of communication, its fort and valuable magazine of military stores, renders Phillour the most important post in the Jalundhur Doab. As regards the present exigency, it was the most important place in the Punjab; for if we had lost Phillour, Dehlee could not have been taken when it was. At the commencement of the outbreak the 3rd Native Infantry held Phillour and a detachment from the regiment garrisoned the fort. Colonel Butler was in command of the station and also of the regiment which he had commanded since 1846. He had risen in this corps and had been 12 years its Adjutant; in short, he had spent his life among the sepoys, with whom he was deservedly popular. His personal influence did not prevent them displaying signs of disaffection at an early period of the present crisis. Several bungalows were burnt, and the sepoys at one time refused to receive the ordinary cartridges which they had always been in the habit of using. **Signs of disaffection.**

8. Second only in importance to Phillour was the fort of Kangra. "He who holds the fort holds the hills" is a common saying of the people of the country. A wing of the 4th Native Infantry under the command of Major Pattenson held the fort of Kangra. The other wing of this regiment held the sister fort of Noorpoor. Some years ago the 4th Native Infantry had been in open mutiny regarding Scinde allowances. This circumstance did not augur well for the future conduct of the regiment; its mention here will justify the measures taken for the security of the fort of Kangra, and shows in more vivid contrast how much credit is due to Major Wilkie and his officers, both European and Native, for having maintained the loyalty of the regiment in a period of universal corruption. **Importance of Kángra.** **Garrison of Kángra and Núrpur.**

9. The station of Hoshiarpoor was under the command of Colonel Sandeman, who also commanded the 33rd Native **Position at Hoshiárpur.**

Infantry. No effort was spared by him to maintain the loyalty of his Corps. Even the ladies of his family, regardless of the dangers to which they were exposed, in a spirit of daring heroism remained with the regiment after all other ladies had withdrawn from the station. Colonel Sandeman was zealously supported by Captain Tulloh, his Second-in-Command, and the European officers of his regiment. The Native officers with one or two exceptions were equally earnest and active on the side of Government. With the 33rd Regiment, Native Infantry, were cantoned the 9th Irregular Cavalry and the 4th Troop, 1st Brigade, of Native Horse Artillery, which has since given memorable proofs of loyalty and devotion to the British Government.

Position at Jullundur.

10. The force at Jalundhur under the command of Brigadier Hartley consisted of Her Majesty's 8th Foot (The King's Own), Major Olphert's troop of Horse Artillery, the 6th Cavalry, with two regiments of Native Infantry,—the 36th and 61st. The former had done distinguished service in the field during the first and second campaigns against the Sikhs. On its march through Amballa a circumstance occurred which showed the feeling regarding the new cartridge. One of the 36th sepoys, receiving instruction at the Musketry Depôt at Amballa, went to see his comrades when they marched into the station. By one of them he was openly taunted with being a Christian. He appealed for redress to his Commanding Officer; the enquiry which followed increased the excitement which the subject had already occasioned. The 6th Cavalry only reached Jalundhur in April, having marched from Nowgong in the course of the relief. Before its arrival various rumours were afloat affecting the loyalty of the corps, but as they were merely rumours, not much heed was paid to them at the time.

Charge of Treasury, Jail and Tahsils.

11. The Treasury, Jail and Tahsil guards of this division were taken by the Sher Dill Police Battalion, a corps of mixed races recruited from every district in the Punjab. The regiment was under the orders of Captain Younghusband, who with the few men left at head-quarters was stationed at Dharmsala.

12. From the above account it will be seen that the force in the Jalundhur Doab and in the Kangra Hills consisted of twelve guns, or two troops of Horse Artillery,—the one European, the other native,—of five regiments of Native Infantry, one regiment of European Infantry, two regiments of Cavalry and a Police Battalion. After deducting men absent on furlough, it may be stated in round numbers that there were six thousand natives to nine hundred Europeans, Her Majesty's 8th and the Artillery troop not having their full complement.

Total force in Jullundur Doab and Kángra—European and Native.

13. Besides the military posts above enumerated there are several stations in this division where Europeans are detached whose safety would have been compromised had the spirit of hostility which has led to the perpetration of such fearful outrages in Hindoostan spread to this province.

14. Early in June an attempt was made in Kooloo to excite the population to rise in rebellion against us. This movement was organized by one Purtab Singh, who pretended to be the rightful Rajah or Chief of the principality of Kooloo. He gave out that all Europeans in the Punjab and in Hindoostan had been massacred, and, appealing to the religious feelings of the population, he called upon them to rise and declare in his favour. A detailed account of this plot having been submitted under a separate report, it is sufficient to state here that it was promptly repressed and detected by the vigilance of Major Hay and the native officials of Kooloo. It shows the risks to which Europeans at detached stations are exposed; for if this insurrection had broken out it would probably have cost Major Hay his life, and also have compromised the safety of three Moravian Missionaries, who in a spirit of abnegation and Christian enterprise have settled in Lahoul on the borders of Tibet. With a barrier of snow eighteen thousand feet high between themselves and the civilised world these devoted men stand as videttes on the frontiers of barbarism, seeking to enlighten the savage races among whom they have willingly immured themselves and whose good-will they appear to have won.

Attempt to excite rebellion in Kulu.

Friendly feeling of population of Kángra hills.

15. Throughout the Kangra hills the mass of the population have exhibited a friendly feeling towards Europeans and a spirit of loyalty towards the British Government. In the Noorpoor direction our hill subjects signalised themselves by capturing the fugitive mutineers of the Sealkote Brigade. This is more satisfactory as Noorpoor was the principal scene of Ram Singh's rebellion in 1848-49. As on that occasion so on this, Vazeer Socheit Singh, Take Chand, Choudree of Indoura, and Pheenoo, local Kotwal of Shahpoor, were prominently active and zealous.

Protection of some ladies at Dalhousie by the Raja of Chamba.

16. At the hill sanitarium of Dalhousie some ladies sought refuge after the mutiny at Jalundhur and were efficiently protected by the Rajah of Chumbah. Upon his good offices their safety depended, as Dalhousie is completely isolated: it is within 12 miles from his capital and 50 miles from Noorpoor, the nearest military station occupied by our troops.

Precautionary measures taken at each station.

17. The precautionary measures of a general nature taken at each station to defeat the machinations of our mutinous sepoys next call for notice.

18. Throughout this struggle the priority of intelligence which the Telegraph secured to us has proved of inestimable benefit. The British in India owe a deep debt of gratitude to Lord Dalhousie for placing this valuable engine at their disposal. Long before the sepoys could hear of the doings of their brethren at Dehlee and Meerut measures had been carried out in the Punjab, which by the blessing of God established our supremacy. If there had been no telegraph the results might have been very different.

Receipt of news of Mutiny and measures taken by Brigadier Hartley.

19. A telegraph message communicated by the indefatigable Superintendent at Jalundhur (Mr. Rees) informed Brigadier Hartley of what had occurred at Dehli. He convened a council of Commanding Officers and Heads of departments at which it was determined to place Europeans in the Fort of Phillour. Twelve hours after the resolution had been formed



Photogravure. Survey of India Offices Calcutta. May. 1908.

RAJA RANDHIR SINGH.

CHIEF OF KAPURTHALA IN 1857.

the measure had been carried out. At the same time a Telegraph Office was opened in the Fort of Phillour.

Assistance from Kapúrthala.

20. I was absent from Jalundhur, and Captain Farrington, the Deputy Commissioner, attended the council at which the important resolution noted above was taken and carried out. Captain Farrington also wisely took upon himself the responsibility of applying for aid to Raja Rundheer Singh, Allowalia, the Raja of Kapoorthula. This Chief came at the head of his troops, bringing with him his brother Kowur Bikrama Singh and his principal advisers. To the decided part thus taken by the Rajah at the commencement of the outbreak I attribute in a great measure the safety of the civil station of Jalundhur on the night of the mutiny and the security we enjoyed in the Jalundhur Doab throughout the crisis. I shall have occasion to notice hereafter more in detail the special services performed by this loyal Chief and his troops. I cannot, however, mention his name without acknowledging prominently the cordial support he rendered throughout this struggle in maintaining order in the Trans-Sutlej Division. If he had been an Englishman and one of us, his co-operation would not have been more hearty.

Arrangements made by Major Lake at Kángra.

21. The intelligence received by telegraph was forwarded to me and reached me in camp one march from Kangra, whither I was proceeding on circuit duty. I immediately made arrangements for bringing into the citadel of the Fort of Kangra all the available men of Captain Younghusband's Police Battalion. Major Pattenson, commanding in the Fort, readily assented to the measure which had already suggested itself to Major Taylor and Captain Younghusband. At daylight on the morning of the 15th Captain Younghusband marched with three hundred Punjabees into the citadel. This strong fort was thus secured and the wing of the 4th Native Infantry were effectually controlled, as their lines were commanded by the citadel. I gave orders at the same time for provisioning the fort.

Measures taken at Hoshiarpur.

22. From Kangra I retraced my steps to Hoshiarpoor, where in concert with Colonel Abbott arrangements were

made for occupying the native fort of Brijwara and preparing it as a place for refuge for Europeans in case the Native troops at Hoshiarpoor should break out into open mutiny. The garrison of this fort consisted partly of sepoys of the Sher Dill Battalion and partly of hillmen (burkundazes of the Kangra District) upon whose fidelity, as having no sympathy with the population of the Jalundhur Doab, more dependence could have been placed in the event of local insurrection. With this view 64 Burkundazes of the Kangra District were drafted to Hoshiarpoor and new levies from Mundee and other parts of the Kangra hills were stationed at different points in the Hoshiarpoor District.

Measures for defence of public buildings and safe custody of treasure.

23. From the first, measures were taken by Captain Farrington at Jalundhur, by Colonel Abbott at Hoshiarpoor, and by Major Taylor at Kangra, to put public buildings in a state of defence. Precautions were also taken for the safe custody of treasure. At the head-quarters of each station only sufficient funds were retained for current expenditure, the surplus of Kangra was sent to the fort of Kangra, and arrangements were matured for placing in the Fort of Phillour the bulk of the treasure of both Jalundhur and Hoshiarpoor.

Measures for transmission of intelligence.

24. Additional establishments were organised for the speedy transmission of intelligence between the different stations of this Division, and officers at outposts were kept well informed of passing events. All are under deep obligations to Captain Farrington for his courtesy and thoughtfulness in sending timely notice of all important occurrences.

Entertainment of Irregular levies.

25. Irregular levies of horse and foot were entertained in each district. I recommended that the Conquest tenure Jagirdars should be called upon to furnish the quota of sowars required for Jalundhur and Hoshiarpoor because their jageers afforded material guarantees for their good behaviour. Captain Farrington by sending for 20 Daoodpootras from Leia introduced a foreign element into his troop which was advantageous, but still I believe the plan of calling out the Conquest tenure Jagirdars was the best suited to the exigencies of the time.

26. I now pass on to the causes which produced the Mutiny. I believe them to be legion and too numerous to be discussed in the limits of the present report. With due deference, I would note some of those vital errors which have been, most of them, already pointed out by abler men, and which if not remedied will interfere with the proper reorganization of a native army in India :— Opinion of Major Lake as to the causes of the Mutiny.

First.—Power had become so centralised in the head-quarters of the Army that Commanding Officers were mere automatons, pulled by the strings of the Adjutant-General's Office.

Secondly.—So much deference was paid to caste that it became more rampant in our Native Army than it had ever been under any Native Government. The professional instruction received by them as soldiers was the only result of Sepoys having been intimately associated with British Officers for a century ; in every other respect contact with a civilised race had only rendered the Sepoys more bigoted and more prejudiced. Some European Officers have become Indianized, but no Hindoo Sepoys have adopted the tastes, habits or manners of the Europeans. All this was the result of undue deference to caste.

Thirdly.—The seniority system has produced the worst results both in the European and Native ranks of the army. Officers who had no fitness for the charge succeeded as a matter of course to the command of regiments. For a small minority of men placed in command to wield power with effect, it is necessary that, in addition to the adventitious weight derived from rank, they should have superior qualities which in themselves command respect and enforce obedience. This obvious principle of Government was reversed in the native ranks; all vigor and energy was at the bottom of the machine, imbecility, both mental and physical, at the top, and the result has been an explosion which has shattered the machine to pieces. Our army, moreover, affords no opening for men of rank or family; we recruit from one class only, and off parade all are on an equality, that is, the Native Officer has no more

Opinion of Major Lake as to the causes of the Mutiny.

social influence than the sepoy. If all classes of society had been represented in our army, so universal a combination could not have been formed against us without our receiving due warning or notice.

Fourthly.—In recruiting, sufficient pains were not taken to procure a healthy admixture of races. Great family cliques were allowed to grow up in certain regiments, and in all Brahmins, who should have been strictly excluded, were allowed to preponderate. The recruiting fields were too limited in extent. The army was a local militia drawn from Oude, Bahar and the Gangetic Doab. The population of other provinces of India were virtually excluded from the ranks of the Bengal Army.

Fifthly.—The Sepoys were petted, humoured and belauded to such an extent that they conceived exalted notions of their own powers and fancied that they had conquered Hindoostan for the British. It would be just as easy they thought, and much more profitable, to conquer Hindoostan for themselves.

Sixthly.—The cardinal error which has cost so much blood and suffering was keeping too few Europeans in the country and leaving forts and magazines under the protection of natives only. Allahabad, Ferozepoor, Phillour, Kangra and Govindghur were all in the hands of natives when this storm first burst upon us, and it was only at the eleventh hour this fault was rectified. Fortunate it is for British power in India that officers on the spot took upon themselves the responsibility of revising these arrangements, or our disasters would have been much more serious. I have enumerated six glaring defects in our past policy, but all who have watched the present movement must admit that the immediate cause of the mutiny was the introduction of the suspected cartridge. This lit up the incendiary fires which were signalled back from station to station, and gave the disaffected a common bond of sympathy and action with the bigots of two conflicting creeds. Hindooism and Mahomadanism made common cause against the cartridge, by the use of which it was

universally believed the Government wished to Christianize them. A sad and memorable instance has thus been added to the lengthy catalogue of popular delusions, which shows how readily an uneducated mind attaches importance to the veriest trifles and assents to the grossest fabrications.

27. The sad events of 1857 have also shown that no amount of toleration will disarm prejudice, superstition and bigotry. In our desire to conciliate caste and to avoid offending the religious prejudices of our native subjects we have been tolerant to every creed but our own. Our policy has not only been misconstrued, but has raised a storm such as the proselytising Mahomedan had never to encounter during eight centuries of misrule. It has been supposed that our toleration was a mask purposely assumed to enable us to undermine insidiously the religious faith of our sepoys, and that to attain this object we were prepared to descend to the lowest artifices. The ludicrous absurdity of the cartridge delusion would provoke a smile if it had not led to so much misery and suffering on one hand; to so much crime and outrage on the other. The blood of our suffering countrymen will not have been shed in vain if it leads to our adopting a policy based upon and openly avowing Christian principles. Such a policy would be less open to misconception and would be more worthy of the exalted position which God has allowed us to occupy in this country.

Incidents connected with the Mutiny.

28. I now proceed to place on record some of the memorable incidents which occurred in connection with this Mutiny.

Burning of Mess House of 33rd Native Infantry at Hoshiárpur.

29. On the 3rd of May the Mess House of the 33rd Native Infantry at Hoshiarpoor was burnt to the ground. There is every reason to suppose that this was the act of incendiaries. Taken in connection with fires which occurred afterwards at Phillour and Jalundhur and the conflagrations at Ambala, it showed the existence of a secret understanding between the sepoys of different regiments to combine against the Government and to afford each other mutual support. It has been surmised with some show of reason that leave Sepoys were chiefly employed as incendiaries and emissaries, and that

in fulfilment of their mission they travelled about from station to station. It appears desirable in future to control sepoys on leave by making them report themselves periodically to the local authorities of the district in which they reside.

Excitement on receipt of news of Mutiny.

30. On the 11th of May came intelligence of the Dehlee catastrophe; this was followed almost immediately by the open mutiny of the Ferozepoor Brigade, the Simla panic, and a partial insurrection at Nalaghur.

31. These events kept up excitement at all stations of the Jalundhur Doab, and more particularly at Jalundhur itself, where the native troops gave many indications of the spirit which afterwards led to open outbreak.

State of affairs at Jullundur.

32. Fires were more or less frequent; a seditious notice was placarded at the Pay Office threatening certain Native Officers who had been commended by the General Commanding for their loyalty; a Brahmin (a near relation of the Pundit of the 61st Native Infantry) was detected spreading false alarms among the sepoys; a Cavalry trooper who had taunted a fellow-soldier with being a Christian was screened by Native Officers of his own regiment, who to shield him did not hesitate to practise deceit upon their Commanding Officer: with all this there was a marked readiness to take offence, and demands were made quite incompatible with a proper state of discipline. For instance, when the Jalundhur treasure was taken from them and made over to an European guard, they begged that it might be made over again to them. When this demand was complied with they expressed a doubt whether money had really been made over to them, and wished that the bags might be opened and the money counted in their presence. This demand was also complied with: while on one hand much was done to show the sepoys they were distrusted, these concessions made them suppose they were also feared.

Attitude of troops.

Explanation of delay in disarming of Jullundur Brigade.

33. It will be asked why under these circumstances the Jalundhur Brigade was not disarmed, and although the adoption of this measure rested with the Military authorities, I must confess that at the commencement of the outbreak

I openly deprecated having recourse to it, chiefly because I imagined that it would compromise the Europeans at Hoshiarpoor, Phillour and Noorpoor.

34. When, however, I had opportunities for testing the temper of the troops, and found their acts betokened open defiance of constituted authority, my views changed, and I strongly recommended that one if not both regiments should be disarmed.

35. Separate reports having been already submitted regarding the mutiny which took place on the 7th June and the pursuit which followed, it is sufficient to state that the main body of mutineers, after being joined by the 3rd Native Infantry at Phillour, crossed the Sutlej River at Lesara, some ten miles above Phillour. Although the sepoys of the 3rd Native Infantry joined the Jalundhur mutineers as a matter of course, they evinced no wish to injure their officers or the Europeans in the station. All the women and children reached the Fort in safety without being molested, and when the Commanding Officer and others walked from the lines to the fort they passed the rear and commissariat guards by whom they were saluted as an ordinary occasion. **Mutiny at Jullundur on 7th June.**

36. That on the night of the mutiny no attempt was made to release the convicts from the Jail, to rob the Treasury or to plunder property, private and public, must be attributed to the presence of the Allowalia Rajah and his troops, who supplied all the principal guards in the civil lines. On the morning following the mutiny the Rajah and his brother went through the city of Jalundhur reassuring the townspeople, who were disposed to close their shops and desert the place. He also detached a body of his Cavalry in pursuit of the mutineers with Captain Farrington and Mr. Hogg, who accompanied General Johnstone's column. **Services of Raja of Kapurthala and his troops.**

37. Unfortunately the mutineers got clear away to Dehlee, and as a counterpoise to them it became necessary to send reinforcements to our own army. Accordingly Her **Despatch of reinforcements to Delhi.**

Majesty's 8th Queens at Jalundhur and the two troops of Horse Artillery received orders to move immediately.

Arrival of Movable Column at Jullundur and arrangements made by Brigadier-General Chamberlain.

38. It was at this time that the wisdom of the policy which had organized a Movable Column became apparent. It moved in the direction of Jalundhur, where its arrival was preceded by the gallant officer in command, Brigadier-General Chamberlain, who had many arrangements to make consequent upon the withdrawal of all reliable troops from the Jalundhur Doab. In the first place women, children and all non-combatants were removed from Jalundhur and sent to Lahore; secondly, two post guns to be worked by volunteers were equipped and organized; thirdly, a position was taken up in the cantonment of Jalundhur, where the two post guns, one hundred Europeans and all European officers and residents were concentrated instead of being spread over a straggling cantonment; additional supplies were thrown into the Fort of Phillour and one hundred Europeans were reserved for its garrison. About this time all the Punjabees of the 4th Native Infantry were brought together at Noorpoor and formed into a separate body. The Poorbeeas there, some 250 in number, were thus controlled by the European officers and 159 Punjabees, while outside the fort were hill levies who would have been ready to support Major Wilkie in any emergency.

Disarming of 33rd and 35th Native Infantry.

39. A proposition was made by Brigadier-General Chamberlain to disarm both the 33rd and 35th Regiments of Native Infantry. A few days afterwards this was most skilfully managed by Brigadier-General Nicholson, upon whom the command of the Movable Column devolved when General Chamberlain proceeded to Dehlee as Adjutant-General of the Army.

Police arrangements at Jullundur.

40. For the protection of property, private and public, in cantonments a mounted police was organized and a system of patrolling carried out. A regular cordon of posts was established round cantonments, at which were stationed extra foot levies raised for the purpose, but instead of enlisting strangers I sent upon this duty picked men from among the Chokeedars

of Jalundhur and Hoshiarpoor. In raising the mounted police Lieutenant Willock (whose untimely death is to be lamented) displayed great zeal and energy; on his departure for Dehlee the charge of the mounted police devolved upon Lieutenant Millar, who was generally responsible for the security of cantonments. It speaks well for his arrangements and for the orderly conduct of the population of this Doab that no fires, robberies, or outrages occurred after the station was denuded of troops.

Commendation of services of Lieutenant Willock and Lieutenant Millar.

41. The residents of the bazars in the Jalundhur cantonment, as well as those of Phillour, were shortly afterwards disarmed under special instructions from yourself.

Disarming of residents of bazaars.

42. For the greater security of cantonments 100 of the Allowalia Rajah's Infantry were posted in the camel sheds and 300 of the Tewana Horse under Mullick Sher Mahomed in the vacant lines of the 6th Cavalry.

Reinforcement of Jullundur Cantonment.

43. The Chief Commissioner also directed that two new regiments of Punjab Infantry should be raised under my supervision,—one at Jalundhur under Captain Tulloh, the other at Loodhiana under the command of Captain Nicolls. I received great assistance in recruiting from Colonel Abbott at Hoshiarpoor, Captain Younghusband at Kangra, Mr. Naesmyth at Gordaspoor and Lieutenant Perkins at Amritsur. So anxious were the Sikhs and Punjabees of the neighbourhood for service that the ranks of both regiments would have been filled in a month if I had not limited the number to be taken from each locality. With the view of ensuring a healthy admixture of classes and tribes, I sent for recruits to Rawul Pindee, Jhelum and even Kohat. Although this delayed the organization of the regiments, the active exertions of officers employed with the corps soon rendered them fit for military duty. In four months from the date on which the first recruit was entertained, the 21st Regiment raised at Jalundhur was employed against the Gogaira insurgents. The 22nd Regiment raised at Loodiana would in general efficiency bear comparison with the best regiments in the Punjab.

Raising of new corps.

44. In connection with the 21st Regiment a troop of Cavalry was raised and placed under the orders of Captain Obbard, the Second-in-Command, a smart and energetic officer. This troop is now commanded by Lieutenant Aikman, a smart officer thoroughly conversant with the details of regimental duty, who did good service to the State at Noorpoor as Adjutant of the 4th Regiment, Native Infantry.

45. Upon the regiment raised at Jalundhur and the Tewana Horse devolved the anxious and somewhat harassing duty of watching the 33rd Native Infantry, which after being disarmed was stationed in the Jalundhur Cantonment. From the day it entered Jalundhur the corps did not lose a single man by desertion. This speaks well for the regiment and the arrangements made to watch it.

Despatch of reinforcements to Delhi.

46. At this time were also entertained 127 Sikh and Punjabee Artillerymen who were sent down by bullock train to Dehlee, where they worked in the batteries throughout the siege. I also made arrangements with Captains Tulloh and Nicolls for sending down 90 men to the Guide Corps and 30 men to the 4th Sikh Infantry to fill up some of the casualties which had occurred before Dehlee.

Precautionary measures against Siálkot mutineers.

47. On the 9th of July occurred the Sealkote mutiny. To relate the particulars of this outbreak or to detail the skilful operations by which the mutineers were overwhelmed does not fall within my province, but as the security of the Jalundhur Doab would have been seriously compromised if the Sealkote mutineers had escaped, it is my duty to acknowledge with gratitude the untiring energy and military ardour displayed by Brigadier-General Nicholson on this occasion. We also owe much to his gallant band of soldiers, who under a burning sun in July made a forced march of 40 miles and completely dispersed the mutineers.

48. Preparations had been made in the Jalundhur Doab to obstruct and oppose them had they escaped from General Nicholson. The boats at all the ferries were either stranded or rendered unserviceable. A detachment of the Allowalia

Rajah's troops, consisting of 200 Infantry, 100 Cavalry and 2 light guns, was sent to Hoshiarpoor for the protection of that station. Teams of horses were procured from Amritsur for the 2 post guns at Jalundhur and a 6-pounder at Hoshiarpoor which had been equipped and organized for this emergency. The Kumaon Battalion, which was then passing through the Doab to Dehlee, was kept at hand to form the nucleus of a movable column, with which it was proposed to act against the mutineers.

Disarming of Native troops at Kángra.

49. At this time also the Poorbeeas of the left wing of the 4th Native Infantry in the Fort of Kangra were disarmed. Captain Younghusband had only at his disposal some three hundred men of the Police Battalion, a large number of whom were employed as guards and sentries, and while the bells of arms were at some distance from his men they were quite close to the lines of the Poorbeea sepoys. Under these circumstances disarming was a critical operation, but owing to the skilful arrangements of Captain Younghusband, the active co-operation of Major Taylor and the good feeling of the sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry, no disturbance took place. The arms were taken and placed in the citadel.

Acknowledgment of services of Captain Younghusband.

50. I may take this opportunity of acknowledging the advantage it has been to the public service to have an officer of Captain Younghusband's well-known merits in the fort of Kangra, and I would suggest for consideration the propriety of putting selected officers in charge of our principal forts and magazines, when final arrangements are made for securing our hold upon the country.

Voluntary surrender of arms by garrison of Núrpur.

51. Immediately after the disarming at Kangra occurred one of the most remarkable episodes of this eventful Mutiny and which contrasts most favourably with the horrible outrages recorded elsewhere. I refer to the voluntary surrender of their arms by the Noorpoor garrison at the simple requisition of their Commanding Officer, Major Wilkie. Too much cannot be said in favour of the regiment, which I hope will not be forgotten when rewards are given to the loyal and

well disposed. It is as creditable to the men as it is to Major Wilkie and his officers, both European and Native. It is true that Major Wilkie would have been supported by the Sikhs of his regiment inside the fort and by the hill levies outside, but if the Poorbeeas had resisted disarming, the issue of the contest would have been doubtful and must have been attended with loss of life.

Rewards for loyal Purbiahs.

52. Every Poorbeea who has stood by us in this struggle has become an outcaste among his brethren, and when he returns home will be put outside the pale of intercourse. I trust that the growing aversion which is felt for the race will not prevent individuals from being substantially rewarded. We cannot punish too severely those who fought against us or reward too highly those who have stood by us. I hope that rolls of sepoys and officers recommended for reward by Commanding Officers will be called for both from the 4th and 33rd Regiments of Native Infantry.

Exertions of Major R. Taylor to intercept Siálkot fugitives.

53. It must be remembered that this voluntary surrender of arms by the right wing of the 4th was made before General Nicholson's decisive action with the Sealkote mutineers on the 12th of July. It also was made before Major Taylor could arrive at Noorpoor with a hundred of the Police Battalion whom he brought by a forced march from Kangra. Major Taylor did, however, excellent service at this juncture by organizing lines of posts for intercepting the Sealkote fugitives. Some 30 sepoys and 60 camp followers were apprehended in the Kangra district, and some 30 individuals were seized in Chumba, half of whom were sepoys.

Capture of stragglers of 25th Native Infantry from Miáu Mír.

54. At the close of July the vigilance of the local authorities was again actively aroused by intelligence that the 26th Native Infantry had mutinied and fled from Lahore after murdering their Commanding Officer. A few stragglers were intercepted in Kangra, and more recently one man has been captured in Jalundhur.

Good effects of the co-operation of the Raja of Kapurthala.

55. From the beginning of August until the fall of Dehlee was a critical period for the Jalundhur Doab, as the Movable Column had passed on to Dehlee and from the

Police Battalion at Kangra a wing had been sent to Meeruth to form the nucleus of the 7th Punjab Infantry. In the event of disturbance very little assistance could be given from other quarters, for the large reinforcements sent to Dehlee had so reduced the garrison of every station in the Punjab that it could do little more than take care of itself. A placard posted about this time in the school house of Mr. Merk, the Missionary at Kangra, showed there were traitors about who were conscious of our weakness, for the notice threatened the extermination of all Christians, to whom the term "Nazarenes" was applied. At this juncture the active co-operation of the Allowalia Rajah proved of signal service. Any wavering on his part would have encouraged the disaffected and seriously interfered with our main operations at Dehlee. To the loyal example set by Rajah Rundheer Singh, I mainly attribute the orderly conduct of the population of the Jalundhur Doab and the immunity from crime and outrage which distinguished this critical period.

Civil and fiscal administration of the Trans-Sutlej States.

56. The civil and fiscal administration of the Division was conducted as in ordinary times and the business of the courts of justice was carried on without much interruption. The revenue was paid in most punctually; at the end of August the whole of the spring crop had been realized with the exception of small sums in balance marginally noted.

	Balances.
	Rs.
Jalundhur .	. 1,200
Hoshiarpur	. 1,600
Kangra .	. 5,000
	7,800

Remittances of money.

57. Supplies of money were sent from this Division to Simlah, Umbala and the Army before Dehlee. On two occasions treasure was escorted in safety by the sepoys of the 33rd Regiment, Native Infantry, but more frequently guards were furnished by the raw levies entertained in connection with this crisis. It is satisfactory to add that no loss occurred.

Contributions to 6 per cent. loan.

58. In the districts of Jalundhur and Hoshiarpoor the monied classes have contributed two lakhs of rupees towards the 6 per cent. loan. In the Kangra District one lakh-and-a-quarter will be realized from the Mundee State and from

Vazeer Goshaon, besides which some ten thousand rupees have been contributed by the several Hill Chiefs and other parties. Although the loan was more or less forced, the whole sum was collected in a very short space of time without murmur or remonstrance of any kind. This speaks well for the arrangements of District Officers and the influence they exercise over the people.

Praiseworthy conduct of Chiefs.

59. The conduct of the Chiefs, who are very numerous in this jurisdiction, has also been very praiseworthy.

Services of Raja of Kapurthala.

60. First and foremost among them has been Rajah Rundheer Singh, Allowalia, whose active and zealous co-operation exercised the best influence upon all classes of the population. I have already mentioned that we were indebted to the Rajah on the night of the Jalundhur mutiny for the safety of the Civil Station, that his troops took an active part in the pursuit of the mutineers, and that when the Sealkote mutineers were advancing upon this Doab a detachment of his troops marched for the protection of Hoshiarpoor. I might cite other instances in which his good offices aided our cause, but it will suffice to state in general terms that, without regard to his personal comfort, his chief consideration during the crisis was how he could best assist the British Government. Not content with placing his troops at our disposal he remained with them himself throughout the emergency, exchanging during the most trying season of the year the comforts of his palace at Kapoorthula for a building of limited accommodation at Jalundhur. He also volunteered to send troops to Dehlee, but as we were chiefly dependent upon them for the protection of the Jalundhur Doab, I informed him they could not be spared. His brother, Kower Bikrama Singh, was actuated by the same spirit and showed himself on all occasions a most active and zealous supporter of the British cause. I may say the same of the Rajah's officials of all ranks, among whom his Vazeer, Gholam Jeelanee, and the commander of his troops, Choudree Sooltan Allee, deserve special notice. Although the Rajah's soldiers were encamped six months in the

neighbourhood of a large town, and had before them the bad examples set by our own sepoys, no breach of discipline occurred, and their conduct throughout was most exemplary.

61. The good services of Vazeer Goshaon, the Regent of Mundee, next call for prominent notice. At my request he supplied 125 matchlock-men to the local authorities of Hoshiarpoor and sent some 50 men with myself to Jalundhur. Vazeer Goshaon, in compliance with the expressed wishes of the Chief Commissioner, had made arrangements for furnishing me with a larger number of men, if any call had arisen for their services. In the event of any local insurrection in Jalundhur or Hoshiarpoor, the fidelity of the Mundee men might have been depended upon as having no sympathy with the population of the plain portion of the Jalundhur Doab. The Vazeer has been equally forward in affording the Government pecuniary aid, having made arrangements to contribute a lakh-and-a-quarter of rupees towards the Punjab 6 per cent. loan. Seventy-five thousand rupees are the accumulated savings for two or three years past of the Mundee Principality, and fifty thousand rupees is a personal contribution on the part of the Vazeer himself. **Services of Regent of Mandi.**

62. I have already mentioned that the Rajah of Chumba afforded protection to ladies and children at the hill sanitarium of Dalhousie. He also captured thirty of the Sealkote mutineers and made them over to the local authorities of Kangra. **Services of Chief of Chamba.**

63. Hameed-oolla Khan, ex-Rajah of Rajouree, resident in the Kangra district, where he draws his pension, afforded Major Taylor valuable aid in raising levies, and his brother Nowab Khan, who fought for us at Mooltan, joined Major Taylor at Noorpoor with a band of retainers when he heard the Sealkote mutineers were marching in that direction. **Services of ex-Chief of Rajauri.**

64. Rajah Ram Singh of Seeba and Rajah Jodhbeer Chund of Nadoun came in person at the commencement of this outbreak to meet me and tender offers of assistance. **Offer of aid by Chiefs of Síba and Nádaun.**

Services of Konwar Suchet Singh of Kapurthala.

65. Konwur Sochait Singh, a younger son of the late Rajah of Kapoorthula, repaired on the first intelligence of this outbreak to the head-quarters of the Hoshiarpoor district, and taking a house adjacent to that of the Deputy Commissioner showed himself on all occasions ready and anxious to support our cause. He remained with Colonel Abbott throughout the crisis, and his retainers were employed on various miscellaneous duties. He was put to considerable expense, entertaining an additional number of horsemen and footmen to meet the emergency.

Services of followers of Guru of Kartárpur.

66. Goroo Sadho Singh of Kurtarpoor was prevented by sickness from attending in person at Jalundhur, but his followers did good service.

Loyalty of Conquest tenure Jagirdars.

67. By supplying horsemen and footmen at the requisition of the local authorities, the Conquest tenure Jagirdars of the Jalundhur Doab showed their loyalty and good feeling.

68. For maintaining friendly relations with the chiefs who have done us good service and in securing the co-operation of the masses who have rallied to the cause of order, my special acknowledgments are due to District Officers.

Services of Captain Farrington, Deputy Commissioner, Jullundur.

69. I have already mentioned that Captain Farrington took upon himself the responsibility of sending for the troops of the Rajah of Kapoorthula, by which be probably retarded the mutiny of the Jalundhur Brigade. By this and other precautionary measures be provided for the safety of the Civil Station of Jalundhur. Captain Farrington accompanied the column which followed the Jalundhur mutineers, and although the pursuit was mismanaged, I have learnt from various sources that Captain Farrington did his utmost to accelerate the advance of the column. He was accompanied by Mr. Stuart Hogg, Assistant Commissioner, who on this as on other occasions showed himself zealous, active and energetic. Mr. Knox, Extra Assistant, deserves favourable notice for the zealous assistance he afforded his superiors throughout the crisis. Mahomed Ukbur Khan among the Tahsildars, Mohubbut Rae and Essur Singh among the

Services of Mr. S. Hogg, Assistant Commissioner.

Services of Mr. Knox, Extra Assistant Commissioner, and native officials.

Thanadars, were most distinguished for zeal and activity among the native officials of Jalundhur, who as a class behaved well.

70. When this disturbance broke out, Colonel Abbott, Deputy Commissioner of Hoshiarpoor, was under orders for Oude. It was, however, most fortunate for the interests of the public service that he remained at Hoshiarpoor, where he enjoys the confidence and good-will of all classes of the community, among whom his name is a tower of strength. The various precautionary measures he took are fully detailed in his report and show that he was fully equal to the critical position in which he was placed; for if the native troops at Hoshiarpoor had risen, Colonel Abbott with his raw levies would have had to fight against fearful odds. Jalundhur was too distant to give support in any sudden emergency. Owing, however, to the judicious manner in which the 33rd Regiment was managed and the bold front assumed by Colonel Abbott, no disturbance took place. His district was remarkably free from crime, and his proceedings throughout were characterised with much vigour and energy.

Services of Col. Abbott in Hoshiárpur.

71. He received cordial support and assistance from Captain Paske, Lieutenant Millar and Mr. Lennox, his Assistants, all of whom exhibited a spirit of hearty co-operation. Captain Paske was detached on two occasions into the interior of the district with parties of Irregular Cavalry, and showed himself zealous and active. Among the native officials of Hoshiarpoor, I would prominently notice the zeal and energy of Abdool Samud, Kotwal of Hoshiarpoor.

Assistance rendered by Captain Paske, Lieutenant Millar and Mr. Lennox in the Hoshiarpur District.

72. In Kangra much important work devolved upon Major Taylor. In the first occupation of the citadel of Kangra as in the subsequent disarming of the left wing of the 4th Native Infantry, Major Taylor took a prominent part; again when the mutiny at Sealkote exposed Noorpoor to danger there at once Major Taylor repaired and made excellent arrangements for intercepting fugitive mutineers. Major Taylor showed himself equal to every emergency and maintained the high character he gained in other struggles for

Services of Major Reynell Taylor in Kangra.

Services of Major Hay, Mr. R. Saunders and Lieutenant Hall.

gallantry, courage and devotion. Major Hay's vigilance in Kooloo has been favorably noticed elsewhere. Mr. Reginald Saunders gave marked assistance to Major Taylor throughout this critical period. Lieutenant Hall, under whose immediate charge was the jail and station guards of Dharmsala, deserves praise for his effective control and supervision. The sanitarium became a place of refuge for an unusually large number of ladies. I am happy to say no disturbance took place, and the station was wonderfully free from false alarms. The arrangements made for the protection of the place are detailed in Major Taylor's report. Extra Assistant Jaishee Ram, Gunga Purshad, Tahsildar of Noorpoor, Nika Ram, Naib Tahsildar of Palach, and Ram Singh, Kotwal of Kangra, all deserve praise for their exertions.

Services of Major Davidson, Commanding 16th Irregular Cavalry.

73. I take this opportunity of tendering my acknowledgments to Major Davidson for the excellent discipline he maintained in the 16th Irregular Cavalry during the time that corps was employed on civil duties in this Division. It was currently rumoured that the men were disaffected, but while on one hand Major Davidson showed no signs of distrust, he on the other maintained the strictest discipline. To this I attribute the exemplary conduct of the men.

Services of Uttur Singh of the Police Battalion and Bhagwan Singh, Subedar, of the 4th Native Infantry.

74. Although not under my orders, I may be excused for bringing to the favorable notice of the Chief Commissioner the names of Uttur Singh, the native Komadan of Captain Younghusband's Police Battalion, and Bhugwan Singh, a Sobedar of the 4th Native Infantry. Both these native officers were stationed in the Fort of Kangra and had great influence in their respective regiments, which they strenuously exerted on our side.

Reforms suggested by late Mutiny.

75. As the late Mutiny has brought to light that our arrangements are in many respects defective, I will make no apology for drawing attention to those points in which reform is most urgently called for.

Treatment of people.

76. First and foremost let us ever remember that the people of Hindoostan are bound in heathenish darkness and

steeped in ignorance for which to find a parallel we must revert to the darkest ages of Europe. Let us not legislate for them as we would for civilised Europeans of the nineteenth century. With them liberty too soon degenerates into anarchy, and power is only prized when it permits the unrestrained exercise of the worst passions of humanity. In dealing with such a class we must appeal to motives of fear; they must be governed by a rod of iron or they will turn again and rend us.

77. In every military cantonment and at the head-quarters of every civil station, a fort or some temporary place of refuge should be constructed in which a small party of determined men could defend themselves against superior numbers. **Necessity for places of refuge.**

78. In cantonments the lines of the Artillery should always be in the closest proximity to those of the European regiments. Instead of this, at Jalundhur the European regiment is at one end of the cantonment, the Artillery at the other, and the lines of a Native Infantry regiment are between the two. **Position of troops in cantonments.**

79. The bells of arms and magazines of native corps should be placed in rear of their lines and close to the great thoroughfares of a cantonment, so that a small party of Europeans might take possession of them when they pleased.

80. Secure places of refuge for non-combatants in time of war are most urgently required in India. This was first brought prominently to my notice during the first Sutlej Campaign, when Loodiana, Umballa, Dehlee and Meeruth were all denuded of troops. If we had had an enterprising enemy to deal with, or if the disaffection which has now displayed itself in the Bengal Army had broken out 12 years earlier, all our women and children must have been sacrificed. Again, during the present crisis the presence of so many non-combatants at Lahore would have proved very embarrassing if the spirit of disaffection had extended from Hindoostan to the Punjab. That we were spared such a trial should not make us forget that such a contingency might have occurred **Places of refuge for non-combatants.**

or may occur hereafter. No one will pretend that the Fort at Lahore was sufficiently capacious or our soldiers sufficiently numerous to protect a large number of women and children and at the same time to act vigorously against an external foe. On the main line of road from Calcutta to Peshawar there are scarcely more than half a dozen forts, and these are scarcely large enough to hold an adequate garrison, much less to afford accommodation to non-combatants. Moreover, a Fort on a main line of road is too exposed for women and children; on this account as well as for many other reasons I recommend that the Fort of Kangra be made one of the places of refuge for the Punjab.

Suitablity of Kángra as a place of refuge and its advantages.

81. Its natural strength is so great that it may be pronounced impregnable against the attacks of any native enemy. Inside the fort there are considerable spaces of open ground on which double-storied barracks might be built. The population of the valley in the immediate vicinity of the fort are peaceful and unwarlike. The climate is better than that of the plains for an European constitution. The only drawback to the scheme is the inaccessibility of the place, but this might be remedied by widening the excellent road made by Colonel Abbott and Mr. Forsyth. A lakh of rupees expended on this line would open it to the bullock train in which parties might traverse the distance between Jalundhur and Kangra in 30 hours. To open this line *would not only* strengthen our hold of the Kangra District in a military point of view, but it would open out one of the richest tracts of the Punjab, the products of which only require this outlet to find their way into the markets of Europe. Nothing but the difficulties of transport can prevent a large exportation of tea, hemp, rice, flax, iron and opium, all of which are produced in the favored district of Kangra.

Necessity for concentration of troops and improvement of communications.

82. It is by concentrating our troops at large stations and by improving the means of communication between these large stations and outposts that we must retain our hold in future of this country. The telegraph has saved British India; lines of railways and roads will prove the most effective

instruments for preserving that which has been saved. So infamous is the main line of road between Jalundhur and the Beas that during the rainy season Jalundhur is virtually cut off from Amritsur and Lahore. During the late crisis two mortars urgently required at Dehlee could not get along this road, so execrable was its condition. This (be it observed) is the main military line of India connecting Calcutta with Peshawar and the important posts of Phillour and Jalundhur with Amritsar and Lahore. No time should be lost in making this road passable at all seasons of the year.

Suggestions for location of troops.

83. Although the location and distribution of troops does not fall within my province, I may be excused for saying that Phillour is the point of the greatest strategical importance in the Jalundhur Doab. If therefore new barracks have to be built for fresh European troops now arriving in the country, I would recommend their construction at Phillour in preference to Jalundhur. Next to Phillour the most important posts are Kangra and Noorpoor, which I trust in future will be held by Europeans and not by natives.

Importance of Phillaur.

Undesirability of leaving strongholds in charge of Native troops.

84. The recent Mutiny has taught us that strongholds should not be left in the hands of natives. If proper garrisons of Europeans cannot be spared for places of strength, they ought to be destroyed. I believe it would be highly impolitic to destroy either Noorpoor or Kangra, but this would be far better than leaving them in the hands of natives, be they Punjabees or Poorbeeas.

Views of Major Lake as to the composition of the Native Army.

85. It must always be remembered that the morality of the Punjabee is in no respect superior to that of the Poorbeea. A reference to their history will show that the Punjabees in their dealings with each other have been guilty of treachery and cruelty scarcely less revolting than those sepoy outrages which have made the name of Poorbeea a bye-word and reproach. Although they have done us eminent good service during this crisis, the Sikhs look upon us as usurpers and cannot forgive us for having supplanted them as the dominant class in this country. Their conduct during the present crisis is no guarantee for the future.

86. During the first Sutlej Campaign, when the Sikhs were engaged in a death-struggle against us and attempted in vain to corrupt the Poorbeea soldiers of our army, who would have predicted that in twelve years the Poorbeeas would become our deadliest enemies and the Sikhs our staunchest allies? And who can now venture to say how long our newly-made friends will continue well disposed? My own conviction is that they would not hesitate to turn against us to-morrow if they fancied they were strong enough to do so with any prospect of success.

87. The exclusion of the Poorbeeas as a class from public employment in the Punjab, and the present cry of Punjabees for the Punjab, weakens in my opinion our hold on the country and paves the way for successful insurrection. When all the police are recruited from the population of the country, how powerless a Magistrate will become in the event of local disturbance? So far from prohibiting the employment of Poorbeeas, I would advocate a judicious admixture of Punjabees and Poorbeeas in our police and in our regular army as a safeguard against a second general mutiny, of which there is every probability among mercenary troops. Recent events have widened so much the breach between Punjabees and Poorbeeas that I look upon the latter as the best agents we can use in future to control the population of the Punjab.

Major Lake's views as to the disposal of disarmed regiments and treatment of loyal sepoys.

88. I do not advocate retaining in our service the disarmed regiments now in the Punjab, first because it is not desirable to retain a single man more than we can avoid of those brought up under a system so faulty as that of the Bengal Army, and, secondly, because it is well known that these men would have acted against us if they had not been disarmed.

89. There are, however, on the other hand, loyal regiments like the 4th and 33rd, with a few others, and sepoys of mutinous regiments who instead of joining their comrades stood by their European officers in the hour of danger, for whom we are bound to provide. The best of these I would

take as non-commissioned and commissioned officers of the new Poorbeea regiments I would propose to raise for service in the Punjab. By this arrangement loyal men would be rewarded, and the Poorbeea troops would consist partly of new men untainted by a vicious system and of old men who in spite of that system had shown themselves true and devoted in the hour of trial.

90. The feeling against Poorbeeas is so strong at present that I have little hope that the views expressed above will meet with approval. I would, however, press upon your earnest consideration the importance of introducing mixed classes and tribes into our district police; for instance, let residents of the Jalundhur district be drafted into the Jhelum police and let men of Jhelum serve in the Jalundhur police. The opportunity appears favorable for reorganizing the Punjab police on a footing similar to that of the Irish Constabulary Force, but this and other questions of civil government must be reserved for special report. This Mutiny has warned us in unmistakable terms that we must set our house in order. There are evils in our present system of government which call urgently for reform. Hatred of that system in many districts led the population into the worst excesses.

Advisability of introducing mixed classes into District Police.

*91. By putting on record the information I have ob*tained and the opinions I have formed in connection with the recent crisis, I have been influenced by the consideration that similar reports will be submitted from other quarters, and that by comparing the various accounts the Government will have the means of obtaining a clear insight into the recent mutiny in all its bearings. Our future in India depends upon our rectifying in a right spirit the errors of the past.

92. In conclusion, I would commend to the favorable consideration of superior authority the European officers mentioned in this report as well as the Native Chiefs who have supported the cause of order during a most critical period. If the stability of our power in India requires us to deal out the severest retribution to the guilty, justice and sound policy

Commendation of European officers and Native Chiefs.

make it no less incumbent upon us to reward the loyal and well-disposed. By dealing with them liberally we shall do much to restore our prestige, which during this struggle has been shaken to its very foundations; for if the Mutiny has taught us in characters of blood that we must maintain a large European force, it has also taught us that Europeans alone cannot hold the country without the assistance of natives.

ENCLOSURE (1) to 17.

18. *From Captain O. J. Mc L. FARRINGTON, Deputy Commissioner, Jalundhur, to Major EDWARD LAKE, Offg. Commissioner and Superintendent, Trans-Sutlej States,—No. 1804½—599½, dated 6th November 1857.*

Events in Jullundur District.

WITH reference to the Judicial Commissioner's circular No. 232 of the 2nd June last, I do myself the honor to report as follows.

Receipt of intelligence of Mutiny and action taken.

2. The news of the outbreak at Delhie reached Brigadier Hartley on Monday evening, the 11th May. It was communicated to me late that evening with a request to keep it quiet for the present. On the following morning I went down to the Brigadier to ascertain what he thought of it and how the information had reached. I met him on his return from a general parade of the troops, at which the sentence of death on a Native Officer of the 34th Native Infantry had been promulgated.

3. At about 11 that day an officer was sent up by Brigadier Hartley mentioning the news that had intermediately been received from Meerut and requesting me to join in a consultation at his house; there I found the Brigadier and his staff, Commanding Officers and their staff.

4. The general feeling prevailed that these outbreaks were the beginning of others throughout the country. There had been fires at Phillour and Hooshyarpoor, three simultaneously on one occasion at the former station; however, as far as I recollect, none had then taken place at this station.

5. At the council of war the following measures were discussed and carried out.

Establishment of telegraphic communication with Phillaur.

6. An official of the Telegraph Department was despatched by an express cart to Phillour and succeeded in setting up his apparatus in the Fort and opening communication with Jalundhur by 10 that night. Mr. Brown was also the bearer of letters from the Brigadier to the Officer Commanding at Phillour intimating that Europeans were to be despatched, and from myself to the Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana informing him of the events at Meerut and Delhie, requesting Mr. Ricketts to assist with the 9th Irregular Cavalry at his disposal should their services be required; for previous to this the corps at Phillour had shown a refractory spirit.

Despatch of troops to Phillaur.

7. At sunset 150 men of Her Majesty's 8th Foot and two Horse Artillery guns, with spare men and horses, were despatched to Phillour and took possession of the Fort by 3 A. M. the next morning (the 13th May 1857), having made the 24 miles in one march. The two guns above mentioned were brought back as well as two others from Phillour for which spare men and horses, as above mentioned, had been sent from this; 50 men of the above detachment also returned as an escort.

8. These arrangements were carried out promptly and without exciting any particular notice until the object desired had been effected.

9. The object in despatching two guns was to act in case the corps at Phillour should rise or the guard refuse admission into the Fort, in which latter case an attempt would have been made to blow open the gate.

Strengthening of Jullundur.

10. The extra guns that were brought back from Phillour strengthened Jalundhur and enabled two guns to be placed in the European lines. These, as you are aware, are at the other end of cantonments from the Artillery lines.

11. A party of 100 Europeans was brought down to protect and act with the guns in the Artillery lines, and other precautions, such as throwing out picquets, &c., were made.

12. After the experience gained at several stations during the late disturbances it seems quite desirable that, amongst other reforms, the Artillery and European Infantry

should be located close together. At this station they are nearly two miles apart, with the Infantry regiments intervening and the Native Cavalry on the flank of the Artillery.

Co-operation of Raja of Kapurthala.

13. I was asked whether I could raise a body of Sikhs or what assistance I could render. I resolved to call on the Raja of Kupoorthulla's Vazeer (who was carrying on affairs during the Raja's absence at Hurdwar) for some men. Almost immediately after this, intelligence was received that the Raja himself was near Phillour. His Vakil was despatched to him informing him how matters stood. He lost no time in hastening in, and arrived by a double march, attended by his followers and one gun. Two other guns and some 4 or 500 men also came in from Kupoorthulla; this number was subsequently doubled.

14. At the meeting held at the Brigadier's matters were fully discussed. Every officer did his best to be useful, and the greatest desire for prompt measures prevailed amongst those present. It was also arranged that a reserve company should be sent from Lahore to Phillour. This detachment was, however, detained at Govindgurh, where it was required.

Advantages gained by occupation of the Phillaur Fort.

15. There is no doubt the occupation of the Fort of Phillour by Europeans was a great point gained, and from what can be learnt the movement was not much too early. The corps at Phillour had already shown a bad spirit; it is out of the question to suppose such an opportunity as holding one of our largest magazines in the Punjab (and that from which a large portion of the munitions for Delhie have been supplied) would have been lost by the mutineers.

16. I lost no time in forwarding news of the occurrences to yourself, the Deputy Commissioner of Hooshyarpoor, Officer Commanding at Noorpoor, and Captain of Police, Dhurmsala.

Excitement among troops at Jullundur over the cartridge question.

17. There was a good deal of excitement amongst the troops. It appears that some of the new cartridges had been received from the Umbala Depôt and were laid out for inspection at the quarter-guards of regiments. These were destroyed by orders of the Brigadier, and the men expressed themselves

satisfied, but it was evident the sepoys were still very unsettled. If I may use a somewhat contrary expression, the excitement was of a passive nature; the excitement of surprise at being anticipated. There was the usual amount of nonsense spread about that the sepoys were surprised at the distrust shown, &c., but we know well the value of all that now: all the mutineers have shown us that where prompt measures and requisite precautions were taken and the mutineers found themselves checkmated, they assumed an air of injured innocence, and when such were omitted bitterly have those who trusted them suffered.

Bad spirit shown by troops at Phillaur.

18. The corps at Phillour, as already observed, had shown a bad spirit. One of the corps at the station when on the escort of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief had had an affair about the new cartridges; fires had occurred at the neighbouring stations: these were all sufficient grounds for the measures taken. Had it not been for the precautions then taken and the force collected in the civil lines, an outbreak would have occurred much sooner than it did.

Measures for protection of treasure at Jullundur.

19. On instructions received from the Judicial Commissioner I applied that my treasure might be placed under Europeans. Every argument was used by me to bring about this arrangement, but without success. It was alleged that the removal of the treasure would be distasteful to the sepoys; that its presence would in the event of an outbreak draw down the mutineers on the European Lines, where there were a number of women and children requiring protection. Being unsuccessful, I distributed the Raja's men and the few others at my disposal in such a way that they should be available to protect the treasury from attack and act against the treasury guard should they prove unfaithful. Care was taken that the guard at the treasury should remain in charge of the premises and that the men at my disposal should not come into collision with them.

20. The refusal of the military authorities to place the treasure under Europeans or to receive it in cantonments was duly reported. A peremptory message came by telegraph

from Sir J. Lawrence to me to again urge that the treasure should be placed under Europeans, and to point out that its loss would strengthen the hands of the enemy and be very discreditable to us. On this I was requested by the Brigadier to send down the treasure under the guard then in charge of it, in order that it might be made over to Her Majesty's 8th Foot. A small party of the guard remained behind to load the men's traps. The guard had scarcely proceeded half a mile when a fire was discovered in one of the office rooms. Three record boxes, the planks of which did not fit closely, had been fired. The fire was speedily extinguished. It was very evident the sepoys who remained behind were fully aware of the circumstances.

Transfer of custody of treasure to European troops.

Re-transfer of custody of treasure to Native troops.

21. At this period General Johnstone assumed command of the station. The treasure was taken from the Europeans and half made over to each of the native corps. I was not aware of this arrangement till it had been carried out. I understood the step was taken on the representation and request of the Officer Commanding the 2nd Native Infantry, who stated the men were much annoyed at the distrust evinced towards them, &c., &c. Subsequent to this, General Reed, Commanding in the Punjab, telegraphed to the Brigadier that the treasure was again to be placed under Europeans. On receipt of this I received a communication from the Brigadier begging me to represent to the Chief Commissioner that the distribution of the treasure to the custody of the Native Troops had had the best effect; that it seemed very unadvisable to take it away from them now that they had once received charge of it: there seemed considerable apprehension in cantonments that this matter of the treasure would cause an outbreak amongst the troops. Under the circumstances set forth by the Brigadier, I at his request and on his authority made the communication above mentioned to the Chief Commissioner, and the treasure remained with the Native Troops, no further reply being received.

22. It seems quite desirable that I should render the above explanation. My position was by no means an easy one. With so many who continued to place confidence in the sepoys,

and who were inclined to listen to their subterfuges by which they chose to regard necessary precaution as acts of aggression and withdrawal of confidence, it became advisable (from various matters that occurred, into the details of which it is unnecessary to enter) to avoid any measures by which the actual outbreak of the troops, which appeared then almost inevitable, could be at all attributed to this Department.

23. In order to obviate as much as possible any evil consequences arising from Government treasure being placed with the Native Corps, any payments that were required, instead of being made from other sources, were made alternately from the money in charge of each Native Corps, so that on the night of the mutiny only about 10,000 rupees remained with each corps, and only one of these sums was plundered owing to the fidelity of the Native Officers and a large portion of the guard of the 36th Native Infantry.

Raising of levies and barkandazes.

24. Instructions were received from you to raise 100 sowars and 150 extra burkundazes to aid in preserving the peace of the district. These men were raised with all practicable despatch. In order to have a reliable body of men, however small, in the Civil Station, the men of the Sher Dill Regiment or 2nd Police Battalion were recalled from the tehseels and concentrated at the sudder.

Despatch of revenue collections to Phillaur.

25. It was also arranged, under your instructions, that the collections of all the tehseels, excepting the sudder, should be remitted to the Fort of Phillour in order to obviate having any large amount of treasure at the sudder and to secure the safest locality in the whole district for depositing the bulk of the revenue.

26. A good deal of excitement continued amongst the troops. I caused picquets to be thrown out on both the roads leading to cantonments, in order to give warning should any body of men approach towards the civil station.

Provisioning and repairing of fort of Phillaur.

27. Supplies were thrown into Fort Phillour by the military authorities. My aid was offered, but the arrangements were carried out by the Commissariat Department. Lieutenant Oliphant was deputed from Amritsar to place the Phillour

Fort in repair. Guns were mounted on several of the bastions and many improvements effected. Doubtless a full report has been made by that officer on the subject, which is therefore only casually alluded to by me.

Arrangements for rendering the Jullundur Tahsil defensible.

28. Arrangements were made for making the Jalundhur Tehseel as defensible as possible. Independent of its being the only place presenting any security (and that was little enough), our treasure, ammunition, spare arms, &c., &c., had been removed to it; windows were blocked up; the doorway strengthened; two of the Raja's guns were placed outside so as to command the road from cantonments,—they were protected from surprise by a trench and embankment; extra men were placed in the vicinity of the jail, and other arrangements made to preserve confidence amongst the people of the town, into the details of which it is not necessary to enter.

Attitude of troops.

29. Fires were of constant occurrence in cantonments. Sometimes there appeared a lull; then renewed excitement. About the period of your return matters seemed to have settled down. This did not continue long. It is not intended in a report like this to narrate the changes of feeling towards the troops or the *apparent* changes on their part towards Government, or is it requisite to enter into all the proposals for disarming the brigade or the resolves that were made and abandoned, or to go through the various circumstances indicating the feeling of the troops. Suffice it to say they were scarcely behind other corps in deceit; for the 8 or 10 days previous to the outbreak the manner of the native soldiery was quiet, indeed occasionally embarrassingly obsequious.

30. You have already submitted a report to higher authority regarding the outbreak which occurred on Sunday night, the 7th June; my report regarding the pursuit of the mutineers has also been forwarded, so that nothing further need be said on those subjects.

Raising of a new Sikh Regiment at Jullundur.

31. Subsequent to the outbreak a new Sikh Regiment was ordered to be raised at Jalundhur under your supervision. 300 Tewana Horse under Malik Shere Mahomed arrived

under orders from Lahore to assist in preserving the peace of the district; 50 of these men were subsequently sent by you to strengthen Hooshyarpoor.

Measures for intercepting the Siálkot mutineers.

32. On the mutiny of the corps at Seealkote 2 guns and some 4 or 500 men belonging to the Raja of Kuppoorthulla were detached from this by you to Hooshyarpoor; at Jalundhur a force was told off to act against the mutineers on their approach, or in the event of their moving on Hooshyarpoor to advance to the assistance of that place.

33. The smaller ghats on the Bias were closed; the boats were drawn up on this bank and were rendered temporarily unserviceable by removing the sides; footmen and horsemen were located along the river to prevent boats from plying; the number of burkundazes at the Wuzeera Ghat was increased. On the outbreak of the 26th Native Infantry a party of Tewana Horse was also sent down, as by that time all the ghats but the one at Wuzeera had been closed.

34. Horsemen and hurkaras were placed on the Hooshyarpoor road in communication with the Deputy Commissioner of that district, in order to convey any item of intelligence of any importance. Similar arrangements were made on the Tanda road with the view of obtaining rapid intelligence from the ghats in the direction of Goordaspoor, Noorpoor, &c.

Pursuit of Jullundur mutineers.

35. On our troops leaving Jalundhur in pursuit of the mutineers, as you are aware I was accompanied by about 150 of the Raja of Kuppoorthulla's sowars. On my departure arrangements were made by you. Guards were supplied from the Raja's force to protect many of the public buildings in cantonments. The police of the district were also called in and assisted in the protection of private dwellings. From the time the mutineers left the station not a single fire took place or was there a single robbery. A few villagers scuttled into the lines and picked up a few things left behind by the sepoys in their huts.

Disposal of mutineers and disloyal officials.

36. Several mutineers were apprehended by the Police of the district and by the officials of the Kuppoorthulla Raja. A number of bad characters were detained by me in jail until

the country became settled, and some few are undergoing imprisonment for treasonable discourse, &c. I have also deported a number of bad characters, and have removed from the district a number of Hindoostanees out of employ. All Hindoostanee muskoories have been dismissed; also the few Hindoostanee burkundazes that were in the jail. More removals will be made during my tour in the district. I have not thought it necessary to make any changes at present amongst the Hindoostanee Amla. During the disturbances the Thanadars and Darogahs, on whom most work devolved, were men of this province.

Assistance rendered by Captain Farrington to the Movable Column.

37. The march of the Movable Column on three occasions through the district, the disarming of the 33rd and 35th Regiments, Native Infantry, are possibly subjects not included in the report now called for. Suffice it to say that I accompanied the late General Nicholson on two of the above occasions and rendered any assistance in my power.

Work thrown on district staff.

38. As you are aware, the position of the district, the constant movement of troops, the great demand for carriage for them as well as for the transport of stores, the removal of the families of officers and soldiers, &c., and other circumstances well known to yourself, has thrown a considerable amount of work and thought on the officers of the district.

Services rendered by Raja of Kapurthala and his brother Bikrama Singh.

39. The conduct of the Kuppoorthulla Raja has been excellent throughout. He has shown himself fully worthy of the confidence that has been reposed in him. The promptness with which he took so decided a part in aid of good order had the best effect in this district and I believe in other parts of this province. From the moment I called on him to aid he came forward and with his officials entered into the cause of Government most heartily. He and his brother, Bickrama Singh, both at much personal inconvenience, remained here from the first for several months. Escorts were supplied by this Chief for the ladies and soldiers' families on its being deemed expedient they should leave the station on the departure of European troops to Delhie. His men gave every satisfaction in the way in which they conducted themselves, and the whole

time they have been at Jalundhur I have had no cause to find fault with them. On the troops leaving Jalundhur in pursuit of the mutineers the people of the town became uneasy and alarmed, many of them meditating departure. The Raja proceeded in person into the town and by his arguments restored confidence.

40. The demeanour of the Raja, probably one of the most influential Chiefs now within our territory on this side of the River Sutlej, cannot I think but have had a most beneficial effect on the people. It is, however, not for me to enlarge on matters relating to the Punjab generally; it will be for you and others to decide whether my having without loss of time called on the Raja for troops (on being asked for aid by the Military authorities), his having been thus by the confidence that was shown him been placed in a position to declare at once apart (*sic*), the presence of himself at the head of his men and the straightforward conduct he pursued,—did not defer the outbreak at Jalundhur and conduce materially to the peace of this Doab. I was in daily intercourse with the Raja and his officials, and did not omit enquiring from other sources to ascertain the character the sentinents of his camp gave to the feelings of the people towards Government; the result seemed to me very favorable. I trust this Chief will receive a due acknowledgment of his services.

Services of Mr. Hogg, Assistant Commissioner, and Mr. Knox, Extra Assistant Commissioner.

41. I have much gratification in reporting to you that Mr. Hogg, Assistant Commissioner, rendered me great assistance during the last six months of excitement and exhibited energy in all he did. He accompanied me as far as Loodiana on the troops pursuing the mutineers. Mr. G. Knox, Extra Assistant Commissioner, has also, I am glad to record, made himself very useful, giving willing aid whenever required.

Good conduct of subordinate staff, especially the Tahsildar of Jullundur

42. The Tehseeldars of the district (with one exception) have conducted themselves much to my satisfaction, carrying out orders with care and alacrity, and preserving order and confidence in their several districts. The exertions of the Tehseeldar of Jalundhur have been the most prominent.

A great deal of work was of necessity thrown on his hands; he undertook everything with the greatest willingness and carried it out with almost European energy. I believe this man has already attracted your attention. I beg to bring his exertions particularly to your notice. The exception above alluded to was Zeeaooddeen, Tehseeldar of Phillour, an inhabitant of Hindoostan. A special report was made regarding him, which resulted in his dismissal.

Loyalty of respectable citizens and landholders.

43. The present report would not be complete without mentioning the excellent feeling that has prevailed throughout the district during the recent crisis. The respectable men and landholders have taken every occasion to show their want of sympathy with our mutinous Poorbeea army. There has been an absence of crime of a violent nature, and the calendar in other respects exhibits but the usual amount of delinquencies.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 17.

19. *From Lieutenant-Colonel S. A. ABBOTT, Deputy Commissioner, Hosheyarpur, to Major EDWARD LAKE, Offg. Commissioner and Superintendent, Trans-Sutlej States,—No. 504, dated Hosheyarpur, 7th October 1857.*

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel S. A. Abbott, Deputy Commissioner, Hoshiárpur, on events in that district.

IN compliance with the desire expressed by the Judicial Commissioner in his Circular No. 50, dated 29th May 1857, I have already done myself the honor to submit a Diary of Events that have occurred and the measures taken in this district during the Mutiny of 1857; but it appears desirable, and I understand you to wish it, that I should now report upon the subject in a more condensed form. This I have now the honor to trouble you with.

2. I shall endeavour to improve the subject by dividing it into several heads, for it appears desirable that the Government should have the most extensive means possible of forming an opinion on the causes as well as the effects of the Mutiny, and this can only be obtained by weighing the

circumstances that have occurred and the opinions of those who have had opportunities of watching the Mutiny.

3. The heads I propose are—

1st.—Narrative of events as affecting the district under my charge and the measures taken for its safety.

2nd.—The effects of the Mutiny on the Civil, Fiscal and Judicial Administration. The loyalty of the subjects, &c.

3rd.—The six (6) per cent. Loan.

4th.—The character and conduct of the troops stationed here.

5th.—Circumstances and opinions as to the causes of the Mutiny.

6th.—Conclusion.

Burning of Mess House of 33rd Native Infantry.

33rd Regiment, Native Infantry.
9th Irregular Cavalry.
5th Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.

4. At Hosheyarpur were stationed troops as per margin when the subject of the use of the Enfield rifle cartridge was occupying public attention. The troops at Amballa had shown a decided disinclination to them, and daily fires were the result, when on the 3rd of May the Mess House of the 33rd Native Infantry was fired and was blazing when we went to Church in the morning, it being Sunday. A Court of Inquiry did not detect the individual, but it was ascertained to have been the act of an incendiary, and there was every reason to believe that the act was perpetrated by a man or men of the 33rd Native Infantry.

5. With this exception no overt act of mutiny occurred. The men were noticed to be sullen and disrespectful, passing without saluting me or their own officers, but were obedient and under control, and so they continued until news reached me on the 13th May of the mutiny and massacre at Meerutt

Measures taken on receipt of news of Mutiny.

and Delhi, which I communicated confidentially to the Officer Commanding the troops, Colonel Sandeman. His first impulse was to send away all the women and children to Jalundur, where there were European Troops, but, after consultation, decided to wait lest he should excite unnecessary alarm.

Strengthening of Kotwali guard.

6. I took the precaution of strengthening my Kotwally guard, and, under the pretence of remitting treasure, called in all the chokee burkundauzes, replaced them with village chokeydars, collected others from the different tehseels and thannahs, replacing them in a similar manner. The burkundauzes were armed with flint muskets (without bayonet) and sword, and mustered about 60 men.

Conversion of Tahsil into a place of refuge.

7. By the 14th the events became generally known, and I thought it best to throw off all disguise and place myself on the defensive, and afford if possible a place of safe refuge for the European residents and families. With this view I called in all the "Sher Dill" men from the tehseels and from the jail, replacing the latter by burkundauzes, the former by new levies. In this manner I collected some 70 "Lion-hearted" Sikhs and threw them into a masonry building, the Tehsildaree, commanding the road to the city; entrenched the position round it by a slight breastwork with flanking projections at the corners, and on two different profiles, as represented in the annexed sketch;[1] mounted sand-bags on the walls, leaving loop-holes between them and a 6-pounder brass gun on the south-east bastion commanding the road to cantonments and the entrance to the entrenchment.

Moving of guns into entrenchment.

8. Captain Penny, Commanding the Native Troop, was somewhat anxious about his guns, which were on the immediate right flank of the 33rd Native Infantry and might any moment be surprised by them. He consulted me, and the Colonel readily consented to allow two of the guns to be moved down to my entrenchment, which not only gave it additional strength, but released the guns from a position of great danger

[1] Not printed.

and rendered them available to act against mutineers, should the remaining four guns be surprised by them. I had 40 sowars of the 9th Irregulars in escort with them and Lieutenant Maynard of Artillery in command.

9. By employing both prison and free labour on the entrenchment, and by Lieutenant Maynard's active assistance, I was enabled on the 15th current to intimate to the residents a notice to the following purport :— **Notice issued to residents of Hoshiárpur.**

"News has just been received from Ferozepur that the Church and 15 bungalows had been burnt, but that the 57th Native Infantry had laid down their arms and the 45th were being potted down wherever they dared to show their faces. One officer only had been wounded.

"The Deputy Commissioner believes that this will have a most beneficial effect and prevent the troops at Jalundur rising. The troops here will certainly not do so without those at Jalundur taking the lead.

"The Deputy Commissioner is quite prepared with 70 Sher Dills, 3,500 rounds of spare ammunition, supplies for 15 days, 2 guns, Horse Artillery, 38 sowars and a Sikh gun mounted on the bastion, and he recommends that on the first alarm being given all parties resort to this refuge."

10. On this day also (15th) I persuaded all the ladies at the Civil Station to leave for Dhurmsalah, and started them under escort of a thannadar and some burkundauzes. **Removal of ladies to Dharmsála.**

11. I was also in receipt this day of the letter of instructions of the Judicial Commissioner, the energetic tone of which was calculated to give confidence and met the approval of the Officer Commanding.

12. The following day you intimated arrangements for strengthening the police of this district, which have been beneficial; and without adverting to dates it is as well to give a general sketch of the measures. Fifty matchlock-men of the Mundee State were stationed at Noorpoor; 25 at the tehsil of Oonah in the Dhoon or valley between the first and **Arrangements for strengthening police and raising levies.**

second ranges of hills, this tract being one that was most likely to be disorganized; 50 more of the same contingent were sent to Hosheyarpur. You also raised a body of 50 men for employment in this district, in the Rajoree States, armed with matchlocks. The intrinsic value of these levies as soldiers is perhaps not much, but the moral effect was good. It tended to keep the hill people quiet by giving their idle hands employment below, and their numbers swelled up the small means at my disposal; added to the crowds of Sikhs seeking service and being enlisted every day that thronged the civil lines, and gave an appearance of strength and preparation that doubtless in a great measure held the troops stationed here in awe.

13. Added to these, we raised 100 men for the civil station, arming them with percussion muskets of the 33rd Regiment after they were disarmed, and formed half of burkundauzes that had learned the use of the flint-musket and half raw recruits. Matchlock-men were employed to man the ghats and others to strengthen the tehsils and thanahs; while a body of 100 horse was raised partly from our Jagirdars, who willingly took service, and, considering the hurry in which these troops, horse and foot, were raised, both are very efficient.

Detention of Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott, who was under transfer to Lucknow, at Hoshiárpur.

14. The mutiny had cut off a wire message from the Secretary to Government of India which I expected directing me to proceed to Lucknow, to which I had applied to be transferred at the invitation of my valued friend, with whom I had early in life been associated, Sir H. Lawrence—alas now no more! Under the circumstances of the outbreak, thinking my services would be more valuable here, I addressed the Chief Commissioner, who expressed regret at losing me under any circumstances and directed me to remain at my post. He gave permission also to strengthen our police and cautioned against surprise.

Interception of treasonable correspondence.

15. On the 17th May the post office letters were called for to and from sepoys. The Baboo sent them for a few days, but discontinued. The post office was occupying a Sergeant's

bungalow in the heart of the Native Infantry Lines. I strongly urged and at length obtained permission to take the post office under control, on the 26th June 1857,—a measure which it would have been well to have put in force at an earlier period. Only few letters of a treasonable character have been intercepted in this district. The intrigues have been carried on chiefly by emissaries (sepoys) from one corps to another.

16. On the 17th idem also we heard of the Simlah panic, which affected this district more than might have been expected; but the fact is that many of the jhampanees, carpenters, &c., employed at Simlah reside in the neighbourhood of Oonah, and many of these, having been seized with the general panic resulting from the refusal of the Nusseeree Battalion to move, returned to their homes with no exaggerated accounts of the disorganized state of that sanitarium. I endeavoured to dispel alarm by calling all the chowdries and head zemindars to the sudder and explaining affairs to them, urging them to give confidence to the people. I assured them of protection, and received expressions of unmistakable loyalty from all sides.

Disturbing effect of news of Simla panic.

17. On the 19th May a report reached us that the 4th Native Infantry from Kangra were marching down upon us in a state of mutiny. It turned out to be a detail of Artillery from Kangra going to join the Army. The Colonel expressed a desire for the return of the guns to cantonments; and about this time a very marked change had taken place in the bearing of the regiment: their sullen looks had given place to most assiduous politeness of manner. They had heard that the 45th Regiment had been cut up (which afterwards turned out to be greatly exaggerated). They had heard of the failure of the 3rd Native Infantry to seize upon the Fort of Phillour and of its being occupied by Europeans. They let me send away 50,000 rupees of treasure by a police guard from their treasury without a murmur. They saw that time had passed for a surprise and that we were prepared to oppose force to force, and they felt little inclination to risk

Withdrawal of guns from entrenchment to Cantonments.

the encounter. I therefore consented to the withdrawal of the guns, which reassured the troops as well as the towns-people.

Arrangements for protection of prisoners.

18. Our prisoners were confined in a very insecure building adjacent to the town consequent on the earthen jail having fallen down. It appeared desirable both to you and myself to remove them to the Brijwara Fort, a place of considerable strength about 2½ miles distant, but it was held by the Military authorities and by a small guard of the 33rd. The Commanding Officer, after a little hesitation, permitted us to occupy it, which I did by moving the prisoners in on the 23rd May. It was not only an object to secure the prisoners, but to prevent it falling into the hands of mutineers, and to afford a more secure place of defence than the Tehsildarry, which I now abandoned.

Occupation of Brijwara Fort and abandonment of entrenched tahsil.

19. The place was repaired, shelter erected for the prisoners on one side, for the guards and troops on the other, a temporary wall dividing it. Provisions were laid in, the magazine well filled, and subsequently enhanced by the magazines of the disarmed 33rd and of the Artillery and 9th Irregulars, which they left behind. A number of Jinjals and small iron guns were cleaned up and mounted upon the walls. The intention was, if compelled, to take refuge and defend it, to turn out the prisoners and with a small body of staunch Sikhs it might have held out against anything the mutineers would bring to bear upon it. While on the subject of the jail, I shall here mention that on the 12th July 1857 a conspiracy of the prisoners was detected to seize the fort, magazine, guns and treasure. Five (5) of the ringleaders were tried in the morning by a commission and hanged before evening. One was a sepoy of the 69th Regiment, a Poorbeea; two were most notorious dacoits and desperate characters. The effect was excellent; and the promptitude of the measure met the approval of the Chief Commissioner.

Conspiracy of prisoners to seize Fort.

Remittance of treasure to Phillaur.

20. On the 26th May I remitted Rs. 1,60,000 treasure under escort of the 33rd Native Infantry detachment to Phillour, which was safely delivered.

Precautionary measures against Rupar mutineers.

21. On the 28th May Lieutenant Paske, my Assistant, was despatched with 50 sowars of the 9th Irregulars to watch the mutineers at Roopur. Two companies of the 5th Native Infantry on command there had become quite insubordinate, had their officers under restraint, cut off communication with them, and gave countenance to one Mohur Singh, a Jagirdar of that place, who proclaimed the extinction of British rule and an end to "cow slaughter." I gave Lieutenant Paske orders to prevent the mutineers crossing and if they crossed to cut them up and give no quarter. The movement of this detachment, perhaps exaggerated in strength, induced the mutineers to move on to Amballa, to be disarmed with the rest of the regiment, and Lieutenant Paske returned when he heard of their being within 10 miles of Amballa. In the meantime I had to despatch Rs. 1,62,000 of treasure received from Kangra to Amballa, and despatched it under an escort of the 33rd, which delivered it safely at Roopur to an escort sent out to receive it. I was under some anxiety lest the men of the 5th, hearing of the intention to disarm them, should double back upon the treasure.

Despatch of a troop of Horse Artillery from Hoshiárpur to Jullundur.

22. On the 5th June the troop of Horse Artillery marched to Jalundur under orders. There was a slight sensation in the regiment at parting, in consequence of one of the Artillerymen having informed that a 33rd man had said they were moved away to be disarmed. He, however, would not or could not point out the man, and they eventually parted excellent friends. The troop was escorted by my police in consequence of the expressed inability by the Officer Commanding the 9th Irregulars to march 24 miles in one night. An occurrence took place which might have been more serious and caused at the time a sensation. On the march some of the camp followers tried to seize a hackery, which was resisted by the villagers; the former cried "murder." My new levy sowars rushed to the spot, each eager to distinguish themselves, cut one poor fellow considerably, and brought him in bound as a most desperate dacoit, and of course the row was magnified into an extensive dacoity gallantly repulsed.

23. On the 7th idem I remitted by police escort 24,000 rupees to Jalundur.

Anxiety at Hoshiárpur consequent on mutiny at Jullundur.

24. The 8th June was an eventful day to us, or rather one of great anxiety, consequent on the events at Jalundur. At 11 o'clock A. M. only did we receive intimation of the rise of the troops at that station, which occurred at 11 o'clock over night. We ought to have had much earlier intimation. As it was, a merciful Providence spared us; for had they, as intended originally, taken this route, unprepared as we were, not a soul would have escaped. The events of the Mutiny it is unnecessary for me to touch upon. Suffice it to say that we ascertained that the mutineers, after leaving Jalundur Cantonments, held a council of war. They abandoned their intention of going by Hosheyarpur for fear of pursuit, but split as to the direction they should take. It resulted in 200 Infantry and some 15 Cavalry (61st, 36th Native Infantry and 6th Light Cavalry) taking the direction of the hills and skirting them down to Seharunpore with a view to avoid the pursuit of Cavalry and Artillery. No route could have been better selected, and the order and rapidity with which it was effected were worthy of a better cause. They marched avoiding police stations, sending on a *russud* guard as if marching on duty, paid regularly for everything they took, and thereby excited no suspicion amongst the zemindars; so that their advent was unreported.

Escape of a party of Jullundur mutineers.

25. One of my native officials, however, had crossed their path in the morning and reported to me at night the direction they were taking, and I immediately despatched Lieutenant Paske with 30 (thirty) sowars to watch their movements, and if possible raise the country upon them. He was too late: they had eaten a hurried meal at Jyjoon at the entrance of the hills and left again that very night. The hill defiles were impracticable to Cavalry, so Lieutenant Paske returned. I had also sent a thannadar, a resident of the country, in another direction, but they had too long a start and got clear off into the Nalagurh territory before he could raise any considerable body of men.

26. The record of the rapidity of their flight is peculiar. At 11 A. M. on the 7th the mutiny broke out. At 5 P. M. on the 8th they reached Jyjoon, full 40 miles; at 9 A. M. on the 9th reached Suntokgurh; at 2 P. M. same day crossed Sutlej at Byrampoor; and 8 A. M. on the 10th reached Nandpur, and started again at 9 P. M., reaching Pinjor on morning of the 11th, making by my calculation 130 miles in 54 hours, or at the rate of 60 miles in 24 hours.

Rapidity of flight of Jullundur mutineers.

26½. From this party some of our zemindars ascertained that it was the intention of the Jalundur, Hoshiarpur and Kangra troops to have mutinied on the 10th idem and join at Keerutpoor on this very line of march.

27. The larger body of mutineers took direct (*sic*) to Phillour as you are aware, were joined by the 3rd Native Infantry, and crossed the river before an ineffectual pursuit from Jalundur.

Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott addresses the 33rd Native Infantry urging loyalty.

28. The mutiny of this body of men so close to us, and on whose movements I had reason to believe the 33rd were waiting, was of course an event of great anxiety. Emissaries had evidently been at work with them or badmashes had been trying to excite them. It had been given out on authority of my Assistant by some man in the corps that their pensions were to be stopped, and in reply to the Commanding Officer calling for explanation I offered to address the men, which I did that same evening on parade.

I told them that they knew as well as I did that their pensions were as sure as the pay they received monthly from the treasury; that any man who told them to the contrary was a liar; that I had fought and been wounded in the same action with them at Ferozeshah; that I had witnessed their valor in the field and tested their fidelity by entrusting them with treasure in escort, which had been faithfully delivered; that the Government was pleased with them and their officers for their steady conduct; and that it should be my especial duty to bring it prominently to notice if they still continued faithful. I told them not to believe what the mutineers wished

them to believe, that the whole army was with them; that I had that day letters representing everything quiet from Agra to Calcutta; that Nawabs and Rajas had come forward to aid the Government in destroying such traitors, a few regiments of whom were trembling in their shoes at Delhi, while the British forces were closing in upon them from every side, and would soon sweep them from the face of the earth; and wound up by saying that the bad men of the Jalundur regiments were being pursued and would be cut up (I hoped so then), and not a man would escape, but should any come in this direction, I felt confident the 33rd would know how to use their bayonets and not let one escape.

The officers told me it had a good effect.

Precautionary measures at ferries.

29. On the 18th of June we received instructions to prevent Poorbeeas passing the rivers without passes. The guards about this time at all the ghats were strengthened; no one allowed to cross without a pass; every Poorbeea searched; and to this arrangement may in a great measure be attributed the immunity the Punjab has enjoyed from intrigues.

30. The boats at the ferries were sunk, their knee-joints taken out or the tail board removed, so as to render them unserviceable; and only a few of the principal ferries were kept open. The 33rd also on this date received orders to march to Amballa. The next night an extensive fire broke out in their lines, which is attributed to incendiarism, for it was a still night and the fire is said to have broken out in several places. We were under arms in five minutes; but, as no disturbance took place, I did not move in the direction of cantonments. The regiment underwent a severe ordeal on this occasion. Major Davidson, Commanding the 16th Irregulars, who was marching to Hosheyarpur, saw the fire at a distance of some miles and golloped with a party of sowars to the spot. The sudden appearance of this party naturally created alarm; their officers even directed the men to break open the bells and arm themselves, thinking it must be a party of mutineers. Their good Colonel soon ascertained the cause and the men behaved admirably. One shot was fired in

Fire in lines of 33rd Native Infantry.

the air by accident by a raw recruit, but all passed off quietly otherwise, the men making every effort to put down the fire.

31. I believe the fire to have been the act of some rascals of this corps or of men from Jalundur, and done with a view to involve the corps in the whirlpool of mutiny. I am led to this conclusion by reports having been spread in the regiment the day before of the maltreatment experienced by the men of the mutinous regiments who had remained faithful at Jalundur.

Transfer of 33rd Native Infantry to Phillaur, where it is disarmed with the 35th Native Infantry.

32. On the 23rd June the carriage for the 33rd having a second time been completed, orders were received for it to move on to Phillour in two marches. There they were with the 35th Native Infantry disarmed in masterly style by Brigadier-General Nicholson and his Movable Column on the morning of the 25th, on which date I heard it by telegraphic message and resolved to disarm the detail of the regiment left here, amounting to about 50 men. This was effected without opposition by moving an overwhelming force down and taking them by surprise. I found to my surprise more arms in the bells than I expected, and had considerable difficulty in removing them, but got them all, some 213 stand, into the Brijwara Fort that night. One man only of this party deserted; he was caught and blown away from a gun by Brigadier-General Nicholson. The next day and day following the magazines of the 33rd Native Infantry, 9th Irregulars and troop of Artillery were all removed into the fort and built up in a bastion.

Relief caused by the disarming of the 33rd Native Infantry.

33. The removal and disarming of the 33rd was an inexpressible relief to this station. From the date of the outbreak up to this time my Assistants and myself took it by turns to keep watch at night, and on any alarm being given our troops were under arms in five minutes.

Transfer of 16th Irregular Cavalry from the civil lines to the military station.

34. I moved the 16th Irregulars, previously encamped in the civil lines, down to the military station. There were considerable doubts as to the fidelity of this regiment. This movement had the effect of keeping them at a convenient distance, and also gave protection to the cantonment property

now deserted by the troops. I also detached parties of the regiment into the different tehsils to reduce the strength at head-quarters as much as possible.

35. The removal of the 33rd also relieved me from a strong guard over the Treasury and Kutcherry, which the Commanding Officer, fearful of showing distrust, was reluctant to remove sooner, and enabled me to concentrate my forces in the neighbourhood of the Kutcherry.

36. We had sat daily in Kutcherry under the sentries of the regiment, with this large guard close to us. The feeling was anything but one of security; and I need hardly say we were well pleased to have them replaced by our own levies. One day, finding the sentry did not salute me, I ascertained that he could not do so because he was loaded.

Measures taken on receipt of news of mutinies at Jhelum and Siálkot.

37. On the 7th July our quiet was again disturbed by the news of the mutiny at Jhelum and the destruction of the 14th Regiment, Native Infantry, followed by the mutiny at Sialkot of 46th and wing of 9th Light Cavalry, which were in full march upon this place, and would have been joined on their way, it was supposed, by the 2nd Irregulars and 4th Native Infantry.

38. Immediate measures were taken to sink all the boats and strengthen the guards at all the ghats. You succeeded in procuring a team of horses for the 6-pounder gun and sent to my aid 2 hill guns of the Alloowallea Raja with 200 of his Infantry and 100 Cavalry, intending to bring the Kumaon Battalion then halted at Jalundur to join at any point that might be threatened. We should have had about 800 men and 3 guns to oppose the mutineers. The difficulty of our position was that we could not take the field without leaving sufficient force to watch the 16th Irregulars, of whose fidelity great doubts were at the time entertained, and other force to protect the fort of Brijwara. It was at this critical moment that the plot of the prisoners of the jail was discovered, to which I have already alluded, and which ended in my hanging five (5) of them.

39. A merciful Providence spared us a conflict in this district, which, even if successful, must have been desperate. To the energetic and masterly movement of Brigadier-General Nicholson are we indebted under Divine Providence to this escape. The mutineers were cut up and dispersed in the Goordaspoor district. The ghats were so well guarded that only one man effected a crossing, who was apprehended, tried by a commission and blown away from a gun that same afternoon in presence of all the troops at my disposal.

Destruction of Siálkot mutineers by Brigadier-General Nicholson.

40. Tranquillity remained until the 30th July, when we were again on the alert in consequence of the 26th Native Infantry having broken away from Lahore. They were, however, well disposed of by Mr. Cooper in the Amritsur and Mr. Naesmyth in the Goordaspoor district, and not a man crossed to this side that I am aware of.

Dispersion of mutineers of 26th Native Infantry by Mr. Cooper.

41. The wing of the 4th Native Infantry from Kangra arrived here disarmed of their muskets, but allowed to retain their bayonets. This added 250 men more to be watched.

42. The mutiny of the 10th Cavalry at Ferozepur had no further effect upon this district than being a caution to me to look better to the security of my guns. At your suggestion I threw up a breastwork round my 6-pounder gun, stationed under the fire of the treasury building. I thought it also desirable to close up and entrench the guns of the Raja to provide against a sudden surprise. I consequently brought them up near my own gun, threw up a breastwork in front and flank, the rear being covered by the fire of the Treasury. I also placed a picket at some distance in front and patrolled the road to cantonments night and day instead of only at night as heretofore.

Measures for security of guns at Hoshiárpur.

43. Major Davidson, the Officer Commanding the 16th Irregulars, made objection to my proceedings and reported them to yourself and the Chief Commissioner. His objection was that he was not consulted and the measure showed distrust of his men. I have heard nothing more of the reference, and therefore conclude that the authorities agree

Protest of Major Davidson, Commanding 16th Irregular Cavalry.

with me in thinking that an officer is not worth much who needs to seek advice as to the disposal of his troops and particularly from an Officer Commanding a suspected corps against which the operations are intended.

44. My opinion has been, and is, that the better prepared we are to knock mutiny on the head, the less chance of their rising. On this opinion I have acted, and under Providence this district has been spared the scenes of mutiny and bloodshed from which so many others have suffered.

Section II.

Effect of Mutiny on the Civil, fiscal and Judicial administration of the district.

45. The Mutiny had little effect in disturbing the Civil and Criminal administration. In fact, the period is remarkable for a freedom from crime of a heinous character and a considerable decrease in petty offences. My belief is that men's minds were occupied with the events occurring and awed by the executions taking place about them. The season, however, was one of no scarcity, which generally tends to increase crime.

46. In the Civil Court business proceeded much as usual. In my own Court of Appeal only was there any arrears of work, my time being too fully occupied to attend to this department, but in all October, matters will I trust come square again.

47. In the payment of revenue there was perhaps a slight inclination to hang back, particularly in the purgunnah of Dussoha and Hurrianah; but I placed a detachment of sowars of the 16th Irregulars under each tehsildar, with orders to move into villages that were known to be good paymasters but were hanging back, and this, without resort to extremity of any sort, caused the revenue to flow in and was paid up in full.

48. No cases in dispute fell into arrears in the Revenue Department; even the appeals were disposed of regularly.

49. Treasure has been escorted from tehsils to the sudder, from the sudder to Jalundur, Phillour and Amballa, without the slightest excitement.

50. The Educational Department has been steadily at work; revenue has been paid; the courts of justice have been open; not a highway robbery has occurred; and for this great tranquillity I trust I am sufficiently thankful to Divine Providence, and the people have expressed their unfeigned thankfulness for such tranquillity by subscribing one lac of rupees (£ 10,000) to the 6 per cent. loan and by general illumination on the news of the occupation of Delhie.

Section III.

The 6 per cent. loan.

51. Under instructions contained in the Financial Commissioner's Circular No. 65, dated 8th July 1857, a 6 per cent. loan was directed to be opened for a period of one year. In a rural district like this it could not be expected that any person would voluntarily come forward, nor did they notwithstanding that publicity was given to the notice. The 6 per cent. loan.

52. There were no merchants or bankers of substance that could have contributed any considerable sum. I therefore thought it would be expedient, and every way desirable, to induce the mercantile community to subscribe a specified sum, distributing it amongst themselves according to their means. The Punches being collected, volunteered to subscribe 75,000 rupees; with very little persuasion, I induced them to make it 100,000 (a lac).

53. The Punches of the towns of each purgunnah were collectors, who first agreed to divide it on the five purgunnahs. The Punches of each purgunnah distributed it over the towns, and the Punches of the towns on the trades and dealers.

54. The distribution was too minute to be practicable, and several complaints were made. I therefore appointed Gopal Suhoy, Extra Assistant, to revise it in conjunction with the Punches, and from 1595 to reduce it to 281 notes; and the sum of Rs. 1,00,150 was collected up to the 1st October and notes given for the amount.

55. This peculiarity exists, *viz.*, that many notes are in the name of several individuals, generally of one trade or class, several of whom have clubbed together; but, as the loan is for only one year, it will then be paid off with interest and without any intermediate interest being drawn.

56. I have been since made aware that this arrangement was not exactly what the Financial Commissioner intended, but it appeared to me in every way desirable that the classes of subjects who enjoy protection and pay nothing for it should in a crisis like the present contribute their assistance and show their loyalty to the Government, which my influence with them induced them to do with very little persuasion. The consequence is that every town in the district feels a direct pecuniary interest in the stability of the Government, and I feel confident that if Government is in a position to meet the liability without fail, which it should do at any sacrifice, that it will have the most beneficial effect in establishing the confidence of the people of the Punjab in the British Government, and it will induce them in future time of need to come forward even more readily than they have done on the present occasion.

57. It would be satisfactory to me to have the Financial Commissioner's order to pay off the amount of the loan from the general revenues of the district at the expiration of a year from the date of each note or up to any specific date. I urge this upon you feeling how essential to the Government credit is punctuality on such an occasion, and that in the uncertainty of life and changes of office I may not be alive or present to ensure the repayment.

Section IV.

The character and conduct of the troops stationed here.

Character and conduct of troops stationed at Hoshiárpur.

33rd Native Infantry.

58. *First the 33rd Native Infantry.*—There cannot be a doubt but that this regiment was strongly tainted with the spirit of mutiny, the proofs of which are: in the burning of their officers' Mess-house and then their own Lines; in their conduct and bearing at one particular time, already alluded

to; in the conversations of the men who when on escort duty and other occasions talked before my people openly of events which we should soon see; by the information given by the 61st and 36th men on their flight as to the original intention of the corps and its being sworn to join them at Keerutpoor; by the relaxation of discipline that for some time prevailed; and by their nervous and restless excitement at nights described by their own officers who slept in the Lines with them. It must, however, be said for this corps that the good men predominated and prevented the corps from open mutiny. It is much to its credit that on several occasions it escorted treasure for me under circumstances of temptation and excitement. It is much in its favor that, at a time when the fire was raging in the Lines in the middle of the night, the sudden appearance of a body of Irregular Cavalry amongst them did not excite them to open mutiny, as was the case at Jalundur; but that they were well under control of their officers. It is much in their favor that they allowed themselves to be disarmed without resistance and have been quietly located at Jalundur since.

59. To their most worthy Commanding Officer, Colonel Sandeman, is due the credit of keeping this corps straight and saving it from destruction. He is beloved by his men; and the noble devotion of himself and the ladies of his family, who would not to the last leave the men for fear of showing want of confidence, is deserving of admiration. From first to last the most warm cordiality prevailed between him and myself, to which in some measure these results may be attributed; and it will give me sincere pleasure ere long to see this fine corps, weeded of its evil-disposed subjects, restored to confidence and to their arms.

Conduct of 9th Irregular Cavalry.

60. *The 9th Irregular Cavalry.*—While at this station we had no reason to doubt the loyalty of the regiment; in fact they were trusted and looked upon rather as a safety against mutineers than as likely to go. Men on command talking loosely in a mutinous spirit caused suspicion occasionally, but their conduct and bearing were excellent. They underwent very severe duties for some time without complaint from the

men, and on their departure for Delhy, I hoped to hear of their doing good service. They, however, disappointed expectation, and many deserted to the mutineers. I think they might have been better commanded than they were.

Conduct of 4th Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.

61. *4th Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery.*—This troop was our stand-by, and we had full confidence in its fidelity up to the time it remained here. It has more than realized our expectations by its subsequent conduct. It was the first to fire upon the mutineers at Jalundur, which was the only reply to the entreaties of the mutineers to join them. It was deprived of its guns at Delhi from no misconduct, but in consequence of general mistrust of Poorbeeas. The men worked nobly in the trenches, and more so in turning the guns of the town upon the enemy. Their guns were restored to them immediately after the action. A very few desertions took place, chiefly new enlisted Hindoos. They were ably commanded by Lieutenant Renny.

16th Irregular Cavalry.

62. *The 16th Irregular Cavalry.*—This regiment, originally employed with the Movable Column, was made over for civil duty at this station, and arrived on the 19th June. It is needless to conceal the fact that the regiment was regarded with considerable suspicion, both by the authorities and the public. The grounds for these suspicions, so far as I am aware, consist in some mutinous expressions used by one of the troopers on the line of march to some native official, who very properly reported it. I am not aware of any other cause.

63. In every regiment there will be some bad subjects, and doubtless this regiment has a proportion; but as a body of men I must testify to having found them most exemplary in their conduct since stationed here.

64. I have employed them in the interior in keeping open communications and in aiding the Tehsildars in the collection of revenue. I have had no complaints against them. On the contrary, the Tehsildars all report favorably of them.

65. Discipline has been strictly maintained by their Commandant, Major Davidson, and their Native Officers appear studiously to have avoided occasion of offence or suspicion.

66. The regiment has not been disarmed. I believe it, as a body, to be perfectly loyal, and I shall be glad to see it employed in settling the country, feeling sure that, opportunity given, it will soon restore itself to confidence. A finer body of men, better mounted and set up, there is not in the service.

Conduct of 4th Native Infantry.

67. *Left Wing, 4th Native Infantry.*—This wing arrived here from Kangra, where they had been disarmed on the 1st August 1857. The conduct of this regiment belongs more especially to Kangra. I therefore merely mention that its conduct since arrival here has been excellent. Only one instance has come to my knowledge of one man having been overheard to use mutinous language; and in the house of one man who was turned out for bad conduct a sword was found concealed in the *chappar.* They appeared heartily to rejoice on hearing the news of the fall of Delhie.

Section V.

The causes of the Mutiny.

Causes of the Mutiny.

68. It would be presumptuous in me to offer a decided opinion on the causes of the Mutiny without more extensive data than has come before me in this one district of a vast Empire. Facts and opinions will, however, have their value when collected and compared by the authorities.

69. It is my belief, however, that the cause of the Mutiny was the cartridge question. A belief prevailed amongst the men that the Commander-in-Chief had come out with a commission from the Queen of England to enforce Christianity, and the first step was to destroy the caste both of Mahomedans and Hindoos by making them use the fat of hogs and cows.

70. I have conversed freely with the sepoys in private, and there was an unmistakable feeling of abhorrence of the dreaded cartridge. They have told me with tears in their eyes that they have fought and bled for us with the "brown-bess," and were willing to do so again, but would have none of the

Causes of the Mutiny.

new cartridge, in which they were certain was eternal perdition. From a man of the 19th Regiment, a Punjabee Sikh, who had been disbanded with his regiment at Berhampoor, the particulars of the Mutiny were clearly related. He said the first symptom of mutiny was on the advent of ammunition under a guard of the 34th Regiment from Barrackpoor, which told them they had brought up a supply of cartridges to destroy their caste. At first the Brahmins held consultation and determined to resist the use of them. They got the other Hindoos to join of course, but had some difficulty in getting over the Mahomedans, and more in getting over the Native Officers, whom they reproached with love of filthy lucre rather than the salvation of their caste. At last all were unanimous, and nothing that their officers could do could convince them that there was not perdition in the cartridge.

71. It was at the time that the question was mooted as to whether the cartridges should or should not be used at Amballa that the mutinous spirit was shown by constant burning of buildings. It was, I understand, the unanimous strong opinion of the officers at the Depôt that the feeling was so strong that it should not be enforced ; and yet the use of the cartridge was enforced, which was followed by the whole army in succession of regiments breaking into open mutiny.

72. No other cause need be sought for by any one conversant with the native character.

73. That the Mutiny was originated by the 34th Regiment at Barrackpoor there is in my mind no doubt whatever. That the cause of it was the belief that caste was to be destroyed by the cartridges there is even less doubt; but whether the idea originated by accident amongst the sepoys themselves, or was designedly disseminated by the Brahmins in Calcutta, or Kings of Delhie and Oude, it is not so easy to decide. I think it probable that an accidental expression used in the regiment, the Commanding Officer of which it is said was in the habit of preaching to his men in their Lines, would have been quite sufficient to excite their fears. How the spark once ignited has been fanned by Mohamedan

and Hindoo, but chiefly the former, every successive rising has shown. Causes of the Mutiny.

73½. The causes that each discontented individual would advance, taken collectively, would multiply the number attributed in the House of Commons by the Leader of the Opposition, but would be equally as far from the mark. I think it quite possible that the idea may have been disseminated by some malcontents in Calcutta. The law permitting re-marriage of widows alone would be sufficient to incite these wretched *Coolin* Brahmins to strive their best to subvert the Government, and this may possibly have been the means resorted to. It is less possible that the Emperor of Delhie and King of Oude were the instigators. Had they been, their name or their cause would have been mentioned. It was too deep a game even for them to play to set the whole army in mutiny without knowing that they could control it to their will. The Hindoos would never have deliberately joined to set a Mahomedan King upon the throne: the excesses committed by the Mahomedans on their race are too fresh in their memory. Had it been an intrigue of such a character, it must have oozed out. Putting religion out of the question, there was not a Hindoo in the late Bengal Army that would not have rather had an English officer as King set over them than a Mahomedan. No, their minds were poisoned with the belief that the cartridges were intended to destroy their caste and send them to perdition, and they swore on oath to resist it. They could get no hearing; their officers did sympathise, and urged that the hated cartridge should not be forced upon them, but they urged in vain.

74. On Brigadier Johnstone visiting the station, I myself urged upon him not to enforce the use of the cartridge, but rather to have some rifles sent to each corps and call for volunteers to use them. The Commander-in-Chief persisted. It is not therefore surprising that to him they attribute the resolution to destroy their caste. One man of the 33rd, on whom I was urging the absurdity of the objection and the value of the new rifle, told me plainly that we did not

Causes of the Mutiny.

understand the value they set upon caste; that people of the district could get a hearing in my court, which was denied to them in the matter of their caste. Thus deeply rooted was this belief.

75. The part taken by the Kings of Delhie and Oude I believe to have been subsequent to the cartridge question by the army. There was ample time between the agitation of the subject and the break out at Meerutt for the 3rd Cavalry to have intrigued with the King; it was a most natural consequence. Eighty of the men of the 3rd Cavalry had been put in irons. Fraternity, consanguinity and clanship would naturally induce the attempt to rescue the martyrs to their faith. A pensioned Emperor sitting on the throne of the Imperial City, a fortified town, munitions of war without end and guarded only by a handful of their own fraternity, was ready at hand as a rallying point, and fast spread the word from station to station to rally round the Emperor of Delhie and save their creed and caste from contamination. To any one cognizant of the native character there were cause and opportunity sufficient, without seeking for them in annexation or other supposed grievances. The circulation of the *chuppatees* was certainly a curious coincidence. That of the Lotus plant mentioned in Parliament I have not heard of in this country; but it remains to be proved that the circulation of the cakes was connected with the Mutiny.

76. It is possible that Government may obtain evidence to this fact; but if so, it will be found that the conspirators, whoever they may have been, worked upon the army solely by caste prejudices. I repeat my belief that the Kings of Delhie and Oude took advantage of the accident, and did not originate the cartridge question.

Section VI.

Conclusion.

Relative merits of Poorbias and Punjabis.

77. The Mutiny is exclusively a military movement, confined to the army, and has met with little sympathy from the better classes of the people; and I think it to be regretted

that measures have been taken in the Punjab to expel the Poorbeeas from office and the country, thus forcing into the mutinous ranks the more respectable and clever portion of the community.

78. In this district there were fortunately few of the lower officials from the eastward. This class was chiefly enlisted from the country, as will be seen by the annexed memo:—

—	Poorbeeas.	Punjabees.
Criminal Department . . .	22	254
Revenue Do. . . .	4	100
Civil Do. . . .	9	151
TOTAL . .	35	405

79. Of the Sudder Umla only $\frac{1}{3}$rd were Poorbeeas and of the Police $\frac{2}{5}$ths. In the Revenue, it being recruited chiefly from the Settlement Department, who were mostly Poorbeeas, rather a larger proportion, about one-half, prevailed, and yet objection was taken to these proportions. For my own part I am of opinion that independent of their greater efficiency a liberal proportion of foreigners is desirable. I have been now some 15 years in these States and know of no more intriguing character than a Punjabee. The time will come to a certainty that we shall regret the rejection of the Poorbeea. The time is now very close at hand when their influence and experience will be invaluable in restoring order in the disturbed provinces. The army is represented to find the greatest difficulty in procuring information, consequent no doubt on the panic existing amongst the population. It will require much care and judicious handling to restore confidence to the rural population; and men of their country who have proved faithful in the Punjab for a series of years and during this crisis may in my opinion be employed with great advantage in restoring

Employment of a proportion of Purbias advocated.

confidence. To employ Punjabees exclusively will never answer—they will be more dreaded than the European; and I conclude that most of the native establishments to the eastward, civil and criminal, have been swallowed up in the vortex of the Mutiny.

80. I can testify in favor of my officials that during this most trying period the Poorbeeas have vied with the Punjabees in desire to suppress the Mutiny and support the Government. Many have suffered in their families and property, and are as anxious as we are for the restoration of tranquillity.

81. They have aided me night and day with the most assiduous and faithful devotion; and it will give me much gratification to hear that, after a report from each District Officer has been called for as to their conduct, the orders contained in the Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 101 may be reconsidered.

82. It has pleased the Almighty to spare this district in a state of greater tranquillity than perhaps any district in the Punjab. It has also raised up this nation to our rescue in a time of great need; every district has contributed, and this has done so extensively.

Recruits furnished by the Hoshiárpur District.

83. It is impossible at present to state the number of recruits it has furnished, but the number will be found very considerable; besides those raised by me, recruiting parties from every direction have been beating up this populous tract.

Aid rendered to the army in other ways.

84. Carriage for the troops, stores and munitions of war have been a heavy drain on the resources; cash has been forwarded to the army; magazine stores have been and are being made up on contract for the Ferozepoor magazine; sand-bags were forwarded to the army in great numbers; cloth for tents and *tát putty* for the magazine are also being made in large quantities; recruiting, drilling and other details of a military character have occupied our time and attention, and yet the civil and fiscal administration has not suffered. My

Assistants, Lieutenants Paske and Millar, have relieved me by superintending the training of the levies, and Mr. Lennox has joined them and me in nightly watch, while Gopal Suhae, the Extra Assistant, has been indefatigable in disposing of cases. If the tranquillity which has reigned can in any measure be attributed to the measures taken, and they should meet approval, they must share in the approbation.

Services of officials.

85. I cannot conclude this report without mention of the loyalty of Raja Rundheer Singh of Kupoorthulla, who furnished a force of 2 hill guns and 200 Infantry and 100 Cavalry for the protection of this station; and I trust his loyalty will be appropriately noticed by Government when opportunity offers.

Loyalty of Raja of Kapurthala and his half-brother.

86. I also have to thank his half-brother, Kour Sochet Singh, Jagirdar of Bhongah, for his voluntary attendance, with his few followers, throughout the disturbance.

87. Indeed, it has been a most gratifying circumstance that I have met with expressions of loyalty from all classes of the people. Even amongst the Mohamedan population during the Eed and Mohurrum this class submitted to several restrictions on their usual proceedings, and were evidently most anxious to give no occasion of offence and to prevent disturbances which in more peaceable times have not been unfrequent in this town.

Loyalty of population generally.

88. The fall of Delhie was announced at this station on the 21st of September by a royal salute from my 6-pounder gun at the Treasury, taken up by the Raja's guns and completed by another salute from the Fort of Brijwara and by illumination in the towns and large villages, by feasts and fireworks, and by the congratulations of most of the influential residents in the district.

Celebration of fall of Delhi.

89. Hoping that in this detail of events I may not have wearied your patience.

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 17.

20. *From Major REYNELL TAYLOR, Offg. Deputy Commissioner, Kangra, to Major EDWARD LAKE, Commissioner and Superintendent, Trans-Sutlej States,—No. 38, dated Kangra, 15th August 1857.*

Report of events in the Kángra district.

WITH reference to the first paragraph of the Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 232 of the 2nd of June last and your demi-official note of the——instant, calling my attention to it, I have the honor to subjoin a general summary of events and occurrences in this district from the commencement of the present crisis up to date.

2. On the 15th of May Captain Younghusband, Commanding Police, came at 6 A. M. to my house at Dhurmsalla and showed me letters detailing the first events of the outbreak at Meerut and Dehli. You were to arrive that morning at Kangra; I had written to say that I should join your camp in the evening. On the news received I changed my plan and resolved to proceed at once to your camp.

Occupation of the Citadel of Kangra by the Police Battalion under Captain Younghusband.

Before leaving Captain Younghusband I took from him a verbal report of the number of men he could furnish to be added, if necessary, to the garrison of the Kangra Fort, which appeared to me likely to become an advisable measure. I then left Dhurmsalla for your camp, but had not gone a mile when I met a messenger of yours with a letter informing me that you had determined to introduce a portion of the Police Battalion into the Fort of Kangra. I had only to turn my horse and ride back to Captain Younghusband and request him to let us have the men he had mentioned as available by day-break the next morning. I then joined you and accompanied you to the fort, where arrangements were made with the Officer in Command.

Captain Younghusband marched at midnight and reached Kangra before daybreak, and at 5 A. M. the detachment of the Police Battalion marched into the fort, and were located in the Citadel, which fortunately was the only place vacant to receive them.

To this precautionary measure taken within 24 hours from the receipt of the first intelligence of an outbreak at Meerut may, under Providence, be attributed mainly the peace and security we have hitherto enjoyed in the district.

Supplies for the Fort of Kángra.

3. Before leaving for Jullunder you gave me directions to lay in six months' supplies in the Fort of Kangra, which was accordingly done.

Armament of the Fort of Kángra.

4. There were in the Fort the following guns :—One 18-pounder, dismounted ; three 9-pounders (iron) ; and a brass 24-pounder Howitzer, mounted. These were in the lower Fort, and it was considered an object to secure the Howitzer by placing it in the Citadel ; while at the same time it was at this early stage of the Mutiny a delicate matter to take it from the detail of Native Artillery in charge of all the guns. The difficulty was solved by the Artillery being called away for duty by order from Lahore, when the opportunity was immediately taken advantage of and the Howitzer removed into the Citadel and placed on the topmost bastion of the Fort.

Defences of Dharmsála.

5. In a memorandum on the defences of Dhurmsalla you gave me directions to place the Naib Kotwali and Serai at that place, two contiguous buildings, by fixing strong gates to each, loopholing the towers, walls, &c., and making such other preparations as might appear necessary. These arrangements were immediately set about and completed under the supervision of Mr. R. Saunders and Lieutenant Hall, as from the first day I had removed my head-quarters to Kangra to be nearer the officers and troops in the Fort Kangra, being also a better centre to the district in uncertain times than Dhurmsalla.

By advice of Captain Younghusband, Commanding Police, an octagonal loopholed tower protecting the doorway on the side towards the hill was added to the Kotwali, and a pucka masonry tank, into which a constantly running stream could be turned with five minutes' notice, was added by me to the arrangements in the Serai. The two buildings are now strong little posts well prepared for musketry and supporting each other.

Treasure.

6. The bulk of the treasure was moved by your orders into the Fort of Kangra, a small amount being kept in the fortified Kotwali.

State of feeling in the district.

7. The detachment of nearly the whole available force of the Police Battalion to the Kangra Fort had left Dhurmsalla in a very denuded state, and as the news of the mutinies spread and our preparations fell under observation, a good deal of uneasiness and excitement gradually began to manifest itself in the district. With regard to this I found the memorandum you left me concerning the most influential men in the district most useful, and with it and Mr. Barnes' report, and other memoranda and papers in the office, I was soon able to gain a tolerable idea of the possibilities and probabilities of attempts at disturbance among the population of the hills. The Native Chief who fell especially under suspicion was Raja Pertab Chand of Teerah, the reason, I believe, being that he is the legitimate representative of the Kutoch Rajas of Kangra. He was also known to be in debt, to have forts strong and easily made defensible, and further to be very jealous of and hostile to his uncle and neighbour Jodbeer Chand, an illegitimate son of Raja Sunsar Chand, and therefore a natural rival of Pertab Chand's.

The doubts as to what line of conduct Pertab Chand would pursue were increased by the fact of his wilfully mistaking a simple question of yours as to how many men he could furnish, if occasion required, for an order to enlist men, which it was immediately reported that he had set about doing, though by subsequent enquiry I ascertained to my satisfaction that his arrangements had not been carried far in the matter.

There were other men in the district who had before given trouble and who had to be carefully watched, and for a considerable time there were reports of plots and seditious plans, but they came to nothing.

The Thanadar at Teerah was a Kutoch and was reported to be entirely in Pertab Chand's hands. You therefore advised my removing him to Shahpur and sending the Shahpur

Thanadar, a Muhammadan of known merits, two of whose brothers had been promoted into other districts as Tahsildars, to Teerah. This was done, and from that time I have received excellent intelligence of Raja Purtab Chand's movements.

Irregular Levies; house guards at Dharmsála.

8. In consequence of the denuded state of Dhurmsalla, where the Jail guard of the Police Battalion had also been relieved by burkundazes, while from the fact of my having been directed to send 64 trained burkundazes to Hoshyarpoor and to replace two Tahsil guards usually furnished by the Police Battalion with 20 more, total 84 old burkundazes withdrawn from their regular duties, I was unable to draw men from the mofussil for the protection of Dhurmsalla. I was therefore directed to raise new men in the country to aid in the protection of the place. These were to be house guards, and the Judicial Commissioner in a demi-official letter to my address expressed a wish that every house should have a guard. This arrangement, which is the more necessary on account of the straggling nature of the station, involved the employment of a considerable number of men; a detail of their present strength and distribution is appended to this report. A jail guard was also formed from new levies, which, with the assistance of 6 old burkundazes from the Kotwali, has performed its duties most satisfactorily.

Watching of ferries and hill passes.

9. The ferries and *nakahs* or hill passes were next taken in hand, and this was done on the receipt of the first orders regarding vagrants, fakirs, &c., conveyed in demi-official letters from the Judicial Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner's letter without number, regarding ferries, forwarded with your docket Nos. 1270—221 of the 23rd of May.

This district, being a great place of pilgrimage, was more especially infested with vagrants, fakirs, &c. Orders were issued to stop all such at the ghats and prevent them entering the country. Fakirs, gohsains and others residing in the district were readvised by proclamations not to wander about the country, as they were liable to be apprehended, and, if respectable men might, from not being known, be treated roughly as suspected persons. The mosques, temples, takkias,

&c., the usual resting-places of such wanderers, were watched in the large towns, and all new arrivals brought up before me. These arrangements very soon had the effect of clearing the atmosphere, thinning the throng on the roads, and enabling one to pause and consider the probable character of a traveller of doubtful appearance; whereas before it was impossible to single him out of a crowd equally suspicious.

10. About the same time the daks were taken in hand and all letters of doubtful or mischievous tendency received for the regiments or inhabitants of the district were suppressed.

11. On the occasion of the Jullundur outbreak more stringent orders were issued by the Judicial Commissioner in his Circular No. 53 of the 10th of June reiterating the instructions conveyed in the Chief Commissioner's letter on the same subject above alluded to. This came covered by your letter (circular) No. 248 of the 12th of June. I must say that I spared no pains to render the ferries of the district secure against mishap, and the strengthening and concentrating process went on till the result appended to this report was arrived at. I may mention that I was much assisted in these ghat arrangements by maps of each portion of the rivers falling in the three tahsils of Nadown, Hurreepoor and Noorpoor, made by Patwaris. These are coloured and very clear and practical.

Irregular Levies; their aggregate numbers.

12. To return to the levies. 84 men were entertained to replace those sent to Hoshyarpoor. The house guards at Dhurmsalla giving 4 men a house and a proportion of officers amounted to 125 men, the Jail guard to 27. The extra ghat guards on the three rivers—Sutlej, Beas and Ravee—amounted eventually to 79, and this number was only sufficient after a large proportion of the ferries had been stopped entirely.

The Hill Pass guards.

The *Nakah* or defile guards were raised from the villages in the neighbourhood on the moderate pay of 3 rupees per mensem per man. They were not stronger than three or four men per road, but this was found sufficient, and what with the closed ghats and *nakahs* every traveller of at all doubtful

character was sure to be stopped and sent in for examination, and the quieting effect on our towns and roads was most remarkable. Before the streets were full of groups of elaborately dressed and painted fakeers, who for all one knew might be the last batch of emissary sepoys from Dehli; but the arrangements alluded to quickly changed this, and if emissaries got into the country at all it was not in gangs.

Position at Nurpur.

13. The 4th Native Infantry behaved well throughout, but the position of Noorpoor was often a matter of anxiety to me. A wing of the 4th Native Infantry held the fort, and, beyond a small guard of 1 Havildar and 8 men of the Police Battalion in the tehseel, there was nothing to protect the European officers, treasure and town if the regular regiment became mutinous. With regard to the tehseel arrangements the Financial Commissioner's instructions were attended to, but escorts formed a great difficulty. They were, however, provided for by various means, and no large amount of money remained for any long period in the tehseels.

On account of the above-described exposed state of the tehseel, town, &c., of Noorpoor, I proposed to you to raise 50 men under Tek Chund, Chowdry, to assist in collecting the revenue, to strengthen the hands of the civil officers generally, and enable them to lend some efficient assistance should unfortunate circumstances place the lives of the European officers in jeopardy. Tek Chund is a man of local influence, and when a man of the sort has the nucleus of a force ready raised and at hand, he can easily add to it in a few hours and soon collect a body of men capable in advantageous position of protecting friends.

Attempt of Pertab Singh to incite rebellion in Kulu.

14. In the beginning of June a pretender to the Raj of Kullu, one Pertab Singh, made an attempt to accomplish a rising in his favour in Kullu and Seoraj. This man was a pretender too deep, as the man whom he personated, the original Pertab Singh, had been twice pronounced himself to be spurious, having been purchased by his mother and her brothers in infancy and paraded to the world as son of Kishen Singh, a man who had some claims to the Raj.

The original Pertab Singh therefore, though commonly receiving the honorary appellation of Mean, had been twice set aside under the Sikh rule. He subsequently followed Thakoor Singh, Raja of Kullu, to the field as a Ghorchurra and is supposed to have been killed at Moodkee. After a long interval the late pretender appeared professing to be Mean Pertab Singh. After some demur he was received by the widow of Mean Pertab Singh and her relations. He made several attempts to bring himself into notice, but was set aside and warned that unless he remained quiet, he would be ejected from the country and punished.

Major Hay, Assistant Commissioner in charge of Kullu, aware of the man's character, had on the occurrence of disturbances and uneasiness below warned the Police officials to be on the alert in keeping a watch upon his proceedings, and consequently the Naib Tehseeldar of Seoraj, receiving intelligence that some letters had been sent by Pertab Singh to the Negees of Seoraj, was enabled to intercept them, and acting with great promptitude secured the messengers with the letters upon them, and immediately sending intelligence to the Tehseeldar of Kullu, Pertab Singh and his chief confederates were secured without difficulty.

It appeared on the subsequent enquiry that a large body of the Negees of Seoraj were decidedly favourable to Pertab Singh and, if his insurrection had shown any head, would have joined him. However, the character of the whole movement was rather a determination to set up Pertab Singh against the rival and rightful representative of the Raj, *viz.*, Gyan Singh, son of Thakoor Singh, and this under the full belief that our hold on the country was immediately to cease. Men had returned from Simla and reported that the English had fled from thence. The intended movement was not therefore so much directed against the British Government as to secure the country from falling into the hands of a rival faction. This was the feeling of the Seoraj people. The Kullu people, on the other hand, were almost entirely for Gyan Singh.

Pertab Singh and his accomplices were tried by your orders by a commission composed of myself and my two Assistants. Pertab and his principal adviser Beer Singh were condemned to death and executed. The rest were punished with various terms of imprisonment. Three of the party have died since leaving Kullu, and Major Hay is of opinion that the terms awarded are too long for Kullu men, and the probability certainly is that if the whole terms are enforced not one of the 15 men would ever see the valley again; but when better times come, as please God they will, I would recommend portions of the sentence being remitted. The real schemers, who probably knew the true state of affairs at Lahore and elsewhere very well, but who would by taking advantage of the ignorance of the people have raised the country upon us, have died upon the scaffold; the rest were mere tools in their hands, influenced by clannish feeling, but not imbued with any especial dislike to our Government.

Bangáhal Ilaka.

In the course of the proceedings I had to make enquiry from the inhabitants of Bungahal as to whether Pertab Singh had written letters to them. Their reply was a hearty denial. "What should they," they said, "have to do with Rajahs; they never enjoyed any peace or comfort under them; they were rack-rented and seized for forced labour without wages; now they enjoyed peace, and had a margin of money left after paying the Government revenue: so they were little likely to listen to overtures from a class they were well rid of."

Passports.

15. In the commencement of July the Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 64 of the 9th of July, covered by your Circular No. 272, dated 13th idem, laying down certain rules for the issue of *rahdaree* passes, was received, the provisions of which have been adopted and adhered to, with the exception that on account of the distance at which my Extra Assistant at Noorpoor is placed, I am obliged to depute to him the power of giving passes in cases where there can be no doubt of the propriety of the indulgence. I have perfect confidence in Extra Assistant Jaishee Ram's discretion and loyalty.

Disarming of bazars.

16. At the close of the same month was received the Judicial Commissioner's circular No. 60 of the 25th of June, directing that the Hindoostanee population of bazars, towns, &c., together with the native amlah of that class, domestic servants, &c., should be disarmed. This has since been carried out at Noorpoor, Kangra and Dhurmsala. At the latter place the whole of the domestic servants have been disarmed, and the numerous class of jampanees have been made to deposit their arms in the Government *serae.*

Siálkot mutineers.

Disarming of the wing of the 4th Native Infantry in the Fort of Kángra.

17. In the beginning of this month occurred the outbreak at Sealkot and the march of a mutinous body of troops from that station towards Goordaspoor. The Judicial Commissioner wrote immediately in a demi-official letter urging that the wing of the 4th Native Infantry in the fort of Kangra should be disarmed, as he saw danger in the horizon for the fort of Kangra. Neither he nor Brigadier Nicholson, through whom the letter passed, could suggest any means by which the Noorpoor wing could be coerced simultaneously or as a subsequent measure, but Mr. Montgomery expressed an opinion that this difficulty ought not to delay immediate arrangements for securing the fort of Kangra. I immediately enclosed the Judicial Commissioner's letter to Captain Younghusband with a note saying that I believed the time was come and the disarming must be done. He replied that *it must.* One more written communication and answer and rejoinder to that passed, and the thing was arranged. There were local difficulties which it is useless to detail when others have had much greater ones to contend with and when by God's mercy all went well in this instance. At 5 o'clock on the same date I proceeded to the fort and communicated to the Officer Commanding the wing of the regular regiment that it was to be disarmed, which was accordingly accomplished 20 minutes afterwards. Captain Younghusband's arrangements were excellent; and, though from the fact of the number of trained soldiers that he was able to move down to the distant loop of the works occupied by the 4th Native Infantry being very small, if resistance had been made, a

hand fight would have ensued, in which the gun on the bastion of the citadel, 400 yards distant, could have taken little part, as friend and foe would have been mixed up together, still by the arrangements made I feel confident that had a rush to arms been attempted the regulars would have lost a third of their numbers before resistance had assumed an efficient form. Captain Younghusband's numbers in old soldiers were exactly those of the men he had to disarm. There were recruits in the background with muskets in their hands, but they had never fired them, and it was not possible under the circumstances to make preparations which might have excited alarm and suspicion. The case of the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum had just occurred, and for all we knew the Sealkot mutineers were bearing down on the district with a previous understanding with the regiment holding the two chief strongholds in it. There were really an equal number of native troops to coerce a body of native troops, and under these circumstances Captain Younghusband had overruled my advice that the regulars should be paraded with their arms, and I subsequently thought he was right. His arrangements ensured success under the worst circumstances humanly speaking, and this in the case of a valuable fortress was undoubtedly the proper line to adopt.

Surrender of arms by the right wing of the 4th Native Infantry.

18. On the same night I marched with 100 men of the Police Battalion to Noorpoor, a distance of 34 miles of hill road. Before I reached the place, Major Wilkie, who had received intimation by express that the left wing had been disarmed, had induced the right wing to give up their arms. This they did cheerfully and obediently, apparently in the best spirit; and when it is considered that the Sealkot mutineers were in full march towards the neighbourhood, it must be looked upon as a most loyal act on the part of the regiment. They held a fort and were in the direct line of the mutineers, and had they merely rushed like others to wait and watch events it would have been very embarrassing. As it was, their cheerfully giving up their arms greatly simplified matters and was a real solid act of good faith and obedience to Government.

Arrangements on the supposed approach of the Siálkot mutineers.

19. The Sealkot mutineers were supposed to be about 1,000 men, and as then intelligence could not be supposed to be very good, it was still probable that they might take the Noorpoor line in hopes of getting the 4th Native Infantry to join them, and if they did do this it appeared probable that they would make for the higher ghats of the Ravee, and at the same time it was necessary to make efficient arrangements for the apprehension of stragglers, who might strive to make their way through the jungly tracts of hill country between Noorpoor and the Beas; it was also necessary to be prepared at Noorpoor. You know the localities and will know that the following arrangements were probably as efficient as could be accomplished with the means at my disposal.

The boats on the Ravee had been well cared for, being hauled up high and dry and planks taken out of their bottoms. The last boat at Bissowlee on the other side of the river was destroyed at my request after some demur by the Maharaja's Kardar. The Raja of Chumba on my requisition sent down 300 men to the Bissowlee ghat on the Ravee.

Pheenoo, Kotwal, assembled a body of Mulkeyahs to support the Shahpoor thana and occupy the line of the Chukkee with pickets to apprehend stragglers. From the point where the Chukkee and Noorpoor river join, the line of posts was carried on by Mean Surroo, Kotwal, and Mohroo, Chowdry, to Indowrah and Meerthul, and lines of dak were established from all the principal points into Noorpoor.

A second line of Mulkeyah posts was formed from Tiloknath to Jowallee and down the Jowallee river to Tilwarah on the Beas. On a subsequent occasion I further called upon the Seba and Hurreepoor Rajas to furnish 50 men each to support the Beas ferry guards; this was when the 25th Native Infantry were expected. As the mutineers did not come our way the preparations made may appear uselessly elaborate, but had it been otherwise, that is, had they eluded the Movable Column and got into this district, we should have had hard work to deal with them. I had 100 Sher Dils at Noorpoor.

Major Wilkie had 150 Sikhs and Punjabees unarmed, but who were to be armed for the occasion, and there were Tek Chand's 50 men with some Mulkeyahs. We were not helpless or unprepared, but a thousand unbroken desperate men would have upset the whole country for a time. The storm was providentially averted, and the peace of the district remained unbroken.

Deputation of Ram Singh, Kotwal, to Núrpur.

20. I should mention that, in accordance with your advice, I had put Ram Singh, Kotwal of Kangra, to act as Kotwal of Noorpoor for a time. He has great local knowledge and influence in the neighbourhood and would be useful to Major Wilkie in case of any meditated rebellion or other mischief.

The fiight of the 26th again caused some anxiety lest they should make for the jungles of this district, but they were crushed ere they could reach it. A party straggled up to near the Meerthul ghat, but were overtaken and destroyed before they could make it. Two of this regiment have since been captured by the *Nakah* guards ; they are on their way in.

Capture of fugitives from mutinous corps.

21. Owing to the activity of the *Nakah* guards and Mulkeyah posts, I do not think above three or four men of these two mutinous bodies ever reached the river, and those that did were captured by the ghat guards. 20 sepoys in all, 3 horses and about 60 camp followers have been captured in the district. Of the first one was of the 9th Cavalry, one Ramzan, Quartermaster-Havildar, who I have been informed by an officer of the corps burnt the Kutcherry at Sealkot and was prominent in releasing the prisoners, and was made a Brigadier for his services. This man was executed at Noorpoor. 17 were men of the 46th,—1 havildar and 16 sepoys. 6 of these were executed at Noorpoor and 10 [1] were forwarded to Jullunder at your suggestion, the painful task of destroying them being uncongenial to the peace and quiet which had reigned in the district, and calculated to unsettle the minds of the 4th Native Infantry and perhaps disgust the Sher Dils,

[1] Gungadeen, Havildar of the Grenadier Company, 46th, whose case you are acquainted with, remains here for the present.

who had had no war and turmoil to work them up to the point.[1]

22. Major Hay has succeeded in arresting Ashum, the second emissary of Pertab Singh, who had at first escaped. Thus all concerned in the attempt in Kullu have been arrested or punished. Pertab Singh's family have arrived at Kangra, and with them, Major Hay writes, the memory of Pertab Singh and his attempt will probably depart from the Valley.

Irregular levies in Kulu.

23. The Kullu and Seoraj guard was in the first outset of disturbance reduced from 80 to 65 men. Since the attempt at insurrection I have given Major Hay 50 Irregular levies, and in his isolated position I think them absolutely necessary for his safety and usefulness. Kullu is 90 miles from this, and the communications during the rains are of the worst description, and he has to seize rebels, eject families, raze houses, &c., while the Police Battalion guard, having the treasure in charge, cannot leave the tehseel.

Realization of revenue.

24. The revenue throughout the district has been realised without difficulty.

Distribution of newly-raised men of all denominations.

25. I subjoin a general distribution list of new levies, extra police, ferry and *Nakah* guards, &c. You will see that there are not many that might not at any moment be urgently required when they could not immediately be got together; but in deference to your wishes on the subject considerable reductions will be effected before the close of the month.

Services of officers.

26. I need only further mention that I have received the most hearty and efficient assistance from Mr. R. Saunders, Lieutenant Hall and Major Hay throughout the time that has lapsed since the first outbreak. The latter officer has managed admirably in Kullu; his presence there has been a fortunate thing for the peace of the district.

[1] The Raja of Chumba captured 32 prisoners, whom he is sending in, as you are aware. A large proportion of these are said to be soldiers.

The Government interests have greatly profited by Captain Younghusband's zeal, intelligence, and influence with his men, and I look back gratefully on the uninterrupted cordiality that has existed between that officer and myself from the first.

Store of arms discovered in Kulu.

27. I should have mentioned before that, on information given by the rebel Pertab Singh, a large repository of arms, matchlocks, swords, *zumboorahs*, &c., together with a large store of powder and lead, was found in Kullu. The powder has been destroyed and the arms broken up.

28. Extra Assistant Jaishee Ram, deputed to Noorpoor, has shown great intelligence and a very decidedly loyal spirit from the first.

ENCLOSURE TO 20.

21. *General Distribution Statement of newly raised men of all denominations.*

DHURMSALLA HOUSE GUARDS.

1 Native Officer Commanding the whole.

2 Jemadars. One of these has charge of the guards of the higher circle of houses, the lowest being Major Jackson's; the other has charge of the lower range.

12 Duffadars, each commanding 8 men. One Duffadar has charge of two contiguous houses, half of his men being placed at each. Duffadars are distributed as follows:—

	Duffadar.	*Men.*
Mr. McLeod's house; Lieutenant C. H. Hall's house . .	1	8
Mr. Saunders' house; Mrs. Ferris' house . .	1	10

	Duffadar.	Men.
Dr. Lawrence's (Gilbert Cottage) Mr. Arnold's	1	10
European barracks	1	8
Raja Allowalia's Major Jackson's	1	8
Rajah's second house and Mr. Nixon's	1	8
Dr. Mathews' Mr. Gardener's	1	8
Mons. Marcadieu's house Mr. Williams'	1	8
Kotewalee, replacing Burkundazes on duty at the Jail	1	12
Kutcherry	1	8
Orderlies with the Subedar in Command	...	2
Sheristadar's house	1	1
Mr. Atherton's house Mr. Bason's house	1	8
Off duty to replace sick men, &c.	1	8

The men are drilled and the guards relieved at intervals; they are very well behaved and zealous, and would certainly be of great use in the case of an alarm or disturbance. By their means each house has a sentry at night, and where many are inhabited by ladies alone and all are so widely scattered about, the guards are a comfort and security.

AT KANGRA.

1 Duffadar and 5 sowars. These are merely kept up for the purpose of carrying messages rapidly or accompanying an officer in a hasty tour to any spot if necessary.

2 Jemadars, 4 Duffadars and 35 men. Present distribution of these—

1 Jemadar and 11 men furnish guards for the Kutcherry and the Reverend J. Merk's house.

2 Duffadars and 16 men have just brought in treasure from Hurreepoor.

1 Duffadar and 8 men have gone to Noorpoor to assist in escorting treasure from thence to Dhurmsalla.

Total as above.

I have no Police Battalion men at any of the tehseels but Noorpoor, and that guard is only 1 Havildar and 8 men, and hitherto not to weaken the garrison of Fort and Dhurmsalla guards, I have not been able to apply to Captain Younghusband for escorts, while both for prisoners and treasure have been furnished by these irregular Duffadars and Burkundazes.

AT NOORPOOR.

1 Duffadar and 4 sowars, chiefly as messengers.

1 Jemadar and 6 Duffadars and 48 men.

There are 50 muskets and some treasure in the tehseel. 3 Duffadars and 24 men should remain present at the tehseel, which, with 1 Havildar and 8 Sher Dils, make up 32 men, a due guard in these times for the tehseel under the circumstances: 2 Duffadars and 16 men march immediately, escorting treasure from Noorpoor to Dhurmsalla. The other Duffadar is always employed escorting prisoners or in other ways.

AT KULLU.

1 Jemadar, 6 Duffadars and 48 men. These are meant to strengthen Major Hay's hands. The Police Battalion guards are divided between the tehseels of Kullu and Seoraj.

JAIL GUARD AT DHURMSALLA.

3 Duffadars and 24 men assisted by Burkundazes from Kotewallee.

FERRIES.

Ravee Ferries.

		Guard.
Bungalah .	This is the ferry opposite to Bissowlee. Boats all hauled up and rendered useless.	1 Jamadar and 7 peons of the Meerbehree, supported during the difficulties by a force from Chumba.
Sirree Nugur .	This ferry closed and the boats removed.	
Shahpoor .	Ditto *ditto.*	

Beas River.

Kotgurh .	1 Duffadar, 5 peons, new levies at this ghat. There have also been 1 Duffadar and 12 sepoys from Hoshyarpoor and 1 Jamadar and 4 sepoys from Goordaspoor. Boats all hauled up and rendered unfit for immediate use.
Reallee .	Ferry closed and boats rendered useless. 1 Duffadar and 8 men, new levies, and 1 Meerbehree chuprassie.

Ray . . .	Ferry closed and boats rendered useless. 1 Duffadar and 8 men, new levies, and 1 Meerbehree chuprasie.
Tilwara . .	Ditto. No guard.
Dadah . .	Ditto. 1 Duffadar, 8 men, new levies.
Dhook . .	Ditto. 1 Duffadar, 8 men, new levies.
Dehrah . .	1 boat plying. 1 Duffadar, 7 men, new levies.
Chumba . .	Ferry closed. 1 Duffadar and 7 men, new levies.
Nadown . .	1 boat plying. 1 Duffadar and 7 men, new levies.
Teehra . .	Ferry closed. 1 Duffadar and 7 men, 1 chuprassie Meerbehree.
Lumbagraon .	Skins allowed to Raja Pertab Chund for his servants, &c. 1 Duffadar, 4 men, new levies.

Sutlej Ferries.

Bussee Buchertoo	1 boat plying. 1 Duffadar and 8 men, new levies, and 1 Meerbehree chuprassie.

NAKAH OR PASS GUARDS.

Puttee	10
Puppoo Kutaleir	4
Ban Attarean	5
Thokee	4
Dhumtal	3
Total . .	26

		Men.
Hoshiarpur road,—6 Chokies—		
At 5 Chokies, 2 Hurkaras at each; and At 1 Chokie, 1 Ditto	.	11
Kangra and Dhurmsalla Road ... ... 3 Chokies, — 2 Hurkaras each	.	6
Kangra and Noorpoor ... 5 Chokies, — 2 Hurkaras each	.	10
Kangra, Kullu and Pullach ... ... 15 Chokies of 1 Hurkara and 3 Chokies of 2 Hurkaras each	.	21
2 Runners employed as messengers with Dr. Lawrence, Civil Surgeon		2
Total .	.	(*sic*) 50

KANGRA :
The 19th August 1857.

R. TAYLOR, MAJOR,
Offg. Deputy Commissioner.



Photogravure. Survey of India Offices, Calcutta, November 1907.

M^R A. A. ROBERTS, B. C. S., C. B.

COMMISSIONER OF THE LAHORE DIVISION IN 1857.

(From a photograph.)

CHAPTER III.

REPORTS ON EVENTS IN THE LAHORE DIVISION.

22. *From A. A. Roberts, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division, to R. Montgomery, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, Lahore,—No. 106, dated Lahore, the 20th March 1858.*

Reports on events in Lahore Division.

As directed in your Circular No. 5, dated 16th January last, I have the honor to submit reports from the Deputy Commissioners of this Division on the events which have occurred and the measures which have been taken for the preservation of tranquillity during the agitation and excitement consequent upon the mutiny of the Hindoostanee troops last year.

2. As you yourself were present at Lahore throughout this trying time and had personal cognizance of all that occurred, while most of the measures which were adopted for the maintenance of quiet emanated from yourself, it appears hardly necessary for me to enter into any great detail. Nevertheless, in compliance with your requisition, I proceed to review what has happened in my own Division.

Excitement in Punjab on receipt of news from Barrackpore and other places.

3. The incendiary fires which occurred at Barrackpore towards the end of January 1857 and subsequently at many other places, the mutiny of the 19th Regiment, Native Infantry, at Berhampore in February and its disbandment on the 31st March, the outrageous conduct of Mungul Pandy, of the 34th Regiment, Native Infantry, at Barrackpore on the

29th March and the demeanour of the whole regiment on that occasion, as well as other incidents connected with the subject of greased cartridges, engrossed as much attention and caused as much discussion and excitement at Lahore, at Amritsur, at Sealkote, and probably at every station in the Punjab as in Hindoostan Proper or in Bengal.

Military force in the Lahore Division on the 1st May 1857.

4. On the 1st May 1857 the military force in this Division was composed as follows :—

AT MEEAN MEER, LAHORE.

	Europeans.	*Natives.*
Artillery	449	170
H. M's. 81st Regiment . .	836	...
8th Light Cavalry. . .	12	374
16th N. I. Grenadiers . .	10	792
26th Native Infantry . .	11	940
49th Native Infantry . .	14	879
Total .	1,332	3,155

AT SEALKOTE.

	Europeans.	*Natives.*
Artillery	192	105
H. M's 52nd Light Infantry	870	...
9th Light Cavalry . .	14	490
35th Native Infantry . .	15	993
46th Native Infantry . .	12	994
Musketry Depôt . . .	27	165
Total .	1,130	2,747

AT AMRITSUR.

	Europeans.	*Natives.*
Artillery	75	159
59th Native Infantry . .	16	989
Total .	91	1,148

AT GOORDASPOOR.

	Europeans.	*Natives.*
2nd Irregular Cavalry . .	3	300
Total .	3	300

In short there were in the division—

	Europeans.	*Natives.*
Artillery	716	434
2 British Regiments of Foot .	1,706	...
3 Regiments, Native Cavalry	29	1,164
6 Regiments, Native Infantry	78	5,587
School of Musketry . .	27	165
Grand Total .	2,556	7,350

5. From the very composition of this force, containing as it did 9 regiments of Hindostanees and upwards of 400 Hindoostanee Golundaze and Gun Lascars, it could not but happen that there should be great sympathy with everything that took place, even at the most remote stations, connected with the feelings and prejudices of the Bengal Army.

Preponderance of Hindustanis in the Punjab.

6. The native soldiers, however, above enumerated by no means represent the number of Hindoostanees in this part of the country who were taking the most lively interest in whatever went on in Hindoostan.

7. There were thousands of Hindoostanee syces, grass-cutters and Artillery drivers, and thousands of Hindoostanee camp-followers and bazar people at all the large military stations, while there were hundreds of Hindoostanee domestic servants at every place.

8. Lastly, the Hindoostanee element prevailed in all the more responsible and lucrative appointments in all departments and offices.

9. Of 6 native Extra Assistants attached to this Division, 5 were from Hindoostan.

10. Of 19 Tehseeldars and 47 Cotwals and Thanadars about one-half of the former and one-third of the latter were Hindoostanees. The proportion among the Tehseel and Thanah Mohurirs was about the same, or from a half to a third.

11. As to the Serishtedars, Nazirs and Mohurirs at all the sudder offices, the greater number were from the old North-Western Provinces, and there were not a few Poorbeahs among the orderly jemadars, chaprassies and muzkoorees and also among the same grades in the Tehseels and Thanahs.

12. In short, the but recently conquered Punjab was held in subjection by a large proportion of Hindoostanee troops, while the revenues were collected and the laws were administered in a great measure through the medium of Hindoostanee officials.

Indications of disaffection in the Punjab.

13. The indications of uneasiness and dissatisfaction which first appeared at Barrackpore gradually spread westward, and ere long shewed themselves at Umballa and in the Punjab Proper.

14. Some time in April a seditious paper was found, I believe, on the parade ground of the School of Musketry at Sealkote.

15. Incendiary fires occurred at Umballa, and I have since ascertained that a very suspicious fire took place towards the end of April in one of the public offices at Umritsur, but it was extinguished before much harm was done.

Excitement at Ambála on 10th May.

16. On Sunday, the 10th of May, a telegram announced at Lahore that the 5th and 60th Regiments of Native Infantry at Umballa had turned out under arms in great excitement, and that the treasury guard had done the same.

17. About noon the following day a message stated that 3,000 mutineers from Meerut had marched upon and besieged Dehli. Deeming it my duty to ascertain the state of feeling of the troops at Meean Meer, about whom there had been many rumours, I went the same day to cantonments accompanied by Mr. Egerton, the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, and heard from Captain Piercy, the Cantonment Joint Magistrate, that the native troops were disaffected, and that they held nocturnal meetings. Captain Piercy, moreover, said that a fresh supply of cartridges had lately been received, and that the sepoys were resolved upon refusing to take them. All this was duly communicated to you.

Disaffection at Mián Mír.

Measures taken at Lahore.

18. On Tuesday, the 12th May, you and Mr. McLeod, the Financial Commissioner, convened a meeting of the heads of offices, after which you and Colonel Macpherson, the

Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, proceeded to Meean Meer to communicate the tidings which had been received from below to Brigadier Corbett and to suggest to him the propriety of taking such measures as would circumscribe the power of the native troops for mischief.

I was at the same time instructed to request the conductors of the newspapers, English and Vernacular, not to publish any intelligence or to make any remarks that could alarm or excite the public mind. The Post Master was also desired to stop the correspondence of the sepoys. The same evening we heard of the massacre of the European and Christian residents of Delhi, and shortly afterwards it was confidentially intimated that Brigadier Corbett had determined upon disarming the native troops at Meean Meer the following morning.

Disarming of troops at Mián Mír by Brigadier Corbett.

19. At daybreak on Wednesday, the 13th of May, several of the residents of Anarkullee accompanied you to the grand parade at Meean Meer and saw two-and-a-half regiments of Native Infantry and a regiment of Light Cavalry disarmed by Brigadier Corbett with two troops of Horse Artillery and six weak companies of Her Majesty's 81st Foot.

20. The attitude of the Artillerymen standing, lighted portfires in hand, beside their unlimbered and loaded guns ; the ring of the bayonets of Her Majesty's 81st as the soldiers obeyed Colonel Renny's order to load; the address of the Brigadier to the sepoys which was so admirably delivered by Lieutenant Mocatta; the moment of suspense which ensued ere the orders to pile arms and to stand from their arms could be executed by the Infantry Regiments in succession ; the clang of the sabres of the 8th Cavalry as the troopers threw them by order at their horses' feet; and, finally, the arrival of the carts which carried off the arms of the baffled, cowering, yet thoroughly ill-disposed Native soldiery,—must be impressed upon the memories of all who witnessed the momentous scene.

Disarming of wing of 26th Native Infantry in Lahore Fort.

21. While these proceedings were being enacted at Meean Meer, Colonel Smith, Her Majesty's 81st, had marched a portion of that ubiquitous regiment to the Citadel, and had with equal tact and success disarmed the wing of the 26th

Native Infantry, which with a few Europeans had heretofore formed the garrison of our stronghold. Some of the men of Soobhan Khan's Police Battalion were thrown into the fort to assist the Europeans in sentry duty, and the Treasury, which had up to this time been guarded by a detachment from one of the disarmed regiments, was also made over to the Police Battalion.

Measures for providing for the safety of Govindgurh.

22. Captain, now Colonel, Richard Lawrence, the Captain of Police of the Division, and I proceeded under your instructions from the parade ground of Meean Meer to Umritsur to communicate with the Officer Commanding at that place and to provide for the security of the important fortress of Govindgurh.

23. We found that the garrison of Govindgurh consisted of about 70 effective European Artillerymen and 216 sepoys of the 59th Native Infantry.

24. Colonel Boyd deemed that in the absence of a sufficient number of Europeans to coerce the sepoys in case of need it would not be prudent to evince any want of confidence in his regiment, the 59th, but he earnestly requested to have a reinforcement of Europeans.

25. Colonel Lawrence and I returned to Lahore on the morning of the 14th and called on Brigadier Corbett, who agreed, if carriage was provided, to send half a company of the 81st, which was all he could spare, to secure Govindgurh. A sufficient number of *ekkahs* was forthwith furnished by the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, while others were sent out from Umritsur, and, notwithstanding the demonstration which was made in the course of the day by the disarmed regiments, the Europeans were despatched and run through to Govindgurh during the night. Captain Waddy, moreover, succeeded in getting the guns of his native battery into the Fort of Govindgurh the same evening.

26. The intelligence of the disasters at Meerut and Delhi, as well as the measures of precaution which had been taken at Lahore, were communicated without delay to every district.

Moreover, on the 13th May you addressed a demi-official circular to all Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab expressing your opinion of the state of affairs, and giving the most valuable directions and suggestions to district officers for their guidance.

Measures for security of treasure at Gujránwála,

27. Acting thereon, Captain Cripps, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Goojranwalla, the same day got rid of his Treasury guard, consisting of a Native Officer and 40 men of the 46th Native Infantry from Sealkote, whose places were supplied by part of the Jail guard, which was formed of men of the Police Battalion, for whom burkundazes had to be substituted, while the latter were replaced by newly-raised police. Two or three days later Captain Cripps, under instructions from here, ran the bulk of his treasure, amounting to nearly two lacs of rupees, into Lahore in one night, and it was placed in the treasury in the Citadel.

at Gurdáspur,

28. Mr. Naesmyth, the Deputy Commissioner of Goordaspoor, on the 19th May sent the greater part of his treasure, about seven lacs of rupees, into Umritsur under an escort of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry. The money was deposited with the treasure of the district in the Fort of Govindgurh. A few days later Mr. Naesmyth dispensed with the detachment of the 59th Native Infantry from Umritsur which had heretofore formed his treasury guard. Men of the Police Battalion from the tehseels and jail were substituted, and the places of the latter were taken by burkundazes, whose places were again filled up by new men.

at Siálkot,

29. At Sealkote Brigadier Brind by a judicious disposition of the Artillery and Her Majesty's 52nd Regiment commanded the lines of both the Native Infantry Regiments, but they as well as the Cavalry were allowed to retain their arms and to perform duty as before. The treasure was brought from the civil treasury into Cantonments, and, as a mark of confidence, was placed in charge of one of the native corps, while the other regiment was entrusted with the care of the Executive Engineer's treasure chest. It was hoped by this means to keep the sepoys in good humour.

30. I must now record an event which occurred at Lahore on Thursday, the 14th May, the day after the sepoys were disarmed, and which revealed to us our exact position.

Panic at Lahore on 14th May 1857 and measures taken.

31. During the forenoon of that day Brigadier Corbett wrote word that the disarmed regiments had resolved to break away in a body, in the evening, for Ferozepore; that he had determined to follow them with his guns, but that he required horsemen to escort and guard the guns.

32. It was being calculated in your office room how many sowars could be got together, and steps were being taken to rouse the country-people with a view to intercept and, if necessary, to destroy the sepoys, when a second note from the Brigadier intimated that the sepoys were already collecting in great numbers, and that he was getting out the guns. You forthwith appointed the Central Jail, about midway between Anarkullee and Meean Meer, as a rendezvous where every available European and every sowar and footman that could be spared was to assemble.

33. In the meantime the most exaggerated reports came pouring in to the effect that the sepoys had rushed upon and taken the guns and were in full march upon Anarkullee, in which place there was not a single regular soldier. The result was a panic. Nearly every family fled to the Citadel and the shopkeepers both in the bazaar and in the city hastily shut up their shops and began to secrete their valuables.

34. However, within an hour of the receipt of the Brigadier's second note, almost the entire male Christian population, Covenanted and Uncovenanted, to the number of about one hundred, had assembled, variously armed, at the appointed place, to which many had walked through a fierce midday sun.

Suppression of mutinous symptoms at Mián Mír.

35. The guard at the jail was strengthened, and those of our community who were not mounted remained there, while the rest with about 125 police sowars under Captain Lawrence accompanied you rapidly to Meean Meer. We found that the Brigadier's promptitude and the alacrity with which the Artillery and the 81st had responded to his call had thoroughly

cowed the sepoys and had driven them back to their lines. The event, nevertheless, shewed that the disarmed soldiers, 600 of whom had still their horses, were bent upon deserting in a body and only watched for an opportunity to do so. The greater number of them were believed to be in possession of private arms and the whole were ripe for mischief.

Possibilities of danger from disarmed troops at Mián Mír.

36. In the event of a rise the Artillery and the available portion of the 81st would certainly have disposed of some of the miscreants, but there was a large and straggling cantonment to take care of and there were barracks full of women and children to be defended. There, therefore, remained but few British troops for the pursuit and destruction of thousands of desperate Hindoostanees. The Cavalry could of course have got away, while the chances of the Native Infantry those only can appreciate who know the country and climate and have observed what has since happened here and elsewhere.

37. It was felt, then, that the greater number of the disarmed men could, if they had the spirit to try, get away from Meean Meer.

38. They might plunder and burn Anarkullee and murder every Christian in it should they come down suddenly upon the defenceless place.

39. They might attack the two jails and release two thousand five hundred prisoners, many of whom were hardened villains sentenced to long terms and even to imprisonment for life.

40. They might attempt to make their way, as was said, to Ferozepoor, only 50 miles distant, where there was a large magazine full of arms and ammunition, and where there were two Native Infantry Regiments with arms in their hands ready to assist. It is remarkable that, within 12 hours of the event which I have been narrating above, the two Native Regiments at Feerozepoor did attack and attempt to take the magazine, but were repulsed by a company of Her Majesty's 61st Regiment which had just previously been thrown in on receipt of an express from yourself.

41. Or, lastly, the disarmed regiments might march upon Umritsur and in conjunction with the 59th Native Infantry and Native Artillery take possession of Govindgurh, as yet occupied by only a handful of European Artillerymen and an overwhelming proportion of sepoys.

Precautions against disarmed troops at Mián Mír.

42. To aid the military in watching the disarmed regiments and preventing them from leaving Meean Meer, every police sowar that could be spared was placed, and has since remained, under the orders of the Brigadier. But this was not sufficient. With a view to intercept and if need were to destroy the Hindoostanee sepoys on their way either to Ferozepoor or to Umritsur, it was necessary to take a very bold step.

43. The Cantonment of Meean Meer is situated on the western edge of that strip of country lying between the Sutlej and the Ravee which is known as the Manjha, the nursery of the stalwart Sikhs who formed the flower of Runjeet Singh's great army and who fought against us at Sobraon and at Goojrat.

44. Hundreds of old Sikh soldiers, both greybeards and middle-aged men, were living in their villages in the Manjha, lamenting the want of employment and thinking over former times.

45. Umritsur is well in the centre of this tract, while Kussoor, on the road to Ferozepoor, and Hurreekee on the more direct route to Hindoostan, are on the eastern edge of it. The disarmed sepoys had, therefore, from 35 to 40 miles of the Manjha to traverse, whichever way they might go.

Enlistment of aid of Manjha Sikhs against mutineers.

46. The animosity between the Sikhs and the Poorbeeahs is notorious, and the former gave out that they would not allow the latter to pass through their country. It was therefore determined to take advantage of this ill-feeling and to stimulate it by the offer of rewards for every Hindoostanee sepoy who should be captured.

47. The moment it became known that the sepoys contemplated a general move, expresses were sent off to the Deputy Commissioner at Umritsur and to Mr. Thomas, the

Assistant Commissioner at Kussoor, to rouse the people and to intercept the deserters. Mr. Cooper relates how Dewan Nurain Singh, the Agent of Sirdar Kanh Singh of Attaree, responded to Mr. Macnaghten's call on that side, while the capture of many sepoys who stealthily deserted from Meean Meer during the night of the 14th shews that the people in the direction of Puttee and Kussoor were equally true to their instinct.

48. For the better security of the station of Anarkullee almost the entire male community (Christian) to the number of 120 enrolled itself on the 15th May as a Volunteer Company under the command of Colonel Macpherson, who was assisted by Colonel Ommaney, Captain Hutchinson and Lieutenant Gulliver, the last-named being the Adjutant of the Company.

Formation of Corps of Anárkali Volunteers.

49. It is not for me to report what proficiency the Volunteers acquired in drill or in the use of their arms, but I may say that they were always ready to turn out; that they kept night watches; and that during the very anxious period from the 15th to the 26th May, when troops from the North-West began to pass through Lahore on their way to Delhi, the Anarkullee Volunteers, with about half a company of Soobhan Khan's Regiment, a few sowars, some burkundazes and the leave men of the Punjab regiments who had wisely been called in from this and the neighbouring districts and were collected together under the late lamented Captain Travers, constituted the defensive force of this station.

Services of Volunteers.

50. Orders were early received from the Chief Commissioner to furnish both the citadel of Lahore and the fort of Govindgurh with six months' provisions. This was very promptly done by Messrs. Egerton and Cooper, in conjunction with Captain Wroughton, the Commissariat Officer.

Provisioning of forts of Lahore and Govindgurh.

51. About the middle of May General Reed resolved upon forming a Movable Column which was to be composed chiefly of troops from the Sealkote Brigade.

Selection of troops for Movable Column.

52. Accordingly before the end of May all the Artillery except two guns, one wing of the 9th Cavalry, Her Majesty's 52nd Regiment, with the exception of two companies, and

the 35th Native Infantry marched from Sealkote to Wuzeerabad. Subsequently the two guns and two companies of Her Majesty's 52nd had to join the Movable Column. Brigadier Brind protested; but as the column was much below the strength originally proposed and its efficiency was of paramount importance, his objections were overruled and Sealkote was left in charge of one wing, 9th Light Cavalry, and the 46th Native Infantry.

53. During the remainder of the month of May, independently of the tidings from Hindoostan of the successive mutinies there, and of the gathering of the mutineers at Delhi, we heard one day of the mutiny of the regiments at Ferozepoor; another day, of the disarming of the native troops at Peshawur and of the mutiny of the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan, besides endless rumours of what was likely to happen everywhere.

Arrest of suspicious persons.

54. There were many suspicious persons going about in the guise of Hindoo and Mohamedan fuqueers. These were arrested and either required to give security or were thrown into prison or deported.

Guarding of ferries.

55. The ferries were guarded with the double object of preventing emissaries from below from entering the Punjab, as also deserters from here from swelling the numbers of the disaffected at and about Delhi and Meerut. This from the position and formation of the Division was no easy task. The Deputy Commissioners of Goordasspore, Umritsur and Lahore had to watch the Beas and Sutlej with their numerous ferries on one side for a distance of about 150 miles, and the Ravee running parallel with an equal if not greater number of ferries on the other side; while the Deputy Commissioners of Sealkote and Goojranwalla had to look after about 100 miles of the Chenab on the west.

56. Numbers of extra police were raised not only to guard the ferries, but to supply the places of the burkundazes who were taking the duties of men of the police battalions, while the latter were performing many duties hitherto undertaken by the regular Native troops.

57. Recruiting for regiments, both foot and horse, was commenced within three or four days of the receipt of the intelligence of the outbreak, and, although this subject appertains to the Military Department, you are aware that the proclamations inviting recruits were issued through District Officers; that they and their subordinates were frequently the medium of communication with the Sirdars and other influential persons who offered and gave assistance in raising men; that the Deputy Commissioners themselves frequently selected recruits, and that they in many cases had to superintend the manufacture of arms, uniforms, accoutrements, &c.

Recruiting for new regiments.

In Goojranwala, Sealkote and Goordaspore levies were raised and have since been drilled, armed and equipped like the Police Battalions, the duties of which they chiefly performed.

58. Towards the end of May troops began to pass through on their way to Dehli. On the 26th of that month the Guides under their gallant leader Major Daly made a forced march in, were feasted, provided with extra carriage and passed on. Rothney's, Cokes', Wyld's and other regiments which came in and passed on at intervals were similarly treated.

Passage of troops *en route* to Delhi.

59. On the 2nd of June the Movable Column under Brigadier-General Chamberlain marched into Anarkullee and remained here until the 10th idem. I cannot say that the presence of the column afforded much feeling of security. The 35th Native Infantry, the wing, 9th Cavalry, and the Native Artillery were all believed to be thoroughly disaffected and had to be narrowly watched by General Chamberlain.

Arrival of Movable Column.

60. On the 8th June intelligence was received of the mutiny at Jullunder, and on the following day two sepoys of the 35th Native Infantry were blown from guns on the Anarkullee parade ground by order of General Chamberlain for using mutinous language. The effect was most salutary on the 35th and other native troops of the column, on the disarmed regiments at Meean Meer, on Hindostanees generally and on the people at large, for there were many mischievous rumours and reports and much seditious talking at this time.

Execution of two sepoys of the 35th Native Infantry.

Inflammatory proclamation intercepted by the Post Master of Lahore.

In the Appendix A, I give a specimen of the spirit that was abroad. The letter and its enclosed proclamation were posted at Ferozepoor for Lahore and were, if I recollect rightly, stopped by the Post Master of Lahore and sent to you and by you were made over to me.

Arrival of Movable Column at Amritsar.

61. On the 11th June the Movable Column reached Amritsur. While it was there Radha Kishen, a Poorbeeah Brahmin, was brought to a Drumhead court martial and hanged for having tried to seduce a Native Officer of Coke's Regiment from his allegiance.

Expected mutiny of 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum.

62. About the middle of this month the mutiny of the 14th Native Infantry at Jheelum was deemed imminent and greater vigilance in guarding the ferries was enjoined. Moreover on the 16th of the month intelligence was received from Dehli of the departure of 12 emissaries from that place to gain over the troops in the Punjab. Orders were forthwith issued for preventing any Hindostanee from entering the Punjab without a pass.

Prevention of Hindustanis from entering the Punjab.

Disarming of Hindustanis in the Punjab.

63. The disarming of the Punjab on annexation was a measure the wisdom of which has been most apparent throughout the late crisis. Strangers and foreigners were also prohibited from keeping arms except under a license. Nevertheless towards the end of June you issued instructions for the more complete disarming of Hindoostanees, which step was duly and immediately carried out.

Disarming of 33rd and 35th Native Infantry at Phillaur.

64. Before the close of the month Brigadier-General Nicholson, who had succeeded to the command of the Movable Column, had disarmed the 33rd and 35th Regiments of Native Infantry at Phillour.

Disarming of 59th Native Infantry at Amritsar.

65. On the 7th July the 14th Native Infantry at Jheelum refused to give up their arms and made a violent and determined resistance. On the receipt of the intelligence at Amritsur General Nicholson, who had returned to that place with the Movable Column, disarmed the 59th Native Infantry.

66. Within 48 hours of the outbreak at Jheelum the wing of the 9th Cavalry and the 46th Native Infantry at Sealkot mutinied.

Mutiny at Siálkot.

67. The movement commenced about daybreak of the 9th July by the Cavalry galloping, armed and equipped, to the lines of the 46th Native Infantry, to the jail and to the lines of the Mounted Police. The European officers who proceeded to the lines of their respective regiments on hearing the commotion were either warned off or fired at. It was soon found that both Cavalry and Infantry were quite out of control. The officers and residents generally had to seek their own safety and that of their families by flying either to the old fort, which is close to the town and about a mile from cantonments, or to the neighbouring stations.

Murder of Brigadier Brind and other Europeans, *viz.*—

68. Brigadier Brind was hotly pursued by several troopers and received a wound, of which he died a few hours afterwards in the fort.

Dr. Graham, Superintending Surgeon;

Dr. Graham, the Superintending Surgeon, was shot dead by a trooper while driving his daughter in a buggy.

Dr J. C. Graham, Medical Store-keeper;

Dr. J. C. Graham, the Medical Store-keeper, was similarly murdered while trying to escape with his wife, another lady and some children in his carriage.

Capt. Bishop, Brigade-Major.

Captain Bishop, the Major of Brigade, who fled from his carriage, which contained his family, apparently in order to draw off the troopers from it, was followed and had his brains deliberately blown out by a trooper within sight of those who were standing on the ramparts of the fort, but who were not able to rescue him or to revenge his death.

The Reverend Mr. Hunter and family.

Lastly, the Reverend Mr. Hunter, a Scotch Presbyterian Missionary, his wife and their babe were dragged out of their carriage near the jail and were brutally murdered by a fiend named Hoormut Khan, who had formerly been a trusted and favoured orderly of Mr. Inglis, but who had lately been degraded from his former position and had been transferred as a burkundaze to the jail.

Disloyalty of mounted police.

69. The three civil officers who were living together in the Deputy Commissioner's house looked anxiously but in vain for the mounted police, whose lines are close by and who had been ordered to assemble at the house in the event of a disturbance. Instead, however, of any show of fidelity on the part of the sowars there was indication that they had fraternized with the mutineers.

Escape of civil and military officers and residents to the fort.

70. Mr. Monckton, who had risen from a sick bed, went off with a punkha cooly to a village, whence the latter procured a cot, on which his master was carried by a circuitous route to the fort.

Lieutenant MacMahon and Mr. Jones, the Assistant Commissioners, put themselves at the head of a few raw levies, who did not know how to load their muskets, and made their way to the same point. *En route* they were threatened near the jail by a party of troopers, who addressed the young levies and tried but in vain to induce them to join.

71. Colonel Farquharson and Captain Caulfield of the 46th Native Infantry were detained in a hut in the lines, where they were visited by a great many sepoys of the regiment. They were not only protected, but I believe it is the fact that they were both offered handsome pay and a residence in the hills during the hot season if they would remain with and command the mutineers !

Colonel Campbell, Commanding the 9th Cavalry, Mrs. Campbell and Miss Graham were detained some time in the quarter-guard of the regiment and were subsequently escorted to the fort.

The remarkable escape of Dr. and Mrs. Butler and of Captain and Mrs. Saunders with their families in an out-office of their house has been published by one of the party.

With the particulars of the escape of the Roman Catholic Priest and of the ladies and children of the Convent I am not acquainted further than that they were escorted to the fort by some troopers, one of whom, Soobhan Khan, a Havildar, carried two children on his horse and entered the fort with

the fugitives and remained there with them. Soobhan Khan has, as you are aware, been made a Soobahdar.

About 20 sick men of Her Hajesty's 52nd Light Infantry under Lieutenant ——— took up a position in the dead-house of the Artillery Hospital, but were not molested.

72. During the morning the prisoners in the jail, to the number of upwards of three hundred, were liberated and many of the jail buildings were destroyed. The Treasury, in which a small amount of cash (Rs. 11,341) was kept for current expenses, was plundered thereof and of stamps to the value of about a lac of rupees, but many of the latter were recovered.

Destruction of jail and liberation of prisoners. Plundering of Treasury.

Finally the Kutcherry with all its valuable records was burnt.

Destruction of Katcheri.

73. By 4 o'clock in the afternoon the mutineers had ransacked many of the houses in cantonments, had collected all the public and private carriage and every horse in the place, and, accompanied by a great number of private servants, by not a few of the police and other public servants, and by almost the whole of the residents of the sudder bazaar, marched for Goordaspoor. They took with them a treasure tumbril containing about 35,000 rupees which had been under their charge and also the big station gun. A strong party, however, of both Cavalry and Infantry was to be seen in the neighbourhood until late in the evening, and the inmates of the fort felt by no means certain that they would not be attacked during the night.

March of Siálkot mutineers for Gurdáspur.

74. Intelligence of the outbreak was carried to Goojranwalla by Lieutenant Montgomerie of the Cavalry, who escaped thither on horse-back. The news, which was forwarded by Mr. Blackall, did not reach me until 10 o'clock that night, and not long afterwards Lieutenant Montgomerie arrived here on the mail cart.

Measures taken at Lahore consequent on the mutiny at Sialkot.

75. It was not at this time known by us what route the mutineers had taken or whether they had left Sealkot at all.

76. The intelligence of the outbreak was forthwith communicated to Brigadier Corbett, who sent down a couple of guns and a party of Her Majesty's 81st to secure the bridge-of-boats.

77. An express was despatched to General Nicholson at Amritsur, who, with characteristic promptitude and decision, at daybreak next morning disarmed the wing of the 9th Cavalry, which still formed part of the Movable Column.

Pursuit of Siálkot mutineers by General Nicholson.

78. During the day of the 10th it was ascertained that the mutineers had marched in the direction of Goordaspoor. That evening General Nicholson set out with a portion of the Movable Column for Goordaspoor. He left three guns and about two companies of the 52nd at Amritsur to overawe the 35th and 59th Regiments, Native Infantry, and the wing of the 9th Cavalry. His force consisted of 128 European and 61 Native Artillerymen, 658 of Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry, about 2 companies of a frontier Police Battalion (Shere Dil) and some newly raised Sikh horsemen.

Mr. Roberts and Lieut. Perkins, Assistant Commissioner, accompany the column.

79. It appeared to be my duty to accompany the column, and with your permission I at once proceeded to join it. From Umritsur I was accompanied by Lieutenant Perkins, the Assistant Commissioner of that place, who attended the column for the purpose of providing carriage, supplies, guides, &c.

Arrival of column at Gurdáspur.

80. Goordaspoor is 44 miles from Umritsur. General Nicholson accomplished the distance in 19 hours and entered Goordaspoor by 3 P. M. of the 11th July.

Defeat of Siálkot mutineers at Trimmu ferry by General Nicholson.

81. The rebels were known to be approaching the Ravee, but all the boats had been scuttled two days previously when the news of the mutiny at Jheelum was received, and it was supposed that the river was nowhere fordable for many miles.

82. On Sunday morning, the 12th July, Captain Adams, the Assistant Commissioner, who had been sent out with a small party of horse to watch the mutineers, reported that both Cavalry and Infantry were crossing the river by a deep ford at the Trimmoo ferry.

83. Leaving 150 of Her Majesty's 52nd with the camp at Goordaspoor, where it must be remembered the 2nd Irregular Cavalry were cantoned, General Nicholson marched with the rest of his force at 9 A. M., and by 1 P. M. found the enemy drawn up in battle array at the village of Wuzeerpoor, about half a mile from the river.

84. The General had scarce got his guns and Infantry in position ere the 46th commenced a sharp fire of musketry and the 9th Cavalry charged down from both flanks upon the guns. No sooner were the troopers disposed of than the 46th advanced in face of the fire of the Artillery and of the 52nd. Several sepoys charged close up to the guns, but the soldiers of the 52nd rushed with a shout to the front and closed with the foremost sepoys, whereupon the whole of the 46th and the rest of the Cavalry turned and fled precipitately across the river. Upwards of one hundred of their number, both foot and horse, lay dead on the field, while many were drowned in wading through the water which was breast high. The want of Cavalry alone prevented General Nicholson from destroying all who had crossed to this side. Many got back to the large island in the middle of the river, on the edge of of which they had erected a battery for their heavy gun and where they took up a position.

85. A number of camels laden with plunder and baggage, some carriages and carts, and several horses and other animals, which had been brought over by the rebels, were captured.

86. Proclamations were issued and rewards offered for the apprehension of the fugitives, and information was collected regarding the numbers and exact position of the remnant on the island who could not be attacked until boats were procured.

Annihilation of remnant of Siálkot mutineers.

87. The necessary means having been obtained, on Thursday, the 16th July, General Nicholson attacked and carried the position on the island, captured the gun, slew many of the mutineers and drove the rest into the water, in which

numbers were drowned while others got on to sand-banks and small islands in the middle of the river, whence escape was difficult, as the country-people were up on both sides.

88. The rest of the plunder and baggage, but no treasure, was taken on the island.

89. Numbers of fugitives continued to be captured daily after the first action and were summarily executed by order of General Nicholson so long as he remained at Goordaspoor and subsequently by sentence of the Deputy and Assistant Commissioners.

Execution of portion of Siálkot mutineers who took refuge in Jammu territory.

90. A hundred and forty-one mutineers were handed over by the Kardar of Jusrota in the Jummoo territory, whither all who escaped fled, to Lieutenant McMahon, who remained encamped with a party of levies for some weeks on the frontier. The above-mentioned number of mutineers were executed by order of that officer and Captain Adams, who sat in commission with him.

Estimate of number of mutineers destroyed.

91. In my letter No. 344, dated 7th August 1857, I calculated that the mutineers numbered from 900 to 1,000 men, but the return which I have since obtained of the strength of this brigade on the 1st May, and which has been given above in paragraph 4, shews that the 46th alone must have amounted to at least 1,000, if not more, and the Cavalry to 200. In that letter I gave an approximate account of 759 mutineers disposed of. A few more have since been captured and executed, while the rest must still be fugitives in the Jummoo territory.

Disposal of followers.

92. Hundreds of those who cast in their lot with the mutineers and accompanied them from Sealkote were arrested, soundly flogged and sent back to Sealkote in case any specific charge of plunder, desertion of service or otherwise might be brought against them. The women and children, with the exception of a few who for sufficient reasons were sent or allowed to return to Sealkote, were provided with means for the way and were forwarded towards Hindoostan.

93. An achievement of so distinguished a soldier as General Nicholson needs no eulogy from me, but I may be permitted to draw attention to what would almost inevitably have occurred had he either failed to intercept or, having intercepted, to destroy the Sealkote mutineers.

Probable consequences of failure to intercept and destroy Siálkot mutineers.

94. The 2nd Irregular Cavalry have remained loyal and have since done good service, but General Nicholson could not take them with him to oppose the mutineers and doubted whether they should not be disarmed. They have proved faithful, and I rejoice at it; but had the mutinous troops from Sealkote reached Goordaspoor the 2nd Irregulars could scarcely have escaped being drawn into the vortex of revolt. The 16th Irregulars at Hoshiarpoor, only a few miles further on, must have shared the same fate, and had the 4th Native Infantry at Noorpore and Kangra and the 33rd Native Infantry, then, I believe, at Jullundur, resisted the influence of such a large body of their mutinous brethren in the neighbourhood, the result would have been otherwise than could be expected.

In short, but for General Nicholson's promptitude, vigour and success, a powerful brigade of mutineers would have swept through the Baree and Jullundur Doabs, increasing as it went and threatening either to cut off the communication between the Army before Dehli and the Punjab, the basis of our operations, or to cast itself on the rear of that Army.

95. During my absence with the Movable Column at Goordaspoor, you deputed Colonel Lawrence and Captain Cripps to Sealkote to restore order and to report the state of matters there, as Mr. Monckton, the Deputy Commissioner, was too ill to do any duty and had to take leave on medical certificate.

Measures for restoration of order at Siálkot.

96. Colonel Lawrence's report is before you, and, therefore, I need only say that he and Captain Cripps sentenced and caused to be hanged the Rissaldar of the Mounted Police, the Soobadar of the Police Battalion, the Darogah of the Jail and others for treachery and rebellion, imprisoned others for various terms of years, and imposed a fine on some villages in the

immediate neighbourhood, the residents of which had been most active in plundering the cantonments both before and after the mutineers had left.

After the departure of Colonel Lawrence and Captain Cripps, Captain Eliott, who had taken charge as Deputy Commissioner, and Captain Chambers, the Cantonment Joint Magistrate, sat in commission on many more offenders.

97. The European community remained in the fort for several days and then took up their residence in the barracks of the 52nd.

Despatch of General Nicholson with Movable Column to Delhi.

98. On the 19th July the Chief Commissioner arrived at Lahore. With the exception of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry at Goordaspoor, there was now not a single armed Hindoostanee regiment in this part of the Punjab, while our gallant little force at Dehli was being rapidly worn out by disease and the numerous attacks of the swarming mutineers. Sir John Lawrence, therefore, determined to send General Nicholson with the Movable Column and every available soldier in the Punjab to Dehli. Accordingly on the 23rd July General Nicholson's force left Amritsur for Dehli, and another, but much smaller, Movable Column was formed at Amritsur.

Mutiny of 26th Native Infantry at Mián Mír and their fate.

99. On the 30th July the 26th Regiment, Native Infantry, supposed to be the quietest and best disposed of the Hindoostanee Regiments at Meean Meer, rose, murdered Major Spencer, their Commanding Officer, the Quartermaster-Sergeant, the Havildar-Major and a Soobadar, and went off in a body about 11 A. M. during a dust-storm.

100. All the particulars of the occurrence, as also of the capture, execution or destruction of 568 of the 600 sepoys who are supposed to have gone off, were reported to you in my letter No. 357, dated 17th August 1857. Your letter No. 3521, dated 16th October 1857, gave cover to a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, No. 3722, dated 11th September 1857, highly commending the energetic measures taken by the Civil Officers for the capture and disposal of the 26th Regiment, Native Infantry. I need, therefore, only here

record that nearly all the sepoys mentioned above were disposed of in the district of Amritsur by Mr. Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner, Prannath, the Tehseeldar of Ujnalla, the Police and the country people in that neighbourhood.

Measures for guarding the disaffected regiments at Mián Mír and Amritsar.

101. A cordon of Police chowkees was now placed all round the cantonment of Meean Meer, and on the 4th August the remaining disarmed regiments were removed from their lines and put into tents within range of guns which were drawn up in front of the barracks of H. M's. 81st Regiment. This has been the position of the 16th and 49th Regiments, Native Infantry, and 8th Cavalry ever since. The removal of these regiments from their lines was a delicate operation, carried out with complete success by General Gowan and Brigadier Corbett. The whole of the lines were searched and some concealed arms were found. The lines of the 16th Grenadiers were thrown down and levelled.

102. The 35th and 59th Regiments of Native Infantry remained and still remain at or in the neighbourhood of Amritsur, watched by horsemen and the Police, while a small body of troops is at hand to act against them if necessary. The wing of the 9th Cavalry has been brought over to Meean Meer and placed with the 8th.

Punishment of headmen of village of Raja Jang in the Manjha.

103. In the early part of August an informer stated that some of the headmen of Raja Jung, a large and somewhat turbulent village in the Manjha, were in treasonable correspondence with Shere Singh Attareewalla, then and still under surveillance at Calcutta. By order of the Chief Commissioner an immediate investigation was made. The accusation was found to have originated in enmity. Nevertheless some concealed arms were found in the houses of the accused, who were duly punished.

Vigilance during the Muharram.

Treasonable placards at Siálkot.

104. Towards the end of this month the Mohurrum occurred. Vigilance and firmness were required everywhere, but with the exception of two highly-treasonable placards,* which were found stuck up on a garden gate near the entrance of the town of Sealkote, and the summary

* Translations annexed,—see appendix.

execution at the same place of a Meerut butcher, who the day before the great day of the Mohurrum made a very dubious and threatening speech to the Bazaar Sergeant, nothing of moment occurred.

105. Dehli had now been nearly four months in the hands of the rebels, and we had not as yet been able to retake the place. The mass of the people of the Punjab could not understand this state of things, and many who had hoped and believed in our prestige began to doubt the re-establishment of our power in Hindoostan.

Celebrations on fall of Delhi.

106. The intelligence of the successful storm of Dehli reached Lahore on the 14th September, but it was not until Monday, the 21st, that salutes at the various stations announced to the people the capture of the place. It was not, however, until many days later,—until in fact the news was corroborated through their own sources of information, and by the return of Punjabee soldiers laden with plunder,—that the people at large believed that Dehli was in our possession.

Rebellion in Gugera and measures taken by officers of the Lahore Division.

107. In the meantime the Khurruls and other wild and turbulent tribes in the Googaira district rose in insurrection, disarmed the police and cut off the communication with Mooltan.

108. The southern portions of the Lahore and Goojranwalla districts adjoin Googaira, and the people are closely allied. Mr. Egerton, therefore, proceeded to ascertain the state of feeling in the lower part of his district. He was joined at Mangtanwalla by his Assistant, Mr. Perkins, with 30 sowars and afterwards by a troop of the 1st Sikh Cavalry. Leaving Mr. Perkins and some sowars at Mangtanwalla, Mr. Egerton proceeded with the Sikh Horse *viâ* Syudwalla, where there is a Thanah and Tehseel which he strengthened, to Googaira and remained there some days, while Lieutenant Elphinstone, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, was absent with troops in the direction of Mooltan.

109. Owing to the nature and extent of the country and the paucity of troops, the disturbance was not very easily put

Rebellion in Gugera and measures taken by officers of the Lahore Division.

down. The main body of the rebels was collected on the Ravee below Googaira, and it was chiefly the country between that place and Mooltan that was disturbed. Still there was a good deal of uneasiness on the right bank of the river, especially in the Pergunah of Syudwalla. On the 10th of October Mr. Egerton and I went out to Mangtanwalla with 120 Puthan Horse under Lieutenant Vivian, 76 of Wales' Sikh Horse under Lieutenant Prendergast, and about 50 disciplined Burkundazes. Thence we pushed on to Boochoke, a Thanah in the Googaira district, near which a considerable body of the rebels was assembled. We remained here three days during which Buksha, one of the Khurrul leaders, came in and the assemblage of Khurruls at Mehanranwallee dispersed. We then marched on to Syudwalla, whence I put myself in communication with Major Marsden, who had been appointed Deputy Commissioner, Googaira, and with Major Hamilton, the Commissioner of Mooltan, who were both with the troops on the left bank of the Ravee. At Syudwalla other Khurruls came in and gave up their arms and settled down in their villages. Lieutenant Prendergast now returned with his detachment to Lahore, as his services were required elsewhere, while Mr. Egerton and I proceeded under the instructions of the Chief Commissioner, with Lieutenant Vivian and the Puthan Horse and Burkundazes, down the right bank of the Ravee through Jhamra, Uhmud Khan Khurrul's village, to Pindee Shaikh Moosa. Here we were joined first by a party of levies from Googaira and subsequently by a wing of the Punjab Regiment under Captain Obbard. During this interval the chiefs of the Wuttoos, Koreshees and other tribes in that neighbourhood also came in and the people settled down in their villages. The main body of the rebels, moreover, who had taken up a position in a dense grass jungle called the "jullee" on an island in the middle of the river, were driven out from thence by the troops on the left bank of the river and fled in the direction of Pak Puttun and towards the Sutlej. Captain Obbard and Lieutenant Vivian with their detachments now marched from Pindee Shaikh Moosah to Alumshah, which is still further down the right bank of the Ravee, and

Mr. Egerton and I, finding all quiet in those parts, returned to Lahore on the 29th October.

110. Captain Cripps, the Deputy Commissioner of Goojranwalla, on the first breaking out of the Khurrul insurrection, moved down to Sheikhoopoora with a detachment of his levies and then marched through the top of the Bar to Pindee Bhutteean, whence, all being quiet in the district, the levies proceeded under Captain Le Gallais to reinforce the Deputy Commissioner of Jhung.

Return to their homes in the Punjab of Sikh and Punjabi soldiers of mutinous regiments and their punishment.

111. About the end of October a great many Sikh and Punjabee soldiers of the regiments which had mutinied in Hindostan began to find their way back to their homes in the Punjab. A few returned earlier, but it was not until a month or six weeks after the expulsion of the mutineers from Dehli, and until after the defeat of the Mhow and Neemuch Brigades by Colonel Greathed at Agra on the 10th October, that many of the Sikh and Punjabee sepoys returned to their homes. They were immediately arrested and brought to trial. Those who belonged to regiments which had not only mutinied, but shot at their officers and others were as a general rule executed; the others were sentenced to be imprisoned for life in transportation, or to imprisonment for terms of years.

Reference to District Reports for details of events in the Lahore Division.

112. Such are a few of the principal events which have happened in this large and populous division during the convulsion of the Empire by the mutiny of the Bengal Army. For further details I would refer you to the District Reports.

Measures for maintenance of peace.

113. I have also mentioned some of the measures which were taken for the maintenance of the peace, and beg here to record one or two more.

Reduction of Hindustani officials and deportation of unemployed Purbias.

114. I have stated that there was a large proportion of Hindoostanee officials and others in the Punjab. To the classes mentioned I ought to have added the large shopkeepers (a very numerous body), contractors, mooktars and adventurers of all sorts. The presence of all these Hindoostanees was found to be inconvenient, embarrassing and mischievous everywhere, but especially at Sealkote, when the mutiny occurred, and

at Goordaspoor, when the Movable Column went there to intercept the mutineers.

115. On the 17th July you issued the first of a series of circulars regarding the reduction of the number of Hindoostanee officials and the deportation of Poorbeahs out of employ. Weekly kafilahs were despatched, and Mr. Egerton reports that up to the 31st December 1857, 2,536 persons had been forwarded towards Hindoostan. All these were not of course from Lahore or the Lahore Division, but from Peshawur downwards; still there is no lack of Hindoostanees either in our offices or our cities and bazaars. Of the officials those only have been got rid of who were lazy, inefficient or of doubtful honesty and loyalty, while of other Hindoostanees those only have been deported who had no ostensible means of livelihood in the Punjab.

Measures for reducing the number of prisoners in jails.

116. Another general measure was to reduce and to keep low the number of prisoners in our jails, which were becoming rapidly overcrowded. Immediately after the disarming of the regiments a good many stealthy desertions took place. The deserters were in most cases apprehended, but the military authorities expressed their inability to try, and declined to receive, these offenders until the arrival of the Movable Column at Lahore. In the meantime they were kept in jail. Similarly a good many Sikhs and Punjabees of regiments which had mutinied below were apprehended and kept in confinement until the measure of their offence and a general policy towards them could be decided upon.

Again, there were numbers of fukeers and suspicious persons, and also persons accused of sedition or using seditious language against whom there was not evidence to warrant summary execution or punishment, apprehended in every district who were committed to jail in default of furnishing security.

Lastly, it was necessary to be prepared at any moment to take charge of a large number of disarmed sepoys. These and other considerations rendered it desirable not to have our jails

overcrowded. You, therefore, permitted the release on payment of fines suitable to the circumstances of each case of all prisoners who had served the greater portion of their period of imprisonment. Secondly, fine and flogging have been resorted to in preference to imprisonment as much as possible.

Behaviour of people of the Punjab during the crisis.

117. I would now offer some observations on the behaviour of the people of the Punjab throughout this trying crisis. There was a marked difference between the conduct of the agricultural community and that of the mercantile and trading classes.

118. By the middle of June almost the whole of the Hindoostanee army was in revolt or had been disarmed and was watched. The authority of the British Government in the North-Western Provinces, except within the limits of half a dozen forts and cantonments, was at an end. Mutiny had raised its head and sedition was busy in the Punjab. The communications were closed ; commerce was impeded ; there was but a handful of British troops, quite insufficient for the occasion in the country, and the speedy downfall of the British rule was predicted. Notwithstanding this state of things, the instalments of the land revenue, which became due in June and July, were in many instances paid in June, and the whole were collected with no greater solicitation or coercion than in an ordinary year.

119. Moreover, the sturdy peasantry from the first evinced their readiness to assist in coercing the refractory Hindoostanee troops. Sikhs and Punjabees of all castes and sects have pressed by thousands into the service. They have helped to watch and overawe disarmed regiments and have fought side by side with the British troops at Dehli, Agra, Cawnpore and Lucknow.

120. Very different has been the conduct of the towns-people. Entirely free from taxation, for the light town duties levied chiefly upon luxuries scarcely deserve the name of a tax, and enjoying under our rule immunities and advantages which they never before possessed, the bankers and merchants and

persons of independent means who live in our cities and towns have failed to help us in the only way in which they could do so, namely, by subscribing liberally to the 6 per cent. loan. What has been given has been given most grudgingly and reluctantly.

121. I have now only to notice the demeanour of the district officers, covenanted and uncovenanted. This, as you are aware, has been admirable. **Notice of services of officials.**

122. The District Courts, except in Sialkote and Goordaspoor, were not closed for a day on account of disturbances. At particular periods the attendance of the people at the District Courts was very slack and there was occasionally much alarm, but more business of every description was disposed of and a greater number of persons were tried and punished, exclusively of those who were arrested and tried on charges connected with the Mutiny, than in any previous year.

123. Mr. Cooper at Umritsur and Mr. Egerton at Lahore were in charge of the two most important and difficult districts, containing the former the commercial and the latter the political capital of the Punjab. Mr. Naesmyth administered Goordaspoor ; Captain Cripps was at Goojranwalla ; Mr. Monckton and Captain Eliott at Sealkote.

124. The European Assistants employed were—

AT LAHORE.

Mr. C. P. Elliott, transferred in June to Umballa.

Mr. H. E. Perkins, who has done excellent service as censor of the native press.

Mr. R. Thomas, throughout at Kussoor in the Manjha.

Mr. J. H. Penn.

Mr. R. Berkeley.

Cantonment Joint Magistrate.

Captain Piercy.

AT AMRITSUR.

Mr. F. Macnaghten; was also for about three months my Personal Assistant.

Lieutenant Perkins; was present with General Nicholson at Trimmoo and received a contused wound; afterwards transferred to Googaira.

Mr. C. Aitchison.

Mr. W. Blyth.

Mr. C. Stephen.

Sirdar Jodh Singh, an old Sikh chieftain, who was with Mr. Cooper at the destruction of the 26th Native Infantry.

At Goordaspoor.

Captain Adams, whose particular services when the Movable Column was in this district I brought to your notice in my letter No.——dated————.

At Sealkote.

Lieutenant McMahon.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. Blackall, subsequently transferred to Goojranwalla.

Cantonment Joint Magistrate.

Captain Chambers.

At Goojranwalla.

Mr. O. Wood, until the end of May, when he left on medical certificate.

Gratitude of Mr. Roberts for help and counsel of his superiors.

125. For myself I had the inestimable advantage of constant communication with, and continual advice and instruction from, yourself, and I have a most grateful recollection of the confidence with which you honoured me. I had further the privilege and benefit of frequent demi-official communication with the Chief Commissioner before his arrival at Lahore and almost daily personal communication thereafter.

126. It is impossible to recall the instances of wisdom, energy and determination which it was my privilege to witness, or to contemplate the measures some of which it was my duty in my limited sphere to help to carry out,

without a feeling of satisfaction at having taken part in the administration of the Punjab at a time of such peril to the Empire; but that feeling is quite overborne by one of deep and humble thankfulness to Him of Whom it is said—"Counsel is mine and sound Wisdom: I have understanding: I am strength. By me Kings reign and Nobles rule, even all the Judges of the Earth."

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 22.

Appendix.

23. *Translation of a Proclamation issued by the Hindoos and Mahomedans assembled at Dehli and elsewhere who have without any motives of worldly gain fought for their religion, destroyed the tyrants and enemies of their faith, and are prepared to war with the intention of upholding the religions of the Hindoos and Mossulmans for ever. May God banish the Tyrants!*—(*Vide* paragraph 60 of letter No. 106, dated 20th March 1858, from Commissioner, Lahore—22 *supra*.)

Inflammatory Proclamation issued by mutineers.

To all the inhabitants,—Hindoo, Mussulman and others,—be it known—

THE armies of Hindoostan have fought faithfully in behalf of the King of London and the Honorable Company and conquered for them the countries extending from Calcutta to Peshawar. For those services the said King and English rulers have bestowed the following rewards:—

1st.—In Hindoostan they have exacted as revenue Rs. 300 where only Rs. 200 were due and Rs. 500 where but Rs. 400 were demandable, and still they are solicitous to raise their demands. The people must, therefore, be ruined and beggared.

2nd.—They have doubled and quadrupled and raised ten-fold the chowkeedaree tax and have wished to ruin the people.

Inflammatory Proclamation issued by mutineers.

3rd.—The occupation of all respectable and learned men is gone, and millions are destitute of the necessaries of life. When any one in search of employment determines on proceeding from one zillah to another, every soul is charged six pie as toll on roads and has to pay from four to eight annas for each cart. Those only who pay are permitted to travel on the public roads.

How far can we detail the oppression of the tyrants. Gradually matters arrived at such a pitch that the Government had determined to subvert every one's religion! Therefore the whole army of Hindoostan, both Hindoo and Mussulman, from Calcutta to Peshawur have risen. They have argued that one can but die once, and that to die after denying one's faith is disgrace in both worlds. This should be avoided, but to destroy oppressors and the enemies of faith is laudable in every creed: it is the path to martyrdom and paradise.

Wherefore all Hindoos and Mussulmans serving with the army have assembled at Delhi and other places with the view of fighting for their religion, and it has been decided by all that we should kill the enemies of our faith wherever they may be found. It is proper that every Hindoo and Mahomedan should kill whenever he may find an opportunity. If not, all should proceed to Delhi, &c., with the parties to which they respectively belong, for this contest is simply in defence of religion. If our faith be preserved we have everything: if otherwise, it is preferable to die than live.

Should the enemies of our religion at this time endeavour to soothe or win over or proclaim a reconciliation, their promises are unworthy of reliance and altogether deceptive. Let no one sacrifice his life by falling into their snares.

The inhabitants of Punjab should also awaken from their apathy, and consider that since the Government has ruined Hindoostan by heavy assessment and improper cesses, and attempted to destroy our religion, they will assuredly do worse

to the Punjab and subvert the faith of its people. Then you will not be able to do anything. At the present time it is easy to bring the tyrants to account. The army is disaffected from Calcutta to Peshawur, and the forces of the English consist of only four or five thousand Europeans (*Goras*) (of whom some are sick) and not more. Cast therefore the *attire of females* from you and join us in the garments of men. Do not pay even a shell towards the Government revenue; whoever pays before the establishment of absolute dominion will regret the step, and whoever plunders the people or travellers, his house and property will be confiscated and he will be punished accordingly.

Inflammatory proclamation issued by mutineers.

As this determination has been arrived at by the Hindoos and Mussulmans together, whosoever acts contrary to it will be punished. Whoever plunders the enemies of our faith, however, will not be called to account, but will gain a good name.

Be it known that all the forces employed by the tyrants in the provinces of Lucknow (Oude), &c., have risen for their faith and assembled at Dehli. The few troops still remaining are also gradually joining us, and will if God permit soon be with us. The English have now but a few European troops, and if each among us would manfully but throw a handful of dust towards them, by God's blessing not a vestige of them would remain. Let no Hindoo or Mahomedan be alarmed; let them watch their opportunity and kill the enemies of their religion. Trust in God and let not your resolutions waver. It is a great thing to trust in the Almighty. Remember Him always; with His aid you will be victorious.

Whosoever, Hindoo or Mahomedan, joins with the enemies of his faith to fight against us will have his face blackened in both worlds. He will have no rest, as the contest is for religion.

To the English we have to say, do not prohibit the perusal of this proclamation by your subjects at large. By doing so nothing can be gained; you should be resigned

Inflammatory proclamation issued by mutineers.

to your fate. As you have issued proclamations for your arrangements, so do we.

As you are preparing for the contest, so do we, trusting in God. Remember that if it please God to maintain your Government it must continue; if not, whatever God wills, will be. The tyrannies of which you have been guilty God will bring before you.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 22.

24. *Translation of a Proclamation addressed to the Native Soldiers of the regiments of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery, &c., cantoned at Lahore.—(Vide* paragraph 60 of letter No. 106, dated 20th March 1858, from Commissioner, Lahore—22 *supra.*)

From your Brother Soldiers, Hindoo and Mahomedan, who have assembled at Dehli,

To our Brothers, Hindoo and Mussulman, who are employed at Lahore and other places in the Punjab.

Peace be to you! Râm! Râm!

It is a matter of much regret that although we have for the sake of our religion revolted from the English, and considering you our associates have collected treasure from every place and made arrangements for fighting, and moreover have killed all the European Soldiers, the enemies of our faith, and through the assistance of God been victorious, why then are you, who are our relatives and connections and brothers in arms, sitting idle there? Such conduct is unbecoming. In whatever way you can, destroy the enemies of your religion and come to Dehli. All the revolted troops from Calcutta to Peshawur are collecting in Delhi. It is proper to fight in defence of our faith; thousands of Hindoos and Mussulmans have joined us for the purpose. Don't remain there on any account, and if European Soldiers should oppose you on your way kill them by all means.

Don't think of your pay and services; through the blessing of God there are appointments of Rs. 12 per month

here and food and drink in abundance. Those who are slain in this contest if Mahomedan will become a martyr, and if Hindoos, will become "Bykont Bashees."

Inflammatory proclamation issued by mutineers.

Do not entertain any fears, but come at once. All the sepahees have in consultation issued a proclamation throughout Hindoostan. All the country, Hindoo and Mussulman, &c., is with us. A copy of the proclamation is forwarded to you with this. *Hear* its contents and become acquainted with the particulars. You should have 10, 20, 50 or more copies of it written in a legible hand and suspended in every place where there may be a cantonment, so that all our brothers, both Hindoo and Mahomedan, in the Punjab may be put on the alert and may perform whatever they are capable of. Do not fail in this.

The arms of a soldier are his hands and feet. Never at a verbal order resign your arms and thereby, rendering yourself helpless, suffer the imputation of cowardice. While you have life do not give up your weapons, and should European soldiers oppose you on your way do not let them escape: you should be ashamed of your conduct. We are all assembled at Dehli while you are scattered at various places. What is the cause of delay? Act up to the instructions contained in this proclamation.

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 22.

25. *Translation of an inflammatory placard discovered on a Garden Gate at Sealkote*—(*Vide* paragraph 104 of letter No. 106, dated 20th March 1858, from the Commissioner, Lahore—22 *supra.*)

(*Firmaun by the Commander-in-Chief, Maharaja Shere Singh, Chief of Hindoostan and Punjab.*)

Inflammatory placard found at Siálkot.

ON this date, the 1st Jeth, Sumbut 1914, this Firmaun is issued to the Hindoos and Mussulmans of the Punjab, for this reason that the Europeans are scamps (budmashes) and never publish news concerning the war; therefore this firmaun is issued. In the first place God (Sut Gooroo) so ordered it that we have been involved in misfortune for the last ten years. There was no hope of liberation, but in the

"Durgah" of "Sut Gooroo" there is no want of power. God so willed it that the senses of these worldly-wise vagabonds disappeared in the draught. They attempted to subvert our religions, so that all else may be ruined and they alone may be raised. But Fate confounds wisdom. When the Padree Sahib arrived at Dehli, he ordered the troops to bite the cartridges. All night the troops continued silent. When morning dawned and the cock crew, the din of human voices rose. Jurakun Sing, Sóobahdar Buhadoor, having made ready his troops, had all the vagabonds massacred and placed the King on the throne. Firmauns were addressed to the entire Hindoostan army, who massacred those in their respective cantonments. The face of the Padree was well sweetened! At the present time Jurakun Singh is marching about in the direction of Calcutta, placing his own men in every thanah and tehseel. The Raja of Burhma is at Calcutta itself with an army of one lac and forty thousand men. Not a single soul of the vagabonds is allowed to enter. Hazrut Mirza Baee is now at Dehli with several thousand soldiers. Be assured! God will not permit them to escape alive from this country. In the same manner as they caused dogs to be killed, will they themselves be killed. They have already retreated 40 miles from Delhi towards Lahore. If God assist us we shall soon make over their wives to our sweepers. Any Hindoo or Mussulman who may kill a Feringhee will be well rewarded and taken care of.

For the rest all is well!

ENCLOSURE (4) TO 22.

26. *Translation of an inflammatory placard discovered on a Garden Gate at Sealkote.—(Vide* paragraph 104 of letter No 106, dated 20th March 1858, from the Commissioner of Lahore—22 *supra.)*

Inflammatory placard found at Siálkot.

[*This firmaun is issued to the English vagabonds (budmashes).*]

BE it known to you that when I march towards Lahore you will find it difficult to escape, because the army of the Punjab will join me *en masse.* Rest assured the Punjab will

never be yours, and I know that your bones will be broken to pieces in this province, and you will fall into difficulties. If you consult your own good you will be off to Europe at once. You may thus be saved, but you are helpless. God has confounded you; nothing good can enter your minds.

ENCLOSURE (5) TO 22.

27. *From R. E. EGERTON, Esquire, Offg. Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, to A. A. ROBERTS, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division,—No. 115, dated Lahore, 9th February 1858.*

Events in Lahore District.

I HAVE the honor to forward the report called for in your Circular No. 21, dated 23rd January 1857.

Receipt of news of Mutiny at Delhi.

1. On the 12th of May 1857 news was received by telegraph from Umballa that a general rising of the troops and of the population had taken place at Dehli.

Disarming of troops at Mián Mír and other precautionary measures.

2. On the 13th the troops at Meean Meer were disarmed without the least shew of resistance*; horse patrols were appointed for the roads leading from Meean Meer to the city and the civil station, and extra police, to the number of 150, were appointed to guard the thana of Anarkullee, the subordinate chowkees, and the city gates.

* By order of the Judicial Commissioner.

3. On the 14th the sowars stationed at the tehseels and thanas were recalled to Lahore, and a portion of the old burkundazes of each thana were ordered in also. Their places were supplied by recruits from the district. A Subadar with half a company of the Police Battalion were stationed at the District Kutcheree, and the inhabitants of the station were warned to assemble at that place in case of alarm. News of the mutiny at Ferozepoor was received during the day, and it was reported that the disarmed sepoys at Meean Meer intended to march towards Ferozepoor. About 1 P. M. news was received that the sepoys were coming down upon the central gaol, and a body of sowars, burkundazes, and volunteers from the European community, headed by the Judicial and Financial Commissioners and the Commissioner of the Division, went

Threatened attack on Central Jail by mutineers from Mián Mír.

out to meet them. The alarm was a false one, and everything remained quiet. Proclamations were issued offering Rs. 20 reward for the apprehension of any sepoy attempting to desert, and these orders were conveyed to Kussoor and distributed throughout the district generally.

Formation of Lahore Volunteer Corps.

4. On the 15th the Lahore Volunteers, consisting of members of the European community, were enrolled under the command of the Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner.

Raising of inhabitants of the Manjha against the sepoys.

5. On the 16th I proceeded to Kussoor for the purpose of raising the inhabitants of the Manjha against the sepoys, should they attempt to march towards Ferozepore for the purpose of joining the mutineers at that place. I found that Mr. Thomas had apprehended 19 deserters on the previous day, and had forwarded them to Lahore in charge of a body of Kussoor Puthans. I found that the inhabitants of Kussoor and of the district generally entertained a good feeling towards our Government and a strong hatred and contempt of the Poorubeeya sepoys, and I felt sure that Mr. Thomas would be cordially supported in case of any rising of the troops at Meean Meer.

Attitude of inhabitants of Kasúr and district generally.

Raising of levies.

6. Proclamations were issued calling for men for enlistment as sowars and foot soldiers. Sirdar Kahn Singh Rosa came forward with offers of assistance, and many of the Puthans of Kussoor and the Jagheerdars of that district offered to send recruits, and eventually did so. Precautions were taken for observing the movements of persons supposed to be disaffected and for guarding the Sutlej ferries. I returned to Lahore on the 18th of May.

Apprehension of fakirs.

Guarding of ferries.

7. On the 21st orders were issued for the apprehension of all fuqueers and vagrants found in the neighbourhood of cantonments. On the 22nd extra guards were sent to the ferries on the Ravee in accordance with the orders contained in the circular* of the Chief Commissioner of the 19th of May. Orders were this day received for

*Vide Circular No. 166, dated 21st May 1857.

victualling the fort of Lahore for six months for 4,000 men, and arrangements were made for procuring the necessary supplies through the Tehseeldar of Lahore.

Provisioning of Lahore Fort.

8. The district remained perfectly quiet, and large numbers of recruits continued to come forward, anxious for service. A good deal of seditious talking and writing, principally amongst the Hindoostani residents at Lahore, was known to prevail, and orders* for the censorship of the Native Press were issued on the 23rd of May.

Censorship of Native Press.

* *Vide* Circular No. 157, dated 26th May 1857.

9. On the 26th the Guides marched in to Lahore and marched the next evening for Umballa *viâ* Hurreekee. The European families from Seealkot came in to Lahore on the 29th : they were brought in consequent on the removal of the European troops from that station.

March of Guides through Lahore.

Arrival of European families from Siálkot.

10. The Movable Column came in to Lahore on the 2nd of June and on the 9th two men of the 35th Native Infantry were blown away from guns on the Anarkullee parade ground for using mutinous language. This exemplary punishment had an immense effect on the inhabitants of Lahore, and people were much more cautious in their remarks about the state of the country and the prospects of the English after it took place.

Execution of two sepoys of 35th Native Infantry at Lahore.

11. On the 16th of June further orders† to guard the ferries more strictly were issued. Only two of the Ravee ferries above the bridge-of-boats were kept open and the number of boats on them was reduced to the utmost extent. The rest of the boats were also brought down to the bridge at Shahdera, where they were kept under the control of a guard of the Police Battalion. At the two ferries above the bridge, which were left open, strong guards of police, each under a Native Officer, were stationed. It was not considered necessary to guard the ferries below the bridge-of-boats so strictly or to reduce their number, as the country on both sides of the Ravee within a short distance of the river is uncultivated jungle, and it was not likely that any of

Guarding of ferries.

† Letter No. 443, dated 13th June 1857.

the routes leading to these ferries would be traversed by mutineers.

Disarming of Hindustani population of Lahore and Anárkali.

12. On the 29th of June the Hindoostani population of Lahore and Anarkullee were disarmed in accordance with the instructions contained in the Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 60, dated 25th June; 288 weapons of sorts were seized. This was a smaller number than was expected; many of the more valuable weapons, especially swords, were no doubt concealed by the owners.

Vide Circular No. 205, dated 26th June 1857, and reply No. 746, dated 29th July.

Precautions against Siálkot mutineers.

13. On the evening of the 9th July news of the mutiny at Seealkot was received; and additional precautions were taken for the custody of the boats at the ferries above the bridge. Messengers were sent out to ascertain the route taken by the fugitives: the mutineers did not proceed in the direction of Lahore however; so that no tidings were received through the messengers. The bridge-of-boats was guarded by a detachment of Europeans and Artillery from Meean Meer until the news of the mutineers having been met and defeated by Brigadier-General Nicholson at Trimmoo in the Goordaspoor District arrived.

Passage through Lahore of sowars of 10th Irregular Cavalry.

14. On the 16th of July the disarmed and dismounted sowars of the 10th Irregular Cavalry arrived at Shahdera, and were forwarded under an escort of police *viá* Hurreeke to Loodhiana. The men behaved quietly; one man only, a churrus-smoker, in a fit of fury managed to seize a sword belonging to a sowar of the police at the halting ground at Hoodiyara, and after threatening several persons with it was induced to give it up quietly. His comrades did not in any way support him and his proceeding was evidently unpremeditated. He wounded no one. He was sentenced by the Commissioner to five years' imprisonment with labour in irons.

Prohibition of the sale of lead and sulphur.

15. On the 23rd July the sale of lead and sulphur without notice being given to the District Officer was prohibited.*

*Vide Circular No. 229, dated 20th July 1858.

16. On the 24th the sale of percussion caps by native merchants was prohibited,* and the stock in hand was called in and placed in safe custody.

*Vide Circulars Nos. 230 and 240, dated 23rd and 27th July 1857.

Mutiny of 26th Native Infantry at Mián Mír.

17. On the 30th July the 26th Native Infantry mutinied at Meean Meer; they killed their Commanding Officer, Major Spencer, and nearly killed Lieutenant White of the regiment. They went off in a north-east direction during a dust-storm and completely evaded pursuit for some time. They were not observed by the police of this district, and this is accounted for by the line which they took in their flight. They left the cantonment by the road leading towards Thana Chubeel on the Umritsur Road, but on reaching the Baree Doab Canal, which crosses the road first named about half way between Chubeel and Meean Meer, they struck off to the right, and followed the course of the canal, which here passes through a succession of Government grass preserves. They crossed the Trunk Road eventually at a place called Wageh, on the boundary of the Lahore and Umritsur districts, and as it was broad daylight and stormy, they managed to pass without being observed by the burkundazes of the Chowkee. Their subsequent fate will be duly narrated by the Deputy Commissioner of Umritsur.

Route taken by mutineers.

Precautions against escape of more mutineers from Mián Mír.

18. After this outbreak a cordon of police was stationed all round the cantonment to prevent the recurrence of a similar escape being made by any of the other regiments left in Meean Meer. During August all remained quiet at Lahore, but it was felt that unless our army at Dehli met with some signal success, the people of the district would not support us so well as they had up to this time done; the anxiety grew deeper and deeper until the news of the assault and capture of Dehli arrived.

Deportation of Hindustanis.

19. During the months of July, August and September measures were taken to dismiss the Poorubeeya Burkundazes and to send them to their homes. All unemployed inhabitants of

Vide Circular No. 244, dated 29th July 1857.

Hindoostan resident at Lahore were likewise forwarded under escort to their homes *viâ* Hurreeke twice a week. The number of persons thus forwarded up to the 31st December, when the escorts ceased to be sent, was 2,536.

Letter No. 646, dated 2nd September 1857.

Precautions in connection with rebellion in Gugera.

20. The Khurrul disturbances commenced in the beginning of September. On the 17th of that month I went down to Bhaee Pheroo to ascertain the feeling of the people of that pergunnah, which borders on the disturbed district. I heard there that the tehseel at Syudwalla in the Gogaira District was threatened, and in order to ascertain the real facts I rode out to Syudwalla on the 19th, found all quiet at the tehseel, and the Tehseeldur himself in good spirits and well supported by a force of police and levies which could have held the tehseel against the rebels with ease. On the 20th I rode over to Mangtanwalla, another outlying thana on the border of Gogaira, leaving Chooneeyan all quiet. At Mangtanwalla I was joined by Mr. Perkins, Assistant Commissioner, who had come out there with 30 sowars. I was also joined by a troop of the 1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry under Rissaldar Ummur Singh.

21. Mangtanwalla is situated amongst villages of Mahomedans, allied by marriage with the Khurruls and other rebel tribes, and there was some fear that the villagers of this district might join in the disturbances; nothing of the sort took place. I was joined at Mangtanwalla by the most influential lumburdars of the neighbourhood, and leaving Mr. Perkins with 16 sowars at Mangtanwalla I proceeded on the 21st to Boochokee, a thana of the Gogaira district, about 12 miles from Mangtanwalla, and which had been threatened by the insurgents. The people of Boochokee, principally Sikhs, seemed well affected. I left 12 sowars to guard the thana, which is situated in an old fort of sufficient strength to resist any ordinary attack, and proceeded with the troop of the 1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry to Syudwalla. There I found all as I had left it on the 19th, and on the next day, the 22nd of September, at the request of Lieuten-

ant Elphinstone, Deputy Commissioner, I marched with the Cavalry to Gogaira. I think that the show of force at Mangtanwalla prevented the people of that part of the country from joining in the disturbances. While the inhabitants of villages immediately beyond the boundary of Thana Mangtanwalla were in open rebellion, and had deprived the police of their arms, all was quiet in the Mangtanwalla district. The thana itself is a remote one, and has only lately been annexed from Goojranwalla. It had only once before since annexation been visited by a district officer, and my appearance there with a strong body of sowars was calculated to cause the people to pause before taking any decided part in the disturbance, as it made them perceive that they were watched. The whole of the Lahore district remained remarkably quiet during the Khurrul disturbances, and the people did not appear to sympathize at all with the insurgents.

22. I accompanied you in your march through the Syudwala Tehseel in October and acted under your immediate orders.

23. Nothing occurred during the months of November and December which can be considered connected with the mutinies.

24. I have omitted to mention the 6 per cent. loan in its proper chronological order as I considered that a report on the police arrangements of the district was what was principally required. As, however, the 6 per cent. loan was a necessity arising out of the Mutiny, I may mention here how the call was responded to at Lahore. **6 per cent. loan.**

25. Not one of the wealthy inhabitants of the city came forward on the occasion. They appeared to doubt the genuineness of the loan, and apprehended that the money deposited would never be repaid, and doubted if interest even would ever be allowed upon it. This is the only way in which I can account for their exceedingly culpable backwardness on the occasion.

26. Each of the wealthy men of the city would, when alone with me, enlarge upon the exceedingly bad spirit shewn by the other inhabitants, but, when called upon to subscribe liberally himself, was as illiberal as the rest.

27. The people have not the confidence in Government in regard to money matters which might be expected after 10 years' experience of our rule. The total contributed by natives up to the 31st December was Rs. 75,400, and of this Rs. 55,000 were contributed by one family, the representatives of which are minors, leaving only Rs. 20,400 for the Lahore contributions, and of this sum Rs. 15,300 were contributed by wealthy natives of the Goojranwalla district.

28. The inadequate contributions of the City Punch were rejected by you, and their conduct has formed the subject of a separate correspondence.

Apology of Mr. R. E. Egerton for the meagreness of his report.

29. In concluding this meagre outline, which can scarcely be called a narrative, I must observe that, situated as I was at Lahore, under the immediate eye of yourself and the Judicial Commissioner, few, if any, of the measures taken for the preservation of the tranquillity of the district were originated by myself. The whole of what happened at Lahore was well known to you, and I feel that you are as well aware of what took place here and more fully acquainted with the object of the various orders given than myself.

30. No diary of events was kept by me, and none was required, for your information. I hope therefore that you will supply what I have omitted, and review my report, which has been written hastily and compiled from insufficient data, with leniency.

ENCLOSURE (6) TO 22.

28. *From F. H. Cooper, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Umritsur, to A. A. Roberts, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division,—No. 52, dated Umritsur, 19th February 1858.*

Events in Amritsar district.

I HAVE the honour to submit the desired memorandum on the measures taken, and the conduct observed, which

contributed to the tranquillity of the Umritsur District during the period of the successive mutinies.

MEMORANDUM.

Measures taken on receipt of intelligence of Mutiny.

May 1857.—On the 12th of May, when first intelligence of the Meerut and Delhi mutinies reached Umritsur, the force within cantonments consisted of the 59th Native Infantry, of whom 216 were doing duty inside the Fort of Govindghur. On the disarming of the troops at Lahore nothing could be done but await calmly the progress of events. A rendezvous was appointed in case of a disturbance. The next evening there came (what fortunately turned out to be a false alarm) news that the disarmed troops at Lahore were preparing for escape, possibly with the idea of swarming into Fort Govindghur. Mr. Macnaghten accordingly, with the utmost zeal, proceeded with the tehseeldar, General Hursookh Rai (who has shown great energy and fidelity throughout) to Ataree. Dewan Narain Singh, the agent of Sirdar Kanh Singh of Ataree, at once came to aid Mr. Macnaghten in rousing the villagers and forming a barrier across the Grand Trunk Road so as to intercept the mutineers and give us time to prepare ourselves. In the meantime Colonel Boyd picketed out the 59th Native Infantry in various directions, by way of diversion of attention, while Captain Waddy removed the whole of the battery of Artillery inside the fort. All this occupied but two hours. In the interim I had picketed outside the gate of the fort (from that day till it was well garrisoned by Europeans) a company of Sikhs and some sowars, who at a certain signal from the fort were to accompany me in. Having adopted all immediate possible measures, attention was paid to the feeling of the city, which was, to say the least, excited. As if to try the temper of authority, a Mussulman chokeedar had the audacity to cut down a cow, with the shallow pretence that he thought it was a dog. Setting aside regulation, and in anticipation of approval, I had the man most severely

flogged and placed in prison with irons for a year. The effect was great, and nothing of the kind occurred since. Expecting the attack noted, I should mention, in addition to the eulogy of Dewan Narain Singh, the name of the Scindanwallah family, who at once replied to my summons to render any such effectual aid such an emergency might call for.

Opening of communications with other stations.

2. Forthwith communications were opened with Goordaspoor, Jullundur, and incessant bulletins interpassed. The Goordaspoor treasure arrived safely, and was deposited in Govindghur; so also, subsequently, without awakening any suspicion of distrustfulness with the 59th Native Infantry, was the bulk of my own treasure.

Arrest of Bairagi fakirs.

3. The arrest and holding to bail of numbers of *Bhyragee* faqueers next ensued. Numbers were deported, or held to bail, or temporarily imprisoned. Forty-four noted bad characters, who had suffered frequent imprisonment, were at once incarcerated and made to work on the roads, a measure that greatly contributed to tranquillity in the city. Four new havalats were erected inside the Kotwallee for the reception of all sorts of suspicious vagabonds. Bhung was forbidden to be sold at the tanks outside the city; and at my suggestion sepoys were forbidden to enter the city.

Provisioning of Govindgarh.

4. Meanwhile, as usual, morning after morning, the city was visited in order to allay alarm, and mark any change of demeanour. In anticipation of the orders of the Chief Commissioner, Govindghur Fort was promptly stored in three days with provisions for three months. Each different sort of provision came out from different bazaars at different hours of the day and at different gates, which device effectually obviated any curious concentration of attention on the plain opposite the fort. Thus much briefly were the general arrangements for May.

Discovery of a Muhammadan conspiracy.

5. *June.*—The June month presents some peculiar features. The 59th Native Infantry continued armed, though their numbers in the fort were much reduced. All letters to sepoys were intercepted, and in some very suspicious matter

was contained; but the time had hardly arrived to press matters. Evidences of the Mahomedan basis of the rebellion soon stood forth. Through Mr. Phillip's exertions a man named Doolee Singh brought to light some clear cases of seditious conversation and projected treason. Through his evidence, aided by corroborative and collateral testimony of certain Native Christians, perfect proof was obtained of anticipated triumph on the part of the Moslemites. Mohammed Shureff, a relation of Rissaldar Burkut Ali, of the mounted Ressallah here (himself no small thorn in my side, a Hindoostanee and resident of Shahjehanpore), Meer Sahib, a clock-maker, Myan Sahib, a devilish-looking faqueer (whom I arrested at night in the city), a Noor Mahomed Khan, who admitted to have left Delhi on the 22nd of May (he was an ex-moonshee, had a fine horse and disguises, and clearly had left for the crusade in Umritsur), a Moonshee Rujjub Ali, and others, were at once tried and thrown into prison, and there they are still. A Mussulman thannahdar on the day of that trial had left his district and was found by tehseeldar Hursookh Rai in the shop of the conspirators; he was promptly dismissed from all Government employ.

Precautions against Jullundur mutineers.

6. On the 9th of the month under review the mutiny at Jullunder took place, and Mr. Assistant Commissioner Aitchison started at once with orders to intercept any who might attempt to cross at Hureekee Ghat. Nothing of the sort was attempted. But the police and villagers maintained their reputation, and handed over the Punjabee deserters from the Jullunder regiments.

Arrest of Bhai Mahraj Singh and acknowledgment of services of assistants.

7. The immediate arrest of Bhai Maharaj Singh by the Commissioner's orders, who was found 16 miles away in a village seated amongst his listeners, by Mr. Macnaghten, in a buggy, and his removal during the night to prevent suspicion, met the Commissioner's and Judicial Commissioner's approval; other similar directions were carried out by my assistants, to whom one and all (and to Mr. Macnaghten, Captain Perkins and Mr. Aitchison particularly) I am under the greatest obligations for their ready help.

Execution of Radha Kishen, Brahmin.

8. During this month Rada Kishun, Brahmin, was hanged, in the presence of the whole Movable Column under Brigadier-General Chamberlain, for high treason. A proclamation proclaiming his crime and punishment was printed in the gaol and published in the city.

Anxiety in connection with jails.

9. Connected with the gaol was some anxiety, it being situated inside the city. My assistants had been urged to resort to fines and flogging, as far as possible, and valuable diminution in the numbers imprisoned was immediately perceptible, a diminution increased by the permission of the Commissioner to release certain convicts, such as the sick, or small term prisoners, on the payment of moderate fines in lieu. The severest discipline was maintained. The manufactures went on as usual, doubling the ordinary profits; no *émeutes* and not a single escape occurred.

Recruiting of Sikhs.

10. The Tarun Tarun pergunnah, being the nursery of the Sikh Khalsa soldiery, recruiting parties began to arrive, and added immensely to the miscellaneous business of the administration, entailing incessant correspondence, large advances and daily examination. In these duties Captain Perkins' assistance was invaluable. A bad case of highway robbery occurred, but the parties were so successfully tracked that the property was recovered; and the undiminished activity of the police thus shown, and cordial aid of the villagers, aided by prompt rewards invariably accorded to the abettors in suppression of social disorder, operated to the prevention of any accession of heinous crime during the unparalleled season.

Activity of Police.

Passage of troops *en route* to Delhi.

11. *July*.—During the present month the march of troops through this district was almost daily, and no complaints have occurred either of want of supplies or of a single robbery. The Chief Commissioner's orders about this time were carried out concerning the reduction of ferries, the increase of guards for those that remained, and the formation of breastworks, by careful attention to which the denizens of each Doab

were caged. No Hindostanees (by similar instructions) could pass any ghaut even down without passes, nor up at all.

Disarming of 35th Native Infantry.

12. As matters down country grew darker, still greater vigilance was adopted; spies in disguise were organized with success, sufficient evidence was elicited from nine sepoys of the 35th Native Infantry, committed to me by Brigadier-General Chamberlain, to show their intention to mutiny after they had crossed the Sutlej. In company with the 35th they were disarmed. Associated with the efforts of my spies, was the safe surveillance of the sacerdotal high priest of infanticide notoriety, Beedee Bekramah Singh, who for six months was prohibited even horse exercise. Correspondence between Major Abbott, Deputy Commissioner of Hooshiarpoor, Major Lake and myself had frequently passed concerning this dangerous character.

Surveillance of Bedi Bikrama Singh.

Disarming of Native troops at Amritsar.

13. On the 9th of the month now referred to occurred the fight at Jhelum, and Brigadier-General Nicholson, who, with the Movable Column had been here (at Umritsur) some time, resolved to and did at once disarm the 59th Native Infantry. Subsequently, on the 13th, intelligence was received by me in a hurried note of the 11th of the mutiny at Sealkote, and the gallant Brigadier-General forthwith disarmed the remaining wing of the mutinous 9th Light Cavalry. The Trimmoo Ghaut action, at which the Commissioner, Mr. Roberts, was present, my assistant Captain Perkins, whom I despatched to aid, and General Hursookh Rai, also to aid in supplies, does not properly find scope in the Umritsur narrative.

Panic among traders and capitalists at Amritsar.

14. Of the utmost importance was it to preserve tranquillity, if possible to restore confidence, and inspire hope among the great traders and capitalists of Umritsur. Frequent and laborious were the interviews. In communication with Major Hamilton, negotiations for the arrival in portions of the Bombay invoices were opened with success. Letters of guaranteed contents were sent open to me, and I franked bundles. Nevertheless more than one panic ensued, and the insidious hints and doubts thrown on our ability to afford the customary protection in one instance resulted in almost a

stoppage. It was a season of trial indeed, when the very life-blood of the mercantile community was nigh dammed up. During this period the disarmed 35th Native Infantry were pitched at Jhundiala, 12 miles out; and daily reports as to their behaviour were submitted to me.

Flight of 26th Native Infantry from Mián Mír and measures taken by Mr. Cooper for the destruction of the mutineers.

15. *August.*—The close of the month of July was signalized by the flight of the 26th Native Infantry from Meean Meer after the murder of their Commanding Officer. Expecting they would take a down-country road, and the information conveyed as to their route being at fault, a party of Tewana Horse went out to Hurekee. Next morning, the 31st of July, the tehseeldar of Ujnala, Dewan Pran Nath, despatched an express to me to say that the mutineers had been delayed on their road through his district by a clever chowkeedar; that he had intercepted them, and awaited my arrival. Having suggested that such portion of the Movable Column as the military authorities chose should proceed on the Futtehgurh road, under the impression that I should be fortunate enough only to pursue the mutineers into their clutches, I started with about 80 sowars, 50 of whom were furnished by Colonel Boyd, consisting of Wild's Tewana Horse. Arriving at the banks of the river, some 24 miles, a bloody struggle it was obvious had taken place, and 150 had been drowned and killed; the rest were just visible on an island. Leaving the doubtful Hindostanees on the bank, I put off and captured 166; subsequently others who had been gleaned up from the villages were brought into the Ujnala tehseel, whither back I had to escort safely the whole batch, in all present 282 (two hundred and eighty-two). Thirty-five I had counted drowning, who had thrown themselves into the river in despair at seeing us approach fully armed. Of the 285, 237 were executed by me early on the 1st of August (next morning). The remainder met perhaps a worse fate; for in the tumult of the affair and the difficulty, with my small force, of preventing the escape of so large a squadron of desperate men, it was forgotten that one of the bastions of the tehseel, in which 66 were confined, had been fortified,

and the only windows admitting light and air closely shut up. Hence, when I ordered the door to be opened, expecting resistance and a rush, from the fact of the prisoners having inevitably heard the roll of the musketry, which every ten minutes told to death (*sic*) ten of their comrades, no sound issued, and upon entry 45 dead bodies were dragged out. I thought at the time that it was fright, hunger and exhaustion, until I subsequently learned from Captain Perkins, who had fortified the tehseel, what must have been the true cause.

Destruction of mutineers of 26th Native Infantry.

The responsibility I was undertaking I had fully calculated upon; and I cannot otherwise than feel pride in having, on report of the above disposal of the case, received in the most handsome terms the thanks of the Commissioner, the Judicial Commissioner, the head of the Punjab Government, and the Governor-General in Council, for having meted out so swift and terrible a retribution.

Reference is made to the original Report, but for the continuity of this narrative it was thought better to advert to the circumstance.

6 per cent. loan.

16. *September.*—During this month no stirring events occurred here affecting civil authority, or connected with the mutinies, with the exception of the hanging of a native doctor of the 35th Native Infantry for seditious conversation in denying the fall of Delhi. But much labor and trouble was expended in attempting to popularise the 6 per cent. loan. Anything more illiberal and less gratifying than the feeling displayed cannot be imagined. The large mercantile community upon which our system had heaped favors, and secured immunities unknown before, utterly failed in their duty to the State, and the contrast they displayed to all sections of the opposite class. The agricultural community, especially that of Sowreean, who one and all turned out to oppose the passage of traitors, and who are hardly burdened, will not be, I hope, lost sight of, when a revision of our financial policy is under deliberation.

17. Numerous arrests of Sikh sepoys have since taken place, who have tried to return quietly to their homes.

Gratitude of Mr. Cooper for advice and help of his superiors.

18. I hope in the above *résumé* nothing of importance has been omitted; it is chiefly from memory. How much I am indebted to the original, firm, wise and cheering view taken by the Judicial Commissioner, Mr. Montgomery, in frequent letters exchanged during the late period, and his brilliant example, it may be out of place to mention, because every district officer can but have one deep feeling on the subject as regards himself. But I am not debarred from expressing my thanks to the Commissioner of the Division, my immediate superior, for his valuable advice, directions and suggestions, his unvarying support (when so much had to be done in anticipation of sanction), and the confidence which he has reposed in one entrusted with the charge and responsibility of administering for the Umritsur city and district during such a momentous period.

FRED. COOPER,

Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE TO 28.

29. *Memorandum of Prisoners incarcerated in gaol or punished.*

Hanged			2
Since let out			42
Sentenced			12
Died			2
Sent to Lahore			6
Committed to Sessions			17
Under trial			33
Blown away by Commanding Officer of the station, belonging to late 26th Native Infantry			6
Despatched to Lahore	ditto	ditto	45
Executed or disposed of (at Ajnala)	ditto	ditto	285
Counted drowning			35
Killed by the police			150
GRAND TOTAL			635

FRED. COOPER,

Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (7) TO 22.

30. *From HENRY MONCKTON, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner of Sealkote, to A. A. ROBERTS, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division,—No. 101, dated Sealkote, the 2nd February 1858.*

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge your Circular No. 21 of 23rd ultimo, received 30th idem with Circular No. 5 of 16th idem, from Judicial Commissioner, and I proceed to give a brief history of the last few months as far as my incumbency in office is concerned.

Events in Siálkot district.

2. This station, as you are aware, contained not only a brigade consisting of Her Majesty's 52nd, the 9th Light Cavalry, the 46th Light Infantry, and the 35th Native Infantry, a battery of European Foot and a troop of Horse Artillery, but was also the head-quarters of the Musketry Depôt for instruction in the use of the new Enfield rifle, and consequently contained parties from every regiment in the Punjab. Before the news of the outbreak the Brigadier felt uneasy at the reports of disaffection at other stations and at the efforts of ill-disposed persons to take advantage of the formation of the depôt to sow disaffection. The Cantonment Joint Magistrate and myself were requested to keep watch both in and out of Cantonments for persons in the guise of faqueers. I consulted with the then Ressaldar of the Mounted Police, Runjeet Singh, and requested his aid in procuring secret information. His confused manner and apparently affected ignorance on the subject of the cartridges, and the forced manner in which he then and subsequently pretended to treat the matter so lightly as a mere *kotah andeshi ke bat* on the part of the sepoys, made me suspicious. After the outbreak I expressed my doubts of this man, and the Captain of Police wrote to me to learn the grounds of my distrust. As I had nothing stronger than surmise, and as I understood the Punjab Police were behaving well elsewhere, I let the matter drop. He was subsequently hanged by order of Captain R. Lawrence for his conduct on the day of the mutiny.

Detail of troops at Siálkot.

Precautionary measures.

Suspicious conduct of Runjeet Singh, Ressaldar of Police, and his subsequent execution.

Alarm at Siálkot on receipt of news of Meerut outbreak.

3. The telegraphic news received on the 12th announcing the outbreak at Meerut caused general alarm from the erroneous statement that the Europeans were defending their barracks, and the Brigadier thought that for two European corps and a large Artillery to be reduced to defence against only three native regiments augured a gloomy prospect for the approaching contest.

Measures taken on receipt of news of massacre at Delhi and contemplated disarming of Native troops at Mián Mír.

4. The news of the massacre at Delhee and the contemplated disarming of the Native Corps at Meean Meer arrived at 1 A.M. on the 13th along with Colonel Younghusband, and I urged, and at last successfully, that the Brigadier should make arrangements for the protection of the Artillery, which was done by exchanging a portion with two companies of the 52nd in their respective quarters. The news of the disarming of the regiments at Meean Meer soon followed, and by showing the sepoys and people how ready we were to stand our ground, and the advantages we possessed in priority of intelligence and as an organized ruling power, made the disaffected pause and reconfirmed the wavering. From a conversation I had with the man on the treasury guard belonging to the 35th Native Infantry I could see that they fully appreciated the moral force of that *coup*. The people generally did not realize the dangers of the approaching contest. Treasury drafts on Delhi, some for large amounts, continued to be taken up to the 19th May, and on other treasuries in the North-West to a much later date.

Raising of a levy at Siálkot.

5. The measures I adopted were first to form a levy, at first cautiously disguised as a town guard, and then as the men had been collected, to select such as would be fit for permanent military service and impart to them some simple training. To command this force I obtained the services of Lieutenant M. I. White, 26th Light Infantry, whose knowledge of his profession and of the language and manners of the Punjabees proved very valuable. Lieutenant Davidson was first appointed Adjutant, but taking no interest in his charge was exchanged for Lieutenant Stewart, who applied himself assiduously to his duties and succeeded to the command on the

departure of Lieutenant White. The spare arms of the leave men of the native corps and a large supply of ammunition was received from the cantonments. The force was fully organized and equipped, and had just begun to learn musketry drill when the mutiny of the 9th July occurred, and, though unable to oppose a large body of disciplined troops, yet rendered good service in holding the fort and afterwards clearing the cantonments and its vicinity of marauders.

Calling in of barkandazes.

6. To be available for any emergency while the Levy was being organized, I called in the burkundazes from the thannahs and chokees, supplying their places by extra police, leaving, however, a strong additional guard at each tehsil sufficient to resist any local outbreak. The burkundazes thus called in were drilled and organized into one body and stationed at the jail, treasury, and in a picket at the cart-sheds on the road between cantonments and the city. The police, however, had scarcely even been instructed in their drill and contained in their ranks too large a proportion of Poorbeeahs.

Entertainment of extra police.

7. For the protection of the roads extra police were entertained and placed at chokees every two miles. During the year 1857 only two highway robberies occurred,—one on the 9th July, the day of the outbreak, and one on the 11th idem, near the route taken up by the mutinous sepoys,—and both were unattended with aggravating circumstances.

Protection of ferries

8. In this district there is but a smaller extent of river line to be guarded. To secure that I had all the *surnays* belonging to zamindars placed in security. I also appointed extra guards, and afterwards had the orders carried out for constructing a breastwork at the principal ferry (the others having been closed) and for placing the boats in midstream, as danger was to be apprehended on either side. At last all the boats were sent away and communication with the right bank of the Chenab restricted to the Wuzeerabad bridge of boats.

Reasons for meagreness of report.

9. I need not recapitulate the circumstances connected with the mutiny itself. I had been long ailing and had prepared an application for leave, supported by a statement of

my case from the Civil Surgeon, which was signed and ready for despatch on the 13th May. The news received on that day induced me to hold my application in abeyance. On the 8th July, however, I had become so ill that I reported to you that the next day I should make over charge to Lieutenant McMahon. The outbreak on the 9th prevented the transfer. That officer will submit a report of his exertions to restore order, capture runaway convicts and his expedition to Bheeka Chuck in pursuit of the runaway sepoys of the mutinous corps. On the 15th July Captain Eliott assumed charge and retained it till the 16th October, when I returned from leave. Since my return the tranquillized state of the Punjab has happily precluded the necessity for further measures of precaution.

ENCLOSURE (8) TO 22.

31. *From Lieutenant C. A. McMAHON, Assistant Commissioner, Sealkote, to A. A. ROBERTS, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division,—No. 108, dated Sealkote, the 4th February 1858.*

Account by Lieut. C. A. McMahon, Assistant Commissioner, of expedition against fugitive Siálkot mutineers.

AGREEABLY to the concluding paragraph of the Deputy Commissioner's letter No. 101 of the 1st instant, I have the honor to submit for your information a report of the expedition to Chuck Bheeka for the capture of the fugitive Sealkote mutineers.

2. Prior to the receipt of the news of the utter discomfiture of the Sealkote mutineers at the Trimmo Ghat, having learnt that a strong body of them had posted themselves in the island, and that the rest had re-crossed the Ravee, it was determined to send out a party from this with the view of cutting off detached parties and opposing the passage of those still on the island.

3. The party at my disposal consisted of 10 of the Mounted Police, 44 of the Police Battalion and 247 of the newly-raised Sealkote Levy under Lieutenant Stewart.

4. We proceeded by forced marches towards Trimmo Ghat, but hearing *en route* of the complete success of the troops under General Nicholson, I made for the Jummoo border and skirted along it as far as Chuk Beeka in the Goordaspoor district in the hopes of coming across the fugitives.

5. Learning that a large body of them had taken refuge at Jusrota, I left my detachment under Lieutenant Stewart (not liking to march armed men into foreign territory without sanction) and started with a few sowars for that place.

6. Hearing of my approach, the Dewan came out a few miles to meet me, and in the interview which I had with him negotiations were entered into which resulted in a large body of the mutineers being given up a few days afterwards.

7. The arrival of my party on the border was opportune, as the mutineers at Jusrota were daily melting away and escaping to the hills, but after the interview with the Dewan this was stopped.

8. Of the mutineers who were given up on the first occasion 78 of them were immediately shot. Smaller parties given up subsequently shared the same fate, a few only being selected for trial at Sealkote.

9. Camp followers were sent into Sealkote under an escort.

10. The following is an abstract of those given up and executed:—

9th Light Cavalry.	*35th Native Infantry.*	*46th Native Infantry.*
1 Subadar.	1 Subadar.	4 Subadars.
2 Havildars.	3 Sepoys.	2 Jemadars.
1 Darogah.		7 Havildars.
9 Troopers.		9 Naiks.
		2 Drummers.
		100 Sepoys.
13	4	124

In addition to the above, two men were captured, but capital punishment remitted by superior authority for special reasons.

11. Rupees 5,316-1-2 was recovered and jewels to the value of Rs. 570-6-0, *viz.*—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Given up by the Dewan . . .	1,989	4	0
Found on the persons of the mutineers on their arrival in camp . . .	2,079	15	0
Found on the camp followers . .	1,246	14	0
TOTAL .	5,316	1	0

105 horses and 15 camels were also recovered.

ENCLOSURE (9) TO 22.

32. *From Captain W. R. ELIOTT, Deputy Commissioner, Sealkote, to A. A. ROBERTS, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division,—No. 146, dated 15th February 1858.*

Report by Captain W. R. Eliott of events in Gujrát and Siálkot.

WITH reference to the 2nd paragraph of the Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 5, dated 16th ultimo, which was received here on the 1st February, when I was no longer in charge of any district, where he declares it to be due to all officers who were in charge of districts during the late crisis that their exertions to preserve order and suppress sedition and revolt should be recorded and brought to the notice of Government, as having been in charge of a district during the entire period in question I beg to submit a statement of what I did during the crisis.

Absence of Captain Eliott on leave at Ambála at the time of the Mutiny.

2. On the first occurrence of the late disturbances in India I was at Umballa on leave of absence on urgent private affairs in attendance on my brother-in-law, who was very dangerously ill. I reached Umballa on the day of the mutiny of the troops at that station. On receipt of the news of the massacre at Delhie I at once offered my services to Mr. Commissioner Barnes for the period of my stay at Umballa in any capacity he chose to make use of me. I had only been in Umballa, however, nine days when I heard from Goojrat, of which district I was in charge, that symptoms of disaffection had been evinced there amongst the Police Sowars and the

guard of the 35th Light Infantry over the treasury. I therefore immediately determined to give up my leave and return to my post. I left Umballa by mail cart the following afternoon and rejoined my appointment at Goojrat on the 23rd May.

Cancellation of leave and return to Gujrát.

3. Lieutenant McKenzie had in my absence commenced making the various arrangements ordered by the authorities for the security and protection of the district and the suppression of disaffection and sedition. I completed them.

Measures taken for the security and protection of the Gujrát district.

4. Extra Police, both horse and foot, were entertained and armed, and posted at short intervals along the whole of the many roads which intersect the Goojrat District; the Thanah and Tehsil Guards were strengthened; breastworks constructed and guards placed at all the ferries, both horse and foot; all suspicious characters and vagrants watched and searched and, when thought advisable, placed in confinement; the proceedings of our neighbours in the Cashmere frontier closely observed and secretly inquired into; the bulk of our treasure remitted to Lahore; the public records and whole of the treasure for current expenses removed and lodged in the fort which is situated in the town of Goojrat; and the fort itself rendered as defensible as possible by the construction of parapet walls of mud, loop-holed at all quarters, with a view to our retiring there for refuge if necessary; native letters opened and examined; &c., &c.

5. Nothing occurred at Goojrat to create alarm or interrupt the transaction of business as usual till the long-expected outbreak of the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum actually took place on the 7th July.

6. The first announcement we had of it at Goojrat was the report of cannon at daylight in the direction of Jhelum. At first we did not know what to make of the matter, the Artillery located at Jhelum having to our knowledge long since left for Delhi; but in a couple of hours by a note brought by sowar from the Deputy Commissioner of Jhelum written overnight I was informed that the 14th Native Infantry were to be disarmed by a party of H. M's 24th

Measures taken for the security and protection of the Gujrát District.

Regiment from Rawul Pindee and some Artillery. No one contemplated the sepoys offering the resistance they did, and I concluded that the cannonade we heard was the Artillery pursuing and shooting down the terrified sepoys. I accordingly despatched notes to that effect by sowars to the Deputy Commissioners of Goojranwalla and Sealkote, and proceeded immediately to issue proclamations and offer 50 rupees reward for the seizure of every fugitive sepoy, authorizing the people to destroy the sepoys if they resisted seizure, and to appropriate any property found with them as their rightful dues as captors. These proclamations were distributed by means of our numerous sowars in a few hours over every part of the district. This done, I started a body of sowars to the Kharian Pass, which was defended by a large body of newly-raised extra Police consisting of the followers of, and commanded in person by, an influential man in that quarter, Rajah Sooltan Khan, and accompanied by Mr. Teasdale, the 2nd Clerk, who volunteered his services and had seen service in Scinde. About noon I followed and overtook the sowars on the road and we all proceeded through the Kharian Pass to the Jhelum River.

It was near sunset when we got there, but the firing at Jhelum, both of musketry and artillery, was to my surprise still sustained, and appeared so unaccountable that I determined to cross the River with a part of my force to ascertain what was going on, and was fortunate enough to meet the Deputy Commissioner at once on the other bank, to whom I offered my services and those of my men, but he said nothing further could be done that day beyond leaving a party of my men to strengthen his Kotwallee, and he advised me to recross and pass the night patrolling on the river banks, to prevent any of the 14th crossing over into my district. This I did with such success that I believe not a single sepoy who crossed the river into the Goojrat District escaped, and on the strength of my proclamation and reward that very evening the lumberdars brought in four or five sepoys of the 14th who had swum across; they were sent into Jhelum at once and executed next day.

Measures taken for the security and protection of the Gujrát District.

7. On the following day I remained the entire day on the river bank patrolling, whilst from the firing on the opposite bank it appeared that the force at Jhelum had resumed offensive operations against the mutineers, who in numbers took possession of an island in the middle of the river. They were distinctly visible, and I wrote to the Deputy Commissioner of Jhelum to say that if he would send a party of Police from his side of the river I would co-operate from our side and we would dislodge the fellows from their lair. Aid was promised, but never arrived. Meantime the scouts we sent into the island informed us that the sepoys were not so numerous, but that we might venture unaided to attack them. Accordingly we crossed over to the island in boats and attacked them. Owing to the dense jungle and their greater acquaintance with the locality, their greater dexterity and skill with their muskets, and their fire being so much more rapid and precise than ours, we experienced greater difficulty in dislodging the mutineers than I had anticipated, and before we managed to drive them out of the island into the river we had the misfortune to have one Native Officer and five men more or less badly wounded. It was dusk ere we got back. We kept watch again for parties who might cross over in the night, and next morning were joined by a party of Police from Jhelum under command of Lieutenant Battye, Assistant Commissioner, and Lieutenant Pollard, of the Engineers, who volunteered for the duty; and again we crossed to the island in the river to see if in the night any sepoys had, as we had heard, sought refuge there, and we captured, without resistance being offered, eight sepoys and sent a party after several others, who on seeing us threw themselves into the river and swam down the stream. What success attended this party I have not heard.

Services of Mr. Teasdale, Clerk in the Gujrát District Office.

8. It is due to Mr. Teasdale to say that he behaved under fire in the island in the Jhelum River with marked coolness, and his example greatly inspirited the men under him. That night at a very late hour we heard of the revolt of the troops at Sealkote, and, as the Jhelum mutineers had by that time been nearly all accounted for and disposed of, or

believed to be so, I returned with all haste to Goojrat with the whole of the Police who were out with me.

Transfer of Captain Eliott to Siálkot and measures adopted by him at that station.

9. Three days afterwards, on the evening of 13th July, I got orders to proceed to Sealkote to relieve Mr. Monckton of the charge of the district, and next day I arrived here, and on the departure of Captains Lawrence and Cripps on the 14th I assumed charge on the 15th July.

10. My first order was to Lieutenant McMahon and Lieutenant Stewart to proceed with a party of the Levy towards Trimmoo Ghat in the hope of their being able to seize some of the stragglers of the mutineers and to reassure the people in that quarter. I then selected, in consultation with Captain Chambers and Major Drake, the barracks of H. M's. 52nd Regiment for the future residence of all the Europeans at the station rather than the fort, and on Mr. Jones and self settling ourselves there, our example was speedily followed by every one.

11. A committee of officers was then composed for looking after the recovered plundered property of the residents consisting of—

The Revd. W. Boyle,
Lieutenant Russell, 46th Regiment,
Lieutenant Fraser, H. M's. 52nd,
Mr. Jones, Assistant Commissioner,

it being clearly understood that Mr. Jones' duties were only to extend to looking after the property of himself, Messrs. Monckton and McMahon, as his other duties would not allow of his devoting much time to this matter.

12. Orders were next issued to put the jail into repair. The Hindostanee burkundazes and chuprasees amounting to upwards of 90 were weeded out and deported to the Provinces, but my time of course was principally taken up at first in the trial of public offenders.

Trial and punishment of offenders.

13. Captain Chambers, the Cantonment Joint Magistrate, tried a number of cases with me on commission, and we were never otherwise than unanimous in our opinions in those

cases or as to the punishments that should be awarded. The very explicit instructions I received from yourself and Mr. Montgomery on the subject of punishments were strictly attended to. I annex a statement of the number of prisoners punished and the punishments awarded.

Recovery of stamp paper and recapture of escaped prisoners.

14. By granting petty rewards on the recovery of stamped paper no less than 53,000 rupees worth of stamped paper was restored to us; nearly 200 convicts were reapprehended between 15th July and the 15th October, when I made over charge of the district to Mr. Monckton; but owing to the destruction of our records we had the greatest difficulty in knowing who had escaped, what offences they had committed, for what period they had been sentenced, and how much of their term of sentence remained. Fortunately since the 15th October a jail book has been recovered which has given some clue as to the names of those who were in jail on the 9th July, their terms of sentence, &c., and by offering rewards for their apprehension numbers, who have never yet been traced, are being caught and punished.

Anxiety during Muharram.

15. The Mohurrum passed off quietly, but, like people elsewhere at that season, we felt anxious. The villages of the Goojrat District on the Cashmeer frontier had been attacked by our neighbours, and there were constant rumours of Sealkote being about to be similarly attacked and plundered not alone by the inhabitants of the Cashmeer territory but by the Hindoostanee Sepoys and others who were secreted there in numbers. A most seditious proclamation was affixed in a conspicuous position on the highroad leading from Cantonments to the town a day or two before the grand day of the Mohurrum, and the tone and language of a Hindoostanee butcher to the Bazar Sergeant was in one case so threatening and unprovokedly insolent that, following as it did so immediately after the appearance of the seditious proclamation alluded to above, it was found necessary to execute the man. This deed was followed by the best results: we never afterwards heard or saw anything threatening or offensive on the part of any native in his demeanour to Europeans. I trust it will

Seditious proclamations.

Execution of a Hindustani butcher.

Difficult position of Captain Eliott at Siálkot.

be borne in mind that on my assuming charge of Sealkote I found the Kutcherry destroyed, the records burnt, the Jail dismantled, prisoners at large, Treasury plundered, and the whole of the Government servants under suspicions of disloyalty. I was myself quite new to the district, ignorant of localities, of the characters of either the people or the officials over them, separated from Lieutenant McMahon, who was on duty in the interior for the best part of the first of the three months I was in charge, and unable to consult him readily on these matters, and Kaim Ali, the Native Extra Assistant, being a Hindostanee, could not be confidentially consulted. Mr. Jones was almost as new to the district as myself and quite new to Civil duties (although a very promising officer). Moreover, whilst at Chuk Bheek Lieutenant McMahon, although he did good service with the Levies, was unable to render me much assistance in Kutcherry, and for the last three weeks of my incumbency of the district I was unfortunately unable to do so much as I had wished, being blind with ophthalmia. Add to this, as you are aware, the Native officials of this district, Tehseeldars and Thanahdars are below par in point of efficiency. Therefore neither from them or the Clerks of our English office do the European Officers get work done as it is done elsewhere; still if allowance be made for all this, I believe it will be allowed that I have done fairly, at least I hope so.

ENCLOSURE TO 32.

33. *Punishments inflicted on account of the outbreak at Sealkot on the 9th July 1857.*

OFFENDERS.	Executed.	Shot.	Imprisoned.	Flogged.	Fined.
Government Servants, Military .	19	141	11	...	37 Villages,—Rs. 10,688-11-1.
Ditto ditto, Civil . .	2	...	...	...	
Camp followers and others . .	13	...	44	928	
. TOTAL . .	34	141	55	928	

Punishments inflicted, &c.—concluded.

OFFENDERS.	Executed.	Shot.	Imprisoned.	Flogged.	Fined.
By Captains Lawrence and Cripps—					
Government Servants, Military .	3	...	7	...	27 Villages.
Ditto ditto, Civil . .	1	...	...	...	
Camp followers and others . .	3	...	...	368	
Total . .	7	...	7	368	
By Captains Eliott and Chambers—					
Government Servants, Military .	16	...	4	...	10 Villages.
Ditto ditto, Civil . .	1	...	...	...	
Camp followers and others .. .	10	...	44	560	
Total . .	27	...	48	560	
By Lieutenant McMahon—					
Government Servants, Military .	...	141	...	...	...
Total . .	...	141	...	...	...

SEALKOTE,
DY. COMMR'S. OFFICE :
The 15th Feby. 1858.

W. R. ELIOTT,
Offg. Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (10) TO 22.

34. *From* JAMES NAESMYTH, *Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Goordaspore, to* A. A. ROBERTS, *Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division,—No 85, dated Goordaspore, 30th January 1858.*

As desired by your Circular No. 21, dated 23rd current, received on the 26th idem, I have the honor to submit a brief *résumé* of the principal occurrences, since the 12th May last to the close of 1857, connected with the recent disturbances, **Report on events in Gurdáspur.**

in as far as my charge of the Goordaspore District was concerned, and of the measures which were from time to time adopted for the maintenance of public tranquillity.

2. As the intelligence of the events at Meerut and Delhi became known and circulated in the Punjab it seemed evident that considerable popular ferment or agitation would ensue. Any overt indication of such it would be necessary at once to crush ; hence the first measure adopted was to ensure the regular, accurate and direct communication of intelligence from each outpost of the district as to the state of feeling, &c., in the neighbourhood. The Police, whilst required to transmit such direct to me, were further enjoined at once to arrest any agitator or suspicious person or persons who might be disseminating or stirring up mischief, or who could not satisfactorily account for themselves.

Orders for arrest of agitators and suspicious persons.

Measures for facilitating communications.

3. To facilitate communication and to ensure the transmission of prompt intelligence runners or "hurkaras" were posted at easy intervals along the lines of road. Ordinarily the mounted Police were not used for this purpose, but were reserved for the transmission of extraordinary intelligence as the former would have unnecessarily harassed them and tended to render them ineffective in the hour of need.

Measures for ascertaining the temper of influential persons in the district.

4. In addition to the above, for ensuring the earliest and best intelligence from all parts of the district trustworthy informers were thrown out, and means were taken to ascertain the temper of certain influential individuals whose antecedents warranted some degree of distrust, and whose example would be likely materially to influence the people ; for as yet the sentiments of the Sikh aristocracy and other influential Punjabees of rank were not clearly apparent nor had the national feeling decidedly declared itself.

Removal of treasure to Amritsar.

5. The next step was the removal of the large amount of treasure—nearly seven lakhs—to Umritsur. This was quickly arranged for, and the treasure, escorted by a party of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry, run through in one night : relays of Bylees

were stationed on the road, and the treasure reached Govindghur in safety on the 20th of May.

Disarming of Treasury guard consisting of 59th Native Infantry.

6. With so small a balance of cash in the Government Treasury—simply sufficient for current expenses—it seemed to be unnecessary that the detachment of the line (59 Native Infantry) should be retained at Goordaspore; and as there was ample reason for believing that since the outbreak some of their body had been suspiciously visiting the Irregular Cavalry lines at night, I was anxious to be rid of them. In communication, therefore, with their Commanding Officer, the guard left Goordaspore on the 3rd of June and were not relieved by a fresh detachment. The treasury was then entrusted to the men of the Police Battalion, who in the meantime had been called in from the tehseels, and in whose stead trusty burkundazes had been placed.

Concentration of Mounted Police at Sadr.

7. The concentration of as large a portion of the Mounted Police as possible at the sudder station seemed desirable and necessary, if their services as a body were to be counted on. The majority therefore were called in, leaving only those necessary to maintain rapid communication with Umritsur and other lines and points of importance. Patrols in the neighbourhood of the station and town were then established and a serviceable body of horse prepared for an emergency.

8. Extra Police were immediately appointed in lieu of these Mounted Police withdrawn. Their duty was specially to watch the thoroughfares and to arrest all suspicious persons, mendicants, &c.

Measures for ensuring safety of Europeans.

9. Early measures were taken for ensuring the safety of all Europeans in the civil station, and guards from the Police Battalion were stationed at their houses and on the departure of the detachment of the line at the Government Kutcherry.

Protection of jail.

10. Thirty extra burkundazes were appointed at the jail, and the available Police Battalion Guard, which had been strengthened by the advent of those from the tehseels,

redistributed at all the public offices, which were aided for night duty by pickets from the Mounted Police. I deemed it expedient to discourage interviews between the prisoners and those outside and to restrict the convicts to in-door labour.* Subsequently I prohibited interviews altogether and, as far as possible, any communications whatever from without.

*Bricks, &c., for the work-sheds, and yard.

11. It seemed to me so essential to maintain the strictest surveillance over the jail that I had all the prisoners in the larger wards linked together at night by a strong chain, which was padlocked at either end. No material inconvenience resulted as long as the prisoners kept quiet, and each could recline as usual, whilst it prevented any movement on the part of individuals without disturbing the others. A file, it was found, had, notwithstanding all precautions, been introduced, and this fixed my intention at once to adopt the chain and the very closest surveillance.

12. Independent of the ordinary sentries and guards, the wards were repeatedly visited during the night and the Native Officer of the guard fully instructed how to act if necessity required it.

Preparation of Treasury building as a rendezvous in case of need.

13. The treasury building at *Goordaspore, which was* the only position capable of being defended with the small force at our disposal, was as far as possible rendered available in case of need,—a well sunk inside and a small supply of provisions and water placed in it. This would have been the rendezvous had necessity required it.

Measures for ascertaining the temper of the Muhammadans.

14. As soon as the Mahomedan character of the rebellion became apparent, special measures were taken to ascertain the temper and sentiments of this class of the community as manifested or expressed at the mosques by their "Mullas" and other influential persons among them. Nothing however of a treasonable nature was disclosed; it is probable that they had a shrewd idea that they were watched.

15. Only in two instances were persons (natives of the district) arrested for treasonable language and severely punished. The effect was complete, and there were no further similar cases. There were subsequently a few cases, implicating certain Hindoostanis, chiefly employés on the Baree Doab Canal.

Punishment of two persons for using treasonable language.

16. Before the end of May information tending to cast grave doubts on the loyalty of the Judicial Serishtadar, and Extra Assistant Shyam Lall was received by the Chief Commissioner and communicated. The former was at once arrested by myself and placed in confinement; his house and effects searched, but without result. The latter was immediately transferred from the separate charge at Buttala to Goordaspore, where he could be closely watched, and Extra Assistant Rala Rae, whom I had every reason to believe faithful, sent the same day to replace him.

Doubts as to loyalty of Judicial Sharistadar and Sham Lal, Extra Assistant Commissioner.

17. Subsequently I succeeded in intercepting a very mysterious letter addressed to Shyam Lall by the Kutoge Ranee. On communication with Major Taylor and Mr. McLeod there seemed grounds for still further suspecting in this the integrity of Shyam Lall, though nothing tangible against him could be elicited.

18. The presence of so dubious a character, and one occupying an official position of such importance, whose evident scheming disposition and doubtful loyalty rendered him an encumbrance rather than an aid, coupled with the inexpediency, as it seemed to me, of his being permitted to remain so near Noorpoor (where he had been long Tehseeldar and evidently possessed influence, and might have done infinite mischief in the event of any disturbance in that direction) induced me strongly to suggest his removal to some more distant district, which on your representation the Chief Commissioner was pleased to sanction. I am strongly impressed with the idea that he was ready to intrigue and communicate intelligence and advice to the Kutoge Ranee, who probably bore the British Government no good-will.

Transfer of Sham Lal to another district.

Scrutiny of correspondence of natives.

19. Such were the principal measures adopted for ensuring tranquillity *within* the district, to which may be added the close inspection of all native letters received at the Post Office. The bags were opened either before me or the Assistant Commissioner and the contents carefully examined. There were, as was to be expected, many very doubtful and mysterious documents among them, but few which led to any practical results. Of these latter were letters implicating, or rather casting, strong suspicion on some of the Moonshees of the Canal Establishment, among which was one which, I believe, led to the implication of the Lahore Division Nazir.*

* Since acquitted.

20. These measures proved under Providence effective, and the district remained internally tranquil during the period of the crisis.

Excitement at Dera Baba Nának.

NOTE.—There was some incipient excitement among the Bedis of Dera Baba Nanak, as was to be expected from an idle, quarrelsome and easily-agitated community, but no overt act of any kind occurred. They were well watched, and all remained tranquil. A Hindoostani Faqueer, who had recently settled there and who had ingratiated himself with the community by practising some skill he possessed in medicine (European), there was reason to believe was disposed to create and fan excitement; his speedy arrest and imprisonment was doubtless effective. I am inclined to think this mysterious stranger was in some way interested in promoting popular excitement. He is a Hindoo.

Arrangements at ferries.

21. It now remains to notice the arrangements adopted at the ferries to provide as much as possible against evil from without, and the interception of Hindoostanis, &c., and other suspected persons.

22. On the 16th of May 66 extra burkundazes, who were fully equipped and armed a few days thereafter, were appointed to the ferries. A Naib Darogha was also appointed. A small guard was fixed at each ferry on the Ravi subordinate to this district, and these were intermediately patrolled. At the centre ferry, "Trimmoo," a strong burkundaze guard was posted under the command of a picked Non-Commissioned Officer of the Police Battalion. This guard was independent of the party at each ferry and was intended to act as a

movable body at whatever point their services should be needed. Mud breast-works were, as directed by the Chief Commissioner, thrown up at each ferry, and the boats were all collected at the posts on the left bank of the river at nightfall, where they were retained till morning. Arrangements were made for the immediate scutling of the ferryboats on an order being issued to that effect, and the river was cleaned of all stray beams or rafts which might afford a passage across.

23. All suspicious persons, or those who could not satisfactorily account for themselves, were directed to be detained and sent in from the ferries, and all Hindoostanis and Poorbeeah faqueers.

24. On the Beas (subordinate to Hoshyarpur) there were guards placed opposite the ferry stations; these were duly armed and equipped, and their duty was to prevent any unauthorized or suspicious persons from crossing the river. A trustworthy jemadar was placed in charge at each of these posts.

25. It soon became evident that so long a line of ferries, extending over nearly 40 miles, could not be sufficiently guarded and patrolled, as the importance of the subject demanded, unless a much larger body of extra Police were entertained. It was therefore determined to reduce the 12 to 4 (*sic*) of the more important ferries and the others were closed, and the boats removed or sunk on the 12th of June. The guards were concentrated at these four points, a watch set over the sunken boats, and the line intermediately patrolled.

Measures taken on advance of Siálkot mutineers to Trimmu Ghat.

26. Such was the state of the arrangements up to the second week of July, when the Syalkote troops mutinied and marched for the Trimmoo Ghat on the Ravi. On the receipt of the intelligence all the boats were forthwith scuttled, and from one end of the line to the other there was not a boat afloat or any means whereby a passage could be obtained. The river was daily rising, though only from the melting of the snows, so that although all the fords were believed

to be impassable, the necessarily uncertain depth of the river at this period (rising and falling at times two and three feet in twelve hours) rendered it impossible entirely to depend on all these passages being so; and so it happened (it cannot be said unfortunately, as nothing could have been more opportune than the occurrence) that on the morning of the 12th July the Syalkote mutinous troops crossed (though up to their throats in water) at Trimmoo and were shortly afterwards engaged by Brigadier-General Nicholson, who utterly routed them; they fled precipitately back to the river, which in the interim had been gradually rising, so that the ford, which had by this time nearly ceased to be such, proved the destruction of numbers of the fugitives and of the camp followers who had subsequently attempted to cross.

Rout of the mutineers by Brigadier-General Nicholson.

27. The further narrative of the final destruction of the remnant of the rebel force by General Nicholson has been elsewhere accurately and graphically recorded; and it is sufficient here to add that the whole machinery of the police and the co-operation of the people was set in motion to entrap the fugitives, which was well responded to by both.

Damage done by Siálkot mutineers.

NOTE.—The Syalkote mutineers committed little material damage in their progress through the Shukurgurh Purgana. The indication of their ill-will was confined to plundering a Bunneeah's shop at "Ghureeb Shah," rooting up and smashing a sign post, destroying the gate of the "Nyna Kot" thanna and tearing the records. At "Trimmoo" they destroyed a portion of the serae.

These injuries have since been met from the sale of their property which was captured.

Route taken by fugitives and their destruction.

28. The majority of the fugitives made for the upper part of the Doab. The hills was the only route by which they could hope to elude the vigilant search which was now instituted, and every villager well understood the value of a mutineer. Some wandered up the right bank of the Ravi and became entangled in the dense jungle and swamps of the "Narot Talooqua" and were eventually hunted down by the police or the zemindars; others attempted to conceal themselves in the brushwood which lines the river's bank or on the islands in its bed, and either met a similar fate or perished

in attempting the passage of the Ravi; some contrived to escape to the Jummoo territory, where it is believed the majority were apprehended and either made over to justice or stripped of all and left to wander penniless outcasts beyond the limit of British territory. Some few attempted, by assuming the guise of faqueers, boldly to escape across the Beas or, pending more fortunate times, to exist as mendicants and to fraternise with faqueers of the country, &c.; but in this too they were foiled, for their speech betrayed them, and the bonds of caste and superstition failed to protect them from the animosity of a race who detested them, and who were now tempted by pecuniary reward, and thus from the doom they so richly merited (*sic*). In short, few could altogether have escaped; many were executed at Goordaspore; at Shuckurgurh I presided at the disposal of several camp followers; innumerable were flogged, deprived of their ill-gotten gain, and sent back to the place from which they came there to receive the punishment that awaited them for any act of violence or crime. The plunder was sold for the benefit of the force, and on the 18th July General Nicholson returned with the column to Umritsur.

Salutary effects of punishment inflicted on mutineers.

29. The effect of this was most salutary, and the people (who in justice to them, be it recorded, had from the first evinced a spirit generally not otherwise than obedient and loyal) were confirmed in their respect for British power and in the conviction that in thus acting they had selected the better part.

Raising of levies.

30. I should have alluded before to the active recruiting which commenced on the orders being received from Lahore. The levy rapidly filled and was as rapidly equipped and armed; crowds flocked for military service, always dearly prized by the people; the difficulty was, without damping ardour, to select the suitable ones from the hosts who came forward. I sent a goodly number of men to Major Lake, and the levy was sufficiently organized and drilled to take part in the station duties in June and to assist in the subsequent affair at Trimmoo on the 16th of July.

Popularity of enlistment.

31. This general enlistment was one of the most popular, as it was among the most effective, measures adopted by Government and contributed in a vast degree to link the popular feeling in this part of the country with the British cause. A national interest and sympathy was created to support that cause which had now become common; deep and earnest were the aspirations which vibrating in every homestead evinced that the military spirit of the nation had been gratified; and afforded an assurance that its valiant sons would not be backward in vindicating the trust bestowed.

Appointment of Captain Adams to command the levy.

32. As you are aware, the management of the new levy was eventually entrusted to Captain Adams, and he subsequently received the assistance of a Subaltern officer.

Destruction of remnant of mutineers of 26th Native Infantry in Gurdáspur District.

33. The next event deserving notice was the arrival in the district, during the first week of August, of the remnant of the 26th Light Infantry who had escaped the destruction of the main body by the Umritsur authorities. They numbered some 25 or 30 and were a desperate gang. Arrangements were made to intercept them, and a body of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry under Captain Cureton started on the information being received. Owing to the heavy rain and darkness of the night, this party missed the fugitives, who were next heard of as being on the confines of the Kanoowan swamp. Means were at once taken to overtake and intercept them; and they were eventually destroyed to a man at a point to the north-east of Goordaspore. I was personally, as you are aware, incapacitated by an accident from conducting this small party of the levy, who ultimately came up with the fugitives, and was compelled to confine myself to forming the arrangements which were happily effective. Whilst the party of the levy with Mr. Garbett (who happened to be with me at Goordaspore at the time and who offered his services as I was unable to go) took the fugitives in rear, they were headed by the police from Puthankot and thus speedily and completely destroyed. They were armed with sticks and one or two had *tulwars*, but they fought with the determination of despair.

Tranquillity during the Muharram.

34. The Mohurrum festival, which being an occasion of considerable excitement, required to be carefully watched. I attended personally at Buttala the only town of the district where any disturbance could be expected. All passed off quietly and with even greater propriety than ordinary. Every precaution was of course adopted to meet any possible contingency.

Publication of news of fall of Delhi.

35. The intelligence of the fall of Delhi was widely circulated and responded to by the illumination of the principal towns of the district and by expressions of congratulation from all classes of the population. There were evil men who endeavoured to keep up the notion that Delhi had not fallen, but the speedy arrival of the spoil from the captured city practically convinced the people, and their joy was to all appearances sincere.

Reduction of establishments.

36. If any ill-feeling on the part of the evil-disposed men still lingered it was now seen to be hopeless, and any idea of demonstration was speedily laid aside. From this time the possibility and expediency of reducing the "*war establishment*" came under consideration, for the public finances could ill-bear so heavy an additional burden. Accordingly vacancies as they occurred were not filled in, and finally in *October* the greater proportion of the extra burkundazes were *dismissed* and as many as were willing and fit were forwarded to Lahore for service in the North-Western Provinces.

37. The extra establishment at the jail was reduced on the 15th current. Some still remain at the ferries and at some of the thannas, on which subject I have separately addressed you.*

* All to be dismissed from the end of the month.

38. It should have been mentioned that proclamations were from time to time widely circulated as to the rewards paid for mutineers armed or otherwise, warning the inhabitants against affording them protection or conniving at their escape. There is not a village or hamlet in the district where these notifications did not reach.

Disposal of treasure and prompt collection of revenue.

39. The amount of treasure retained at Goordaspore was reduced to the minimum and sufficient only for current expenses retained. All above this was sent to Govindghur by 10,000 rupees as collected. The Puthankote receipts were forwarded direct to Madhopore up to the amount of the monthly requirements of the canal.

The *kists*, it may be here added, were promptly and easily collected in June and July, and in some instances the *malgoozars* evinced a desire to display their loyalty by payments made much earlier than in ordinary times.

Transaction of public business.

40. The public kutcherries were not closed for a single day either at Goordaspore or Buttala. This I considered an important point. A regular and quiet prosecution of public business kept the popular mind steady at a time when any unusual suspension of such would have been regarded in a thousand false views by the easily-agitated mass.

Attitude of the people.

41. It was a great point to keep the people easy and free from panic. This I endeavoured to do myself and enjoined the same on the officials in the district. To cause popular agitation was one of the main objects of the agitators; to avoid anything of the kind by those in authority, on whom of course all eyes were fixed, and thus to counteract the attempts of our enemies, was an important duty.

42. The attempts to take advantage of the times to press false accusations were not so numerous as was to be expected. Care in this respect was highly requisite, and punishment was inflicted in some instances where malice was apparent. Anonymous petitions were frequent—the work of unknown rascals—announcing the intended burning of the kutcherries, poisoning the Europeans, &c., &c., some of which, though treated with apparent disregard, led to precautionary measures of various kinds.

43. The above comprise what appear to be the most notable points to be recorded. Circumstances from time to time called forth other minor arrangements and orders, all of which probably contributed in some degree to the maintenance

of public tranquillity, but few of which would have been so effective had not the people of all grades behaved generally with exemplary propriety, and so, by the blessing of Providence, were averted evils which elsewhere were so disastrous.

44. I may add that the Police generally behaved well and have been rewarded. Some who did not have been dismissed from the service of Government. Good onduct of the Police.

45. Annexed are the supplementary statements called for by Mr. Montgomery.

ENCLOSURE TO 34.

35. *Statement of Persons punished from May to December 1857 in the Goordaspore District for offences against the State.*

MILITARY.		NON-MILITARY.		Total executed.	Total otherwise punished.	REMARKS.
Executed.	Otherwise punished.	Executed.	Otherwise punished.			
Men of the 46th Native Infantry and 9th Light Cavalry and of the 26th Light Infantry,—80, irrespective of those executed by Brigadier-General Nicholson at Goordaspore, and by the Assistant Commissioner of Syalkot at Beeka Chuck. Some were shot and some hung.	None.	1 A Poorbeah Burkund a z who was attached to the ferries, hung	23	80	23	Besides these, 25 of the 26th Light Infantry were shot in the affair of the 6th August. The arms recovered from the mutineers were sent in to the Lahore magazine.

DEPUTY COMMR'S. OFFICE,
GOORDASPORE :
The 30th Jany. 1858.

J. NAESMYTH,
Deputy Commissioner.

ENCLOSURE (11) TO 22.

36. *From* JAMES NAESMYTH, *Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Goordaspore, to* A. A. ROBERTS, *Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore Division,—No. 119, dated Goordaspore, 14th February 1858.*

IN reference to my letter No. 85, dated 30th ultimo, forwarding a general narrative of events connected with my charge of the Goordaspore district from May to December 1857, I have the honour to submit the following addenda in regard to certain points which were perhaps too cursorily alluded to in my former communication.

Acknowledgment of services of Captain Adams, Assistant Commissioner.

2. Although I endeavoured in my report to embrace all prominent and main points and to record all occurrences of general importance, it may possibly be considered that the services of the Assistant Commissioner, Captain Adams, were not so fully acknowledged as they might have been; and, inasmuch as any such omission as the record of individual services, which was not altogether unusual in a general narrative, was by no means intended as a non-recognition of such, I hasten to remove any misconception (of the kind) by the present communication.

3. From Captain Adams I ever received ready assistance. In consultation, as in the execution of military arrangements,—defences, distribution of guards, picquets, &c.,—his military experience was valuable and was always as promptly tendered as it was readily accepted.

4. As you are aware, Captain Adams was placed in charge of the Goordaspore Levy by the order of the Chief Commissioner on the 10th of June; that he raised, organized and commanded the same, and so efficiently that I believe it is considered one of the best which has been formed in the Punjab. In addition to this, the recruiting duties were mainly entrusted to his care. The result has already been favourably acknowledged by the Chief Commissioner; some 1,400 men have from first to last been enrolled.

5. Adverting to paragraph 32 of my report, I beg to remark, what, however, you are fully aware of, that Captain Adams accompanied the detachment of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry under the command of Captain Cureton, who proceeded with the hope of intercepting the 26th Light Infantry mutineers. His absence on this duty at my request, which involved a march to "Beyte Ferry," 18 miles from Goordaspore, and a subsequent detour which he made to Buttala, on the intelligence that the rebels had taken that direction, necessarily prevented him conducting the party of the Levy which followed the mutineers up the Doab.

6. I should extremely regret if any inadvertance on my part, by omissions in my former letter, should in any way tend to detract from or ignore the effective assistance rendered by Captain Adams during the period under review. As before stated, his counsel in military arrangements was highly valuable and useful, and otherwise in general matters I have much satisfaction in publicly and cordially acknowledging his assistance.

ENCLOSURE (12) TO 22

37. *From Lieutenant-Colonel J. CLARKE, Deputy Commissioner, Goojranwala, to A. A. ROBERTS, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Lahore,—No. 62, dated Goojranwala, 30th January 1858.*

Reports on events in the Gujránwála District.

Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 5—180 of 10th January 1858.

IN reply to your Circular No. 21, dated 23rd instant, with annexure noted in the margin, calling for a report on the measures taken in this district for the maintenance of tranquillity since the 12th May last, I have the honor to submit a memorandum drawn up by Captain Cripps at my request. He had charge of the district up to the middle of October, and his narrative will be found to supply very satisfactorily the information desired.

2. I beg to append the two statements ordered,—one of persons punished for offences against the State, and the other that of the extra police establishment employed.

3. Proclamation of the formation of the Movable Column was notified throughout the district with a view of inspiring the well disposed with confidence.

Arms despatched to other districts.

4. I find that the following districts were assisted with arms from here as follows :—

22nd May.—Sealkote : swords	100	Supplied from confiscated arms in Malkhana.
27th " .—Rawul Pindee : swords	50	
" " " muskets	50	
Unknown.—16th Regiment, Irregular Cavalry : swords	9	
Various.—Commissioners and Superintendents : swords	200	50 from Malkhana; 150 made up by Deputy Commissioner.

The Deputy Commissioner of Goojrat had a number of carbines made up in this district at Nizamabad ; the Deputy Commissioner of Goojranwala also during the year had 180 carbines made up at the same place under your orders.

Transfers from Gujránwála levy to other corps.

5. From the Goojranwala Levy raised by Captain Cripps there have been transferred—

1 Complete company, 100 *strong, to 10th Regiment,* Punjab Infantry,

1 Complete company, 100 strong, to 20th Regiment, Punjab Infantry,

1 Complete company, 100 strong, to Deputy Commissioner of *Jhang,*

independently of 26 men to 14th Regiment, Punjab Infantry, and the present strength is 236. Independently of this, 33 Sikh recruits have been supplied for Captain Berry's police battalion, and 100 men for service as burkundazes in the North-Western Provinces were sent to the Judicial Commissioner.

6. On my taking charge of the district I found Captain Cripps at Manawala on its south-west corner prepared to quell any insurrectionary demonstration which possible sympathy with the insurgent Khurruls on the Ravee might excite. With the sanction of the Commissioner I withdrew the detachment of the Foot Levy from Manawala and posted them in the old fort of Shekhoopora, returning myself to Goojranwala ; a strong picket of Mounted Police was left at Manawala. Both these detachments were withdrawn to their ordinary duties when the Googaira district was tranquillized.

Measures taken by Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke on assuming charge of the Gujránwála District.

7. It cannot be supposed that such a tremendous crash as the mutinies have occasioned in the North-Western Provinces should be unfelt among our community, and manifestations of unrest more or less distinct were and are observable. The disarming law, the confiscation of rebels' houses in 1848-49 have doubtless been valuably operative in the maintenance of good order, and I am very much disposed to think that the liberality and consideration of Government in the assessment of the land revenue have been strongly felt and appreciated by the mass of the agriculturists. The sense of this consideration and liberality was present to them, for it was recent, that is within the last 10 years, and they remembered that change would probably bring back anarchy. In Tehseel Hafizabad, containing 1,441 square miles, where a large class of the inhabitants are wild and of plundering habits, the assessment has given almost entire satisfaction. I am not aware of the exhibition of any sympathy among these people with the disturbances on the Ravee, but I do not intend to say there was none. You are fully aware of the enormous fabrication of information and the currency of false reports in disturbed times. It was for instance reported that Mussoo, a very influential lumburdar of Sookhekee, who was imprisoned in 1856 for harbouring thieves and for various other malpractices, sent strict injunctions to all the Bhuttees not to take part with the Khurruls as they valued his safety, and that, but for this, there would probably have been some outbreak in the wilds between Pindee Bhutteean and Shekhoopora.

Attitude of the people.

8. The native gentry of the district behaved in all respects as becomes good subjects, and perhaps Captain Cripps might think some of them specially deserving of mention should you think the occasion suitable.

ENCLOSURE TO 37.

38. *Memo. of proceedings at Goojranwala during the disturbed period of 1857 by Captain C. M. CRIPPS, Offg. Deputy Commissioner.*

Narrative of events in the Gujránwála District.

THE news of the massacres at Meerutt and Delhi reached Goojranwala by express from Lahore at noon of the 13th May and was forwarded at once to Brigadier Brind at Sealkote.

Removal from Gujránwála of party of 46th Native Infantry.

2. As recommeded in demi-official letter from Mr. Montgomery, I determined to get rid of the Treasury guard composed of a Native Officer's party of 40 men from the 46th Native Infantry. The Jemadar was therefore directed to return to head-quarters at Sealkote, and by the evening of the 13th the guard had quitted Goojranwala.

Measures for protection of treasury, &c.

3. For the protection of the treasury, jail, and establishments there then remained only 6 sowars of the mounted police under an old worn out Ressaldar and about 35 men of Lawrence's police at the jail under a Native Officer. Some of the latter were placed over the treasure and their places taken by burkundazes from the kotwalee; the treasure, about 2 lacs, was also brought to my house.

Precautions against mutineers from Lahore and Siálkot.

4. The next day I heard from Lahore by express "that the disarmed regiments were plotting to break away, and would probably make for Goojranwala." The danger was also great from the Sealkote quarter, as I found from Brigadier Brind's communications that he had full and entire confidence in the loyalty of the three native regiments under his command, and had been much annoyed by my mistrusting the sepoys. It therefore became necessary to take precautionary measures against a surprise by mutineers, Sealkote being distant only one forced march and the treasure offering great temptation.

The treasury building unfortunately was insecure, being completely commanded by the kutcherry and having no well inside.

The money was consequently removed to the Baradaree in the Sumadh Garden, a walled enclosure adjoining the city ; loop-holed parapets of unburnt bricks were quickly built on the walls and platforms erected inside for the men to stand and fire from; the old buildings to the rear were also levelled.

Simultaneously with these arrangements a large proportion of the police from all the thanas and chokees were called into the suddur, as were also the mounted Police to the number of about 40, with the exception of those on the Grand Trunk Road. All the vacancies thus caused were filled by new men armed with the chokidar's swords, and with the matchlocks formerly served out to Shikarries for the destruction of wolves. There was also a goodly store of confiscated arms in the Malkhana. In a few days I had collected about 200 Policemen, who were taught to move in divisions under Jemadars newly appointed from the oldest and most experienced hands. A great quantity of ammunition was also prepared and supplies laid in the garden, where all the Police were located.

5. A Jemadar and 15 footmen with a few horsemen were deputed to patrol the line of road from Shekhoopoora to Pindee Bhutteean, and to keep a sharp watch on the border villages of the Bar. *Patrolling of roads.*

The ferries were also closed, with the exception of Wuzeerabad, Ramnuggur, Mahmoodpore and Choochak. Guards of 20 men with officers were located to protect the two former and a Jemadar and 8 men at each of the latter, the boats being always moored at night on the left bank. *Closing of ferries.*

6. Some of the most influential Sirdars of the district were called into the Suddur with a view to assist in raising some levies which the Judicial Commissioner thought would soon be required. *Summoning of influential Sardars to head-quarters.*

Removal of treasure to Lahore.

7. As soon as the alarm of an outbreak at Lahore had subsided the treasure guarded by some Mounted Police was run into Lahore in one night laden on tumbrils, for which relays of bullocks had been provided.

Measures for inspiring confidence among the people.

8. All this time the wildest rumours were rife amongst the people, some to the effect that Peshawur had been evacuated, others that Govindgurh had fallen into the hands of mutineers and the wealthy were moreover burying their treasure and valuables. Everything was done to inspire confidence, and kutcherry work carried on as usual. The precautionary measures taken in collecting the police instead of causing alarm greatly encouraged the loyally disposed, and I was fully aware that timely preparation in such cases may often avert disasters. Goojranwala from its position was particularly open to surprise by the mutinous troops who might have broken away from Sealkote quite as easily as from Jullundhur or Dinapoor.

Raising of levies.

9. In a few days orders came from the Chief Commissioner authorizing me to enlist burkundazes at discretion and to organize a levy of 200 men with a due proportion of Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers.

With the aid of a number of transfers from the police force and a few of Lawrence's Police to assist in drilling the squads, a very efficient body of men of the required strength was organized, no time being lost in teaching them the most essential movements coupled with the use of the musket and target practice. Their number was subsequenly raised to 400 men, and Captain Le Gallais, of the late 46th Native Infantry, appointed to do duty.

Operations against Jhelum mutineers.

10. When the Jhelum mutiny occurred I hastened to Wuzeerabad with 100 men to guard the ferry and had all the boats moored at the island in the centre of the River Chenab. Shortly after my arrival an urgent call for aid came from the Deputy Commissioner of Goojrat, as from the unsatisfactory state of affairs at Jhelum he expected that many of the mutineers would effect the passage of the Jhelum River and invade

his district. I therefore crossed the Chenab with my 100 men, mounted them on camels at Goojrat, and by morning arrived at the banks of the Jhelum River; but the mutinous troops who had so stoutly resisted the attacks of the 24th Queen's had evacuated their defences in the small village to the left of cantonments and made off to the territory of Cashmere. The levy was therefore brought back at once to Wuzeerabad, where I learnt that during my absence the 46th Native Infantry and wing of the 9th Cavalry having mutinied at Sealkote had marched in the direction of Goordaspore.

11. This outbreak did not at all disturb the quiet of the Goojranwala District, and I accompanied Captain Lawrence to Sealkote to assist in restoring order. **Deputation of Captain Cripps to Siálkot.**

12. On the occasion of the 26th mutiny, Mr. Blackall was deputed with a party of horsemen to look out for mutineers who might cross the Ravee at the higher ghats, but the regiment was destroyed on the left bank. **Measures for intercepting the mutineers of the 26th Native Infantry.**

13. Towards the close of September a report was sent in from Shekhoopoora of the attack on the police posts in the Bar of the Jhang district by the tribe of Khurruls. With 100 men of the levy I at once hurried off to Shekhoopoora, reaching it in one night. The headmen of all the border villages were summoned, and seeing no reason to apprehend an outbreak I proceeded on to Pindee Bhutteean, where all being quiet the levy was sent under Captain Le Gallais to assist the Deputy Commissioner of Jhang in restoring order in his district. **Assistance rendered by Captain Cripps in connection with the insurrection of the Karrals.**

A few horsemen were left to strengthen the thana of Pindee Bhutteean and to assist in patrolling the high roads. The Shekhoopoora Thana was also strengthened by a few hands, and the police of the smaller chokees were called into the 1st class chokees to guard against surprise.

14. During the entire disturbed period the revenue of the district was collected with ease, and the population seemed loyally disposed. Several wandering faqueers unable to give a good account of themselves were lodged in jail, and spies were **Attitude of the people.**

appointed to watch all suspected parties, who, I am happy to say, were few. When called upon the Mahajans gave their quota to the Government 6 per cent. loan without demur, the entire sum raised being 91,100 rupees.

Contributions to 6 per cent. loan.

Scrutiny of correspondence of natives.

15. From the first the daks were opened in my presence, and a large number of letters were opened and perused; though some contained suspicious matter, yet nothing tangible was discovered.

Deportation of Hindustanis.

16. All the Hindoostanee Policemen were dismissed and deported from the district, as were also a few of the umlah and police officers of the higher grades.

Services of Mr. Chalmers, Civil Engineer.

17. Mr. Wood, the Extra Assistant, was obliged to take leave of absence owing to repeated attacks of fever and ague, but Mr. Chalmers, the Civil Engineer, was luckily placed under my orders and greatly assisted in drilling the police and newly-appointed Levies.

CHAPTER IV.

REPORTS ON EVENTS IN THE JHELUM DIVISION.

39. *From* EDWARD THORNTON, *Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Jhelum Division, to* R. MONTGOMERY, *Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 80, dated Camp Goojerat, 23rd February 1858 (despatched Goojerat, the 6th March 1858).*

Narrative of events in the Jhelum Division.

BY your Circular No. 5, dated the 16th ultimo, I was directed to obtain from the district officers of this division a report of their operations with reference to the mutiny of the Bengal Army, and in forwarding these accounts to you I was to supply any omissions observable and to state the suggestions and orders I had myself issued during the course of this great event.

2. In compliance with the former portion of these instructions, I have now the honor to submit the reports of which a list is given in the margin.

From Captain Cracroft, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Rawulpindee, letter No. 47, dated the 29th instant, with enclosures.

From J. W. Macnabb, Esquire, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Jhelum, No. 113, dated the 1st instant, with enclosures.

From Captain McKenzie, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Goojerat, No. 83, dated the 28th ultimo, with enclosures.

From Gore Ouseley, Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Shahpoor, dated the 25th ultimo.

3. The following remarks from myself will, in conformity with your instructions above noticed, be merely supplementary to the district reports.

Detail of troops in the division.

4. This division comprises four districts with an area of 16,759 square miles and a population of about one million-and-three-quarters. Similar information for each district is given below, as also a detail of the troops which were cantoned in the division at the time the mutiny in the Bengal Army broke out :—

District.	Area in square miles.	Population.	Military force as it stood on the 12th May 1857.
Rawul Pindee.	5,994	553,750	*At Rawul Pindee.* Her Majesty's 24th Regiment. Major Cox's troop, Native Horse Artillery. 1 Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, 16th. 1 Regiment, Native Infantry, 58th. ½ Regiment, Native Infantry, Kumaon Battalion of Goorkhas. *At Attock.* 1 Company, Native Foot Artillery. 1 Company Sappers. Several companies of the 58th Native Infantry. *At Shumsabad.* 1 Regiment, Irregular Cavalry, 17th. *At Murree.* Convalescent Europeans, about 200. A wing of the Kumaon Battalion.
Jhelum .	4,459	375,743	1 Battery, Native Foot Artillery. 1 Regiment, Native Infantry, 39th. 1 Regiment, Native Infantry, 14th.
Goojerat .	1,915	517,626	½ Company of 35th Native Infantry.
Shahpoor .	4,391	315,369	1 Company of 46th Native Infantry.
TOTAL .	16,759	1,762,488	

5. The strength of this force is about the same as has been maintained in the division constantly from the time the country was first taken possession of by us in 1849.

6. It was on the 12th of May that the Chief Commissioner received by telegraph the intelligence of the mutiny at Merut and Delhi. He was then at Rawul Pindee, and he

remained there until the 15th of July. His presence was a great advantage to the division under my charge, as his advice or orders were always obtainable at a moment's notice.

Measures taken at Ráwalpindi on receipt of news of mutiny.

7. Under instructions from him the measures detailed by Captain Cracroft in his 19th paragraph, and which had for their object the prevention of treasonable communication among the native soldiery through the public post and the surveillance of the Native troops, were introduced at Rawul Pindee on the 12th, and orders to this effect were despatched to the other districts on the same day.

Changes made in location of Native troops.

8. Rapid changes were made in the location of the Native troops. Some of these movements had for their object the séparation of regiments that were at the time brigaded together, as this was likely to disconcert the schemes of the disaffected. The places to which these troops were removed are situated out of this division. The Kumaon Battalion, a loyal regiment, was sent away on service.

9. The effect of these measures was to diminish the force at Jhelum to one Native Infantry Regiment, the 14th, and also to reduce largely the Hindoostanee troops in the Rawul Pindee district.

Withdrawal of treasure to head-quarters.

10. On the 16th of May I wrote to Captain McKenzie directing him to apply to the Commanding Officer of the 35th Native Infantry for the recall of the half company to head-quarters, and also to forward his treasure into Sealkote at once in whatever manner might seem best. On the 17th similar instructions respecting the detachment of the 46th at Shahpoor were sent to Mr. Ouseley, but with permission to exercise his discretion should he not deem the immediate recall expedient. The course pursued in both these matters is detailed in the Deputy Commissioner's reports.

11. But the utmost success that the measures could under the circumstances be expected to produce was to render the Hindoostanee troops less capable of doing harm and to reduce their numerical superiority sufficiently to enable the one

regiment of Europeans, Her Majesty's 24th, to hold them in check.

12. Supposing this object to have been attained, it was nevertheless true that all the troops in the division had practically ceased to exist as regards the object of maintaining order in the country, because the Hindoostanee regiments were untrustworthy, and the most the limited number of Europeans could do would be to neutralise the power of the Hindoostanees to do harm.

Difficulty of task imposed on Civil Officers.

13. Thus the Civil authorities, in addition to the task noticed by Captain Cracroft,* that of guarding the passage of the Indus from an inroad by mutineers from the Peshawur Valley, had suddenly thrust upon them the following anxious duty. They had to try and preserve peace and order in a tract embracing nearly 17,000 square miles and among a population, as above said, of nearly *two millions*, without that military force heretofore at command and with the certainty that its practical non-existence would soon become known.

* *Vide* his report, paragraphs 26 and 27.

Utilization of services of Police.

14. Deprived of the troops, the only resource we possessed was the Police. There were the rural or ordinary Police distributed at various posts for the *prevention* and detection of crime, and secondly *the drilled Police, both* Infantry and Cavalry. The latter were of a good stamp, but very limited in amount. The Cavalry consisted of four ressallahs or troops, one for each district, each troop 100 strong; the latter consisted of one single Police Battalion 800 strong, its head-quarters being at Rawul Pindee.

15. But both Police Battalion and Police Cavalry are, under ordinary circumstances and according to rules, so largely distributed over the country that of the latter only about 30 or 35 horsemen are present at the district officer's station, the rest being dispersed at the tehseels and thanahs or patrolling roads. Of the Battalion about 100 men were usually in each of the districts of Jhelum, Goojerat and Shahpoor. These

were located in parties of 12 at each tehseel as the treasure guard and escort, and about 24 men had charge of each jail; so that in each of those three districts, after making deductions for sick and absentees, the portion of the 100 available at the district station for any emergency was very small; and, as in the Rawul Pindee district the jail is a larger one, requiring a guard of 50 men, and there are tehseel guards as in the other districts, the result is that not above 150 men of the Battalion are usually present fit for duty at its head-quarters.

16. Small as was the numerical strength of these drilled Police, their quality was good—quite as good as that of the Native Infantry of the line or of the Hindoostanee Irregular Cavalry in their most loyal days; so the first step towards supplying the want produced by the sudden defection of the regular army was to make the most of the Police Battalion and the Mounted Police.

17. As early as the 15th of May the wish of the Chief Commissioner on this subject was communicated by me to the district officers. The Battalion guards were called in from the tehseels and relieved from charge of the jail, their places being supplied by picked men from the rural police, who again were replaced by new servants temporarily entertained. So too the Mounted Police were similarly congregated at the district head-quarters and additional horsemen were hired in their place.

18. Hardly were these slight precautions adopted when the news of our danger began to be known among the people. The effect struck me as very peculiar. Great interest was exhibited, but there seemed less of the shock of surprise than I had expected to see. The explanation seemed to be that their eyes had witnessed political convulsions so frequently that they did not regard it as probable that the course of any Government would be equable and undisturbed. Attitude of the people.

19. A time of peril to the Government of the day was to them so common that they conveyed to each other the whole case by use of a single word. There was a "Roulah" or it

was a time of "shorish." Either of these terms sufficed to explain our state to a native of the division. All "Roulahs" did not according to their experience subvert the Government, nor, on the other hand, were all "Roulahs" successfully tided over by the Government. So a prudent man would be observant and profess loyalty until he saw his way clearly. The large majority were satisfied with our rule, and, unless convinced it was really about to close and that they must prepare to avoid offence to our probable successors, they would not voluntarily take an active part against us, and by judicious procedure on our part might be induced to give us their active support.

20. But there were classes by whom anarchy was desired, such for instance as dispossessed descendants of former petty Chiefs, men who had once been independent rulers of their little territory, but had subsequently passed into a state of feudal subordination to the late Government, and had ultimately perhaps by that Government been put aside altogether or depressed to a very inferior position, probably on account of continued resistance to a state of order and quiet. To these are to be added individuals who had advanced claims which our Government was obliged to disallow and who were therefore dissatisfied. Thus where between two factions there existed a feud that had long ago led to the loss of life on one side and this act had been followed by reciprocal murders through many years, the establishment of our rule having cut short the series of retaliations was felt as an injustice by the side that had last suffered and whose turn for satisfaction had arrived.

21. In some instances the strongest feeling in the breast of a man of influence was evidently to render himself more powerful or of more importance than some neighbour of whom he had a hereditary jealousy. If one of these men sided with the Government, it in itself rather inclined his opponent to disloyalty.

patrol-

Line of policy pursued.

22. The line of policy to pursue was to stim[illegible]ally in contented part of the population to active loyalty and to

conciliate as far as possible the better disposed portion of the other sections.

Advantages resulting from enlistment of new Punjab Corps.

23. The enlistment of new Punjab Corps was a measure of the first importance. It drew off a great number of the most active spirits and was a guarantee for the good conduct of the relatives these men left behind them. In the trans-Jhelum portion of Shahpoor and in the Jhelum district generally it was of the greatest use. But in the Rawul Pindee district, with exception to the south-eastern part, the people are unwilling to enlist for distant service.

24. They were anxious, however, to be entertained as extra police in their own district for short periods, and as this mode of employing them gave us the means of rewarding the well disposed and of inducing them to repress the remainder of the population, it was largely had recourse to, as is shewn by Captain Cracroft in the 29th and following paragraphs of his report.

25. Care was required to avoid creating mischievous jealousy in the process of raising these extra police. The little chief, who was called on for a contingent of a certain strength, would urge grounds for remonstrating at our allowing his neighbour to raise a larger one; these reasons had to be listened to notwithstanding the great sacrifice of time. Indeed, excessive accessibility to a degree that would be inconsistent with the discharge of my regular duties as a permament practice was an important feature in the proceedings at the time. All men of any note from position or character were on some pretext or another invited to come in from their residences for an interview and were encouraged to repeat their visit whenever they had anything to report or any question to ask.

Protection of communications.

26. On several parts of the high road to Peshawur where there was danger of robberies being committed by adjacent villages it was thought advisable to call on the head- [illegible] hese to nominate the extra police required for pattolling to them. A similar course was pursued for preventing the outrages on the road between Murree and Rawul Pindee.

Precautions at Murree.

27. Some 10 or 12 of the headmen from the principal villages in the mountains around Murree were summoned to attend on Lieutenant Battye, the Assistant Commissioner at the sanitarium, in reality as in some degree hostages, but under the plea of being at hand to communicate between him and their villages. To reconcile them to the detention a small pecuniary allowance was made them as if to meet the extra expense entailed by their absence from home. It was only Rs. 8 a month to each man, and could hardly have been fixed lower. Yet, small as it appears, it was highly valued, and ere long we were embarrassed at finding that the arrangement, which nevertheless we could not discontinue, was producing jealousy in other persons who considered they had an equal right to the honor and indulgence.

28. I now proceed to note down some of the significant occurrences of the time. I shall not confine myself merely to those events which indicated either a fear we should be unsuccessful in the struggle or a desire for us to fail, but shall also mention other matters that seem to merit remark.

Views of two influential natives as communicated to the Commissioner.

29. Within the few first days of our receiving the intelligence of the disastrous commencement of the mutinies, and as soon as it had become apparent that the struggle was with the whole Hindoostanee army, a native of the Punjab, who had enjoyed especial advantage for forming an opinion, and whose loyalty and intelligence is unquestionable, was speaking to me on the subject of the Mutiny, and he communicated to me in confidence his great distress at the calamity, as his belief was we could not succeed. He knew the numbers and characters of the Native Army and thought we had not the means to oppose it. This man was of great use throughout the contest on account of the valuable suggestions he frequently offered. I considered that, as he who cordially wished us success was thus diffident of our achieving it, it might fairly be taken as an indication that there were others of the same desponding views, and there was no reason to think these would be equally discreet. But indeed this man's own proceedings, though very

guarded, were such as tended unintentionally to reveal his apprehensions, for he removed his family to a place of special shelter, and his conduct as respected several parties who were likely to take the lead at a season of disorganization seemed to be regulated by a wish to establish claims to their consideration in the time of need.

30. Another person inferior to the former as to ability and the means of forming an opinion on the subject, but still an individual of observation and intelligence, confessed to me similar apprehensions of our failure, and urged the propriety of condoning the offence of the mutineers as the only expedient. He proposed to let off the whole of the mutineers in Delhi with a fine of ten rupees all round. This he said was to save us for the moment, but he added that when again powerful we could inflict a severe punishment at our leisure!

Groundless excitement of the Dhund clan around Murree.

31. *About the end of May* Dewan Jowalla Suhai was on his way from Cashmeer to visit the Chief Commissioner at Rawul Pindee. The Dhoond clan around Murree seized an idea that their mountains had been transferred to the charge of Maharajah Goolab Sing. They exhibited considerable excitement on this subject, and are reported to have watched their ferries to prevent the passage of the Dewan. He certainly went round instead of traversing those mountains. It so happened that some of the chief men of the Dhoonds, after expressing their anxiety to Lieutenant Battye, had come down to Rawul Pindee to me, and they arrived the very day the Dewan was expected at that station. I knew he would have but a few followers, so I requested these mountaineers to go forward and meet him and inspect his army. They were exposed to ridicule on his appearing with a very limited suite, and they returned homewards admitting their mistake.

Uneasiness of inhabitants of Shahpur Bár jungle.

32. The men of the Shahpoor Bar jungle about this time gave some indications of uneasiness. They are habitual cattle-stealers, and the inmates of the Shahpoor Jail are chiefly Bar men. A desire to release their friends was thought by Mr. Ouseley to be their actuating motive, but he reported

that there was also in some places a degree of dissatisfaction regarding certain waste tracts. We applied a remedy as respects the latter annoyance, and a judicious arrest was successful in checking the symptoms of disaffection.

Forest fires near Murree.

33. In the mountains about Murree the orders of Government forbidding the firing of the mountain sides and the consequent destruction of trees had always been a grievance. A time of "Roulah" having arrived, the people judged they need not heed the rule, and consequently the mountains were in a blaze until the rainy season came on and put an end to the conflagration.

34. Lieutenant Battye applied to me for instructions. The Chief Commissioner had agreed the preceding year that the open bare tracts might be fired, though the villagers were to see that the burning was not to take place where there is much wood.

35. I replied to Lieutenant Battye that the best course was to affect to believe that the conflagrations were in uniformity with the foregoing rule, but should there occur cases of destruction of wood, of which he could not appear ignorant, he had better do no more than send for the headmen and remind them of the rules and enjoin carefulness; that I would not fine for such an occurrence just then, as it was a matter in which we had all the mountain population unanimous against us. Also the rains would soon arrive and extinguish the fires.

36. I mention this affair because it was indicative of a disturbed state of mind in the people. At any other time they would not have redressed themselves in such a manner.

Collection of revenue from certain recusant villages below Pind Dádan Khan.

37. About the 4th of June Major Browne reported that certain villages below Pind Dadun Khan and situated on the right bank of the Jhelum between Uhmedabad and Khutta were talking of withholding the revenue then due and which was in general being realized with rapidity and ease, the harvest having been good. The Tehseeldar was immediately strengthened, his horsemen being raised to about 30, and the

revenue of the leading village was realized. The recusant villages were on the confines of the two districts of Jhelum and Shahpoor. Mr. Ouseley established a new police post in the neighbourhood, and his attention and that of Major Browne being directed to the subject, the attempt was defeated at once. It happened too most opportunely that Captain Wilde's corps of Punjab Infantry having started from the Derajat for Lahore and having on reaching Shahpoor been countermanded to Peshawur, traversed this unfrequented tract just at that moment. The people probably connected his arrival with the injunctions of the district officers for prompt payment of the revenue.

38. Apprehensive lest the idea of withholding the revenue should spread from the locality above-named to Sone and Kubbukkee on the Salt Range, I established on the 8th of June a direct postal communication from Rawul Pindee through Tullagung to Shahpoor. This enabled Mr. Ouseley and myself to communicate rapidly and put the two Tehseeldars of Tullagung and Jaba in close communication with us both. The country thus opened was one about which I had been feeling some anxiety.

Establishment of direct communication between Ráwalpindi and Shahpur.

39. On the 11th of June Lieutenant Battye wrote to me as follows:—"Some few men of Kakira Kuhuttee, a small village on the Jhelum, forgot themselves the other day, and giving credence to some rumours that our Raj was up and that there was plunder to be had at Murree were on their way here (to Murree) armed, but were met in Sehunna and remonstrated with, and it was pointed out to them that the Beerote, Potah and other Mullucks were not stirring and they were eventually persuaded to return home." This village is a jagheer of Fukeer Khan and Mahomed Khan, the heads of Potah, a large village some eight miles or so from Murree. Kakira Kuhuttee is further off and in a remote situation on the margin of the Jhelum, whose bed there runs along the bottom of a huge chasm. The move was precipitate and was made in ignorance of the stage to which the general mind of the mountaineers had then arrived. Whether it was

Misconduct of villagers of Kakira Kohatti on the Jhelum.

originated by the Kakira Kuhuttee men or by Fukeer Khan and Mahomed Khan was then not known, but the former conclusion seemed most probable, whereas I now suspect the opposite one to be the truth. The two heads of Potah were called into Murree and added to the list of pensioned hostages, and after application to the Chief Commissioner I directed Lieutenant Battye to send me the headman of Kakira. Lieutenant Battye, however, found a difficulty in carrying out this order, and ultimataly the man's attendance did not take place. The presence of the Potah Mullucks was the best guarantee we could at the time obtain that the act should not recur, and Lieutenant Battye's proceedings showed, though he did not state so in words, that it was not expedient to push the enquiry further at the time.

Misconduct of a resident of Hurniawala in the Ráwalpindi District.

40. On the 12th of June Captain Cracroft sent me a report from Chowdree Shere Khan of Chukree in the Rawul Pindee district that Uksur of Hurniawala, a large village in that district, had given out that he should pay no more revenue, as we were in a very bad way. I directed the Deputy Commissioner to proceed against the man, but the measures taken have not been communicated to me.

Search for arms in Murree Bazar.

41. On the 27th of June the bazar at Murree was searched for arms under instructions from the Chief Commissioner, but none were forthcoming.

Disarming of Native troops at Ráwalpindi and Jhelum.

42. The disarming of the Native troops at Rawul Pindee and Jhelum, as narrated by Captain Cracroft in his 48th and following paragraphs, took place on the 7th of July. A small number of the men of the Native Infantry at Rawul Pindee escaped from the Cantonment during the operation and took their way across the broken country leading to the mountains. Futteh Khan of Gheb, Muluk Feroze, and several other natives of consideration in the Rawul Pindee district were with me on horseback in the Cantonment when this fact transpired. I dispersed them in different directions after the fugitives. Most of the latter were taken in the course of the day and brought in alive, but a body of seven, who kept together and were from time to time sighted during their

progress, were at last brought to bay by their pursuers at a singular spot, a rocky cavern in which the ravine they had been threading terminated. They were there slaughtered after a desperate resistance. This event was remarkable as the first in which the people of the Division had shed the blood of the mutineers on our side.

Beneficial effect of disarming of Native troops.

43. The disarming of these troops was, as Captain Cracroft observes, an era in the history of the Mutiny as respects Rawul Pindee and, I may add, as respects the adjoining district of Jhelum. When it had been effected, I observed that many of the people took a more hopeful view of our case than theretofore. They seemed to have judged a good deal by what they saw, and while corps of that Native Army which was avowedly in mutiny retained arms and guarded our treasuries, the people doubted our power to disarm and defeat our enemy. When we showed our superiority on the spot they probably did not merely raise their estimate of our local strength, but gave us credit for being able to act in a similarly vigorous manner everywhere.

Attitude of certain tribes in the Ráwalpindi District.

44. But even the best affected still viewed it as a time of "Roulah." There was a mustering of strength among the tribes in the Rawul Pindee district, evidently with a view to the possibly approaching moment for self-defence. I give an instance of this. The chief family in lower Pindee Gheb, a part of the Rawul Pindee district, is represented at present by Muluk Olea, a youth who is just entering upon manhood. His younger brother Futteh Khan is still a boy and is constantly falling out with his brother. Futteh Khan of Kote, the man of most marked character of any in the district, and whose influence extends over the largest area, attached Muluk Olea to himself. Chowdree Shera of Chukree with the population of the valley of the Sowan confederated with Boodha Khan of Mulal. But though thus rendered about a match for Futteh Khan of Kote if the latter had been alone, they regarded with anxiety his annexation to himself of the influence possessed by Muluk Olea. They therefore espoused the younger brother Futteh Khan's quarrel with Muluk Olea,

exaggerated his claims and succeeded in persuading some of the villages in the tolooka subordinate to the two brothers to muster themselves under the younger one. Their object evidently was to strengthen themselves aganist Futteh Khan of Kote, their hereditary antagonist. Chowdree Shera is a well-intentioned person, but he seemed to have great difficulty in perceiving that his object did not justify his causing a permament estrangement between the two brothers.

45. Yet, while condemning him, I must admit that we ourselves pursued to the limit of what was permissible a course analogous to his. The numerous factions into which the population is divided forms a remarkable feature in the upper part of the Sind Sagur Doab. Heretofore our endeavour had been to soothe and obliterate if possible the feelings that kept up these divisions. Now, however, the want of unanimity in the people was an advantage we could not forego, and one faction was to a certain degree played off against another.

46. I should note that these factions do not seem to exist in the population of the Shahpoor Jungle or Bar. They would probably combine without difficulty whenever they rose, but again their character and position make them less dangerous than the people of Rawul Pindee. Their first object, being habitual cattle-lifters, would probably be to break the Shahpoor Jail and release their relations who are incarcerated there for this crime. With their level country, and at a distance from the frontier, they would speedily be reduced to submission on the arrival of a military force.

Proceedings of Chief of Makhad.

47. One sign of the times was afforded by Gholam Mahomed Khan, the Chieftain of Mukkud. He resides at Mukkud itself, which is a town situated on a high point of land at the very junction of the Sowan and Indus 80 miles from Rawul Pindee. He reported that the town wall was out of repair and offered to mend it. To acquiesce would have been to give him a fortified town in a very inaccessible position. Still it was undesirable to disoblige him by a direct refusal or to show suspicion. I applied for a plan of the spot, and the Deputy Commissioner happened to reject the first plan

as incomplete and demand an improved one. While this went on our emergency passed away, and with it probably Gholam Mahomed's idea that he must prepare himself for troublous times, as the proposal has now been negatived without remonstrance.

Plot to murder the Tehseeldar of Chakwal in the Jhelum District.

48. About the 1st of July a Hindoostanee Jemadar of tehseel Chukkowal in the Jhelum District was detected by the Tehseeldar in plotting to murder the latter and commence a diversion in favor of the King of Delhi, whom he spoke of as having conquered India. The Jemadar was arrested and convicted.

Change in feeling of the lower classes towards the leading tribes of the district.

49. A very remarkable feature in the tone of feeling among the people during this period of excitement was the very different estimate in which they then held the more active and less peaceful classes to what they profess in quiet times. In 1856, for instance, when in course of the investigation into proprietary rights which was being carried on by the officer engaged in the re-assessment of the Government revenue, a Golera or a Ghukkur asserted a hereditary right to the villages of Golera or of Phurwalla, the cultivating occupants of the land would stoutly deny it. But now it became evident from the demeanour of these villagers themselves that were our rule to cease, and to be succeeded by a period of disturbance, these very men would at once admit the right of the Golera or the Ghukkur and place themselves under his authority though he had in truth no means of enforcing it except their pusillanimity and his strength of character.

50. The Khutree or mercantile class began to treat these tribes with marked consideration, and one Tehseeldar, who was of a mercantile family and whose wealth lay in camels and buildings, was currently reported to be doing them kindnesses on the expressed expectation that they would spare him when their day came.

51. I understand from Captain McKenzie that the population on the frontier of the Goojerat district, since the

occurrence of the raids by the Chibs of Deva and Buttala in the Jummo Territory, have re-commenced to make payments to the latter, though it is not clear whether these are regarded as blackmail or as acknowledgment of seigneurial rights.

Applications for pardon of offenders.

52. It seems to have been the fashion under the former dynasty to condone the crimes of offenders still at large during times of disturbance. The expectation that this would be done by us arose in the minds of the people of the Rawal Pindee district when they saw it was a time of "Roula." Overtures were made through Major Becher for the pardon of some 8 or 10 men who on one night committed five atrocious murders at Jundeal in the Pindee Gheb tehseel. These men have for years been hard pressed by our Police; they have moved from the Afreedees to Swat, from Swat to Sitana, and are in discomfort and difficulty, receiving a severe punishment, though not in the shape in which it would be most desirable to inflict it. *Their application was rejected.*

53. In July the headmen of the Dhoonds petitioned Lieutenant Battye for the pardon of some men under sentence of imprisonment passed by him in the preceding April. The offence was an affray. It was not a serious case, and at his request I remitted the sentence.

Voluntary surrender of certain offenders.

54. About this time a Ghukkur, a connection of the Raja of Mandla and concerned in Nadir Khan's affair of 1853, ventured within our territory and may be said to have surrended himself to us. He was detained until the fall of Delhi, and shortly afterwards was released on payment of a fine.

55. Several other men came in and gave themselves up, learning that I considered their cases were such as could be treated leniently.

56. Criminals of a worse stamp in some instances returned to their haunts under the knowledge that at such a time no one would touch them. Thus a noted murderer of the Golera class ventured back from Sitana. The country was difficult. Our Police, as also those of Hazara, failed to

catch him, and when I expressed my surprise that the neighbourhood did not assist us, I was told by the person of whom I enquired that they would not dare to make his class their enemies at such a time.

57. A peculiarity in our well-wishers may here be mentioned as it is somewhat amusing. Whatever good things we might have in store for them in future, they deemed themselves entitled to take titular rewards at once without asking leave. Thus Sirdar Nihal Sing's son, Umreek Sing, became Sirdar Umreek Sing; Nund Sing became Sirdar Nund Sing; and Futteh Khan of Gheb was sometimes exalted to Nawab Futteh Khan.

Unauthorised assumption of titles.

58. As almost a general rule, men who had been against us in the war of 1848-49, and who had lost wealth and rank in consequence, behaved especially loyally on this occasion. The Chowdrees of Dhunnee, who were ruined for their treatment of Mrs. George Lawrence, voluntarily undertook the duty of escorting treasure from Chukkowal to Rawul Pindee. There was on some occasions of this kind a manner about the persons indicative of a knowledge on their part that the time was one in which had they chosen they might without danger have taken the opposite line.

Loyalty of those who suffered in 1848-49.

59. I had in my office, as head of the Criminal Department, a native of Hindoostan, a man of intelligence. When two or three months had passed without his giving me any intelligence I charged him one day with disaffection on this ground; for, as I observed to him, he had special advantages for discovering the messengers from Hindoostan who were undoubtedly passing up to Peshawur or Sitana.

Unfounded story regarding disloyalty of Police Battalion.

60. The next day he said he had something to tell me, and informed me that the Police Battalion was unsound. Whether he knew that this would be a most serious blow to us I could not discover, but his manner did not reveal that he was aware of it. His informant, he said, was a Sikh of the Battalion, a man who had a case in appeal before me. The man had told him that Shere Sing had escaped from Calcutta,

was in Delhi, and had sent word that the English were to be allowed a retreat *viâ* Mooltan and Bombay, but were to be expelled; that the Police Battalion would not oppose Shere Sing; that we were no longer a Government, for there remained to us neither army nor money.

61. I saw the Sikh, and he certainly corroborated the report of the Sherishtedar, but he said he had only spoken what had been told him by a person he had met, and he asserted he could not point out the individual. He evidently concealed much he knew, and he was undoubtedly untrustworthy. Moreover, I found he was a native of a village in Rawul Pindee, situated near to Boota, the country residence of Shere Sing and his father Chutter Sing. I immediately communicated with Captain Miller, the Commanding Officer of the Battalion, and from the Native Commandant, an old Sikh, whom we consulted, we learnt that the Battalion was most contented and happy, as indeed it ought to have been, as the four augmentation companies just allowed had given promotion and allowed the men to bring many of their near relatives into service.

62. That night I happened to observe the sentry in my verandah. It was the very individual of whose disloyalty I had been receiving proof. A sudden shower came on in the night. The man left his duty in the verandah and went to fetch his great coat from a tent a few yards off. He was discovered and put under arrest. I did not know this at the time, but on entering the jail next day I found him a prisoner in irons, and on enquiry learnt of his breach of duty and that he had been sentenced to eight days' imprisonment *in irons*. This involved dismissal, and the Battalion was thus quietly relieved of his presence.

Dissemination of mischievous reports.

63. This took place about the beginning of August, and just at the same time the report regarding Shere Sing was spread over the whole of the division. Major Browne wrote to me from Jhelum that he was told it had issued from Boota, which statement agreed with the suspicions excited in my mind by the Sikh sepoy being a resident of that neighbourhood. The exact uniformity of the reports at places separated a

hundred miles and more showed they were disseminated by means of written papers, and not orally. At the end of August Captain Eliott discovered one of these papers at Sealkote.

64. It was, I think, about the month of August that a murder alluded to in my criminal report for the year took place in the Jhelum district under circumstances which showed that the perpetrators considered the time to be one in which they could commit the crime with comparative safety. Their victim was a lumberdar, and the offence for which they killed him had been given in a matter connected with their village affairs five years previously.

Murder of a lambardar in the Jhelum District.

65. In the course of the month of July the head Doonds and Suttees who were assembled at Murree expostulated with Lieutenant Battye on the subject of Missionary preaching in the bazaar, where they were then residing. The Missionary was the Revd. Mr. Morrison of the American Mission. They said that he told them their religion was false and their Prophet false; that they did not understand why he should take the trouble to come and speak against their religion, as they never spoke against his. At length after some conversation they settled the matter by saying that after all they need not listen to him and he might mean well.

Complaint of Dhunds and Sattis against a Missionary at Murree.

66. On the 18th of July a report reached me through a private letter that a lady at Murree had been accosted by a sweeper, who, seeing her playing with her child, told her she would not laugh long for all the Europeans at Murree would be murdered in four or five days. At my request Lieutenant Battye saw the lady. The story was true, but he failed to find the man.

Warning of rising given to a lady at Murree.

67. About the 7th of August Lieutenant Battye informed me that 8 or 10 days previously some villages, the names of which are entered in the margin, had, he understood, been forming a treasonable confederacy or "dua khyr"; that the originators were Jafoo of the first-named village and Roosmut of Rewat;

Moosiaree.
Rewat.
Khaya.
Saeen.
Guhra.
Hookra Kher.
Samlee Byromal.

Treasonable confederacy formed by certain villages.

and that the real motive of these two men was annoyance at their not having been included in the list of influential individuals who were retained in attendance at Murree. He had judged it best to disconcert the scheme by summoning Jafoo and Roosmut and giving them the position they aspired to. My reply on the 8th of August was to the effect that he had done right, as the best course open to us at the moment was to temporise. Time was everything. The corps that were newly raising at Rawul Pindee under Captain Doran consisted as yet of recruits, and nearly all available men of Captain Miller's Police Battalion had been despatched to Jhelum on duty, leaving only recruits. Every week gained rendered these levies more efficient.

68. About this time Mr. Ouseley reported to me the case alluded to by him of the Mohurrir at Kutha, and on the 10th of August I informed him of the amount of punishment that appeared to me suitable.

Treasonable conduct of certain head-men near Murree.

69. On the 11th of August Lieutenant Battye wrote to say he could give proof of treason against a headman by name Aloo of Hookrah and Kher, hamlets in Beergraon. The evidence would show that he, who was himself a Dhoond, had gone over to Charrihan, the principal village of the small tribe of Ketwal, and had proposed to them to join a confederacy for rising on the first favorable opportunity. This led to enquiries for further information from me on the 12th, and in reply Lieutenant Battye wrote on the 15th giving this information and adding that he believed the villages above named, including Beergraon and also Nummul, had performed "dua khyr" first at Hookra on occasion of a funeral and subsequently at Moosiaree. The act of the Nummul men was in Lieutenant Battye's opinion the more culpable from the circumstance of their having just received what to them was a large sum, 600 rupees in cash, from Government for a very disproportionate loss which they had suffered. A hint had been thrown out that Aloo too should be summoned and added to the list of influential men who were receiving a stipend for their presence with the Assistant Commissioner.

70. The case was embarrassing. An open trial of Aloo would convict not only him but the men of eight villages. We must then either take more extensive measures than were convenient if practicable or let men go unpunished who were aware we had obtained proof against them. The only force at Murree besides the convalescent Europeans was the detachment of the 2nd Hill Regiment under Lieutenant Bracken. It numbered only 180 men. Such portion of the men of Captain Doran's new corps, or of the new levies in the Police Battalion as were serviceable, were required at Rawul Pindee for a movable column to pursue the disarmed Hindoostanees should they break away. The course I ultimately adopted was to direct Lieutenant Battye to send Aloo down to me at Rawul Pindee, merely saying I wanted him and giving no reasons. On the man's arrival he was transferred to the jail until a more convenient season for his trial. He did not reach me, however, until the 23rd of August.

Affray in village near Murree.

71. Intermediately, on the 16th of August, an affray had occurred in the village of Pitlee, which is situated in the mountains about six miles from Murree, on the road to Rawul Pindee. Several men were severely wounded; and the trial which took place about the close of the month showed that the aggressors in the case had deliberately and openly disregarded our rule that no man was to take the law into his own hands.

Proposed increase to detachment of Native Corps at Murree.

72. On the 16th I received from Brigadier Campbell a request that I would give my opinion on a question proposed to him by General Cotton, whether an increase should be made to the detachment of Native troops at Murree. He forwarded for my perusal a letter of the 15th from Captain Berry, the Commanding Officer at the Murree Depôt.

73. Captain Berry had consulted with Lieutenant Battye, and he reported that no addition was at that time needed. He had himself, he said, been closely observing the demeanour of the mountaineers during the past three months, especially towards Europeans, and that they never showed by word or deed any knowledge of the critical state of the country, but appeared

entirely engrossed in selling to the best advantage the produce of their dairies and farm yards.

74. My reply, written on the 17th, was that the problem at the time appears to be not what amount of troops would fully meet the possible wants of any single locality, but how to distribute the military resources of the province, reduced as these were and must for a short time remain, so as best to preserve peace and order everywhere.

75. I added that on this view I refrained from advocating an increase to the detachment of the Native corps then at Murree.

Reports of disaffection among the Dhunds and cause.

76. On the 20th of August I received from Raja Ali Ghor, a Ghukkur Chief of Huzara, an intimation that he had heard of a "dua khyr" among the Dhoonds of Dunnah and Dewul; that he had it on the authority of a person whom he did not name, and that he had sent to learn particulars. I sent this intelligence to Lieutenant Battye, who replied on the 21st that the confederacy must be that he had told me of (*vide* paragraphs 67 and 69), and that all was then going on quietly except that the allowance given to the head villagers in attendance at Murree was giving dissatisfaction to others who thought they had an equal right to be summoned and paid.

77. That the payment and the selection were not satisfactory to the mountaineers generally was shown not only by the proceedings which resulted in the addition of Jafoo and Roosmut to the list and in Aloo's unsuccessful endeavour to come upon it, but was reported to me by Zubberdust Khan, the head of the Suttees, a tribe which, as will be seen by reference to Captain Robinson's map of Huzara, lies next the Doonds and on the south-east of them.

78. At my request Zubberdust Khan came down to speak with me, and he then repeated his objection to the system of payment, but he had no other plan to offer, and he left me promising to keep me aware of any evil design that he might become acquainted with. He said he did not think any serious act would occur, as there was tranquillity in Peshawur and the Derajat and Huzara.

79. On the 24th August Captain Cracroft sent me a report from the Tehseeldar of Rawul Pindee that two persons had appeared at the thanah of Chountra and accused Chowdree Shere Khan of entertaining 16 armed followers secretly and keeping them at his house as a garrison, these being in addition to the followers he had been allowed to arm and make over to the Deputy Commissioner as extra police. In sending me this report Captain Cracroft alluded to a probability that some attitude had been assumed by Futteh Khan of Kote and others (see above, paragraph 44) which might have led to such conduct in Chowdree Shere Khan. I narrate this because it shows how little confidence we could place in our most trusty men, for Chowdree Shere Khan and Futteh Khan were of that number. **Accusation of disloyalty against Chaudhri Sher Khan.**

80. On the 2nd of September Nund Sing, a respectable resident of Rawul Pindee, came to tell me a story he had heard from a friend of his, Mohur Sing, a Khuttree of Nuggree, a Dhoond village of Huzara, bordering on the Kurral tribe, which is also in that district. The story was that the men of Bhagun and Mukole, which are Kurral villages, had formed a compact ("dua khyr") with Nuggree some 10 days previously to make an attack on Murree; that a day or two had passed since the men of the two first-named villages had called on Nuggree to rise, but the Nuggree men replied they must wait the return of an emissary they had sent to Jhelum, who would be back in a week or so. **Threatened attack on Murree.**

81. Bhagun and Mukole are situated near the summit of Mochparree, a lofty mountain of some 10,000 feet, from which the ridge of the chain slopes down towards Murree.

82. The distance from these villages to Murree may not exceed 12 or 14 miles by map, but it would from the nature of the country be a very stiff day's march even for an active mountaineer.

83. The country occupied by the Kurrals is more elevated and further removed from the plains than that of the Dhoonds. Besides, the sanitarium of Murree and the road to

it have to a great degree diminished the natural inaccessibility of the latter, whereas no road exists for reaching the higher villages of the Kurrals.

84. It was therefore with much dissatisfaction that I received the intelligence brought by Nund Sing.

85. A statement of this report was the same day despatched both to Lieutenant Battye and to Major Becher.

86. A few hours afterwards, about 5 P. M., on the 2nd September arrived a messenger with a letter from Lieutenant Battye written that morning. It referred to two private letters said to have been despatched at an earlier hour by a separate hand and which reached me shortly afterwards. Lieutenant Battye stated that at 7 o'clock the preceding evening he had been told by Hakim Khan, of whom I must give an account presently, that the villagers intended to come and plunder the place that night or the one after; that Lieutenant Battye *immediately informed Captain* Berry and Lieutenant Bracken, and they planted picquets all around the station. About 2 A.M. he heard firing in the direction of Captain Robinson's house, and on going down found some men in Mr. Horst's house, below Captain Robinson's and in the lower part of Captain Robinson's grounds; they could see but very few people, but there was a great deal of firing; the assailants then ran away; that one man was shot, but his body had not as yet been recognized. *Lieutenant Battye* added he could form no correct idea of the extent of the mischief, but he was inclined to think it was quite suddenly got up and was joined in by a very few villages. His suspicions were directed against Mullote, Sindhyan, Rewat, Hookra Kher and a few others. He did not think it would spread. He had summoned the religious superiors of the Dhoonds, the Peers of Pulassee in Huzara, and he had sent for men of the Suttee tribe to aid him.

Action taken by Lieutenant Battye and Military authorities.

Dispersion of assailants.

87. The two private letters differed from Lieutenant Battye's in alluding to the insurgents being still visible on the morning of the 2nd at the time of writing, a circumstance not noticed by him.

88. It was of course necessary to reinforce Murree instantly, but it was difficult to see whence the aid should come. I have already alluded (paragraph 70) to the want of reliable Native troops at Rawul Pindee. There were evidently none to spare at Peshawur and there were none that could be safely sent away from Hurreepore or Abbottabad. **Measures for reinforcing Murree.**

89. I determined to ask Brigadier Campbell for about 100 men, the utmost I felt he could spare, and I requested Captain Cracroft to collect as many police as he could safely send away and allow a very excellent official, Umeen Chund, the Tehseeldar of Rawul Pindee, to accompany them to Murre.

90. Captain Cracroft was also requested to send with Umeen Chund certain men whom we both of us agreed in considering useful and loyal, and these were to bring their own retainers. It seemed that the men last alluded to, though undisciplined, would probably be able to take many duties that would otherwise have to be performed by sepoys or burkundazes and would thus tend to increase the efficiency of the force. I also suggested that supplies of food should at once be purchased and sent up under this or some other adequate escort, as there was no doubt the flow of trade from the surrounding country into the bazaar at Murree would be interrupted or cease, and upon it the sanitarium was entirely dependent.

91. These instructions were promtly carried out by Captain Cracroft; and Umeen Chund with some 200 men was off by midnight.

92. After making the foregoing arrangements with the Deputy Commissioner I went to the Brigadier, and in conference with Captains Miller and Doran we decided that 50 men of the new corps under Captain Irvine, Second-in-Command, and 60 of the Police Battalion under Lieutenant Powlett should be sent up and should commence their march in the night.

93. I then sent off intelligence by telegraph to the Chief Commissioner and to the General and an express to Major

Becher, and, feeling I could overtake the party, deferred my own departure, hoping to receive the Chief Commissioner's orders by the morning.

94. On going, however, to the telegraph office in the morning I learnt that my message to the Chief Commissioner was then being despatched, the state of the atmosphere, or some other similar reason, being alleged for the non-transmission of the message during the night.

Departure of Mr. Thornton for Murree with reinforcements.

95. I overtook the reinforcements at Trete, where the ascent of the mountain commences. The small police station at that place consisted of Dhoond burkundazes under a jemadar, who though a Syud was a native of that locality. This post had also been strengthened by temporary extra police, men taken from the adjoining villages of Nundkote and Salgraon.

Changing of guard at Tret.

96. The time had passed at which this arrangement was suitable, and I thought the best plan for defeating any scheme for stopping the road was to remove all the old hands, both the permanent Police and the extra men; so I told these I required their services at Murree, and I supplied their place from a party of Cantonment burkundazes Captain Bean, the Cantonment Joint Magistrate of Rawul Pindee, had during the night kindly made over to me.

Assistance rendered by Muddut and Mutwullee of Nand Kot.

97. On passing the Salgraon bridge before reaching Trete I had picked up another detail of extra Police under a person named Muddut, a remarkable character, a man on whom I felt I could rely for assistance in an emergency. His son and brother had taken life in a blood feud shortly before our rule and had fled to Cashmere for fear of retaliation. I had seen grounds for permitting their return, and subsequently when this man Muddut had been shot through the body by a person who fired through the doorway of the house one dark night, I had adopted a course which gave satisfaction to him.

98. In return he had rendered me good service in 1853 in Nadir Khan's case, and on this occasion he was standing on the bridge ready to accompany me.

99. I learnt from him on a later day that, simultaneously with the rise at Murree, Mutwullee of Nundkote had proposed to Sharuf of Rakhwala to join in burning down the Salgraon bridge, which, though of wood, somewhat on the lattice principle, is an expensive work. This was to close the road and assist them in plundering such of the Murree residents as should find their way down.

100. He had no time to tell me this on the present occasion, but when after starting the reinforcements from Trete and directing the police of that place to march on with them I acceded to the request of Mutwullee of Nundkote that he too might come and do service, Muddut found an opportunity of whispering that if Mutwullee came I ought to take care he walked in advance and not behind me.

101. There was little chance of the man committing himself in the way this hint indicated, but I clearly ascertained afterwards that Mutwullee had a daughter married to a man of Potah, one of the worst villages in the insurrection, and that he had been in Potah for several days and only returned from it to his home on the 1st of September, or the preceding day.

Plundering of travellers at Gora Gali.

102. On my way up one or two persons who had ventured down from Murree and had been plundered on the road came to tell me of their misfortunes. The road was closed, and, though seeing the strong force with me, the people of Goragullee, Numb and Pitlee, villages upon the road, came out and assumed a loyal demeanour, yet it was easy to see that they were guilty, and that the men who had been robbed were correct in saying that their assailants were residents of those villages, though they could not name them.

103. The police at Goragullee were chiefly from the adjoining village of Pitlee, of which the residents had recently committed themselves as is stated in paragraph 71. Their Jemadar, Omur Khan, was also a Pitlee man. I then saw the defiance of our authority so remarkably exhibited in that affray had arisen from their having determined to rebel.

Omur Khan's confused replies when I questioned him both about the affray and the robberies committed on the road during that day, and the events at Murree, convinced me that, instead of doing his duty and guarding the road, he had sided with the insurgents and had assisted in closing it.

Arrival of Mr. Thornton and reinforcements at Murree.

104. It was dark when we reached Murree. The men had marched 40 miles since midnight, and they had showed symptoms of fatigue at the steep ascent which is made by the short cut from Cliffden to the sanitarium.

Measures taken by residents of Murree.

105. It was immediately apparent that a most praiseworthy spirit pervaded all the European residents. The whole body had combined for defence; they had at the suggestion of Captain Berry and Lieutenant Battye selected two Commandants, to whom they yielded obedience and who received their instructions from Captain Berry.

106. The weather was rainy and bad, but the patrolling and picquet duty was systematically ordered and carefully performed.

107. The convalescent Europeans were freely made use of for the protection of the station, though such consideration was shown for the imperfect state of their health as circumstances allowed.

108. It was a most pleasing sight to see these proofs of sound sense and right feeling. The fact is that the society at the time consisted largely of gentlemen, of whom one could have predicted that they would have been examples to a body of men placed in such a situation. I do not of course refer mainly to high spirit or to a cheerful acceptance of duties entailing bodily inconvenience, but to the self-control and forbearance called out when persons of high and low standing in their profession, and men of various grades in society, determined to combine into an organized force.

109. To Captain Berry, however, and also to Lieutenant Battye much praise seems due as respects the cordial and effective union obtained. For in such cases as this there is

room for the exercise of great good judgment on the part of those in authority, or the unanimity and good feeling which it is the object to maintain will suffer. But certainly in the present instance the most cordial co-operation was uniformly afforded.

110. But, although the means of resistance were thus improved to the utmost, they were still very small. The whole body—European soldiers, volunteers, and Lieutenant Bracken's detachment—probably did not amount to 400, while the station of Murree extends along the mountain ridge for a distance exceeding two miles, and many of the houses are a considerable way down from the summit. Inadequacy of European force at Murree.

111. Before I proceed to narrate the events which had occurred at Murree during the first three days of September, ere I had reached the place, it seems worth while to note the way by which the timely discovery of the intimated attack was made.

112. To explain the circumstances out of which the discovery arose it is necessary to go back to the beginning of May. A private guard had then been provided for Lady Lawrence. At its head was Hakim Khan, one of the lumberdars or chief men of Lorah, a village in the lower mountains some 20 miles from Rawul Pindee, and attached to the guard was a Sikh by name Ruttun Chund, a resident of Sydpore, which is only 8 or 10 miles from Rawul Pindee. Hakim Khan is a Dhoond, but, as his home is so far from Murree, he was regarded by the Dhoonds there somewhat as a stranger, and indeed in a letter written to me on the 26th of May Lieutenant Battye mentions that the people about Murree had expressed some jealousy at his being summoned from a distance to do a duty they said they were quite ready to perform. Manner in which threatened attack on Murree was discovered.

113. But, though a comparative stranger, Hakim Khan had betrothed his son to an infant daughter of Uhmud Khan, a lumberdar of Mullote, a large village to the north-east of

Murree. There was also another lumberdar in Mullote, Baz Khan, own brother to Uhmud Khan.

114. Baz Khan is a person of whom I had always been suspicious since I first knew him in 1850. He was a poor man then, whereas the subsequent establishment of the Murree sanitarium had led to his becoming for a mountaineer a wealthy man. Being more intelligent than the rest, he had availed himself more extensively than others had the sense to do of the market and opportunities thus opened to him. He had learnt the value of his limestone and fuel and became a contractor for supply of lime at the sanitarium. Indeed, he had grown so civilized as to stand security for the Murrree Deputy Postmaster, and this simply as a speculation, for the man was a Hindoo as well as a native of Hindoostan, so the surety had no interest in him, but took the office merely in order to exact a monthly payment as his reward.

115. But, notwithstanding the money-making propensities that had been developed in him and his hope of indulging them being dependent on the continuation of our rule, I never ceased to regard Baz Khan as a dangerous man, and as soon as there was reason for unusual care I warned Lieutenant Battye by letter of 27th of May last to beware of him, and on the 29th I sent for Baz Khan to come and see me at Rawul Pindee, hoping to have some effect upon him by treating him as a person to whom we looked for assistance by keeping us aware of whatever was going on.

116. Hakim Khan of Lorah during his attendance on Lady Lawrence and consequent residence at Murree was in the habit of receiving from the house of Uhmed Khan in Mullote such supplies of milk and butter as he required for his daily use.

117. On the night of the 1st of September Uhmed Khan's wife sent word to Hakim Khan that the station was to be attacked that night. She, however, either had not a special messenger at her command or did not choose to send one, but she communicated the intelligence verbally through

the person who was in the habit of conveying to Hakim Khan his portion of the produce of her dairy.

118. It would not have been surprising if a message thus sent had either miscarried or been disregarded; and the fact that it was communicated instantly to Lieutenant Battye and was immediately credited and acted on both by him and Captain Berry is remarkable.

Events at Murree between 1st and 3rd September.

119. I now recount the events that took place between the moment this intelligence was given on the evening of the 1st September and my arrival on the evening of the 3rd.

Protection of ladies.

120. In addition to making a suitable disposition of the force available, another precaution was adopted by Captain Berry and Lieutenant Battye. The ladies were invited to congregate at the barracks, where rooms were cleared for their reception.

Disloyalty of Native doctor attached to Survey party.

121. During the attack on the night of the 1st September Captain Robinson had taken a most active part in the repulse of the insurgents, and while so engaged he observed in the Native doctor attached to his Survey, Russool Buksh, very strong signs of an understanding with the rebels. He therefore made the man a prisoner.

Strength of rebels attacking Murree and their repulse.

122. The strength of the rebels who attempted to force their way into the station at this point was about 300. Finding their plans were discovered and not anticipating resistance, they speedily gave up the attempt and retreated, leaving one man dead, who turned out to be a Dhoond from the village of Bhuttean. A corporal with a party of Europeans engaged in driving out some men who had got into some out-houses received a bullet wound of which he shortly afterwards died.

Complicity of Ahmad Khan of Mullote.

123. Among these assailants the voice of Uhmud Khan of Mullote was clearly recognized by Captain Robinson. The man was loudly exhorting his companions to advance.

124. At no other part of the station was any actual attack made. It was established afterwards that, according

to the plan formed, other points were to have been assailed, but these intentions were given up as soon as the firing was heard and it was discovered that the plot was divulged and preparations were made to oppose the attempt.

Collection of party of insurgents at Kúldanna and Topa.

125. On the morning of the 2nd September a party of the insurgents were seen collected at Kooldunna, a low mountain connecting Murree with Hazara. The number is stated by Lieutenant Battye to have been about 100. These men maintained their position during the day.

126. Another party of similar strength was on Topa, a mountain adjoining Murree to the north-east. This party succeeded in driving off the small guard of 8 men who were at "the flats" in charge of the camp of Lieutenant Bracken's detachment and then plundered the property which had been left there.

Summoning of Pirs of Palasi to our aid.

127. Having on that day no clear idea of the plans formed by the rebels, Lieutenant Battye did not think it prudent to quit the sanitarium to attack either of these parties. But that afternoon the Peers of Pulassee (see paragraph 86) arrived, having been summoned by him early in the morning; and, as he observes, these men by thus obeying the call confirmed on the side of order those of their disciples who had not as yet committed themselves overtly.

Dispersion of insurgents at Topa and burning of Mullote by Pirs of Palasi.

128. The following morning Lieutenant Battye sent the Peers and their followers in the direction of Topa to disperse the insurgents who were still assembled there and then to proceed to Mullote and burn it, as he had ascertained that Baz Khan was a leader of the night attack on the station. The Peers did disperse the insurgents and also burnt a few of the houses in Mullote.

Dispersion of insurgents at Kúldanna.

129. On the same morning Lieutenant Battye and Captain Berry proceeded to Kooldunna with a small party of Europeans, some of the volunteers, a part of Lieutenant Bracken's detachment and some police, and attacked the rebels on Kooldunna, who fled after firing a volley which

wounded one volunteer. Our party then went to Kunnetak, a rent-free village of Baz Khan, and destroyed it.

130. Such was the state of affairs when I arrived on the evening of the 3rd September. The overt act of rebellion had been committed by 15 or 16 villages, as far as had up to that time been ascertained, and these lay near the sanitarium.

Extent of conspiracy and complicity of Dhunds and Karrals.

131. But Lieutenant Battye's report of the 11th June (see paragraph 39) regarding Kakira Kuhuttee and his letters of the 7th and 11th of August (see paragraphs 67 and 69) showed that thoughts of rebellion had been entertained for a long time, and that villages not close to Murree, and one tribe at least other than the Dhoonds, had been invited to join in it.

132. Raja Ali Ghor's information (paragraph 76) and that given by Zubberdust Khan, the Suttee Chief (paragraphs 77 and 78), led to the conclusion that the whole of the Dhoonds at least were in the confederacy, and my observations on my road up (paragraphs 99 to 103) corroborated these suspicions, inasmuch as the Dhoond villages of Pitlee, Numb, and Goragullee, and probably Nund Kote, though not parties to the attack on the sanitarium, were seen to be in confederacy with the insurgents.

133. Again Nund Singh's intelligence (paragraphs 80 to 85) proved that the confederacy extended to the Kurrals. There could be no doubt of its correctness at that time, as it had been verified by the subsequent insurrection. But the complicity of this tribe was a great aggravation of our difficulties, both on account of their strong position and because their country extends far into Hazara. From this latter circumstance it seemed to follow that in dealing with the Kurrals we should become mixed up with Hazara politics, and this seemed the more probable because the Kurrals have a chief whose authority the clan recognizes, and this is the case generally in Hazara. Hussun Ali Khan, the Kurral Chief, could communicate with facility with other Hazara tribes through their chieftains, and confederacies could be rapidly formed and acted on.

The Dhoonds, however, have no chief. They have a strong clannish feeling, but, acknowledging no member of the tribe as their head, they can neither combine so well nor so speedily as they could otherwise.

Effect of assistance rendered by the Pirs of Palasi and other loyal villages.

134. Thus the very partial insurrection of the 2nd and 3rd of September was based on a much more extensive confederacy. That the active rebellion had not extended more widely was owing apparently to the timely discovery, the prompt defence, and the consequent failure of the first move. The obedience yielded by the Peers of Pulassee to Lieutenant Battye's summons was probably the result of this success, as it was also a significant hint to the Dhoond tribe that those who had gone no further than treason would do well to go no further at the present juncture, but would be wise to separate themselves from their confederates who had committed themselves by actual rebellion.

135. There was no scruple on the score of honor in doing this. But there was a difficulty of another kind. To act well the part of loyal men who abhorred the treason of their neighbours they must help to apprehend the latter. But if they did so the captured rebels would expose the confederacy and convict the captors.

136. That the proceedings of the mere conspirators were seriously embarrassed by this dilemma had become apparent by the 3rd of September. The villages of Potah and of Moossiaree gave proofs of this. The Potah men indeed had been very active in the overt offence. They and the men of Mullote had been the most forward in it. But, though Lieutenant Battye had suspected this to be the case with Potah, he had at the time no good proof, and he was not aware of the degree of guilt. So when on the 3rd September the men of that village had the effrontery to join the Peers of Pulassee in the partial burning of Mullote, Lieutenant Battye accepted this as a sort of expiation for their offence, such as he then thought it to be. Still he gave them, I believe, no distinct promise of forgiveness, and they remained under fear as to the course we might adopt when their real guilt should have transpired.

137. The Moossiaree men were certainly confederates in the treason, and, as we now know, they also advanced to the attack of the station on the night of the 1st September from the direction of their village, the side opposite to that where the assault was made, but retreated unopposed when the firing showed that the plan of a surprise had failed. Yet they too joined the Peers in the descent upon Mullote, and by the evening of the 3rd September were professing to be most loyal.

138. When Jafoo of Moossiaree and the other heads of that village and the chief men of Potah came forward on the evening of my arrival to welcome me and to recount their good services, their demeanour indicated very great uneasiness. Guilt and fear of its discovery was written on every feature of their countenances. They urged that in their desire to serve us they had blackened their own faces in the eyes of their tribe, and that this would draw down false accusations which they feared we might listen to.

139. The open espousal of our cause by the Peers and the men of Potah and Moossiaree had had a very depressing effect on the actual insurgents.

Position at Murree on 3rd September, the date of Mr. Thornton's arrival.

140. I have now narrated fully the state of affairs as they appeared when I reached Murree on the evening of the 3rd September. As soon as I had learnt them it was necessary to determine the line of policy to pursue and then to adopt it at once. It was evident too that the line taken up must be adhered to and that success would depend mainly on the correctness of the choice.

141. I had no doubt what to do. Looking at the state of the country at the beginning of September, our position at Delhi and Lucknow, the large amount of disarmed disaffected troops in the Punjab, the sickliness of the season for Europeans, which weakened our English regiments for the time, and the little advance in discipline which had been obtained with the newly-raised Punjab corps, the course I had to follow

Determination of Mr. Thornton to punish rebellious villages.

was clearly to ignore the treasonable confederacies which had pervaded the Dhoond tribe and partly extended to the Kurrals and probably to some others. Those villages, and those alone, which had gone the length of open rebellion were to be selected for punishment.

142. This being resolved on, the first step was to make a list of insurgent villages and the second was to announce the selection we had made and to assure the rest of the mountain population, whether of the Dhoond tribe or any other, but more particularly the former, that as respected the past they were regarded as guiltless and were therefore invited to evince their loyalty and come forward to assist in punishing the offenders.

Names of villages.

143. This was done at once with Lieutenant Battye's aid. The villages selected, in number 11, are recorded in the margin. As Lieutenant Battye's information was incomplete, we were obliged to exclude several villages of whose guilt there was very strong suspicion but no certainty; so that the list was correct only in so far that it contained no village which was not guilty.

Mullote, Rewat, Beergraon, Hookra Kher, Khaya, Khunnetak, Jawa, Dhar, Aliot, Chittra Doonga, Pinhuttee, Bhuttean. Only the last named village is in Huzara.

Issue of a proclamation.

144. It was promulgated early on the 4th of September, and written assurances bearing my own or Lieutenant Battye's signature were then issued to all other villages which seemed specially likely to fear our anger, informing them that we considered as guilty of rebellion only those villages which were named in the list, and that the rest of the people might come forward without apprehension and co-operate with us. I may add here that our information as it accumulated established the guilt of the suspected villages and of some others not at first even suspected. Potah, as I have said, was found to be particularly deserving of punishment. The promise of immunity once given, however, had of course to be observed, but the escape of these villages from the penalty they merited was a small evil compared with the advantage obtained by the

early discrimination of those that could not be pardoned and the consequent restoration of confidence in the minds of the rest.

145. I find I have omitted to mention that, on the occasion of the sudden vacation of their houses by the European residents who resorted to the barracks on the night of the 1st September, the domestic servants in some cases began to plunder, and two men, I think Jampanees, were tried and sentenced to death by a court-martial assembled under orders of Captain Berry. The sentence was executed upon one of the men, but the other suddenly sprung forward and disappeared down the mountain side just at the moment they were preparing to shoot him. Punishment of servants found plundering.

146. I should have stated that I found on my arrival an impression existing among the European residents, and which was afterwards fully corroborated, that the leaders of the mountaineers were under an understanding with some Hindoostanees in the station and had reckoned on their aid both in rendering the attack successful and in producing a panic which might lead to the evacuation of the station. No proof, however, was at that time forthcoming, and Russool Bukhsh, the Native Doctor apprehended by Captain Robinson, was up to that time firm in protesting his innocence. Collusion between leaders of rebellion and some Hindustanis at Murree.

147. Early on the 4th September, in consequence of arrangements previously entered into between Captain Berry and Lieutenant Battye, a strong party of some 300 men, consisting chiefly of the men I had brought up, were sent under Umeen Chand to destroy the villages of Dhar and Jawa. Another party was despatched to burn Hookra and Kher, which were in the opposite direction from the villages first named. Neither of these met with opposition, the inhabitants of all the villages which had actually risen having for the time at least given up the idea of open opposition and being intent only on concealment. Destruction of certain insurgent villages.

148. It was proved afterwards that this measure was of more use than I at first thought it would be; for on the 2nd Salutary effects of measure.

September after their discomfiture and retreat to Kooldunna Baz Khan went on the part of the insurgents to the Kurrals, to Puhlwan Khan of Bhagan and others, and asked why they had not acted up to a promise it was found had been given that they should come down and support the Dhoonds as soon as the latter had commenced a rise. The Kurrals replied it was not too late yet, and they came down with Baz Khan; but when nearing Murree on the 4th September they saw long lines of smoke curling up from the valley in which Dhar and Jawa are situated, while the white houses of Murree were visible in the distance with no signs of conflagration about them. The result was the reinforcements returned forthwith, declaring that the move was no longer a seasonable one.

149. Looked upon then as a beacon to indicate the side on which success lay the burning a mountain village may be a useful act, and where the *assailants are not able to remain* on the spot it may be the most punitive measure practicable.

Measures for arresting insurgents.

150. It did not, however, seem to suit our case, after the first day at least, for we were stationary and capable of maintaining a continued effort for the object of arresting the offenders. But the destruction of the homestead rather increased the difficulty of arrest, as it tended to disperse the fugitives, whereas they could best be taken on venturing back to their homes. It also inflicted an equal punishment on the innocent and guilty.

151. To pursue into distant villages was on several accounts inconvenient and difficult and had a tendency to make those villages compromise themselves. On the other hand, it seemed easy to induce the men to return to their homes, for their large herds of cattle could not have been removed quickly, and if we could arrange to prevent the driving off the cattle the owners would be loath to quit them, and therefore would lurk among the precipices and glens of their own lands. The Indian corn too was just ripening and was partly fit for picking even then ; so a man could secure

a meal by hiding near his own fields who would find it difficult to support himself elsewhere.

152. I proceeded therefore to draw a cordon round the selected villages in the only direction in which the removal of cattle was likely to be attempted. With this object the Thanadars of Dunna and Bukkote in Hazara were summoned to Murree, and the scheme was explained to them, after which they were immediately sent back to carry it out. The Suttee Company from Hazara, which Major Becher had despatched on receiving my letter of the 2nd, had arrived on the 5th and was posted by me at Musote for the foregoing purpose. On the Topa side the Suttee villagers had, at Lieutenant Battye's call, come up to the amount of perhaps 200 and were promised a fourth of the cattle and Rs. 30 for each of the men they might seize from the proscribed villages. Assistance received from Hazára.

153. As the area to be surrounded was large, the arrangements could not be carried out for several days at the least. As soon as they should be completed it was intended to send a body of levies into each village to hunt the cultivation and the mountain sides and seize all the men and cattle that could be found. In the meantime steps were taken to inform the fugitives that any who were innocent had better return to their homes, as their continued absence would lead to the attachment of the standing crop and of their houses.

154. The means for carrying out these measures had considerably increased since my arrival on the 3rd; for Raja Ali Ghor of Khanpoor and his brother Raja Hyder Buksh, two Ghukkur Chiefs of Hazara, sent by Major Becher, had reached me each with a body of followers.

155. It is now necessary to notice an important feature in the principles on which the proper subjects for punishment were to be selected. I have said that we chose certain villages and, confining our punishment to them, resolved to treat the rest of the country as innocent. But what selection was to be made among the men of the proscribed villages? Selection of those to be punished.

Were only the leaders to be taken or were the followers to be punished too ?

Decision to capture the leaders as well as their followers.

156. It seemed to me clear that the case was one in which the latter course was the proper one, although the mere follower might be let off with a comparatively slight penalty.

157. These men were living within a day's walk of Murree and were frequently there for sale of their farm produce or to earn money as day labourers. It aggravated their offence that they were in constant intercourse with us and were daily benefiting by our presence ; and I could see no advantage in teaching them that whenever they are so foolish as to prefer the plunder of the station and its destruction to the regular flow of advantages it affords them they can come and attack it with impunity, as their leaders would be the sole objects of our vengeance should the attack fail. Moreover, the circumstances which as a general rule lead to the unconditional pardon of the humblest members in an insurrection did not seem to agree with those of the present case.

158. I therefore resolved to extend the punishment to all guilty men within the proscribed villages, but at the same time to be lenient in the application of this principle as respected the minor offenders.

Preparation of a nominal roll of villagers.

159. With the view of forming a nominal roll of the men within these villages, the summary settlement papers of each village were examined and the names of the occupants of the land were read over in the presence of individuals well acquainted with the residents. It took some time to compile these lists satisfactorily, and there was no need for haste, as nothing could be done towards arrest until the cordon alluded to above had been satisfactorily established.

Restoration of confidence at Murree.

160. I may here mention that on the night of the 4th of September our position appeared so much improved that the necessity for the assembly of the ladies and children at the barracks or at my house, which had been selected as another good place of rendezvous and had been guarded accordingly

by a part of Lieutenant Bracken's detachment, was deemed no longer to exist.

161. Nearly all the ladies therefore returned to pass the night thenceforth in their own houses. The patrolling by the troops and Volunteers was, however, by no means relaxed, and continued for a long time ere it was gradually left off.

Result of Mr. Thornton's applications for reinforcements.

162. On the 4th, 5th and 6th of the month the result of the several telegrams and expresses despatched on the night of the 2nd became known to me. General Cotton replied he had not a soldier to spare at Peshawur for the reinforcement of Murree,—a fact of which I was aware when disposing of the reference on the 17th August (see above paragraph 74). He referred me to Major Becher, whom I had thought to be also unable to aid us with troops. On the 3rd the Chief Commissioner telegraphed to Captain Cracroft to send an express to Major Becher and request him to send a detachment across the mountains from Abbottabad to Murree. He added that he had asked Major Browne to send up a company from the new levies, of some 300 men, that had been raised at Jhelum by that officer and were being drilled as regular troops.

Help from Hazára.

163. In compliance, Major Becher, who on the 3rd had sent me his Suttee Company of some 40 men, the arrival of which I have noticed above, despatched from Abbottabad nearly all his available force. This detachment started on the 4th under Captain Harding to make its way across the foot of the Kurral country over difficult mountains and in bad weather. Captain Davies accompanied Captain Harding, being intimately acquainted with the route of which the latter was necessarily ignorant, having but recently arrived in Hazara. The force consisted of 3 Companies of the 2nd Hill Regiment and 8 Zumboorahs, or native guns carried on mules, with 30 zumboorchees or Artillerymen under Illahee Buksh, the Soobadar of the Zumboorkhana. Major Becher also sent at the same time under Pyara Khan, Jemadar, a body of about 200 armed villagers selected from various parts of the Huzara district, and in whom he assured me he felt confidence.

Captain Harding and his force were expected to reach us on the 7th.

164. Believing, however, that the inconvenience which would result to Major Becher from being deprived of this detachment exceeded our necessity for its services, I wrote to Captain Harding on the 6th and proposed he should return to Abbottabad. On that date I was able to inform Captain Cracroft that the necessity for purchasing and sending up supplies no longer existed, as the grain dealers had re-commenced their trade between Rawul Pindee and the sanitarium. On the same day it began to transpire that the leading men of the proscribed villages were assembling at Bhagun in the Kurral country.

Anxiety for safety of force sent from Hazára.

165. On the 7th arrived a letter from Major Becher, dated the evening of the 5th, announcing reports that the confederacy was very extensive, having reached the Judhoons as well as Kurrals. He said that he had been very anxious about Captain Harding making his way through such a country and over such a difficult road if seriously opposed, and as he himself had only 87 sepoys left available, of whom all but 12 were recruits, he felt uncertain as to the safety of Abbottabad should any mischance occur.

166. The following day, the 6th, Major Becher despatched to me several letters expressing much anxiety for Captain Harding's safety, and also stating that Nund Singh's report respecting the complicity of Nuggree, Mukole and Bhagun had in his opinion proved correct ; that the Kurrals and the population of the country through which Captain Harding had passed evidently sympathised with the rebels, and that it would be necessary to punish the Kurral Chief if he did not come in quickly. Major Becher was of opinion the Kurrals were ready to follow up any success of the Dhoonds, but that the failure of the latter had disturbed the confederacy. I was urgently requested to send Raja Ali Ghor and Raja Hyder Buksh, the Suttee Company and all the relief I could command, to aid in supporting Captain Harding, and was not to lose a moment in doing so.

167. But on the 7th September ere these letters had reached me I had heard from Captain Harding that he had got through the difficult part of the journey, having escaped an ambush that had been laid for him. Captain Davies came on to Murree and gave further particulars. The ambush was prepared by Kurrals, aided by some of the Dhoonds, and was avoided by the detachment happening to change its route. The rain had rendered the track impracticable for the mules and baggage, and the men found it very hard to get along. Out of the 3 Companies, 250 strong, 90 men were recruits and 40 Hindoostanees; so that an encounter with mountaineers on ground chosen by the latter was not under such circumstances to have been desired.

Escape of Hazára force from an ambush laid by the Karrals and Dhunds.

168. Captain Harding came in the next morning, and, as Major Becher had expressed his opinion that the detachment should remain for a few days and had informed me he had raised levies sufficient to protect Abbottabad for the time, I requested Captain Harding to halt at Murree until the 14th that his men might recruit and his baggage come up. His return was to be *viá* Rawul Pindee according to Major Becher's special request, and it was clearly the right route with reference to the smallness of the detachment.

Arrival of Hazára force at Murree.

169. The Kurrals that had tried to intercept the detachment moved back to a village called Maree when they found it had passed. We were anxious to attack them from Murree, but were restrained by the knowledge that by so doing we should embarrass Major Becher, in whose district Maree lies. His policy was to detach the Kurral Chief, Hussun Ali Khan, from the confederacy the tribe had formed with the Dhoonds. The same day, however, we heard that the people assembled at Maree had moved to Bhagun.

Movements of insurgents who attempted to ambush the Hazára force.

170. Letters of the 7th and 8th from Major Becher showed that Hussun Ali Khan's brother and son had come in to him, and that Major Becher had previously to their arrival been of opinion we should probably be obliged to make a combined attack on the tribe, and even afterwards he considered that if the Sirdar proved himself unable to disperse

the assemblage at Bhagun, and to make the men of that village give up or dismiss Baz Khan and other Dhoond refugees, we would have to proceed against the village ourselves.

Threatened attack by Karrals on the fort of Nara and station of Murree.

171. On the 9th Major Becher heard from his Thanadar at Nara that, although Hussun Ali had ostensibly seceded from the confederacy, Puhlwan Khan of Bhagun, who had received Baz Khan of Mullote and other Kurrals, talked of putting Tayub Khan, a nephew of the Sirdar, at their head and simultaneously attacking the fort of Nara and the station of Murree. This agreed with information we were receiving on our side, and Captain Robinson set himself to learn the best lines to take in an attack on Bhagun and the neighbouring villages.

172. On the 12th several letters were despatched to me by Major Becher announcing that Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan had come in and professed to believe that none of our fugitives were harboured in his country. Major Becher, notwithstanding the arrival of this Chieftain, was very anxious to receive back all the force he had sent to Murree, and they were to be pushed on immediately. One of the letters spoke in general terms of treasonable confederacies being formed, while another instanced Pukli, the northern part of Hazara, as the place where danger was brewing.

News of an extensive confederacy against the British.

173. On the same date the Thanadar of Bukkote, a thanah of Huzarah, the jurisdiction of which extends from the Jhelum up the steep sides of Mochparree till it joins the Kurral country at the summit, came to me to report an extensive confederacy which he heard was being formed against us.

Application for reinforcements from Jhelum.

174. I wrote immediately to Captain Cracroft to hasten up the company from Jhelum (see paragraph 162). Its arrival would in some degree counteract the bad effect of Captain Harding's departure; but, as in Captain Berry's opinion, which coincided with my own, we were still too weak, I applied on the same day to the Chief Commissioner to send an additional 100 men if they could be spared.

175. He replied by telegraph on the 13th and directed that if necessary a detachment of the newly-raised Punjab Corps, the 12th, under command of Captain White, and which had been sent up in the Rawul Pindee direction by the Chief Commissioner to be available on emergency, should move to Murree.

Arrival of reinforcements under Captain White.

176. This detachment consisted of 184 men, *viz.*, 107 recruits and 77 old soldiers. The company above mentioned came up on the 15th and the detachment under Captain White on the 17th or 18th. The company was then transferred to the 12th Regiment; so the force under Captain White thenceforth amounted to about 260 men. On his arrival the detachment of the 19th Punjab Corps under Captain Irvine was sent back to Rawul Pindee.

Deprecation of attack on Karrals by Major Becher, Deputy Commissioner, Hazára.

177. On the 13th Major Becher informed me that Puhlwan Khan and other headmen of Kurral villages had come in to him, and he begged we would say no more of attacking the Kurrals lest we should terrify them into committing themselves. We were also requested not to send any men into the Kurral country to arrest our fugitives, but were to content ourselves with despatching two persons to the Thanadar of Nara that these might be sent with Puhlwan Khan and an agent of Sirdar Hussun Ali's and in their company search for our refugees among the Kurrals.

Success of Mr. Thornton's plans for arresting insurgents.

178. On the same day, the 13th, the plans I had been following up since the 4th for arrest of those criminals who were concealed in the lands of their own villages took effect. The scheme was very well worked out by Umeen Chund, and the number of men secured was 160. Large herds of cattle were also taken. About 20 rebels had been apprehended previously. 600 head of cattle were sent down to Rawul Pindee on the 14th.

Return of Hazára force.

179. The day following these arrests Captain Harding left for Hazara *viâ* Rawul Pindee, but the Suttee Company and "Baradree," as they are called in Hazara, *i.e.*, the irregular levies that had accompanied Captain Harding under

Pyara Khan, were despatched *viâ* Dewul and Bukkote, and thus passed through the part in which fresh plots were said to be forming. Their appearance and the arrests we had made on the 13th checked this mischief, and we heard no more of it for some time.

Effect of news of fall of Delhi on hill-men.

180. The fall of Delhi then took place, and the news of this great event, so important to the welfare of British India, was received with joy and thankfulness at Murree, as in every other place at which there were Englishmen to hear it.

181. To our surprise, however, it did not work the instant good effect we had anticipated in our immediate vicinity. It was whispered that we had invented the story to strengthen ourselves, and certainly a large part of the mountain population credited the calumny to as late a date as the 9th of October. Still truth must prevail at last, and after some time it worked its way among the Murree mountains and improved our position.

Delay in arrest of fugitives in Hazára, and detrimental effects.

182. Our chief remaining difficulty at Murree then arose from the smallness of the military force at Major Becher's command. He was not able until about the end of October to adopt really stringent measures for the seizure of our fugitivies. They were sometimes said to be in the higher Kurral villages of Bhagun, then in the more difficult part of the Bukkote thanah, then a part of them in Seer and Nuggree, which appertain to the Dunna thanah.

183. We considered ourselves strong enough at Murree to carry out a search for these men. Major Becher, however, was clearly not able to do so, and consequently we had to wait until he should be strengthened. The effect was detrimental to us, for though we had taken 180 insurgents by the 13th September and continued afterwards to lay hold of others from time to time, still the men whose capture was for the most part of chief importance were those who longest eluded pursuit and for a long time they found refuge in Hazara villages.

184. The heads of those villages had come in to Major Becher and asserted their loyalty. They were nevertheless

unwilling to refuse hospitality to our fugitives, and again they were uneasy at what they had done in giving asylum even for a short time. The consequence was that they would talk of open resistance, and would thus give rise to reports which disturbed the minds of other people, and more especially of the mountaineers of the Murree tehseel, who could not understand why, when we had searched their mountains without scruple, we were allowing our criminals to remain unmolested elsewhere.

185. About the end of October a detachment of convalescents from Her Majesty's 24th Regiment was sent up to Abbottabad, and Major Becher availed himself of the opportunity this gave for acting more effectually in catching our fugitives, or driving them back to be caught by us in the Murree country.

Arrival of reinforcements at Abbottabad and operations against the fugitives.

186. On the last day of October, in accordance with a request I had made to the Chief Commissioner for some mountain guns, Captain Brougham with half his mountain battery arrived at Murree, and he has been passing the winter there. Those guns have been employed occasionally in blowing away some of the leaders of the insurrection.

Arrival of mountain battery at Murree and execution of some insurgents.

187. At the time I am writing there remain at large only four or five of the chief offenders, but among these is Baz of *Mullote*. There are also some 15 whose guilt is of a lighter shade. Nine of these are thought to be over the Indus in Sitana. Lieutenant Battye considers it most probable that Baz is lurking about nearer home.

Number of offenders still at large.

188. I have refrained from interrupting the narrative regarding the mountaineers and our dealings with them, by recounting our discoveries respecting the Hindoostanees at Murree and their share in the insurrection. I now proceed to supply this omission.

Complicity of Hindustanis in the conspiracy at Murree.

189. Uhmud Khan, to whose daughter the son of Hakim Khan was betrothed, was, as I have said, a leader in the insurrection, but in consideration of his wife's and Hakim Khan's conduct he was treated with leniency, special orders to

Complicity of Hindustanis in the conspiracy at Murree.

this effect having been sent me demi-officially by the Chief Commissioner. He surrendered, and remained at large on the security of Hakim Khan.

190. On the 12th of September Uhmud Khan made a confession before Umeen Chand. It showed that Russool Buksh, the native Doctor attached to Captain Robinson's survey, and Umeer Ali, the native Doctor at the Murree Dispensary, had a large share in the conspiracy. The former of these was a Syud of Patna and the other was a native of that city. A third person named by Kurm Alee was also a Hindoostanee Syud, and, though he followed the humble calling of a worker in tin (*kulygurh*) he had an extensive acquaintance among the mountaineers, and this gave him facilities for carrying on his treasonable designs.

191. On the 15th I sent a chupprasee into the Bazaar to summon Kurm Ali. Immediately on hearing himself asked for, the man fled. Being followed, he caught hold of the sword of his pursuer and was making off. On hearing this I despatched Jafoo, the lumberdar of Moossiaree, who, anxious for forgiveness for his own guilt, which he felt must be known to me, set out with eagerness in pursuit and overtook Kurm Ali, who was then fleeing down the mountain by a by-path towards the plains. Instead, however, of using his sword against the other, Kurm Ali stabbed himself and was brought up to my house stretched on a bed, in apparently a dying state. He said he was a rebel, and that the cowardice of the mountaineers had defeated his schemes. He would, however, add nothing to this statement either then or subsequently. On the 18th the dresser of the dispensary confessed and corroborated the story of Uhmud Khan. Thereupon Kurm Ali gave out he should die that day, as he said it was a Friday and a suitable day for a martyr's death. The prediction excited some interest, so his execution was deferred until the 19th, steps being taken against his destroying his own life intermediately.

192. The dispensary bheestee then added his confession to that already made by the dresser, and the clue obtained was followed up until it led to the conviction of both Russool

Buksh and Umeer Ali, who were executed on the 17th October. The evidence resulted in the conviction of other Hindoostanees besides those already named. They were mostly Syuds and men occupying a respectable position in native society.

Complicity of Hindustanis in the conspiracy at Murree.

193. These Hindoostanees gave very exaggerated accounts of our disasters to the mountain population, and the two parties seemed to have had an injurious effect on one another. While the Hindoostanees expatiated to the mountaineers on our falling condition and the facility with which we could be resisted, the Dhoonds could speak of the strength of their mountains and the support they would receive from the Kurrals, and thus encouraged the Hindoostanees to pursue their treasonable designs.

194. The mountaineers were very badly off for firearms, and still more for ammunition. The Hindoostanees held out wild promises of supplying these deficiencies out of the resources of the sanitarium.

195. There was a strong impression among the European society at the place that the menial Hindoostanee servants were very generally implicated. I did not, however, find proof of this. It was part of the plan of the conspirators that the servants should co-operate, and the evidence procured showed that some servants had joined in the conspiracy. These, however, had disappeared and could not be traced.

196. The meetings of the conspirators used to take place at the dispensary, which was a convenient place, as it was one where an assemblage did not excite suspicion.

197. The Hindoostanees had given a clever turn to the deportation of a large number of their class which had taken place since the 10th of May. The truth was these men were sent out of the Punjab as not worthy of trust. The Hindoostanees told the mountaineers it was the effect of fear on our part and was an act of obedience to the demands of the King of Delhi, whose power we saw increasing and who demanded that his subjects should be sent back to their country lest we should misuse them.

Statistics of insurgents punished.

198. Lieutenant Battye's report shows that down to the 9th of January the number of persons punished was 217*; also that 2,781 head of horned cattle had been confiscated.

*Suffered death		15
Imprisoned for life		9
Imprisoned for 14 years		4
Ditto	10 "	2
Ditto	8 "	2
Ditto	7 "	5
Ditto	5 "	104
Ditto	3 "	49
Ditto	1 year	27
	Total	217

Measures taken for ensuring the safety of Murree.

199. The following precautions have been adopted in accordance with the best military advice I could procure. A watch tower has been erected on Kooldunna and a larger tower at Goragullee. The fort of Dewul has been repaired, and the bastion in which the well lies has been erected into a keep, which can be held by 8 or 10 men, and commands the rest of the fort.

200. The object of the Kooldunna tower is to give a good look out, as its position is such as to command a view of the country on that side, and no considerable body of men could approach the station without being seen for hours beforehand. Also they would have to pass close by the tower and be exposed to its fire. It is small, only calculated to hold 8 men and a stock of provisions, and is entered from the second story.

201. The tower at Goragullee is in the first instance to be the residence of a small police force on the road to Rawul Pindee. It is arranged so as to be easily defensible by a few persons, but is sufficiently capacious to afford accommodation and refuge to travellers should an attempt again be made to close the road.

202. Dewul is on the road to Cashmere, a march from Murree. Formerly there was a full thanah there, but latterly only a small post. We have re-established a thanah for the present to overawe, Dewul, Potha, Berote and other villages, most of which committed themselves on this occasion. Should they do so again the Police of Dewul should sally out and burn the homesteads and crops as soon as the villagers set out to attack Murree. Should the thanah again be given up

the small police post will occupy the keep only, the remainder of the building being useful as a serae. A full report regarding this building was submitted by me to the Chief Commissioner on the 20th of October last.

203. The police at Dewul are not Dhoonds; those at Goragullee have also been changed. A carefully selected Thanadar occupies the former post, and at Goragullee a trustworthy person has taken the place of Omur Khan.

204. The Dhoonds in the police of Murree have gone down to other parts of the Rawul Pindee District, the best men obtainable in the district having been sent in their room. The difficulty of contenting these latter is a matter for consideration. I should be glad to raise their pay to Rs. 6.

Proposed extension of the provisions of the Arms Act to the hill districts.

205. In concluding my account of the insurrection at Murree and the conduct of the mountaineers in our season of difficulty, I feel myself bound to record my opinion that the Arms Act should be extended to that portion of the mountains which lies within the Rawul Pindee District. I should think it might be made also to apply to all that part of Hazara which lies south of Abbottabad.

Action taken against the mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry in the Shahpur District.

206. It remains to add a few words regarding the mutiny of a portion of the 9th Irregular Cavalry. This event took place at or near Meanwalee on the 21st of September. The men entered the Shahpoor District near Chukrala, made a detour in the Salt Range and descended from those hills in the direction of Khoosab. The Police were very active in their pursuit, which was taken up and carried on by Mr. Ouseley, and the result was the mutineers got no rest and were finally met and destroyed by Captain Hockin on the right bank of the Jhelum in the Jhung District near Kadirpore. I did all in my power to inform the Deputy Commissioners of Shahpoor and Jhelum and their Police of the facts of the case, and thus to keep up the pursuit. Abdool Huk, Extra Assistant at Meanwalee, very wisely obtained and circulated descriptive rolls of the mutineers, and thereby much facilitated our endeavours to cut the men off.

Raids by Chibs of Jammu on the Gujrát District.

207. I should not omit all allusion to the raids made by the Chibs of Deva and Buttala in the Jummoo territory upon the Goojerat district, for these outrages are an indirect result of the mutiny. You have, however, all the facts of this case before you already in the correspondence with my office respecting it.

Services of officers.

208. I do not repeat here the statements I have already given in the Annual Criminal Report for 1857 respecting the conduct and proceedings of the several officers of this Division during this period of unprecedented difficulty and anxiety. It would seem superfluous to do so, as your own instructions in compliance with which the present report has been written indicate that my report is to be supplementary and that I need not attempt to incorporate in it a complete history of our proceedings in the Division.

209. I hope, however, that the district reports now sent you, and this one from myself taken with the annual criminal report just sent in, will contain collectively all the information required by you for the compilation of your history of the Punjab during the period of the Mutiny of the Bengal Army.

ENCLOSURE (1) TO 39.

40. *Narrative of events and of the precautions taken for the preservation of the public peace in the district of Rawul Pindee from the 10th May 1857 to the close of the year, being extract paragraphs 17 to 77 of the Annual Criminal Report by Captain J. E. CRACROFT, Offg. Deputy Commissioner.*

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Narrative of events in the Ráwalpindi District.

17. Before entering upon the subject of the state of crime and police management during the year under review, it is necessary to glance briefly at the circumstances which have rendered it an unprecedented and eventful one in the annals of Indian History.

18. On the 12th May 1857 news reached Sir J. Lawrence at Rawul Pindee by telegram of the outbreak of the mutiny of the Bengal Army, which has since spread disorder and desolation throughout India. Receipt of news of Mutiny.

19. The first measure which appeared of immediate importance was to hinder the news of the capture of Delhi and the fate of the European community there from becoming known through the regular post. Accordingly, Brigadier Campbell, yourself, Lieutenant Bean (the Cantonment Joint Magistrate), and myself repaired to the Post Office and made arrangements for intercepting all native correspondence. Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of this measure. Interception of native correspondence.

20. The next step was to gain immediate intelligence of the state of feeling in the 58th Regiment of Native Infantry, the Goorkha Battalion, the Native Troop of Horse Artillery, and the Irregular Cavalry. For this purpose intelligent and respectable natives were selected, who did good service in reporting everything that went on in the lines and in the district generally. Among the best and foremost of these at that time were Sirdar Nehal Sing, Chachee, Nund Sing, and Mukkhun Sing, and Chowdree Sher Khan of Chukkree. Measures for ganging the feelings of the Native troops.

21. Another measure of immediate importance was strengthening the police and guarding the ferries, in case any of the Hindoostanee troops in the Peshawur Valley should break loose and attempt to pass through the district. It was also feared that whenever the news should reach the public through native channels that crime would rapidly increase and that perhaps some of the tribes, especially those on the border of Huzara, would become tainted with the spirit of disloyalty. Strengthening of Police and guarding of ferries.

22. This district is bounded to the north by Huzara, to the north-west by Eusofzye, the Indus flowing between the latter and the fruitful plain of Chuch; to the west by the districts of Peshawur and Kohat; to the south by the Jhelum district; and to the east, beyond the Jhelum River, by the independent territories of Cashmere. Description of Ráwalpindi District.

23. Beyond Eusofzye and at the extreme corner of Chuch, bordering on Huzara, are the independent tribes of Sitana and Mungaltana, who have always given trouble. They harboured a great many of our outlaws, who occasionally made raids into this district, similar to the one recorded in paragraphs —— of this report. They held direct communication with the Nuwabs of Tonk, Jhujjur and other disaffected and influential natives in the North-West Provinces, whence they also received pecuniary aid and arms of which occasional seizures have been made. They had a force of about 300 or 400 armed fanatic Mussulmen Hindoostanees, who were the means of communication with the Provinces.

Apprehensions of danger from Sitána.

24. Apprehensions were entertained that on the knowledge of events reaching them the people of Sitana would lose no time in making descents upon Chuch and plundering the rich merchants of Huzroh and other places. Very soon after the outbreak of the Mutiny a false alarm was spread at Rawul Pindee to the effect that our *Tehseeldar* had been killed and the town of Huzroh plundered and burnt. This report was untrue, but the 55th Regiment of Native Infantry having about that time mutinied at Hotee Murdan and Nowshera, it bore the air of probability.

25. The mutiny at Nowshera necessitated the march of a detachment of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment, which was despatched on the tumbrils of Major Cox's troop of Horse Artillery.

Apprehensions of danger from 55th Native Infantry.

26. It was fully expected that the 55th Native Infantry would attempt to cross the Indus at Hoond, or perhaps further up in the Huzara district, and move down upon Rawul Pindee to gain the co-operation of the 58th Native Infantry. Such a move would have been embarrassing, especially as the mutineers would have been joined by men trans-Indus from Sitana and Mungultana and by the numerous outcasts always floating on the surface of society.

Necessity for vigilance along the line of the Indus.

27. There was a necessity therefore for vigilance along the whole line of the Indus extending over a distance of upwards of 120 miles, especially as there are several roads

from Peshawur through the Rawul Pindee, Jhelum and Shahpoor districts, by which the Hindoostanee regiments located at Peshawur might have forced their way.

Protection of ferries of the Jhelum.

28. The state of feeling in Cashmere was not known, nor the part which would be taken by the Maharaja. The ferries of the Jhelum had therefore to be jealously watched by strong guards.

29. Accordingly a large Police Force was immediately organized, which is marginally noted and located at suitable posts, the aim being so to place them as to gain immediate intelligence of any new occurrence, and so to guard the ferries as to preclude the possibility of a rush being successful across either the Indus from the Eusofzye and Peshawur side or the Jhelum from this bank.

	Number.	*Monthly cost.* Rs. A. P.
Officers, writers, &c. . .	174	1,699 13 10
Burkundazes .	1,187	5,146 5 4
Dâk runners .	26	94 2 1
Sowars . .	156	2,212 0 0
Total .	1,543	

Measures for guarding ferries on the Indus.

30. Mullik Feroz Khan, a native of Chuch, who had formerly been Tehseeldar of Hussun Abdal, and had rendered good service during the Punjab war under Nicholson, was entrusted with the command of 100 foot and 50 horse to watch the left bank of the Indus from Attok to the Hazara boundary. Major Becher sent 60 horse to co-operate with him, and the regular Police Force was strengthened to admit of support being speedily given to the Mullik when required. He had his principal point at the important ferry of Hoond, of which the boats were moved down to Attok and patrolled the left bank from Attok to beyond Jellaleea. He also sent periodical intelligence of the proceedings of the Swatees, Sitana and Mungultana tribes, who at that time were collecting for the purpose of making descents into Eusofzye.

31. Futteh Khan of Dreg was entrusted, under the supervision of Mullik Feroz, with the important ferry of Bagh Neelab, the boats of which were moved up to Attock and placed in charge of Lieutenant Henderson of the Engineers and the Military garrison of that place.

32. Lal Khan of Thuttha was charged with the bank of the river from Bagh Neelab to Dundee.

33. Futteh Khan of Kot Futteh Khan and Mullik Aoleea Khan of Pindee Gheb had charge of the Shadeepoor and Khoshalgurh ferries and the bank of the river down to the boundary of the Mukhud elaka.

34. Gholam Moostupha Khan and his son, Gholam Muhomed Khan, held the Mukhud and Rakhwan ferries and the bank of the river down to Kalabag.

Arrangements for ferries on the Jhelum.

35. Similar arrangements were made on the Jhelum River through the Suttee Chiefs and influential natives of Kuhoota and Kullur, aided by our Police strengthened at all important posts. The boats of minor ferries on the Indus were removed to Attok, Shadeepoor, Khoshalgurh and Mukhud. Those on the Jhelum to Jhelum, Hil, Bugam, and Salgiron, leaving those boats only to ply of which the removal was impossible or inexpedient.

36. Mr. Macnabb, who had immediately after the Mutiny commenced been deputed to Attok, had the superintendence of the Indus line as far as Bagh Neelab; thence to Kalabagh I superintended the measures myself, aided by the Tehseeldar of Pindee Gheb. Those on the Jhelum were also under my immediate supervision, and I received able assistance from Moonshee Ameen Chand, the Tehseeldar of Kuhoota.

Watching and registration of people passing through the district.

37. Establishments were entertained for watching and registering all parties going throughout the length and breadth of the district. Not less than 3,700 persons have passed through it, been examined, and furnished with passes, or forwarded under escort towards Jhelum or Pind Dadun Khan. Hundreds of persons have been examined, to whom it was not necessary to grant passes, who have not been enumerated.

Manufacture of arms and ammunition.

38. Arms, accoutrements and ammunition were speedily manufactured and served out, and every precaution taken to be in readiness for the day when the Hindoostanee troops in the

Punjab should break out into mutiny. The total amount expended in the manufacture and repairs of arms, &c., was Rs. 3,669-7-0.

39. A Movable Column was organized composed chiefly of detachments of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment and of Captain Miller's Police Battalion, Horse and Foot, ready for immediate pursuit, in case the Native troops should attempt to break loose from this station, and I kept myself in a state of watchfulness night and day to start in pursuit the instant I gained intelligence of the fact. At a later period, when Captain Doran's Regiment had been partially organized, it furnished a portion of the column intended for pursuit.

Organization of a Movable Column.

40. For some time our position appeared such as to warrant anxiety. The fort at Attock was occupied by three companies of the 58th Regiment, Native Infantry. They were opportunely relieved by three companies of Major Vaughan's Punjab Regiment and a detachment of Her Majesty's 27th Foot. The three companies of the 58th Native Infantry were sent to Kohat. There were 7 companies of the 58th Regiment here. The loyalty of the Goorkhas had not then had an opportunity of proving itself so brightly as it has done since. There was a regiment of them at the station, part of which was detached at Murree. Two regiments of Irregular Cavalry were in the district, of which one was located at Shumshabad in Chuch and the other at Rawul Pindee. A native troop of Horse Artillery completes the list.

Anxiety on account of Native troops.

41. The only force available to oppose this brigade in case of mutiny, assisted as it would have been by thousands of rabble, was the wing of an European Regiment. At Murree there was a small number of European invalids, a detachment of Goorkhas, and one or two companies of Captain Hardinge's Sikh Punjab Regiment under Lieutenant Bracken.

Paucity of European troops.

42. Arrangements were made along the whole line of Grand Trunk Road at eight encamping places to enable a large body of troops to march through the district without previous notice being given.

Provisioning of Attock Fort.

43. The fort at Attok had been ordered to be victualled through the Commissariat Department, and the officer deputed being unable to carry out the measure with sufficient rapidity, unaided by the Civil authorities, I undertook the responsibility under your verbal sanction of storing it by throwing into it the grain of the spring crop which was then coming in, and crediting it as revenue, a process which required close supervision and involved considerable pecuniary responsibility. Ghee had to be purchased at a distance and arrangements made for its carriage. Other supplies, such as dal, gram, rice, sugar, flour, wood, &c., had also to be brought from considerable distances, and stored. I am happy to say that the whole operation was performed in a comparatively short time, and at a moderate outlay, namely, Company's Rs. 16,088-13-9, of which the accounts have been finally adjusted.

Provision of guards for prisoners and others.

44. *One of the most arduous duties to be performed* has been the constant necessity for providing guards at a moment's notice to escort gangs of prisoners, arms, ammunition, disarmed detachments of Hindoostanee Regiments, &c., through the district. Thus an escort was furnished for the disbanded 10th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, stationed at Nowshera, which took them to Lahore. It was commanded by Sardar Hashum Ali Khan, a native who has rendered valuable assistance. The escort of arms, ammunition and accoutrements from Kohat and back again, and to Jhelum and Lahore, of the Sappers from Attok, of prisoners to Mooltan, and of continual small detachments of disarmed sepoys and troopers from Peshawur are instances in point, and at times it was a work of ingenuity to find a guard at all. Provision had also to be made for *conveying* the treasure of incoming revenue instalments not only from the tehseels of this district (three of which are at great distances) to the Sudder, but also from the tehseels of Jaba in Shahpoor, Tullagung, and Chukkowal in the Jhelum district. Chowdhree Sher Khan of Chukree with his levies and Booddha Khan of Mullal with his followers did most service in this respect.

45. The arrangements for keeping up a large number of camels and mules in readiness for any emergency was a duty of some difficulty, requiring constant attention and forethought in consequence of the time of the year and the large numbers required. The accounts involved in the measure added not inconsiderably to the other work. The total amount expended and adjusted on this head has been Rs. 6,194-7-9. Transport arrangements.

46. Increased vigilance was exercised in hunting for vagrants; active search was made for suspected Mahomedans and other characters of doubtful loyalty; malicious and seditious reports were carefully checked. The most incredible absurdities were palmed on the public. It was stated, among other things, that the Government had collected a large quantity of defiled flour, of which it was intended to make the public partake in order to destroy their caste and that a large stock of the article was stored in cantonments. These fables were believed by many people. A person of undoubted loyalty informed me that, being desirous to trace this report to its source, he went to the spot indicated to see the flour, and of course discovered it to be a myth. Another report was spread in one part of the district to the effect that the station of Rawul Pindee had been abandoned, and that all the Europeans who had not been massacred had shut themselves up in Attok, which was said to be besieged by some enemy. Search for vagrants and suspected Muhammadans, and checking of seditious reports.

47. For a long time the treasury was guarded by the 58th Native Infantry, and the Jail continued in charge of the Police Battalion with but a short interval, when it was transferred to the 5th Punjab Infantry. Great care was taken of the Central Jail, and arrangements made for discovering any plots which might be brewing. The Judicial Commissioner's orders in regard to lights and blue lights were carried out, and watch towers were erected outside the Jail to give notice in case a body of men attempted to approach it to the north and south. The number of prisoners increased to nearly 1,200. The defences of the jail were also improved. Measures for security of the Jail.

48. The 14th Regiment of Native Infantry having evinced a very mutinous spirit, the Chief Commissioner, with a Disarming of Native troops.

view to weaken that regiment, which had nothing to oppose it at Jhelum, ordered a detachment of two companies to escort treasure to Rawul Pindee. The detachment brought the treasure to this place and was detained here. It displayed a mutinous disposition, and the Chief Commissioner determined on disarming both the 14th and 58th Regiments of Native Infantry simultaneously at the two stations. A detachment of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment and the Mooltani Horse passing through this district *en route* to Lahore with some Horse Artillery, were despatched to Jhelum.

49. On the 7th of July 1857 the troops were drawn up at Rawul Pindee on the parade of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment, the 58th Native Infantry with two companies of the 14th Native Infantry in front facing their lines, Her Majesty's 24th, about 200 strong, and guns in their rear, and Lieutenant Miller's Rissala of Mounted Police to the right of the parade on the Peshawur road. No sooner had the guns of Captain Paton's Troop unlimbered than the 58th Native Infantry, pressed and pushed forward by the two companies of the 14th Native Infantry in their rear, suddenly began to run towards their lines. The guns were on the point of opening upon them, but were stopped by Brigadier Campbell. The sepoys then assembled in scattered groups on their parade, the 14th Native Infantry at the furthest extremity on the deserted parade ground of the Horse Artillery and the 58th on their own. For upwards of an hour every inducement was held out to them by Sir John Lawrence, who on this occasion was himself present throughout the operation, and by the officers, Civil and Military, who accompanied him, as well as by their own officers, to give up their arms. A few of them deserted with their weapons, and were pursued by Captain Miller and a portion of his Cavalry. It was on this occasion that that officer was severely wounded in the arm. The main body remained for a long time gloomily obstinate in their refusal to be disarmed. Many sepoys of the 14th Native Infantry detachment and a few of the 58th Native Infantry loaded, but ultimately, although the latter were urged by the 14th to resist and to fight, the 58th gave in and delivered

Flight of regiments to their lines.

Pursuit of some deserters.

Refusal of main body to surrender their arms.

Eventual surrender of arms.

their muskets, which were immediately carted away to the European Magazine. The 14th Native Infantry then gave up its arms also.

Disarming of Treasury and Cantonment guards.

50. While this operation was being carried out, Captain Miller with a detachment of his Police Battalion disarmed the guard of the 58th Native Infantry in charge of the treasury. Captain Black, Staff Officer of the Punjab Field Force, disarmed the Cantonment guards.

51. At one time the Chief Commissioner, considering the attitude of the 58th Native Infantry such as to render coercion inevitable, ordered me to go and direct Lieutenant Paul to bring his two companies, which had that day arrived at Rawul Pindee and were encamped at the south end of the encamping ground, to the parade. Lieutenant Paul obeyed with alacrity, but bloodshed was avoided, and the day passed without the sacrifice of life.

Destruction of armed deserters of the 14th and 58th Native Infantry.

52. It was ascertained that about 26 men of the 14th and 58th Native Infantry deserted with their arms. Of these all, with but few exceptions, were either killed in the pursuit or capitally executed on capture. One party of 7 or 8 marched about 10 or 12 miles towards the hills, and was overtaken and killed after a desperate defence.

53. There can be no doubt that this day was a turning point in the history of the district, for the successful termination of which we are, under Providence, indebted to the temper and patience evinced by Sir John Lawrence and Brigadier Campbell. It is impossible to foresee the result with regard to the tranquillity of this and the surrounding districts had any other course been pursued. Subsequent events have shewn that conspiracies of considerable importance and extent were being organized in Huzara and the northern portion of this district.

Measures for intercepting Jhelum mutineers.

54. Immediately tidings of the Jhelum affair reached Rawul Pindee and a report that the 14th Native Infantry mutineers had, after fighting the whole day, marched towards the Jhelum River to force their way up to the Hil ferry in

this district, Lieutenant Shortt, Assistant Commissioner, was detached with a company of Captain Miller's Police Battalion to meet them and if possible prevent their crossing the river. The hill chieftains were also requested to co-operate, but it proved that the mutineers had got across the river in the Jhelum district, rendering further pursuit impossible. Lieutenant Shortt therefore returned after a harassing and rapid march in very inclement weather.

Arrangements for watching the 58th Native Infantry.

55. For some time after the disarming of the 58th Native Infantry extreme vigilance had to be exercised lest they should desert. A net-work of posts was maintained for the purpose of watching them and giving timely notice of the direction they might take. Ultimately a great portion of the extra Police was discharged, as that regiment uniformly behaved well and shewed no spirit of insubordination; but the two companies of the 14th Native Infantry continued to be as mutinous and insubordinate as they dared; it was therefore determined to confine them in the Central Jail, where they now are.

Confinement of a portion of the 14th Native Infantry in the Jail.

56. Things continued very much in the same state for some time after these occurrences. The public mind was disturbed, in consequence of the prolonged resistance of Delhi, but no overt act was committed, until on the 2nd of September a report reached me at Kutcherry at about 5 P. M. that an attack had been made on the station at Murree by the hill tribes and that reinforcements were urgently required.

Insurrection in the Murree hills and measures for its suppression.

57. I immediately consulted you and summoned Moonshee Ameen Chund, Tehseeldar of Rawul Pindee. It was determined to collect as many men as possible, arm them, and send them to Murree during the night. No time was lost, and at about 2 A. M. that night, after having given out arms, ammunition and accoutrements, I despatched Moonshee Ameen Chund with from 150 to 200 levies and barkundazes. You started yourself early the next morning after consultation with the Brigadier, having obtained from

him 100 men of Captain Miller's Police Battalion and Captain Doran's Corps, who were despatched during the course of the day. All the subsequent arrangements were carried on by yourself and Lieutenant Battye, whose report on the subject I beg to annex. I remained at Rawul Pindee at your request to meet any emergency which might arise at the Sudder station, and I therefore leave the narrative of events at Murree to you.

Value of property taken from the Murree rebels.

NOTE.—I have omitted to mention the value of the confiscated property of the Murree rebels, *viz.*,—

	Rs	A.	P.
Value of cattle	9,713	10	0
Do. of standing crops	1,102	3	8
Total . . .	10,815	13	8

A portion of the above sum will be expended on the fort of Dewul and watch-towers at Goragullee and Kooldunna, and there have been refunds and pay of establishment; so that the total amount expended from this source up to date is Company's Rs. 3,811-5-10.

Measures taken in connection with the Mutiny of a Detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry.

58. The only remaining circumstance to be recorded is the mutiny of a portion of the 9th Irregular Cavalry marching in the Jhelum district, of which I was informed by a note from Mr. Mathews, the Custom's patrol at Kalabag. I made immediate arrangements for arresting the party anywhere it might shew itself in this district, but after several days' suspense it was ascertained that the mutinous sowars had gone in the direction of Shahpoor, whence they were eventually pursued into the Jhung district, and, I believe, annihilated after a severe fight.

59. Since the occurrences above narrated no symptoms of disquiet have appeared anywhere, but the non-arrival of fresh British troops up to this date appears to excite remark among the natives.

Expenditure incurred in guarding ferries.

60. The expenditure incurred on account of preserving the public peace and watching ferries, of arrangements for carriage, of manufacture of arms, ammunition and accoutrements, of rewards and miscellaneous expenditure is noted below. Besides this, Company's Rs. 16,088-13-9 were

expended through the Civil Department for victualling the fort of Attok, which are not shewn in the marginal abstract, as the Commissariat have adjusted the charges in the Military Department:—

SPECIFICATION.	Number.	Amount.			TOTAL.		
		Rs.	A.	P.	Rs.	A.	P.
1. Cost of arrangements for preserving the public peace—							
Officers of police and escorts, writers, &c.	701	6,295	6	6			
Policemen, escorts and guards	4,461	16,902	0	11			
Dak runners	128	425	15	1			
Sowars	578	7,565	9	4			
Stationery charges	...	16	0	0			
Total	5,868	...	...	...	31,204	15	10
2. Cost of carriage kept up for troops					6,194	7	9
3. Rewards for apprehension of mutineers and rebels					3,367	0	0
4. Ditto of manufacture of arms, ammunition and accoutrements					3,663	7	0
5. Miscellaneous expenditure					981	12	5
GRAND TOTAL					45,417	11	0

Result of prosecutions under the Mutiny Act.

61. I beg here to note below the result of prosecutions under the Mutiny Acts by the Civil and Military Commissions. The latter do not include the result of the military trials at Murree, information regarding which I have been unable to obtain:—

1st.—By the Civil Commission.

Blown from guns	7	
Hanged	8	
Total capitally sentenced		15
Imprisoned for life	9	
Ditto for terms of 1 to 14 years	196	
Total imprisoned		205
Cut down in attempting escape	8	
Acquitted or transferred	79	
Security and fined	4	
Total miscellaneous		91
GRAND TOTAL CIVIL		311

2ndly.—By the Military Commission.

Blown from guns	5
Shot by musketry	7
Hanged	4
Transported for life	4
Imprisoned till further orders	174
GRAND TOTAL MILITARY .	194

62. Before completing this section of my yearly report, by noticing the conduct of the officers who have served in the district during this period of anxiety and public excitement, I may be permitted briefly to review the general measures which have been adopted for the public welfare. General measures adopted for public welfare.

63. Reports from the police and secret agents have been received at all hours of the night or day, attentively considered and orders passed; native correspondence examined and checked; ferries and boats guarded; extra police and guards kept up with due regard to safety and economy; the telegraph wire preserved over a distance of 100 miles; vagrants, suspicious characters and disloyal subjects searched for and their haunts visited; seditious reports checked; Hindoostanee officials suspected of spreading them summarily dismissed and sent to their homes; recruiting officers and parties assisted; passes or guards given to 3,694 persons after examination and registry; direct postal communication opened with Shahpoor and Pind Dadun Khan; and the ordinary business of the courts carried on without interruption.

64. Arrangements were made for the apprehension of mutineers; for arresting Hindoostanee sepoys returning from leave; for sending back to their regiments Punjabee soldiers; for escorting disarmed regiments, detachments and individuals, arms, treasure, prisoners and travellers; for enabling large bodies of our troops to march through the district with comfort and celerity; for providing, on emergent occasions, shelter to many detachments of Europeans during the hot months and rains; for victualling the fort of Attok, and storing the encamping grounds with supplies.

65. The defences of the Central Jail and burdasht-khanas on the Grand Trunk Road were improved; arrangements made for the accommodation of a large increase of prisoners; two companies of the 14th Native Infantry incarcerated; 311 persons disposed of under the Mutiny Acts; the safety of treasure and of the jail cared for; the rising at Murree quelled; and the public peace preserved elsewhere.

Acknowledgment of services of officers:—

66. It remains for me to mention the officers who have been in the district and to acknowledge their services.

Lieutenant Battye in charge of Murree.

67. Lieutenant Battye has had charge of the Murree tehseel throughout the year. He has given entire satisfaction in the performance of his ordinary duties, and shewn zeal and ability in his work. But he is entitled to especial praise, and I think also to the thanks of the Government, for the manner in which he acted on the occasion of the Murree rebellion. Slow to believe that the people would break faith with the Government and turn traitors and rebels without the shadow of a cause, he refrained from taking premature steps which might have caused a panic similar to that which occurred at Simla and which in its effects would have been disastrous and terrible. But when once he had received positive information of the actual intention of the rebels to attack Murree, his arrangements, ably seconded by the Officer Commanding the Troops, Captain Berry, Lieutenant Bracken, Commanding the Sikh Detachment, and the European residents generally, were promptly and effectively carried out, and were the means, by the blessing of Providence, of saving the sanitarium and its inhabitants from destruction, and of giving a decisive blow to a hostile combination of which the ramifications were extensive.

68. In addition to his services at the time of the outbreak, I must mention those he has performed in the apprehension of a great majority of the criminals who were declared to have incurred the just vengeance of the Government.

69. While on this subject, and willing to render to Lieutenant Battye the praise justly due to him on the night of the attack on Murree and the succeeding day, and for

his conduct throughout, yet I cannot refrain from offering to yourself the tribute of my admiration of the manner in which you disconcerted the designs of the rebels and of those arrangements which crowned with success the measures you had to carry out.

Services of Mr. D. Macnabb at Attock.

70. Mr. Macnabb, during the period in which he remained in this district, performed his work with his usual activity, intelligence and zeal. Early after the outbreak of the Mutiny he was deputed to Attok, a post of much importance, where he efficiently superintended the crossing of passengers and travellers, a work of no ordinary labor and responsibility; he also was entrusted with the victualling of the fort of Attok, a duty which he performed quickly, economically and well. He was active in watching the ferries from Jellaleea to Soojhunda, a distance of upwards of 40 miles, and in giving me valuable information of the state of feeling in that important part of the country. I may here mention that much good resulted from the deputation of an officer to Attok, and I hope that one may be allowed as a permanent arrangement. In that case a kutcherry would be required.

71. If it be true, as I understand is currently reported, that a Cantonment for European troops is to be formed on this bank of the Indus, then the locality selected for an Assistant in the Hussan Abdal Tehseel will depend on the spot chosen for the cantonment. I understand that the Military authorities of Peshawur have surveyed several places and that the plan is now under discussion.

Services of Lieutenant Shortt at Attock.

72. Lieutenant Shortt succeeded Mr. Macnabb at Attok, and has satisfactorily performed the duties assigned to him. This officer has rendered me efficient aid during this year of anxiety and labor. He had charge of the jail during the Mutiny and ably watched over its safety. He was deputed with a detachment of troops to cut off a portion of the 14th Regiment, Native Infantry, as mentioned at paragraph 54, but did not fall in with the mutineers for the reason therein assigned.

Services of Lieutenant Babbage.

73. Lieutenant Babbage, an officer recently appointed to the Civil Commission, was sent to this district in September last, and joined his appointment on the 15th of that month. Since the transfer of Lieutenant Shortt to Attok, Lieutenant Babbage has had charge of the central jail, to which he has done justice in no ordinary degree, having thoroughly mastered the details of its duties. I am much indebted to him for valuable assistance in various ways since he joined the district, and from his ability and energy I am confident he will, with enlarged experience, become an excellent Civil officer.

Services of Tahsildars.

74. Moonshee Ameen Chund, tehseeldar of Rawul Pindee, rendered good service during the rising at Murree, which, having been performed under your own eye, you will no doubt be able suitably to acknowledge. His conduct has been worthy of all praise. I have noticed this officer again at the close of my report.

75. Of the other tehseeldars there are two whose services I am happy to record with approval, namely, Mullik Firoz Khan and Mukkhun Singh. They are both mentioned again at the close of this annual report.

Services of influential Natives.

76. The following influential natives deserve my special acknowledgments for the services they have rendered and the support their loyalty has afforded to the officers of Government during this eventful year:—

In Tehseel Rawul Pindee.—Chowdhree Sher Khan of Chukkhree; Jaffur Khan of Jhutta; Raja Hashum Ali Khan, a pensioner of the British Government; Raja Jullal of Jungul; Nund Sing and Mukkhun Singh, brothers, and Sirdar Nehal Sing, Chachee; Bhaee Mohur Sing of Doultala.

In Tehseel Kuhoota.—Zuburdust Khan of Nurrh; Jaffur Khan of Nuraee; Bakur Khan of Mator; Hafeezoolla Khan; Rae Futteh Deen; Mirza Hushmut Khan; Mirza Futteh Deen; Syda Khan.

In Tehseel Hussun Abdal.—Mullik Feroz Khan, already noticed; Futteh Khan of Dreg; Sumunder Khan of Sirwala; Hyat Khan and Buhadur Khan of Wah.

In Tehseel Pindee Gheb.—Ghoolam Moostupha Khan and his son Gholam Mahomed Khan; Futteh Khan Gheba, Mullik Aoleea Khan and Mullik Futteh Khan, brothers, of Pindee Gheb; Booddha Khan, Mullal; and Lal Khan of Thuttha.

77. There are many individuals who should have been mentioned in this report had space admitted of the detail. In general, the whole population of the district has displayed conspicuous loyalty, and I think that it would have a good effect and be an advisable measure were a selection made of the most deserving persons and their services suitably rewarded by the Government.

ENCLOSURE (2) TO 39.

41. *From Lieutenant* GEO. BATTYE, *Assistant Commissioner, Murree, to Captain J. E.* CRACROFT, *Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindee,—No. 5, dated Murree, 9th January 1858.*

IN reply to your letter No. 15, requesting me to furnish you with a connected account of the outbreak at Murree and the measures taken for suppressing it, I have the honor to forward you the following report. **Report on the outbreak in Murree.**

2. Some time in June—July last I became aware of an uneasy, restless feeling, consequent on the unsettled state of affairs in the plains, pervading the hills.

3. Some of the chief men among the Dhoond, Suttees and Khetwals, the tribes inhabiting the Murree Hills, were summoned to remain in attendance and give information of all that went on in their respective villages, receiving each a daily subsistence allowance of four annas for the time they were absent from their homes, in accordance with the plan adopted by Major Becher in Hazara. Soon after reports of "dua khyrs" (councils) held in two or three different villages reached me. I did not attach much importance to **Measures for suppressing outbreak in Murree.**

Measures for suppressing outbreak in Murree.

these or consider it advisable, under the circumstances in which we were then situated, to make any inquiry into them, contenting myself with merely informing the Commissioner of the fact. On one occasion, hearing that a lumberdar of the village of Beergraon, close to Murree, had gone to another village and endeavoured to persuade the inhabitants to commit themselves in some disloyal act, I with the sanction of the Commissioner sent him down to the Rawalpindee Jail.

4. Meanwhile in the station itself the most absurd, unfounded reports were daily flying about, needlessly alarming the ladies, of whom together with children there being a great number at Murree this year, a great deal more cause for apprehension appeared to me to exist from the occurrence of a groundless panic within than from any real danger without the sanitarium.

5. On the 1st September 1857 at 8 P. M. Hakim Khan of Lora, attached to Lady Lawrence's personal guard, told me of his having received information of an intended attack on the station that night, but who the assailants were to be or in what numbers he could not say. I immediately warned Captain Berry, Commanding the Depôt, and Lieutenant Bracken, Commanding Detachment, 2nd S. L. Infantry, cantoned at the Flats, and in concert with them planted a chain of sentries all round the station, posting pickets of greater strength at the points most likely to be attacked, such as the bazaar, the wood below Captain Robinson's house, and the road by the graveyard. All the arrangements for defence were completed by 11 o'clock.

6. About 1 A. M. a body of rebels, in number about 300, from the Dhoond villages of Mullote, Rewat, Bhuttieen, Dhar, Jawa, &c., &c., attempted to effect an entrance into the station by the wood just below Captain Robinson's house. Captain Robinson, with a guard of the 2nd Hill Regiment, was there ready to receive them, and the rebels, finding their plans were discovered and not anticipating any resistance, speedily gave up the attempt and decamped, leaving but one man behind shot, who turned out to be a Dhoond from

the village of Bhutteean in Hazara. A Corporal with a party of Europeans engaged in driving out some men who had got into some outhouses received a bullet wound, of which, I regret to say, a few days after he died.

Measures for suppressing outbreak in Murree.

7. At no other part of the station was any actual attack made, any such that may have been intended being given up as soon as it was discovered that preparations had been made to repel it.

8. The remainder of the night passed over quietly. When the day broke two parties of the rebels, numbering each about 100, were discovered on Topa and Kooldunna, two hills distant about two miles east and west of Murree.

9. Having as yet no clear idea of the nature and extent of the outbreak, and fearing that it was much more general than it afterwards proved to be, I did not consider it would be advisable to leave the station for the purpose of chastising them ; they consequently retained their positions unmolested the whole of that day (2nd).

10. The same afternoon the Pirs of Pulassee, the spiritual heads or high priests of the Dhoonds, for whom I had sent early in the morning, arrived, and by thus obeying the summons confirmed on the side of order those of their disciples who had not already committed themselves in the previous night's outrage.

11. On the following morning (3rd September), the rebels still retaining their positions on the Topa and Kooldunna hills, it was determined to move out and disperse them. With this view I directed the Pirs to proceed with their followers in the direction of Topa, and, after driving off the rebels collected on it (who had been engaged the previous night and day in plundering the baggage of the hill regiment abandoned by the guard, left in charge of it), to move on and burn Mullote, a village belonging to Baz Khan, the leader of the night attack on the station. This duty was satisfactorily performed by the Pirs.

Measures for suppressing outbreak in Murree.

12. At the same time we moved out with a small party of Europeans, Police, Goorkhas and Volunteers against the larger party collected on Kooldunna, who on our approach, firing a volley by which one Volunteer was wounded, fled. We went into Khunnetak, a jaghir of Baz Khan, which was destroyed.

13. That evening (3rd) the Commissioner arrived at Murree with a reinforcement of Sikhs, Police and Irregular levies, and at once took up the investigations into the causes of the rebellion.

14. Certain villages which had taken a leading part in the disturbances were marked out for punishment; the cattle and crops belonging to them confiscated, and lists made out of their inhabitants, who were classed into four divisions, according to their respective degrees of guilt; the ring-leaders sentenced to death, or to imprisonment for life, with forfeiture of property, the lesser offenders to short periods of five, three and one years.

15. In the course of the inquiry it appearing that certain Hindustani Mussulmen had been principal instigators of the attack on the station their cases were fully entered into, and, their guilt being clearly proved, four men, two of them native Doctors—intelligent, well-educated men—were hanged. There were strong reasons for suspecting that most if not all the kidmutgars in Murree were cognizant of and approved of the attack, but sufficient proof not bring forthcoming their guilt could not be brought home to them; three only, being tried, were convicted of complicity in a lesser degree and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

16. The bad feeling existing in these hills for the last six months although known to the Suttees and Khetwals was certainly not shared in by them to the same extent as by the Dhoonds, who, secretly backed up and excited by promises of assistance from Hussun Ali Khan, Chief of the Kurruls, a tribe in Hazara, have alone been the actors in the recent outrage.

17. A general rising in the hills and a simultaneous attack on the stations of Abbottabad and Murree appears to

have been the original intention. The plan, a good one, was through Providence marred by the failure of the precipitate attack on Murree.

18. The accompanying list shewing the villages and number of prisoners punished, the number of head of cattle confiscated, &c., will, together with the above statement, I hope, be found sufficiently clear to be of use to you in making up the annual report.

ENCLOSURE (3) TO 39.

42. *From J. W. MACNABB, Esquire, Offg. Deputy Commissioner, Jhelum, to E. THORNTON, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Jhelum Division,—No 113, dated Jhelum, the 1st February 1858.*

WITH reference to your Circular No. 18, dated 20th ultimo, forwarding Circular No. 5 from Judicial Commissioner, dated 16th January, I have, in the absence of any report from Major Browne, the honor to make the following, which, as I have no personal knowledge of the facts and little information being obtainable from the office records, must necessarily be meagre and incomplete. Report on events in Jhelum.

2. Immediately on the outbreak at Meerut measures were taken for scrutinizing and controlling the correspondence that passed through the post office. The police, horse and foot, were increased and ferries closed with the exception of Guttialan, Jhelum, Mung Russool, Jullalpore, Pind Dadan Khan and Ahmedabad, at each of which sufficient guards were posted and all parties crossing strictly searched. All boats other than ferry ones were collected on an island opposite Jhelum. Scrutiny of postal correspondence.

3. Means were also taken to ascertain the spirit of the men of the 14th Native Infantry, which, after the removal of the 39th Native Infantry, Major Knatchbull's Battery and the Irregular Cavalry, were the only troops left in the station. It was soon found that there were constant meetings in the lines and that the regiment were determined to resist any attempt to make them give up their arms. Spirit of Native troops.

Raising of levies.

4. Early in June orders were received to raise civil levies, and by the end of the month 100 men had been entertained and armed, and their drill carried on with all possible activity.

5. In the lower part of the Pind Dadan Khan tehseel some uneasy feeling seemed to exist, and one village it was said meant to refuse paying the demand, but some sowars being promptly sent to the spot the revenue was at once paid up.

6. On the 27th of June two companies of the 14th Native Infantry were ordered up to Rawulpindee on treasure escort and detained there. This arrangement reduced the number of sepoys in Jhelum to 500 men.

Mutiny of 14th Native Infantry.

7. On the 7th July on an attempt being made to disarm the 14th Native Infantry they broke out into open mutiny. As a full report of that occurrence was sent by Major Browne, late Deputy Commissioner, to the Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, I forward that report in original. Of the 500 mutineers about 40 are I believe at present at large. The rest, with the exception of 119 transported for life and 3 to short terms of imprisonment, have been destroyed.

Recruiting and drilling of levies.

8. August was occupied with recruiting and drilling the levies, No. 1 Company of which were on the outbreak at Murree ordered up to that station and subsequently transferred to the 12th Punjab Infantry. Great exertions were also made in recruiting for various Punjab Infantry and Cavalry corps. Care was taken that the Tehree district, which is the strong-hold of the Gukkurs and has always been troublesome, should be almost denuded of men.

Misconduct of Jemadar of Chakwal.

9. About this time the Jemadar of the Chuckowal tehsil, hearing that some disarmed sepoys were about to pass down that road, made a plan to attack the Tehseel, kill the Tehseeldar, and seize the treasure. Had he succeeded the consequences would have been most serious. He was imprisoned for 10 years and two others for shorter terms.

10. A few days before I took charge of the district 141 prisoners were made over to us by the Maharaja of Cashmere; of these 21 were found out to be Dhobees and other camp followers, the rest sepoys of the 14th Native Infantry. Major Browne tried and sentenced the Native Officer before he left; Captain Battye and myself tried the remainder. The sepoys were all sentenced to transportation for life in consequence of the Maharaja having promised them their lives, with the exception of a drummer-boy, who with the camp followers were flogged.

Disposal of mutineers of 14th Native Infantry apprehended in Kashmír.

11. Shortly after the fall of Dehli two mutineers were discovered in a village at the foot of Mount Tilla. As these men had been regularly supported by the villagers, three lumbardars and two zemindars were sentenced to seven years. This had a most beneficial effect, and those who had hitherto harboured any sepoys turned them out, and in a short time seven more were caught and hanged.

Punishment of zemindars near Tilla for harbouring mutineers.

12. On the 28th September news arrived *viâ* Shahpore of the outbreak of the 9th Cavalry. The whole regiment was reported to have gone, although it afterwards turned out that only 32 had mutinied. I started off 40 of the levies under a smart Native Officer to Pind Dadan Khan by boat. 40 Police followed next day. Mr. Hardinge had already barricaded the road through the Salt Range at Sydhan Shah. I remained at Jhelum as it was equally probable that the sowars might take the Doomman Road and make for this or try to cross over into Cashmere by the fords near Dhoohal. All the ferries were closed and the boats kept on the south side of the river. The mutineers, however, only passed through the extreme corner of the district, made for Khooshab, and then down the Doab. One of the number who lost his way was seized by a lumbardar of the Noorpore Ilaka, sent into Jhelum and hanged. I should not omit to mention that immediately on the news of the outbreak reaching him Gholam Hussain, Tehseeldar of Tullagang, collected a number of lumbardars and with his tehseel and extra police sowars attempted to intercept the mutineers, but had unfortunately received the information too late to effect anything.

Measures taken to intercept a party of the 9th Cavalry, who mutinied in the Salt Range.

Services rendered by chaudhris of Chakwal.

13. The revenue of the Tehseels of Chuckowal and Tullagung, amounting to Company's Rs. 2,07,508-14-10, has in three instalments been escorted to Rawul Pindi by the Choudrial of Chuckowal. This body of men having been deprived by us of their position and various hereditary rights for misconduct in the last Sikh War took this opportunity of trying to regain the favor of the Government. They have in reward for this service received khillnts amounting to Company's Rs. 446.

Number of mutineers punished.

14. Statement A[1] shows the number of mutineers punished by the military authorities, exclusive of those killed in action, to be 108, those punished by the civil court to have been 237; total 345, also 786 Hindoostanies were expelled from the district and sent to their homes. This does not include the large numbers who were passed down from Peshawur and Rawul Pindee, who were all examined and their passes and chullans checked and attested.

Extra expenditure incurred.

15. Statement B[1] shows that a force of about 200 levies, 50 sowars and 150 extra police have been kept up at a cost of Rs. 18,416-5-1. Besides this, Company's Rs. 3,342-0-0 have been advanced for recruiting purposes, and 356 footmen and 134 horsemen entertained and sent to the various newly-raised corps and others. Company's Rs. 2,198 have been expended for keeping up carriage, also 379 on extra dak arrangements, Rs. 1,540 on manufacturing arms, and Rs. 1,851-11-8 compensation for detention of boats.

ENCLOSURE (4) TO 39.

43. *Report of the measures adopted for the public safety in the Goojrat district during the period subsequent to 10th May 1857, by Captain* MACKENZIE, *Officiating Deputy Commissioner.*

Narrative of events in the Gujrát District.

1. On the 13th May the outbreak at Meerut was known in Goojrat. The immediate danger then was from the company of the 35th Native Infantry on duty at the treasury.

[1] Not printed.

The principle of action was to be vigilant, at the same time avoiding all appearance of distrust.

2. The Nazir of the Foujdaree Court (a Brahmin), who was in the habit of frequenting his store rooms in the Treasury building, and who was believed to be trustworthy, was taken into confidence. He was told to take an early opportunity of watching the sepoys of the guard and to report the result. The Post Office was also put under espionage.

Receipt of news of Mutiny.

Measures for watching Native troops.

3. On the 14th the Nazir reported that he had been conversing with one or two of the sepoys, and that they did not scruple to avow a mutinous and rebellious spirit; that he had often heard expressions of individual discontent with particular officers; but that it was something quite new to hear natives openly talk of their intention of "killing the Sahibs" and setting up for themselves. The sepoys also said they were only waiting for the signal from some large station to carry out their intentions, and they were surprised it was so long of appearing. The cartridges were the assigned reason for these altered feelings.

4. Besides these regular sepoys there were stationed at Goojrat a company and a resallah of the 5th Police Battalion. They were also watched, but nothing was found out to lead to apprehension from them.

5. The policy of watching while appearing to trust was still maintained. Our anxiety, as may be supposed, was considerable. Daily similar reports of the mutinous state of the sepoys were received. The Tehseeldar was taken into confidence, and the police at the Sudder were quietly strengthened. Means were taken to receive expresses from the head-quarters of the regiment at Sealkote and from Jhelum. The moment anything occurred at either station it was arranged that an attempt should be made to surprise the men here, to seize their arms and make them prisoners. Meanwhile, outwardly all went on as usual until the 17th.

6. On the evening of that day the Sub-Assistant Surgeon hurried down to my house and informed me that he

Alarm on evening of 17th May.

had just overheard very suspicious conversation between three sepoys of the Treasury guard and one of their comrades, who was sick at the city dispensary, and that he felt sure some mischief was intended that night. Similar information was given almost simultaneously by the Head Clerk, who lived at the city. It was too late to do anything except to prepare for defence. The Police Battalion were placed under arms, pickets quietly posted, and the European community collected at my house. The night passed quietly, the only occurrence worthy of notice being the suspicious conduct of the jemadar of the resallah, which cost him his commission.

Despatch of guard of 35th Native Infantry to Siálkot and substitution of police.

7. It was, however, felt that the proper course was to get rid of the regular sepoy guard without delay. The morning was therefore spent in procuring carriage for them. In the afternoon the subahdar was called up and told that for good and sufficient reasons it was absolutely necessary that he and his company should march for Sealkote that day. 10 minutes later the Police Battalion Infantry were marched in and relieved guard and by evening the station was quit of the mutineers. They whiled away the night march by abusing each other for not having resisted the ejection, and the next evening they passed the city of Wuzeerabad indulging in riotous abuse of their Honorable Masters.

Measures taken for ensuring the safety of the station.

8. After this our principal fear was from a mutiny at Jhelum which would have resulted in a visit *en passant* from the mutineers. The district was quiet and apparently every likelihood of its remaining so. To guard against every contingency the central fortified part of the town was repaired, a parapet wall run up along the exterior walls and buildings, the gates loopholed, and platforms for musketry erected. Within this is the tehseel, to which the office records and treasure were removed. Upwards of 300 extra Policemen and 100 horsemen were raised. Strong guards were placed on the public roads and ferries, entrenchments being thrown up on the river bank opposite the latter. A strict system of passports and search was introduced; the highways were all patrolled; all travellers interrogated and vagrants

apprehended; the Thanadars made daily tours in their several beats; all language and demeanour, except the most loyal, were by repeated proclamations pronounced treasonable; and, in short, every step taken towards, as far as possible, making every man feel that his words and actions were watched and the strong hand of authority in the ascendant. District duties usually taken by the regular and Police Battalion sepoys were made over to the police, and the disposable military force besides a strong party of the newly-raised men (horse and foot) held available and in constant readiness for any emergency. 400 camels and a number of mules and ponies were entertained, and supplies of all kinds laid in to facilitate the march of troops passing from the west towards Dehli.

Success of the measures adopted.

9. As the vigorous policy adopted generally in the Punjaub during the late terrible times has been blessed by almost unbroken tranquillity and public safety, so I may perhaps be allowed to say that the measures taken in this integral part of the province were from their stringency entirely successful. Accustomed, from constant changes in the Ruling Power, to revolution, and although doubtless appreciating the great benefits of our wise and moderate Government, yet unable to resist an opportunity (should it offer) for indulging the Punjabee instinctive love of plunder, the inhabitants never ventured to do more than ask each other in the lowest whispers who was to succeed us, what was coming next, and only this with the knowledge and fear that if overheard speedy punishment would follow. Throughout, then, the district has remained absolutely tranquil. It has not been necessary to make an example of a single disloyal subject.

Mutiny of 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum.

10. From external danger it has been equally fortunate. On the 7th July the sound of cannon announced that something had gone wrong at Jhelum. The 14th Native Infantry had resisted being disarmed, but the bridge-of-boats had been previously broken up and only a few fugitives reached the left bank of the river. They took refuge in an island overgrown with high brushwood, but they were attacked by Captain Eliott, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, with a party of the

Police Battalion and were either captured or driven into the river. Captain Eliott's party behaved extremely well and had 6 men wounded, 2 of whom subsequently died.* Upon the 9th the Sealkote troops mutinied, but none crossed the Chenab.

* Captain Eliott was accompanied by Mr. Teasdale, Clerk in the Zillah Office, and bore testimony to his cool courage and the beneficial example he set to the new levies which were placed under his command. Mr. Teasdale showed himself a good soldier on one or two subsequent occasions.

Tranquillity of the Gujrát District.

11. Freed from apprehension from without and vigilant precautions unrelaxed within, tranquillity was, by the blessing of God, maintained; Dehli fell; lightheaded waverers were steadied; our anxiety diminished, and all danger may now happily be considered at an end.

[NOTE.—A further report on events in the Gujrat district will be found in **32** at pages 282-85.]

ENCLOSURE (5) TO 39.

44. *From* GORE OUSELEY, *Esquire, Deputy Commissioner, Shahpur, to* E. THORNTON, *Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Jhelum Division,—dated Shahpur, 25th January 1858.*

Narrative of events in the Shahpur District.

1. In compliance with the Judicial Commissioner's Circular No. 5, dated January 16th, 1858, I beg to relate for your information the manner in which the Mutiny affected this district and the measures which were adopted to meet the effects to which it gave birth.

2. I must, however, premise that I have already dwelt on this subject in my Annual Criminal Report for the year 1857 in a general and superficial way. That report had to pass through the English office, and I therefore considered it better to suppress the mention of many matters full of interest and importance at the time of their occurrence, and without a knowledge of which many of the causes of our most serious anxieties and the nature of the measures adopted to meet them cannot be properly estimated.

3. But I thought it more prudent to accept this disadvantage than to expose to the danger of a too widely-

extended publicity our secret fears, the points at which we were really weak, and the nature of the means which we could command for the preservation of order.

4. As this letter will go to you in original, the cause for reserve above alluded to no longer exists.

5. On the evening of the 14th of May intelligence reached me from Mr. Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner, direct of the mutiny at Meerut and the massacre at Dehli. Receipt of intelligence of the Mutiny.

6. I at once assembled the Collector of Salt Revenue, Mr. H. Wright; the Assistant Commissioners, Mr. D. Macnabb, C. S., and Lieutenant Forster, 39th Native Infantry; the officer on detached duty at this place, Lieutenant Russell, 46th Native Infantry; and we agreed after due deliberation that, as we had only some 64 foot police soldiers (24 of whom were on guard at the jail) and about 60 Police sowars, it would be best to treat the detachment of the 46th Native Infantry, consisting of a full company on guard over the treasury, with an outward show of confidence, but at the same time to watch them narrowly, and, should it appear that they were likely to break out, to take the initiative and to endeavour to disarm them by surprise. Decision to watch the guard of the 46th Native Infantry.

7. At the same time Mr. Wright offered to supply one hundred Punjabee and Pathan chupprassies from his customs line. These men arrived in the course of a few days and remained till the commencement of October. They were armed only with swords, but their presence was of great advantage and amongst other things obviated the necessity for my raising a large number of extra police. Employment of Punjabi and Pathan chaprassis of the Customs Department.

8. On the morning of the 15th of May I sent for the native in charge of the post office, who was fortunately a resident of the Punjab, and told him to bring to me for the future all letters which he might receive for the sepoys of the 46th Native Infantry. These were daily examined by me until the detachment left this. Such as contained nothing dangerous were passed on to the addressees; those which could not be deciphered or which contained objectionable matter were retained by me. Scrutiny of postal correspondence of the 46th Native Infantry.

9. One of these letters, received about the 20th of May, was written by a soldier in the 46th Native Infantry at Sealkote to a comrade at this place. It said that every regiment had mutinied; that the Europeans were banded together in order of battle; that there was a great disturbance throughout India; and that the writer prayed that "Ram" would not stop this state of things. As for himself, the writer went on to remark it would be as well if he were to be allowed leave of absence, for that he did not intend to attend muster after the 1st of next month.

10. This letter I made over to Lieutenant Russell for transmission to his Commanding Officer.

Receipt of orders and suggestions from head-quarters.

11. Day by day we continued to receive information from the Judicial Commissioner of the progress of events, and each day's post generally brought either from him or from yourself orders and suggestions which we lost no time in putting in force.

Protection of ferries.

12. The minor ferries were all closed, and all the boats on the river were concentrated at the chief ferries. These were guarded by experienced Policemen from the thannahs, whilst the new men who were drafted into their places in the thannahs were at once put to learn their drill. The sepoys of the Police Battalion who were at the tehseels were called in and concentrated at the sudr station, whilst new men were entertained in their places at the tehseels. Strict orders were given to arrest all Hindoostani sepoys and fukeers or any other suspicious characters who were unable to account for themselves. Patrolling parties visited the country to the distance of 10 and 15 miles from the station nightly. In concert with the Deputy Commissioner of Rawul Pindee, a new postal communication was organized between that station and this, a distance of some 130 miles; and at the same time that all these precautionary measures were adopted everything was done to keep up the confidence of the people in the stability of our position, and the current business of the courts and of the district went on precisely as usual.

Concentration of Police at Sadr.

Arrest of suspicious characters.

Measures for retaining the confidence of the people.

13. Soon, however, we began to see that a feeling of uneasiness had extended itself to the people.

14. About the middle of May the 39th had marched from Jhelum by the left bank of the river for Dera Ismail Khan, and when it was known that they had entered this district the shopkeepers and petty traders and others who had property to lose began to bury their valuables; strange rumours began to circulate in the bazaar; sometimes it was said that the soldiers of the 39th were marching without their officers and sometimes it was said that they had murdered all their officers. Colonel Macdonald wrote to me hoping that I had not much treasure in store and expressing a disinclination to march through the station whilst the company of the 46th were here. Signs of uneasiness.

15. Lieutenant Forster, Assistant Commissioner, had for some days past been engaged in having all our surplus treasure packed for despatch, and a notion had got abroad, which we took care not to contradict, that this treasure was to be made over to the 39th for escort to Dera Ismail Khan.

16. But on the evening of the 22nd of May, whilst the 39th were still some 30 miles from the station, Mr. Macnabb and myself, accompanied by Lieutenant Russell of the 46th Native Infantry (an officer in whom great good sense was united with other qualities fitting him for command) went to the Treasury accompanied by as large an escort as we could form out of the horse and foot Police at the station, and having caused all our surplus treasure, amounting to Rs. 2,50,000, to be laden on camels we started it off at once under their charge, some for Dera Ismail Khan and some for Jhelum. Despatch of treasure to Dera Ismail Khan and Jhelum.

17. Lieutenant Russell then ordered his men to give over charge of the Treasury fort to some of the Police Battalion, and they at once obeyed. Substitution of Police for the guard of sepoys over the Treasury fort.

18. At that time the men of the 46th, knowing that their comrades had not committed themselves at Sealkote, still professed to be loyal; but even had they been otherwise disposed the treasure was removed from under their charge so suddenly that they had no time to consult about not giving it up. As a measure of precaution the muskets of half of the

Police Battalion had been loaded before they were marched to the Treasury, and they had received private orders to use their fire-arms should the guard of the 46th have shown the slightest inclination to be disobedient to their officer.

Preparation of Treasury enclosure for purposes of defence.

19. During the next two days supplies of wood, grain and water were quietly conveyed into the treasury, and subsequently (I may here state) a small well for drinking purposes was sunk inside the treasury enclosure.

Removal of detachment of 46th Native Infantry to Siálkot.

20. On the morning of the 26th of May Lieutenant Russell at my request marched out with his detachment *en route* to rejoin the head-quarters of his corps at Sealkote, and the same day the 39th Native Infantry passed through this station and encamped opposite to Khooshab: the day after they crossed the river and proceeded on their march.

Deputation of Mr. D. Macnabb to bring back the treasure despatched to Jhelum.

21. It was at this time that, owing to orders which I had received not to transmit any treasure to Jhelum, I was obliged to ask Mr. Macnabb, Assistant Commissioner, to bring back to the station nearly a lac of rupees which had at first been sent in that direction, and which owing to its sudden change of route had been left with a very small escort. The undertaking required both tact and management for its execution, and its difficulties were much enhanced by the season. Mr. Macnabb had to remain for two days without proper food and without any shelter and to ride 70 miles during that time when the weather is about at its hottest temperature.

22. The 39th having passed through and the 46th having left us, we were comparatively speaking at ease, but still the events of the past fortnight had not been without their effects on this part of the Punjab.

Excitement in the "Bár" jungle.

23. There is you are aware a large area of Bar jungle in this district. Its population, though numerically sparse when compared to the number of square miles over which it is scattered, still can muster a good number of men. Compared with the rest of the inhabitants of this zillah (save the men of the Salt Range of hills) these Bar villagers are strong,

bold and lawless. They enjoy the advantage of that sort of moral force which belongs to the body who have always been accustomed to rob and oppress their more peaceable neighbours, and in addition to this, although they call themselves by different patronymical appellations, they may be looked on for all intents and purposes as one family, and they possess an aptitude for combination unknown to any other tribe in this district.

24. Scarcely had the 39th passed through when I was told that some days previous to their arrival 15 men from the largest Bar villages had met together in Kote Momun and Mateela and had bound themselves by an oath to raise the whole Bar if a mutiny of the sepoys should take place in the district. This information did not assume a sufficiently tangible shape to enable me to take notice of the suspected parties, but it warned us of the nature of a great impending danger.

Measures taken for watching "Bár" villages.

25. With a view to keeping the "Bar" villages under due surveillance, I posted a Jemadar and nine of Captain Miller's sowars at the village of Kote Momun, and only withdrew them the other day, as I considered their presence no longer absolutely necessary.

26. The rest of the district was favorable to us, that is to say, that as long as they saw that we were likely to maintain our supremacy they were willing to help us. Had the district through any occurrence become disorganized, then it would have been too much to have expected them to have stood by us.

Levies raised by Maliks of Mitha Tiwána.

27. The only individuals of any rank and who hold jageer lands to any extent in this district are the Mullicks of Mitta Towanna.

28. A few days before the 39th Native Infantry passed through I asked these men and Sahib Khan, Towanna, of Mega to raise me 100 sowars, which they did in a couple of days.

29. About the same time Colonel Edwardes, C. B., and the late General Nicholson wrote to these Mullicks, who had

served under them in 1848-49, and directed them to raise 400 sowars between them. Subsequently each principal member of the Towanna family requested the Chief Commissioner to allow them to raise some sowars for the service of Government, and eventually they marched from this in the month of June for Lahore and Jhelum, taking with them altogether about 1,000 horsemen.

30. I confess that I was very glad to see this exodus, for though the Towannas are not to be compared numerically to the Gonduls of the Bar, yet from being the only Jageerdars in the district they possess great local influence. They are trained to arms, and the Ressalla at this place is almost entirely composed of them. The Ressaldar and Jemadar are both Towannas; and had the heads of the family remained at home and been disposed to be troublesome, I should literally not have had anything but some 60 of the foot Police to oppose to them.

31. I hope that this consideration will be borne in mind in filling up the vacancies which may occur in this Ressalla and that the Sikhs who may be enlisted will be drafted from some other part of the Punjab, for Sikh nominees of the Towannas, or Sikhs whose families live in the Towanna villages, would be valueless.

Causes of the tranquillity of the Shahpur District.

32. The operation of the disarming Act, the benefits of a light assessment, the blessing of good harvests, the great security now afforded to life and property, the cheap and speedy manner in which justice is administered,—have doubtless all had their influence in making the people of the Punjab content with and well-disposed towards their present rulers, but I have no hesitation in saying that the tranquil state of this district during the past year was owing, under Divine Providence, chiefly to the policy which drew to the other parts of the Empire the hardiest, most courageous and most influential men of this zillah. Many of the sowars who accompanied the Towanna Mullicks were heads of villages or were related to the headmen, and the presence of such a number of these among our armies afforded an excellent

guarantee for the good behaviour of those who remained at home.

33. With the departure of these men, which took place early in June, we felt that our chief causes for anxiety were removed. We had got rid of the presence alike of mutinous sepoys and of a very large and powerful body of men whom the events of the day might have converted into ambitious intriguers. As far as we could look forward it seemed to us that for the future we should be obliged to remain passive spectators of the struggle which was convulsing Hindoostan. In days so prolific of marvellous events we felt that there was nothing too strange for the morrow to produce, but our sensations were like those which might be experienced by a person who should find himself confined to a spot from which he could not stir, and between whom and a raging ocean, the violence of which seemed to be hourly increasing, there intervened only a wall the strength of which he could not accurately estimate and towards strengthening which he could do nothing.

34. But though relieved from our most serious causes for disquietude, we ran no risk of forgetting even for a moment the precarious nature of our comparative tranquillity.

Misconduct of a zamindar of a "Bár" village.

35. Early in June a zemindar of a large "Bar" village was brought into court for having demanded from a burkundaz in the execution of his duty money for passing him safely through his village lands and for having said to the burkundaz that all the Europeans had been killed at Mooltan and that there were no Englishmen left alive east of Lahore. I sent this man off thannah by thannah to Umritsur to convince him of his error. He returned quite an altered character.

Measures adopted on the mutiny of the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum.

36. In the commencement of July the 14th Native Infantry mutinied at Jhelum, and on hearing of this I went, with as many sowars as I could get together, to try and capture any fugitives who might come towards Pind Dadun Khan and Meani.

Precautions taken against a party of the 39th Native Infantry.

37. On the 20th of the same month, having received a report that 40 of the 39th were coming towards Mitta Towanna, Mr. Macnabb and I went to meet them with some sowars, but the alarm turned out to be a false one.

Seditious conduct of a Muharrir of the Salt Department.

38. In August a Hindoostani Mahommedan Mohurrir of the Salt Department at the Khutta Chokee was sent in by Mr. Griffiths, Patrol, Salt Department, charged with having tried to influence the religious feelings of both Mahommedans and Hindoos against us. He was found guilty and with your sanction was sentenced to imprisonment for seven years.

Operations against a party of mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry.

39. In September the 9th Irregular Cavalry passed through part of this district on their way from Dehli to Bunnoo. Mr. D. Macnabb accompanied them from Saiwal to the last march in our district and then went to the banks of the Chenab to look after that portion of the zillah. On the 21st of September a portion of the 9th Irregular Cavalry mutinied near Meanwali, and some 20 of them appeared a couple of days after on the plain on the right bank of the Jhelum at a spot nearly opposite to this station. The revenue and Thannah Police under Tehseeldar Jumiat Raie Dutt and Thannahdar Allah Jowaia Khan, most materially aided by Mr. Griffiths, Patrol, Salt Department, and his establishment, allowed them no rest, and so hurried was their flight that Mr. Wright, Collector of Customs, with 40 of his chupprassies and I with some 30 sowars were unable to come up with them within the limits of this district Many of their horses were brought in in a state of great exhaustion by the Police and the zemindars. Mr. Wright and I returned to the station, but I sent on 30 of Captain Miller's sowars,* who came up with the fugitives some 60 miles from this in the Jhung district and assisted Captain Hockin's Detachment in destroying them.

[1] [* I was the more easily enabled to do this owing to Mr. Hardinge, Assistant Commissioner at Pind Dadun Khan, having of his own accord, on hearing that the mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry were in the neighbourhood of

[1] Addition made as requested by Mr. Ouseley's letter of the 24th February 1858.

this station, sent me a reinforcement of 80 sowars. Four of these belonged to Captain Miller's Police Ressala and the rest were newly-raised men. These sowars arrived here on the 27th of September and remained here for ten days, when they returned to Pind Dadun Khan.]

Help afforded in connection with the Gugera insurrection.

40. About this time the Bar tribes in the contiguous district of Jhung and the more remote one of Gogaira rose up in insurrection. This news naturally increased the anxiety of all here on account of our own Bar people, but still I thought it my duty to comply with the urgent request of Captain Hawes, the Deputy Commissioner of Jhung, for reinforcements, and so sent him 40 sowars, 20 being of Captain Miller's Ressalla and 20 newly-raised levies. These horsemen remained in the Jhung district for about three months, and Captain Hawes was satisfied with the service which they rendered.

Cost of extra Police and Military levies.

41. After the month of September no events occurred worthy of mention. It remains for me therefore but to state the amount of cost which was incurred on account of the extra Police and Military levies raised for the preservation of order.

42. The number of new sowars raised amounted to 109. Their monthly cost was Rs. 1,730 and the total cost incurred on their account from May to the end of December was Rs. 10,281-10-6.

43. For the defence of the Tehseel Treasuries, from which I had withdrawn the Police Battalion men, and for the guarding of those ferries which were kept open on the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers, I entertained 100 new Burkundazes at Rs. 4 each per mensem. The total sum received by these men and their officers up to the end of December last amounted to Rs. 2,317.

44. When it is recollected that we had to watch some 40 miles of the Chenab and some 70 miles of the Jhelum Rivers, and that whilst some of our villages touch the Indus others again are on the Chenab, and that our

population is composed of races of men by no means deficient in boldness and independence of character, and seeing that we had lost the services of a company of Infantry of the line, I trust that the above expenditure will not appear either immoderate or uncalled for.

ENCLOSURE (6) TO 39.

45. *From E. THORNTON, Esquire, Commissioner and Superintendent, Jhelum Division, to R. MONTGOMERY, Esquire, Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab,—No. 82, dated Camp Goojrat, 8th March 1858.*

Narrative of events in the Jhelum District by Major C. Browne, late Deputy Commissioner.

IN continuation of my letter No. 80 of the 6th instant, containing my report on the state of my Division during the Mutiny of the Bengal Army, I have the honor to submit a memo., without date, to-day received from Major Browne, Commissioner of Leia, being his report for the Jhelum District, of which he was, as you are aware, Deputy Commissioner from the first outbreak in May until his removal to his present appointment in September.

Memo. of events at Jhelum by Major C. BROWNE, late Deputy Commissioner.

News of Mutiny.

1. The first intelligence of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhie was conveyed to me through Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary, by an express which reached Jhelum at daybreak of the 13th May 1857.

Precautionary measures adopted.

2. I immediately communicated with Colonel Macdonald, Commanding the Station, and arranged with him such precautionary measures as were within our means.

3. The force at that time at the station consisted of—

Major Knatchbull's Native Field Battery.

The 14th Regiment, Native Infantry.

The 39th Regiment, Native Infantry.

4. In the event of all these troops turning against us it was evidently impossible to resist them, there being no building at the place capable of withstanding the fire of Artillery.

5. If, however, the Artillery remained staunch it was possible to hold out in the newly-built magazine, which has a well, and in the hope they might prove so we fixed on that building, situated midway between the Civil and Military lines, as the place of general rendezvous.

6. Under any circumstances it was clear to me that we could not too soon send away the ladies and children to Rawul Pindee, and I strongly urged this to be done in a quiet way and before the intelligence from below reached the sepoys. This advice was not followed; it then only remained to arrange for their instant removal in the event of an outbreak, and it was determined they should start off on the first alarm in carriages whilst their retreat was covered in the best way we could.

Proposed despatch of ladies and children to Ráwalpindi.

7. In the meanwhile it was resolved to keep the intelligence perfectly secret except to the European officers who were bound not to divulge it even to their wives.

8. On taking the opinions of the several Commanding Officers respecting their men, I found Major Knatchbull confident of the loyalty of the Artillery.

Measures for guaging the feelings of the Native troops.

9. Colonel Macdonald did not think that his sepoys would injure their officers, but felt no certainty of their remaining faithful.

10. Colonel Gerrard felt assured of the loyalty of the 14th Regiment, Native Infantry. I then urged that all Native letters should be intercepted and opened, but both Commanding Officers objected to this measure, and it was not carried out until the order for it was received from Rawul Pindee.

11. My next step was to post two police sowars, under plea of bringing letters and accompanying dak travellers, in the post office compound immediately in front of Colonel Macdonald's house. The object of this was to ensure that officer having the means of communicating with me speedily

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on the first symptoms of disaffection and give me time to move down with my police cavalry, as arranged between us, to the Artillery parade ground, to which all officers had been directed to repair.

12. After these preliminary precautions we then watched with intense anxiety the course of events and looked for the measures the Local Government would take to meet the emergency. We had not long to wait for a proof of the full appreciation of the crisis on the part of the Chief Commissioner and of the forethought and decision which has characterized his measures throughout this great calamity.

Opening of a telegraph office at Jhelum.

13. An officer was sent by express to set up a telegraph office at Jhelum; and an order was received for the immediate march of the 39th Regiment, Native Infantry, without their magazine or baggage, towards Shahpoor, where orders would await them.

Removal of 39th Native Infantry from Jhelum.

14. The Delhie intelligence, which had been strictly withheld, was yet unknown to the natives, and the importance of getting this regiment away before it was divulged was obvious to all. No effort was therefore spared to get them off as quickly as possible, and the relief which was experienced on seeing them across the Jhelum may be conceived. I may here explain that I sent them by the left bank of the river purposely to cut off communication with the troops left in cantonments and to put them off the dak road.

Importance of this move.

15. The importance of this move will be understood when I mention that I have since had reason to believe that the whole force at Jhelum were prepared for the Mutiny, and only waited a signal from below. Had this reached them they would probably have marched away, and the effect of such a movement at that time on the troops at Sialkote, Lahore and Jullunder cannot but have proved most ruinous.

Prevention of communication between the 39th Native Infantry and 46th at Shahpur.

16. The progress of this regiment was, however, yet a source of deep anxiety to all; for on ahead there was a mutinously-disposed detachment of the 46th Regiment, Native Infantry, in charge of the treasury at Shahpoor, and it was to be feared that the 39th Regiment if allowed to

communicate with these men would join and walk off with the treasure at that station, or at all events would refuse to recross the Jhelum when made aware they were destined for Derah Ishmail Khan.

17. However, the Deputy Commissioner at Shahpoor had made some judicious arrangements to prevent the men of the two regiments from meeting and also to secure his treasure, and the 39th Regiment proceeded on their march without the exhibition of any ill-feeling.

18. I sent sowars with Colonel Macdonald and made other arrangements for receiving early information in the event of any outbreak, but, as already observed, all passed off well.

Removal of Native Battery from Jhelum.

19. The march of the 39th Regiment was immediately followed by the arrival of a Movable Column composed chiefly of European troops. Their short stay had a good effect, and they took away with them Major Knatchbull's Native Battery, which greatly improved our position. This Battery was disarmed on arrival of the column at Lahore.

Number of Native troops left in Jhelum.

20. The station was thus left with only the 14th Regiment, Native Infantry, and a ressallah of the 16th Irregulars; the latter was also taken away at my request and replaced by a troop of the 17th Irregulars.

Measures for ascertaining events in cantonments.

21. From the first I had taken measures for ascertaining all that passed in cantonments, and after a short time I succeeded in establishing a system by which I received the most correct intelligence of the feeling amongst the sepoys.

Attitude of the 14th Native Infantry.

22. For a time the men of the 14th Regiment, Native Infantry, with a few exceptions, remained to all appearance loyal, then gradually the disaffected party became stronger and beyond the control of the few who were unwilling to break out.

23. Meetings were of nightly occurrence in the lines, at which sometimes one and then the other party would prevail. The turbulent party, ready to seize any pretext for mutiny, at one time nearly brought on the crisis because there was some delay in the issue of pay, but, being made acquainted

with what was going on, I checked this movement by informing Colonel Gerrard and inducing him to take the pay in anticipation of the delayed pay abstracts.

24. Other symptoms of the ebullition that was going on were duly communicated to me and reported to the Chief Commissioner.

I likewise informed Colonel Gerrard, but he and his officers, with one exception, were averse to receive warning and remained infatuated until fired on by their men on the day of the mutiny.

Determination of Sir J. Lawrence to disarm the Native troops in Jhelum.

25. My representations to the Chief Commissioner were met by Colonel Gerrard's repeated assurances of the fidelity of his regiment, but Sir John Lawrence was never for a moment deceived. He first suggested that the regiment should be weakened by sending away two companies to Rawul Pindee under pretence of a treasure party, and after their arrival took care to keep this detachment at Rawul Pindee. Lastly, when matters became worse, he determined to disarm the regiment, and for this purpose despatched a force from Rawul Pindee, consisting of 3 guns, 250 of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment and a considerable number of Irregular Mooltanee Horse and foot: these were to be assisted by such Police force as I had at my command.*

*60 sowars; 150 Punjab Infantry.

Arrival of reinforcements.

26. The Rawul Pindee column marched as if to proceed to Lahore, and arrived at Jhelum on the 7th July.

By desire of the Chief Commissioner I met the Officer Commanding the Force one march from Jhelum and there arranged with him the manner in which the order for disarming the regiment was to be carried out.

Mutiny of Native troops.

27. It appears, however, that the purpose for which the force had come was no secret, and had been made known by emissaries to the regiment. The consequence was the 14th prepared for resistance during the night of the 6th and broke out the next morning immediately they saw the head of the column advancing on their parade.

28. I shall not here repeat what I have already reported of the proceedings of that day. It is enough to say that I accompanied the force and was in the field throughout the day and had my horse wounded.

Services of Major Browne and Lieutenant Battye.

Lieutenant Battye, Assistant Commissioner, took command of the men of the Police Battalion and behaved most gallantly.

29. During the night of the 7th the remnant of the 14th Regiment, amounting to about 250 men, effected their escape from the village where they made their last stand. The chief portion went away in one body led by some man well acquainted with the country to a ferry named Mongrote, where they found three boats belonging to people of the Jummoo territory, and in these crossed the river into the Maharaja's territory.

Escape of remnant of Regiment, and pursuit.

The Mooltanee Horse sent in pursuit of this party under Lieutenant Lind did not come up with them; but a Police force that I despatched under command of a Jamadar of the 1st Sikh Regiment, resident of that part and then on leave, managed to kill a few; the rest were still pursued into the Maharaja's territory and might have been destroyed, but Sir John Lawrence deemed it politic to recall our troops and leave the capture of the fugitives to the Maharaja.

Refuge of mutineers in Jummoo Territory.

Most of those who were unable to get away to the Jummoo territory were brought in by the Police or the country people, and all received the punishment due to their crime.

Trial and punishment of those arrested.

A court-martial sat for several days for the trial of these prisoners, and amongst other duties I had to be President. Our proceedings, which were summary to suit the occasion, were unhappily pronounced irregular by the Judge Advocate's Department; however the mutineers met their deserts, and that is some consolation.

30. I must now revert to the earlier stage of our difficulties. Orders were received for the enlistment of any number of extra horse and foot Police that might be deemed necessary for the peace and protection of the district.

Arrangements made at earlier stages of the Mutiny.

Extra Police.

Guarding of ferries.

Arrangements were at the same time made for securing the bridges, as also all the fords and ferries, for seizure of all Fukeers and vagrants, and for the supply of carriage for troops. I did not, however, entertain any large number of extra police in the first instance.

Raising of new levies.

In preference to putting arms in the hands of an undisciplined rabble, such as extra police usually are, it seemed better, in the peculiar circumstances of the Jhelum district, to enlist and retain at the sudder such men only as could be eventually drafted into the Punjaub Regiments, which I foresaw must be raised, and to this end I solicited the Chief Commissioner to allow me to raise a certain number of Infantry as also of Cavalry.

The former were sanctioned to the extent of 300 men, but not so the latter, which is to be regretted, as I could have turned out a very fine ressallah.

I readily obtained men for my levy, besides sending a considerable number to other Police Regiments and Levies which were then being raised. In short, the Jhelum head-quarters became a recruiting depôt.

My levy were quickly initiated into their drill and the use of their muskets. These men, added to an extra company of the Police Battalion sent on my requisition from Rawul Pindee, in a short time made us feel comparatively secure notwithstanding the presence of the 14th Regiment, Native Infantry.

The levy were armed with percussion muskets, promptly supplied by the Judicial Commissioner at a very critical moment, when I had been strangely disappointed by the Military authorities at Jhelum.

I also raised about 50 sowars, giving employment to many men of good but impoverished families who had their properties confiscated for fighting against us in the last Sikh War. Indeed I may say my personal guard consisted

of a knot of men once noted for disaffection, who had begged for an opportunity to redeem their characters, and it being politic to keep them out of mischief I consented, and they all well repaid my confidence by doing good service.

31. I have already mentioned that I took measures to secure correct information from the lines of the 14th Regiment, but I should have added that I entered into communication with the Sikhs, of whom there were about 100 in the regiment. These youths on seeing what was likely to come about were very desirous to be separated from the mutineers, and I promised this should be done at the right moment. Eventually they were separated from the body of the regiment just before it mutinied, and they immediately took arms and fought eagerly against their late comrades under Lieutenant Macdonnel, a very fine young officer of the regiment.

Separation of Sikhs of 14th Native Infantry from the rest of the regiment, and their loyalty.

32. Our alarms at Jhelum were not confined to the troops at the station ; for at one time a considerable body of the Jummoo troops approached our border and caused some uneasiness, but they were afterwards withdrawn.

Anxiety due to approach of Jammu troops to our border.

33. The Police of the district were during the whole of this period well on the alert and exerted themselves very satisfactorily.

Good conduct of Police.

A large number of the mutineers after their dispersion were brought in by them, and one party, headed by the Thanadar of Jellalpoor, to whom I had sent an express, intercepted and very bravely attacked a party of seven sepoys who attempted to escape down the Jhelum in a row-boat All these were killed or wounded and brought in to me. Of the Police the Thanadar and four or five of his party were wounded, one or two severely so.

34. The Pindadun Khan portion of the district was under charge of Mr. Hardinge, C. S. He raised a few horse and foot under my directions and in all respects showed himself to be an intelligent good officer.

Commendation of Mr. Hardinge, C. S., at Pind Dádan Khan.

Support received from Deputy Commissioners of Siálkot and Gujrát.

35. At an early period of the Mutiny I had arranged a daily communication with the Deputy Commissioner of Goojerat and he in like manner with the Deputy Commissioner of Sealkot. Nothing could have been more cordial and satisfactory than the support I received from Captain Eliott and Lieutenant Mackenzie, who were both at Goojerat. The former officer joined me with a party of extra police on the day of the Mutiny, immediately the intelligence reached him, and prevented the sepoys escaping across the river into the Goojerat district.

Services of lambardars of Jhelum District.

36. In conclusion it is but just to the greater body of the respectable lumberdars of the Jhelum District to state that they all came forward with an offer of their services in any way which would be most conducive to the public interests, and some of them were very useful in escorting treasure from the tuhseels of Tullagung and Chuckwal to Rawul Pindee. Some likewise came forward of their own accord on learning the Government want of money and offered to pay their *kists* before the usual periods, and they did so.

Acknowledgment of services of Tahsildar of Talagang.

37. I must also make mention of the excellent service done by Shaikh Gholam Hussein, Tehseeldar and Superintendent of Settlement at Tullagung; he kept his tehseel, a notoriously turbulent one in former years, perfectly quiet without demanding any extra police beyond a few sowars.